diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
109 files changed, 2767 insertions, 1053 deletions
diff --git a/security/Kconfig b/security/Kconfig index e8e449444e65..b0cb9a5f9448 100644 --- a/security/Kconfig +++ b/security/Kconfig @@ -54,6 +54,17 @@ config SECURITY_NETWORK implement socket and networking access controls. If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. +config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION + bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" + default y + depends on X86_64 && !UML + help + This feature reduces the number of hardware side channels by + ensuring that the majority of kernel addresses are not mapped + into userspace. + + See Documentation/x86/pti.txt for more details. + config SECURITY_INFINIBAND bool "Infiniband Security Hooks" depends on SECURITY && INFINIBAND diff --git a/security/Makefile b/security/Makefile index f2d71cdb8e19..4d2d3782ddef 100644 --- a/security/Makefile +++ b/security/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for the kernel security code # diff --git a/security/apparmor/Makefile b/security/apparmor/Makefile index a16b195274de..9a6b4033d52b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/Makefile +++ b/security/apparmor/Makefile @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # Makefile for AppArmor Linux Security Module # obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR) += apparmor.o apparmor-y := apparmorfs.o audit.o capability.o context.o ipc.o lib.o match.o \ path.o domain.o policy.o policy_unpack.o procattr.o lsm.o \ - resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o + resource.o secid.o file.o policy_ns.o label.o mount.o apparmor-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR_HASH) += crypto.o clean-files := capability_names.h rlim_names.h diff --git a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c index 853c2ec8e0c9..4d202b73a0e1 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c +++ b/security/apparmor/apparmorfs.c @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ #include "include/audit.h" #include "include/context.h" #include "include/crypto.h" +#include "include/ipc.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/label.h" #include "include/policy.h" @@ -248,8 +249,10 @@ static struct dentry *aafs_create(const char *name, umode_t mode, inode_lock(dir); dentry = lookup_one_len(name, parent, strlen(name)); - if (IS_ERR(dentry)) + if (IS_ERR(dentry)) { + error = PTR_ERR(dentry); goto fail_lock; + } if (d_really_is_positive(dentry)) { error = -EEXIST; @@ -530,7 +533,7 @@ static ssize_t ns_revision_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, long last_read; int avail; - mutex_lock(&rev->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); last_read = rev->last_read; if (last_read == rev->ns->revision) { mutex_unlock(&rev->ns->lock); @@ -540,7 +543,7 @@ static ssize_t ns_revision_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf, last_read != READ_ONCE(rev->ns->revision))) return -ERESTARTSYS; - mutex_lock(&rev->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); } avail = sprintf(buffer, "%ld\n", rev->ns->revision); @@ -568,13 +571,13 @@ static int ns_revision_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return 0; } -static unsigned int ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt) +static __poll_t ns_revision_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *pt) { struct aa_revision *rev = file->private_data; - unsigned int mask = 0; + __poll_t mask = 0; if (rev) { - mutex_lock(&rev->ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&rev->ns->lock, rev->ns->level); poll_wait(file, &rev->ns->wait, pt); if (rev->last_read < rev->ns->revision) mask |= POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; @@ -1443,6 +1446,10 @@ void __aafs_profile_migrate_dents(struct aa_profile *old, { int i; + AA_BUG(!old); + AA_BUG(!new); + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(old)->lock)); + for (i = 0; i < AAFS_PROF_SIZEOF; i++) { new->dents[i] = old->dents[i]; if (new->dents[i]) @@ -1506,6 +1513,9 @@ int __aafs_profile_mkdir(struct aa_profile *profile, struct dentry *parent) struct dentry *dent = NULL, *dir; int error; + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(profile)->lock)); + if (!parent) { struct aa_profile *p; p = aa_deref_parent(profile); @@ -1633,7 +1643,7 @@ static int ns_mkdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry, umode_t mode) */ inode_unlock(dir); error = simple_pin_fs(&aafs_ops, &aafs_mnt, &aafs_count); - mutex_lock(&parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); inode_lock_nested(dir, I_MUTEX_PARENT); if (error) goto out; @@ -1682,7 +1692,7 @@ static int ns_rmdir_op(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry) inode_unlock(dir); inode_unlock(dentry->d_inode); - mutex_lock(&parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_findn_ns(&parent->sub_ns, dentry->d_name.name, dentry->d_name.len)); if (!ns) { @@ -1731,12 +1741,13 @@ void __aafs_ns_rmdir(struct aa_ns *ns) if (!ns) return; + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock)); list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->base.profiles, base.list) __aafs_profile_rmdir(child); list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) { - mutex_lock(&sub->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level); __aafs_ns_rmdir(sub); mutex_unlock(&sub->lock); } @@ -1866,7 +1877,7 @@ int __aafs_ns_mkdir(struct aa_ns *ns, struct dentry *parent, const char *name, /* subnamespaces */ list_for_each_entry(sub, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) { - mutex_lock(&sub->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&sub->lock, sub->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(sub, ns_subns_dir(ns), NULL, NULL); mutex_unlock(&sub->lock); if (error) @@ -1903,10 +1914,14 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) { struct aa_ns *parent, *next; + AA_BUG(!root); + AA_BUG(!ns); + AA_BUG(ns != root && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->parent->lock)); + /* is next namespace a child */ if (!list_empty(&ns->sub_ns)) { next = list_first_entry(&ns->sub_ns, typeof(*ns), base.list); - mutex_lock(&next->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level); return next; } @@ -1916,7 +1931,7 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); next = list_next_entry(ns, base.list); if (!list_entry_is_head(next, &parent->sub_ns, base.list)) { - mutex_lock(&next->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&next->lock, next->level); return next; } ns = parent; @@ -1937,6 +1952,9 @@ static struct aa_ns *__next_ns(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) static struct aa_profile *__first_profile(struct aa_ns *root, struct aa_ns *ns) { + AA_BUG(!root); + AA_BUG(ns && !mutex_is_locked(&ns->lock)); + for (; ns; ns = __next_ns(root, ns)) { if (!list_empty(&ns->base.profiles)) return list_first_entry(&ns->base.profiles, @@ -1959,6 +1977,8 @@ static struct aa_profile *__next_profile(struct aa_profile *p) struct aa_profile *parent; struct aa_ns *ns = p->ns; + AA_BUG(!mutex_is_locked(&profiles_ns(p)->lock)); + /* is next profile a child */ if (!list_empty(&p->base.profiles)) return list_first_entry(&p->base.profiles, typeof(*p), @@ -2019,7 +2039,7 @@ static void *p_start(struct seq_file *f, loff_t *pos) f->private = root; /* find the first profile */ - mutex_lock(&root->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&root->lock, root->level); profile = __first_profile(root, root); /* skip to position */ @@ -2127,6 +2147,11 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ptrace[] = { { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_signal[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", AA_SFS_SIG_MASK), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_domain[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hat", 1), AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("change_hatv", 1), @@ -2151,9 +2176,14 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_policy[] = { { } }; +static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_mount[] = { + AA_SFS_FILE_STRING("mask", "mount umount pivot_root"), + { } +}; + static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_ns[] = { AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("profile", 1), - AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 1), + AA_SFS_FILE_BOOLEAN("pivot_root", 0), { } }; @@ -2172,22 +2202,24 @@ static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_features[] = { AA_SFS_DIR("policy", aa_sfs_entry_policy), AA_SFS_DIR("domain", aa_sfs_entry_domain), AA_SFS_DIR("file", aa_sfs_entry_file), + AA_SFS_DIR("mount", aa_sfs_entry_mount), AA_SFS_DIR("namespaces", aa_sfs_entry_ns), AA_SFS_FILE_U64("capability", VFS_CAP_FLAGS_MASK), AA_SFS_DIR("rlimit", aa_sfs_entry_rlimit), AA_SFS_DIR("caps", aa_sfs_entry_caps), AA_SFS_DIR("ptrace", aa_sfs_entry_ptrace), + AA_SFS_DIR("signal", aa_sfs_entry_signal), AA_SFS_DIR("query", aa_sfs_entry_query), { } }; static struct aa_sfs_entry aa_sfs_entry_apparmor[] = { - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".access", 0640, &aa_sfs_access), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".access", 0666, &aa_sfs_access), AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".stacked", 0444, &seq_ns_stacked_fops), AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_stacked", 0444, &seq_ns_nsstacked_fops), - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0666, &seq_ns_level_fops), - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0640, &seq_ns_name_fops), - AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0440, &aa_sfs_profiles_fops), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_level", 0444, &seq_ns_level_fops), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS(".ns_name", 0444, &seq_ns_name_fops), + AA_SFS_FILE_FOPS("profiles", 0444, &aa_sfs_profiles_fops), AA_SFS_DIR("features", aa_sfs_entry_features), { } }; @@ -2419,7 +2451,7 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) aafs_mnt = kern_mount(&aafs_ops); if (IS_ERR(aafs_mnt)) panic("can't set apparmorfs up\n"); - aafs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~MS_NOUSER; + aafs_mnt->mnt_sb->s_flags &= ~SB_NOUSER; /* Populate fs tree. */ error = entry_create_dir(&aa_sfs_entry, NULL); @@ -2459,7 +2491,7 @@ static int __init aa_create_aafs(void) ns_subrevision(root_ns) = dent; /* policy tree referenced by magic policy symlink */ - mutex_lock(&root_ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&root_ns->lock, root_ns->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(root_ns, aafs_mnt->mnt_root, ".policy", aafs_mnt->mnt_root); mutex_unlock(&root_ns->lock); diff --git a/security/apparmor/domain.c b/security/apparmor/domain.c index 17a601c67b62..6a54d2ffa840 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/domain.c +++ b/security/apparmor/domain.c @@ -305,6 +305,7 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, * __attach_match_ - find an attachment match * @name - to match against (NOT NULL) * @head - profile list to walk (NOT NULL) + * @info - info message if there was an error (NOT NULL) * * Do a linear search on the profiles in the list. There is a matching * preference where an exact match is preferred over a name which uses @@ -316,28 +317,47 @@ static int change_profile_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, * Returns: profile or NULL if no match found */ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, - struct list_head *head) + struct list_head *head, + const char **info) { int len = 0; + bool conflict = false; struct aa_profile *profile, *candidate = NULL; list_for_each_entry_rcu(profile, head, base.list) { - if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL) + if (profile->label.flags & FLAG_NULL && + &profile->label == ns_unconfined(profile->ns)) continue; - if (profile->xmatch && profile->xmatch_len > len) { - unsigned int state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, - DFA_START, name); - u32 perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); - /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ - if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { - candidate = profile; - len = profile->xmatch_len; + + if (profile->xmatch) { + if (profile->xmatch_len >= len) { + unsigned int state; + u32 perm; + + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->xmatch, + DFA_START, name); + perm = dfa_user_allow(profile->xmatch, state); + /* any accepting state means a valid match. */ + if (perm & MAY_EXEC) { + if (profile->xmatch_len == len) { + conflict = true; + continue; + } + candidate = profile; + len = profile->xmatch_len; + conflict = false; + } } } else if (!strcmp(profile->base.name, name)) /* exact non-re match, no more searching required */ return profile; } + if (conflict) { + *info = "conflicting profile attachments"; + return NULL; + } + return candidate; } @@ -346,16 +366,17 @@ static struct aa_profile *__attach_match(const char *name, * @ns: the current namespace (NOT NULL) * @list: list to search (NOT NULL) * @name: the executable name to match against (NOT NULL) + * @info: info message if there was an error * * Returns: label or NULL if no match found */ static struct aa_label *find_attach(struct aa_ns *ns, struct list_head *list, - const char *name) + const char *name, const char **info) { struct aa_profile *profile; rcu_read_lock(); - profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list)); + profile = aa_get_profile(__attach_match(name, list, info)); rcu_read_unlock(); return profile ? &profile->label : NULL; @@ -374,8 +395,8 @@ static const char *next_name(int xtype, const char *name) * * Returns: refcounted label, or NULL on failure (MAYBE NULL) */ -static struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, - const char **name) +struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, + const char **name) { struct aa_label *label = NULL; u32 xtype = xindex & AA_X_TYPE_MASK; @@ -448,11 +469,11 @@ static struct aa_label *x_to_label(struct aa_profile *profile, if (xindex & AA_X_CHILD) /* released by caller */ new = find_attach(ns, &profile->base.profiles, - name); + name, info); else /* released by caller */ new = find_attach(ns, &ns->base.profiles, - name); + name, info); *lookupname = name; break; } @@ -516,7 +537,7 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, if (profile_unconfined(profile)) { new = find_attach(profile->ns, &profile->ns->base.profiles, - name); + name, &info); if (new) { AA_DEBUG("unconfined attached to new label"); return new; @@ -541,9 +562,21 @@ static struct aa_label *profile_transition(struct aa_profile *profile, } } else if (COMPLAIN_MODE(profile)) { /* no exec permission - learning mode */ - struct aa_profile *new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, - false, name, - GFP_ATOMIC); + struct aa_profile *new_profile = NULL; + char *n = kstrdup(name, GFP_ATOMIC); + + if (n) { + /* name is ptr into buffer */ + long pos = name - buffer; + /* break per cpu buffer hold */ + put_buffers(buffer); + new_profile = aa_new_null_profile(profile, false, n, + GFP_KERNEL); + get_buffers(buffer); + name = buffer + pos; + strcpy((char *)name, n); + kfree(n); + } if (!new_profile) { error = -ENOMEM; info = "could not create null profile"; diff --git a/security/apparmor/file.c b/security/apparmor/file.c index 3382518b87fa..e79bf44396a3 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/file.c +++ b/security/apparmor/file.c @@ -226,18 +226,12 @@ static u32 map_old_perms(u32 old) struct aa_perms aa_compute_fperms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, struct path_cond *cond) { - struct aa_perms perms; - /* FIXME: change over to new dfa format * currently file perms are encoded in the dfa, new format * splits the permissions from the dfa. This mapping can be * done at profile load */ - perms.deny = 0; - perms.kill = perms.stop = 0; - perms.complain = perms.cond = 0; - perms.hide = 0; - perms.prompt = 0; + struct aa_perms perms = { }; if (uid_eq(current_fsuid(), cond->uid)) { perms.allow = map_old_perms(dfa_user_allow(dfa, state)); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h index aaf893f4e4f5..829082c35faa 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/apparmor.h @@ -27,7 +27,9 @@ #define AA_CLASS_NET 4 #define AA_CLASS_RLIMITS 5 #define AA_CLASS_DOMAIN 6 +#define AA_CLASS_MOUNT 7 #define AA_CLASS_PTRACE 9 +#define AA_CLASS_SIGNAL 10 #define AA_CLASS_LABEL 16 #define AA_CLASS_LAST AA_CLASS_LABEL diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h index c68839a44351..4ac095118717 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/audit.