diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/Kconfig.hardening | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/audit.c | 6 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/apparmor/include/audit.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 15 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c | 1 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/security.c | 76 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/audit.h | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 5 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 38 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/Kconfig | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/tomoyo/common.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 1 |
17 files changed, 134 insertions, 79 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig.hardening b/security/Kconfig.hardening index effbf5982be1..2cff851ebfd7 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig.hardening +++ b/security/Kconfig.hardening @@ -255,21 +255,6 @@ config INIT_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON touching "cold" memory areas. Most cases see 3-5% impact. Some synthetic workloads have measured as high as 8%. -config INIT_MLOCKED_ON_FREE_DEFAULT_ON - bool "Enable mlocked memory zeroing on free" - depends on !KMSAN - help - This config has the effect of setting "init_mlocked_on_free=1" - on the kernel command line. If it is enabled, all mlocked process - memory is zeroed when freed. This restriction to mlocked memory - improves performance over "init_on_free" but can still be used to - protect confidential data like key material from content exposures - to other processes, as well as live forensics and cold boot attacks. - Any non-mlocked memory is not cleared before it is reassigned. This - configuration can be overwritten by setting "init_mlocked_on_free=0" - on the command line. The "init_on_free" boot option takes - precedence over "init_mlocked_on_free". - config CC_HAS_ZERO_CALL_USED_REGS def_bool $(cc-option,-fzero-call-used-regs=used-gpr) # https://github.com/ClangBuiltLinux/linux/issues/1766 diff --git a/security/apparmor/audit.c b/security/apparmor/audit.c index 45beb1c5f747..6b5181c668b5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/audit.c +++ b/security/apparmor/audit.c @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp) { struct aa_audit_rule *rule; @@ -230,14 +230,14 @@ int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + rule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct aa_audit_rule), gfp); if (!rule) return -ENOMEM; /* Currently rules are treated as coming from the root ns */ rule->label = aa_label_parse(&root_ns->unconfined->label, rulestr, - GFP_KERNEL, true, false); + gfp, true, false); if (IS_ERR(rule->label)) { int err = PTR_ERR(rule->label); aa_audit_rule_free(rule); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index acbb03b9bd25..0c8cc86b417b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -200,7 +200,7 @@ static inline int complain_error(int error) } void aa_audit_rule_free(void *vrule); -int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule); +int aa_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, gfp_t gfp); int aa_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); int aa_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h index 3e568126cd48..c51e24d24d1e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima.h +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima.h @@ -546,7 +546,7 @@ static inline void ima_free_modsig(struct modsig *modsig) #else static inline int ima_filter_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, - void **lsmrule) + void **lsmrule, gfp_t gfp) { return -EINVAL; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index abdd22007ed8..e4a79a9b2d58 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -427,8 +427,6 @@ static void __init remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(struct dentry **lists) kfree(lists); } - - securityfs_measurement_list_count = 0; } static int __init create_securityfs_measurement_lists(void) @@ -625,6 +623,7 @@ out: securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(ascii_securityfs_measurement_lists); remove_securityfs_measurement_lists(binary_securityfs_measurement_lists); + securityfs_measurement_list_count = 0; securityfs_remove(ima_symlink); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index c0556907c2e6..09da8e639239 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -401,7 +401,8 @@ static void ima_free_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) kfree(entry); } -static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) +static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, + gfp_t gfp) { struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; int i; @@ -410,7 +411,7 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) * Immutable elements are copied over as pointers and data; only * lsm rules can change */ - nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), GFP_KERNEL); + nentry = kmemdup(entry, sizeof(*nentry), gfp); if (!nentry) return NULL; @@ -425,7 +426,8 @@ static struct ima_rule_entry *ima_lsm_copy_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) ima_filter_rule_init(nentry->lsm[i].type, Audit_equal, nentry->lsm[i].args_p, - &nentry->lsm[i].rule); + &nentry->lsm[i].rule, + gfp); if (!nentry->lsm[i].rule) pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", nentry->lsm[i].args_p); @@ -438,7 +440,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) int i; struct ima_rule_entry *nentry; - nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry); + nentry = ima_lsm_copy_rule(entry, GFP_KERNEL); if (!nentry) return -ENOMEM; @@ -664,7 +666,7 @@ retry: } if (rc == -ESTALE && !rule_reinitialized) { - lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule); + lsm_rule = ima_lsm_copy_rule(rule, GFP_ATOMIC); if (lsm_rule) { rule_reinitialized = true; goto retry; @@ -1140,7 +1142,8 @@ static int ima_lsm_rule_init(struct ima_rule_entry *entry, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type = audit_type; result = ima_filter_rule_init(entry->lsm[lsm_rule].type, Audit_equal, entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p, - &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule); + &entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule, + GFP_KERNEL); if (!entry->lsm[lsm_rule].rule) { pr_warn("rule for LSM \'%s\' is undefined\n", entry->lsm[lsm_rule].args_p); diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 8af2136069d2..831cb84fd75a 