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/audit.h @@ -71,6 +71,10 @@ enum audit_type { #define OP_FMPROT "file_mprotect" #define OP_INHERIT "file_inherit" +#define OP_PIVOTROOT "pivotroot" +#define OP_MOUNT "mount" +#define OP_UMOUNT "umount" + #define OP_CREATE "create" #define OP_POST_CREATE "post_create" #define OP_BIND "bind" @@ -86,6 +90,7 @@ enum audit_type { #define OP_SHUTDOWN "socket_shutdown" #define OP_PTRACE "ptrace" +#define OP_SIGNAL "signal" #define OP_EXEC "exec" @@ -116,20 +121,30 @@ struct apparmor_audit_data { /* these entries require a custom callback fn */ struct { struct aa_label *peer; - struct { - const char *target; - kuid_t ouid; - } fs; + union { + struct { + const char *target; + kuid_t ouid; + } fs; + int signal; + }; }; struct { - const char *name; - long pos; + struct aa_profile *profile; const char *ns; + long pos; } iface; struct { int rlim; unsigned long max; } rlim; + struct { + const char *src_name; + const char *type; + const char *trans; + const char *data; + unsigned long flags; + } mnt; }; }; diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h index 24c5976d6143..ac9862ff7cdf 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/domain.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/domain.h @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@ #include <linux/binfmts.h> #include <linux/types.h> +#include "label.h" + #ifndef __AA_DOMAIN_H #define __AA_DOMAIN_H @@ -29,6 +31,9 @@ struct aa_domain { #define AA_CHANGE_ONEXEC 4 #define AA_CHANGE_STACK 8 +struct aa_label *x_table_lookup(struct aa_profile *profile, u32 xindex, + const char **name); + int apparmor_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm); void aa_free_domain_entries(struct aa_domain *domain); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h index 656fdb81c8a0..5ffc218d1e74 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/ipc.h @@ -27,8 +27,14 @@ struct aa_profile; #define AA_PTRACE_PERM_MASK (AA_PTRACE_READ | AA_PTRACE_TRACE | \ AA_MAY_BE_READ | AA_MAY_BE_TRACED) +#define AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE) + +#define AA_SFS_SIG_MASK "hup int quit ill trap abrt bus fpe kill usr1 " \ + "segv usr2 pipe alrm term stkflt chld cont stop stp ttin ttou urg " \ + "xcpu xfsz vtalrm prof winch io pwr sys emt lost" int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request); +int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig); #endif /* __AA_IPC_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/label.h b/security/apparmor/include/label.h index 9a283b722755..af22dcbbcb8a 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/label.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/label.h @@ -310,6 +310,7 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp); #define FLAG_SHOW_MODE 1 #define FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS 2 #define FLAG_HIDDEN_UNCONFINED 4 +#define FLAG_ABS_ROOT 8 int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view, struct aa_label *label, int flags); int aa_label_asxprint(char **strp, struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h index 436b3a722357..6505e1ad9e23 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/lib.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/lib.h @@ -19,17 +19,6 @@ #include "match.h" -/* Provide our own test for whether a write lock is held for asserts - * this is because on none SMP systems write_can_lock will always - * resolve to true, which is what you want for code making decisions - * based on it, but wrong for asserts checking that the lock is held - */ -#ifdef CONFIG_SMP -#define write_is_locked(X) !write_can_lock(X) -#else -#define write_is_locked(X) (1) -#endif /* CONFIG_SMP */ - /* * DEBUG remains global (no per profile flag) since it is mostly used in sysctl * which is not related to profile accesses. @@ -97,7 +86,7 @@ static inline unsigned int aa_dfa_null_transition(struct aa_dfa *dfa, static inline bool path_mediated_fs(struct dentry *dentry) { - return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & MS_NOUSER); + return !