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -1040,4 +1040,5 @@ static void __exit cleanup_encrypted(void) late_initcall(init_encrypted); module_exit(cleanup_encrypted); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Encrypted key type"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c index 5113aeae5628..e2d9644efde1 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_core.c @@ -395,4 +395,5 @@ static void __exit cleanup_trusted(void) late_initcall(init_trusted); module_exit(cleanup_trusted); +MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Trusted Key type"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index e5da848c50b9..8cee5b6c6e6d 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -2278,7 +2278,20 @@ int security_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) * @size: size of xattr value * @flags: flags * - * Check permission before setting the extended attributes. + * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended + * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry. It is important to note that we have some + * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we + * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer. + * + * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM + * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check, + * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for + * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully + * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr. If all + * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook, + * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still + * performed. If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability + * check is performed. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. */ @@ -2286,20 +2299,20 @@ int security_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) { - int ret; + int rc; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - /* - * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, - * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. - */ - ret = call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size, - flags); - if (ret == 1) - ret = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - return ret; + /* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */ + if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) { + rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return call_int_hook(inode_setxattr, idmap, dentry, name, value, size, + flags); } /** @@ -2452,26 +2465,39 @@ int security_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) * @dentry: file * @name: xattr name * - * Check permission before removing the extended attribute identified by @name - * for @dentry. + * This hook performs the desired permission checks before setting the extended + * attributes (xattrs) on @dentry. It is important to note that we have some + * additional logic before the main LSM implementation calls to detect if we + * need to perform an additional capability check at the LSM layer. + * + * Normally we enforce a capability check prior to executing the various LSM + * hook implementations, but if a LSM wants to avoid this capability check, + * it can register a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook and return a value of 1 for + * xattrs that it wants to avoid the capability check, leaving the LSM fully + * responsible for enforcing the access control for the specific xattr. If all + * of the enabled LSMs refrain from registering a 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hook, + * or return a 0 (the default return value), the capability check is still + * performed. If no 'inode_xattr_skipcap' hooks are registered the capability + * check is performed. * * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted. */ int security_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { - int ret; + int rc; if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; - /* - * SELinux and Smack integrate the cap call, - * so assume that all LSMs supplying this call do so. - */ - ret = call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name); - if (ret == 1) - ret = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - return ret; + + /* enforce the capability checks at the lsm layer, if needed */ + if (!call_int_hook(inode_xattr_skipcap, name)) { + rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); + if (rc) + return rc; + } + + return call_int_hook(inode_removexattr, idmap, dentry, name); } /** @@ -5332,15 +5358,17 @@ void security_key_post_create_or_update(struct key *keyring, struct key *key, * @op: rule operator * @rulestr: rule context * @lsmrule: receive buffer for audit rule struct + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Allocate and initialize an LSM audit rule structure. * * Return: Return 0 if @lsmrule has been successfully set, -EINVAL in case of * an invalid rule. */ -int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule) +int security_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **lsmrule, + gfp_t gfp) { - return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule); + return call_int_hook(audit_rule_init, field, op, rulestr, lsmrule, gfp); } /** diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 7eed331e90f0..55c78c318ccd 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3177,6 +3177,23 @@ static bool has_cap_mac_admin(bool audit) return true; } +/** + * selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks? + * @name: name of the xattr + * + * Returns 1 to indicate that SELinux "owns" the access control rights to xattrs + * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional + * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that + * SELinux does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is + * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability + * based controls. + */ +static int selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name) +{ + /* require capability check if not a selinux xattr */ + return !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX); +} + static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name, const void *value, size_t size, int flags) @@ -3188,15 +3205,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, u32 newsid, sid = current_sid(); int rc = 0; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { - rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); - if (rc) - return rc; - - /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the - ordinary setattr permission. */ + /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - } if (!selinux_initialized()) return (inode_owner_or_capable(idmap, inode) ? 