(dentry->d_sb->s_flags & SB_NOUSER); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/mount.h b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..25d6067fa6ef --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/mount.h @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor file mediation function definitions. + * + * Copyright 2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#ifndef __AA_MOUNT_H +#define __AA_MOUNT_H + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/path.h> + +#include "domain.h" +#include "policy.h" + +/* mount perms */ +#define AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT 0x01 +#define AA_MAY_MOUNT 0x02 +#define AA_MAY_UMOUNT 0x04 +#define AA_AUDIT_DATA 0x40 +#define AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH 0x40 + +#define AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK (MS_KERNMOUNT | MS_NOSEC | MS_ACTIVE | MS_BORN) + +int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags, void *data); + +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *old_name, unsigned long flags); + + +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags); + +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *old_name); + +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, + const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data); + +int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags); + +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path); + +#endif /* __AA_MOUNT_H */ diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h index 2b27bb79aec4..d7b7e7115160 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/include/perms.h +++ b/security/apparmor/include/perms.h @@ -133,6 +133,9 @@ extern struct aa_perms allperms; #define xcheck_labels_profiles(L1, L2, FN, args...) \ xcheck_ns_labels((L1), (L2), xcheck_ns_profile_label, (FN), args) +#define xcheck_labels(L1, L2, P, FN1, FN2) \ + xcheck(fn_for_each((L1), (P), (FN1)), fn_for_each((L2), (P), (FN2))) + void aa_perm_mask_to_str(char *str, const char *chrs, u32 mask); void aa_audit_perm_names(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char **names, u32 mask); diff --git a/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..92e62fe95292 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/include/sig_names.h @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +#include <linux/signal.h> + +#define SIGUNKNOWN 0 +#define MAXMAPPED_SIG 35 +/* provide a mapping of arch signal to internal signal # for mediation + * those that are always an alias SIGCLD for SIGCLHD and SIGPOLL for SIGIO + * map to the same entry those that may/or may not get a separate entry + */ +static const int sig_map[MAXMAPPED_SIG] = { + [0] = MAXMAPPED_SIG, /* existence test */ + [SIGHUP] = 1, + [SIGINT] = 2, + [SIGQUIT] = 3, + [SIGILL] = 4, + [SIGTRAP] = 5, /* -, 5, - */ + [SIGABRT] = 6, /* SIGIOT: -, 6, - */ + [SIGBUS] = 7, /* 10, 7, 10 */ + [SIGFPE] = 8, + [SIGKILL] = 9, + [SIGUSR1] = 10, /* 30, 10, 16 */ + [SIGSEGV] = 11, + [SIGUSR2] = 12, /* 31, 12, 17 */ + [SIGPIPE] = 13, + [SIGALRM] = 14, + [SIGTERM] = 15, +#ifdef SIGSTKFLT + [SIGSTKFLT] = 16, /* -, 16, - */ +#endif + [SIGCHLD] = 17, /* 20, 17, 18. SIGCHLD -, -, 18 */ + [SIGCONT] = 18, /* 19, 18, 25 */ + [SIGSTOP] = 19, /* 17, 19, 23 */ + [SIGTSTP] = 20, /* 18, 20, 24 */ + [SIGTTIN] = 21, /* 21, 21, 26 */ + [SIGTTOU] = 22, /* 22, 22, 27 */ + [SIGURG] = 23, /* 16, 23, 21 */ + [SIGXCPU] = 24, /* 24, 24, 30 */ + [SIGXFSZ] = 25, /* 25, 25, 31 */ + [SIGVTALRM] = 26, /* 26, 26, 28 */ + [SIGPROF] = 27, /* 27, 27, 29 */ + [SIGWINCH] = 28, /* 28, 28, 20 */ + [SIGIO] = 29, /* SIGPOLL: 23, 29, 22 */ + [SIGPWR] = 30, /* 29, 30, 19. SIGINFO 29, -, - */ +#ifdef SIGSYS + [SIGSYS] = 31, /* 12, 31, 12. often SIG LOST/UNUSED */ +#endif +#ifdef SIGEMT + [SIGEMT] = 32, /* 7, - , 7 */ +#endif +#if defined(SIGLOST) && SIGPWR != SIGLOST /* sparc */ + [SIGLOST] = 33, /* unused on Linux */ +#endif +#if defined(SIGUNUSED) && \ + defined(SIGLOST) && defined(SIGSYS) && SIGLOST != SIGSYS + [SIGUNUSED] = 34, /* -, 31, - */ +#endif +}; + +/* this table is ordered post sig_map[sig] mapping */ +static const char *const sig_names[MAXMAPPED_SIG + 1] = { + "unknown", + "hup", + "int", + "quit", + "ill", + "trap", + "abrt", + "bus", + "fpe", + "kill", + "usr1", + "segv", + "usr2", + "pipe", + "alrm", + "term", + "stkflt", + "chld", + "cont", + "stop", + "stp", + "ttin", + "ttou", + "urg", + "xcpu", + "xfsz", + "vtalrm", + "prof", + "winch", + "io", + "pwr", + "sys", + "emt", + "lost", + "unused", + + "exists", /* always last existence test mapped to MAXMAPPED_SIG */ +}; + diff --git a/security/apparmor/ipc.c b/security/apparmor/ipc.c index 11e66b5bbc42..b40678f3c1d5 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/ipc.c +++ b/security/apparmor/ipc.c @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ #include "include/context.h" #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/ipc.h" +#include "include/sig_names.h" /** * audit_ptrace_mask - convert mask to permission string @@ -63,40 +64,48 @@ static void audit_ptrace_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } +/* assumes check for PROFILE_MEDIATES is already done */ /* TODO: conditionals */ static int profile_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, - struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) + struct aa_label *peer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) { struct aa_perms perms = { }; - /* need because of peer in cross check */ - if (profile_unconfined(profile) || - !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) - return 0; - - aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label; - aa_profile_match_label(profile, &peer->label, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, + aad(sa)->peer = peer; + aa_profile_match_label(profile, peer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE, request, &perms); aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_ptrace_cb); } -static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, - struct aa_profile *tracee, u32 request, - struct common_audit_data *sa) +static int profile_tracee_perm(struct aa_profile *tracee, + struct aa_label *tracer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + if (profile_unconfined(tracee) || unconfined(tracer) || + !PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracee, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) + return 0; + + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, request, sa); +} + +static int profile_tracer_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, + struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) { + if (profile_unconfined(tracer)) + return 0; + if (PROFILE_MEDIATES(tracer, AA_CLASS_PTRACE)) - return xcheck(profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa), - profile_ptrace_perm(tracee, tracer, - request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT, - sa)); - /* policy uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ - if (profile_unconfined(tracer) || tracer == tracee) + return profile_ptrace_perm(tracer, tracee, request, sa); + + /* profile uses the old style capability check for ptrace */ + if (&tracer->label == tracee) return 0; aad(sa)->label = &tracer->label; - aad(sa)->peer = &tracee->label; + aad(sa)->peer = tracee; aad(sa)->request = 0; aad(sa)->error = aa_capable(&tracer->label, CAP_SYS_PTRACE, 1); @@ -114,10 +123,111 @@ static int cross_ptrace_perm(struct aa_profile *tracer, int aa_may_ptrace(struct aa_label *tracer, struct aa_label *tracee, u32 request) { + struct aa_profile *profile; + u32 xrequest = request << PTRACE_PERM_SHIFT; DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_PTRACE); - return xcheck_labels_profiles(tracer, tracee, cross_ptrace_perm, - request, &sa); + return xcheck_labels(tracer, tracee, profile, + profile_tracer_perm(profile, tracee, request, &sa), + profile_tracee_perm(profile, tracer, xrequest, &sa)); +} + + +static inline int map_signal_num(int sig) +{ + if (sig > SIGRTMAX) + return SIGUNKNOWN; + else if (sig >= SIGRTMIN) + return sig - SIGRTMIN + 128; /* rt sigs mapped to 128 */ + else if (sig < MAXMAPPED_SIG) + return sig_map[sig]; + return SIGUNKNOWN; +} + +/** + * audit_file_mask - convert mask to permission string + * @buffer: buffer to write string to (NOT NULL) + * @mask: permission mask to convert + */ +static void audit_signal_mask(struct audit_buffer *ab, u32 mask) +{ + if (mask & MAY_READ) + audit_log_string(ab, "receive"); + if (mask & MAY_WRITE) + audit_log_string(ab, "send"); +} + +/** + * audit_cb - call back for signal specific audit fields + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) + */ +static void audit_signal_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + if (aad(sa)->request & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " requested_mask="); + audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->request); + if (aad(sa)->denied & AA_SIGNAL_PERM_MASK) { + audit_log_format(ab, " denied_mask="); + audit_signal_mask(ab, aad(sa)->denied); + } + } + if (aad(sa)->signal < MAXMAPPED_SIG) + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=%s", sig_names[aad(sa)->signal]); + else + audit_log_format(ab, " signal=rtmin+%d", + aad(sa)->signal - 128); + audit_log_format(ab, " peer="); + aa_label_xaudit(ab, labels_ns(aad(sa)->label), aad(sa)->peer, + FLAGS_NONE, GFP_ATOMIC); } +/* TODO: update to handle compound name&name2, conditionals */ +static void profile_match_signal(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *label, + int signal, struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + unsigned int state; + + /* TODO: secondary cache check <profile, profile, perm> */ + state = aa_dfa_next(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_SIGNAL], + signal); + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, label); + aa_compute_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state, perms); +} +static int profile_signal_perm(struct aa_profile *profile, + struct aa_profile *peer, u32 request, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + struct aa_perms perms; + + if (profile_unconfined(profile) || + !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_SIGNAL)) + return 0; + + aad(sa)->peer = &peer->label; + profile_match_signal(profile, peer->base.hname, aad(sa)->signal, + &perms); + aa_apply_modes_to_perms(profile, &perms); + return aa_check_perms(profile, &perms, request, sa, audit_signal_cb); +} + +static int aa_signal_cross_perm(struct aa_profile *sender, + struct aa_profile *target, + struct common_audit_data *sa) +{ + return xcheck(profile_signal_perm(sender, target, MAY_WRITE, sa), + profile_signal_perm(target, sender, MAY_READ, sa)); +} + +int aa_may_signal(struct aa_label *sender, struct aa_label *target, int sig) +{ + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, OP_SIGNAL); + + aad(&sa)->signal = map_signal_num(sig); + return xcheck_labels_profiles(sender, target, aa_signal_cross_perm, + &sa); +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/label.c b/security/apparmor/label.c index e052eaba1cf6..324fe5c60f87 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/label.c +++ b/security/apparmor/label.c @@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static void free_proxy(struct aa_proxy *proxy) /* p->label will not updated any more as p is dead */ aa_put_label(rcu_dereference_protected(proxy->label, true)); memset(proxy, 