0 : -EPERM); @@ -3345,15 +3356,9 @@ static int selinux_inode_listxattr(struct dentry *dentry) static int selinux_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) { - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) { - int rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); - if (rc) - return rc; - - /* Not an attribute we recognize, so just check the - ordinary setattr permission. */ + /* if not a selinux xattr, only check the ordinary setattr perm */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) return dentry_has_perm(current_cred(), dentry, FILE__SETATTR); - } if (!selinux_initialized()) return 0; @@ -7175,6 +7180,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, selinux_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, selinux_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, selinux_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, selinux_inode_xattr_skipcap), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, selinux_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, selinux_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, selinux_inode_getxattr), diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 52aca71210b4..29c7d4c86f6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -21,12 +21,14 @@ * @op: the operator the rule uses * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule); +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, + gfp_t gfp); /** * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index 24d7d8b3cda3..ba2ac3da1153 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ sizeof(unsigned long)) #define EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE BITS_PER_LONG #define EBITMAP_SIZE (EBITMAP_UNIT_NUMS * EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE) -#define EBITMAP_BIT 1ULL +#define EBITMAP_BIT 1UL #define EBITMAP_SHIFT_UNIT_SIZE(x) \ (((x) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) >> EBITMAP_UNIT_SIZE / 2) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index f20e1968b7f7..e33e55384b75 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -3507,7 +3507,8 @@ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *vrule) } } -int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct selinux_state *state = &selinux_state; struct selinux_policy *policy; @@ -3548,7 +3549,7 @@ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) return -EINVAL; } - tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), GFP_KERNEL); + tmprule = kzalloc(sizeof(struct selinux_audit_rule), gfp); if (!tmprule) return -ENOMEM; context_init(&tmprule->au_ctxt); diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index d0d484c1599a..4164699cd4f6 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1283,6 +1283,33 @@ static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path) } /** + * smack_inode_xattr_skipcap - Skip the xattr capability checks? + * @name: name of the xattr + * + * Returns 1 to indicate that Smack "owns" the access control rights to xattrs + * named @name; the LSM layer should avoid enforcing any traditional + * capability based access controls on this xattr. Returns 0 to indicate that + * Smack does not "own" the access control rights to xattrs named @name and is + * deferring to the LSM layer for further access controls, including capability + * based controls. + */ +static int smack_inode_xattr_skipcap(const char *name) +{ + if (strncmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, strlen(XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX))) + return 0; + + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0 || + strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) + return 1; + + return 0; +} + +/** * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs * @idmap: idmap of the mount * @dentry: the object @@ -1325,8 +1352,7 @@ static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE || strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0) rc = -EINVAL; - } else - rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags); + } if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; @@ -1435,8 +1461,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) { if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) rc = -EPERM; - } else - rc = cap_inode_removexattr(idmap, dentry, name); + } if (rc != 0) return rc; @@ -4699,11 +4724,13 @@ static int smack_post_notification(const struct cred *w_cred, * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...) * @rulestr: smack label to be audited * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation + * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation * * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true. * The label to be audited is created if necessay. */ -static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule) +static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule, + gfp_t gfp) { struct smack_known *skp; char **rule = (char **)vrule; @@ -5057,6 +5084,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_xattr_skipcap, smack_inode_xattr_skipcap), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr), diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig index fad75be5f381..1e0dd1a6d0b0 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Kconfig +++ b/security/tomoyo/Kconfig @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ config SECURITY_TOMOYO help This selects TOMOYO Linux, pathname-based access control. Required userspace tools and further information may be - found at <https://tomoyo.osdn.jp/>. + found at <https://tomoyo.sourceforge.net/>. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. config SECURITY_TOMOYO_MAX_ACCEPT_ENTRY diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index ea3140d510ec..5c7b059a332a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -2787,7 +2787,7 @@ void tomoyo_check_profile(void) else continue; pr_err("Userland tools for TOMOYO 2.6 must be installed and policy must be initialized.\n"); - pr_err("Please see https://tomoyo.osdn.jp/2.6/ for more information.\n"); + pr_err("Please see https://tomoyo.sourceforge.net/2.6/ for more information.\n"); panic("STOP!"); } tomoyo_read_unlock(idx); diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index b6684a074a59..39944a859ff6 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -111,6 +111,7 @@ static void report_access(const char *access, struct task_struct *target, /** * yama_relation_cleanup - remove invalid entries from the relation list + * @work: unused * */ static void yama_relation_cleanup(struct work_struct *work) |