0, sizeof(*proxy)); - proxy->label = (struct aa_label *) PROXY_POISON; + RCU_INIT_POINTER(proxy->label, (struct aa_label *)PROXY_POISON); kfree(proxy); } } @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ void __aa_proxy_redirect(struct aa_label *orig, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!orig); AA_BUG(!new); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&labels_set(orig)->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&labels_set(orig)->lock); tmp = rcu_dereference_protected(orig->proxy->label, &labels_ns(orig)->lock); @@ -571,7 +571,7 @@ static bool __label_remove(struct aa_label *label, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!label); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); if (new) __aa_proxy_redirect(label, new); @@ -608,7 +608,7 @@ static bool __label_replace(struct aa_label *old, struct aa_label *new) AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!old); AA_BUG(!new); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); AA_BUG(new->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE); if (!label_is_stale(old)) @@ -645,7 +645,7 @@ static struct aa_label *__label_insert(struct aa_labelset *ls, AA_BUG(!ls); AA_BUG(!label); AA_BUG(labels_set(label) != ls); - AA_BUG(!write_is_locked(&ls->lock)); + lockdep_assert_held_exclusive(&ls->lock); AA_BUG(label->flags & FLAG_IN_TREE); /* Figure out where to put new node */ @@ -1450,9 +1450,11 @@ bool aa_update_label_name(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, gfp_t gfp) * cached label name is present and visible * @label->hname only exists if label is namespace hierachical */ -static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label) +static inline bool use_label_hname(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, + int flags) { - if (label->hname && labels_ns(label) == ns) + if (label->hname && (!ns || labels_ns(label) == ns) && + !(flags & ~FLAG_SHOW_MODE)) return true; return false; @@ -1495,7 +1497,7 @@ static int aa_profile_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *view, view = profiles_ns(profile); if (view != profile->ns && - (!prev_ns || (prev_ns && *prev_ns != profile->ns))) { + (!prev_ns || (*prev_ns != profile->ns))) { if (prev_ns) *prev_ns = profile->ns; ns_name = aa_ns_name(view, profile->ns, @@ -1605,8 +1607,13 @@ int aa_label_snxprint(char *str, size_t size, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!str && size != 0); AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) + if (flags & FLAG_ABS_ROOT) { + ns = root_ns; + len = snprintf(str, size, "="); + update_for_len(total, len, size, str); + } else if (!ns) { ns = labels_ns(label); + } label_for_each(i, label, profile) { if (aa_ns_visible(ns, profile->ns, flags & FLAG_VIEW_SUBNS)) { @@ -1710,10 +1717,8 @@ void aa_label_xaudit(struct audit_buffer *ab, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!ab); AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) - ns = labels_ns(label); - - if (!use_label_hname(ns, label) || display_mode(ns, label, flags)) { + if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags) || + display_mode(ns, label, flags)) { len = aa_label_asxprint(&name, ns, label, flags, gfp); if (len == -1) { AA_DEBUG("label print error"); @@ -1738,10 +1743,7 @@ void aa_label_seq_xprint(struct seq_file *f, struct aa_ns *ns, AA_BUG(!f); AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) - ns = labels_ns(label); - - if (!use_label_hname(ns, label)) { + if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) { char *str; int len; @@ -1764,10 +1766,7 @@ void aa_label_xprintk(struct aa_ns *ns, struct aa_label *label, int flags, { AA_BUG(!label); - if (!ns) - ns = labels_ns(label); - - if (!use_label_hname(ns, label)) { + if (!use_label_hname(ns, label, flags)) { char *str; int len; @@ -1874,6 +1873,9 @@ struct aa_label *aa_label_parse(struct aa_label *base, const char *str, if (*str == '&') str++; } + if (*str == '=') + base = &root_ns->unconfined->label; + error = vec_setup(profile, vec, len, gfp); if (error) return ERR_PTR(error); @@ -2113,7 +2115,7 @@ void __aa_labelset_update_subtree(struct aa_ns *ns) __labelset_update(ns); list_for_each_entry(child, &ns->sub_ns, base.list) { - mutex_lock(&child->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&child->lock, child->level); __aa_labelset_update_subtree(child); mutex_unlock(&child->lock); } diff --git a/security/apparmor/lib.c b/security/apparmor/lib.c index 08ca26bcca77..4d5e98e49d5e 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lib.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lib.c @@ -317,14 +317,11 @@ static u32 map_other(u32 x) void aa_compute_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, struct aa_perms *perms) { - perms->deny = 0; - perms->kill = perms->stop = 0; - perms->complain = perms->cond = 0; - perms->hide = 0; - perms->prompt = 0; - perms->allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state); - perms->audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state); - perms->quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state); + *perms = (struct aa_perms) { + .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state), + .audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state), + .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state), + }; /* for v5 perm mapping in the policydb, the other set is used * to extend the general perm set @@ -426,7 +423,6 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, void (*cb)(struct audit_buffer *, void *)) { int type, error; - bool stop = false; u32 denied = request & (~perms->allow | perms->deny); if (likely(!denied)) { @@ -447,8 +443,6 @@ int aa_check_perms(struct aa_profile *profile, struct aa_perms *perms, else type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_DENIED; - if (denied & perms->stop) - stop = true; if (denied == (denied & perms->hide)) error = -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/apparmor/lsm.c b/security/apparmor/lsm.c index 7a82c0f61452..9a65eeaf7dfa 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/lsm.c +++ b/security/apparmor/lsm.c @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ #include "include/policy.h" #include "include/policy_ns.h" #include "include/procattr.h" +#include "include/mount.h" /* Flag indicating whether initialization completed */ int apparmor_initialized; @@ -511,6 +512,65 @@ static int apparmor_file_mprotect(struct vm_area_struct *vma, !(vma->vm_flags & VM_SHARED) ? MAP_PRIVATE : 0); } +static int apparmor_sb_mount(const char *dev_name, const struct path *path, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + /* Discard magic */ + if ((flags & MS_MGC_MSK) == MS_MGC_VAL) + flags &= ~MS_MGC_MSK; + + flags &= ~AA_MS_IGNORE_MASK; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) { + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) + error = aa_remount(label, path, flags, data); + else if (flags & MS_BIND) + error = aa_bind_mount(label, path, dev_name, flags); + else if (flags & (MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | + MS_UNBINDABLE)) + error = aa_mount_change_type(label, path, flags); + else if (flags & MS_MOVE) + error = aa_move_mount(label, path, dev_name); + else + error = aa_new_mount(label, dev_name, path, type, + flags, data); + } + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_sb_umount(struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + if (!unconfined(label)) + error = aa_umount(label, mnt, flags); + __end_current_label_crit_section(label); + + return error; +} + +static int apparmor_sb_pivotroot(const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) +{ + struct aa_label *label; + int error = 0; + + label = aa_get_current_label(); + if (!unconfined(label)) + error = aa_pivotroot(label, old_path, new_path); + aa_put_label(label); + + return error; +} + static int apparmor_getprocattr(struct task_struct *task, char *name, char **value) { @@ -656,12 +716,36 @@ static int apparmor_task_setrlimit(struct task_struct *task, return error; } +static int apparmor_task_kill(struct task_struct *target, struct siginfo *info, + int sig, u32 secid) +{ + struct aa_label *cl, *tl; + int error; + + if (secid) + /* TODO: after secid to label mapping is done. + * Dealing with USB IO specific behavior + */ + return 0; + cl = __begin_current_label_crit_section(); + tl = aa_get_task_label(target); + error = aa_may_signal(cl, tl, sig); + aa_put_label(tl); + __end_current_label_crit_section(cl); + + return error; +} + static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, apparmor_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, apparmor_ptrace_traceme), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, apparmor_capget), LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, apparmor_capable), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, apparmor_sb_mount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_umount, apparmor_sb_umount), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_pivotroot, apparmor_sb_pivotroot), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_link, apparmor_path_link), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_unlink, apparmor_path_unlink), LSM_HOOK_INIT(path_symlink, apparmor_path_symlink), @@ -696,6 +780,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list apparmor_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committed_creds, apparmor_bprm_committed_creds), LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setrlimit, apparmor_task_setrlimit), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, apparmor_task_kill), }; /* @@ -728,11 +813,11 @@ static const struct kernel_param_ops param_ops_aalockpolicy = { .get = param_get_aalockpolicy }; -static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); -static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); -static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp); -static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp); +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp); /* Flag values, also controllable via /sys/module/apparmor/parameters * We define special types as we want to do additional mediation. @@ -761,7 +846,7 @@ module_param_call(audit, param_set_audit, param_get_audit, /* Determines if audit header is included in audited messages. This * provides more context if the audit daemon is not running */ -bool aa_g_audit_header = 1; +bool aa_g_audit_header = true; module_param_named(audit_header, aa_g_audit_header, aabool, S_IRUSR | S_IWUSR); @@ -786,7 +871,7 @@ module_param_named(path_max, aa_g_path_max, aauint, S_IRUSR); * DEPRECATED: read only as strict checking of load is always done now * that none root users (user namespaces) can load policy. */ -bool aa_g_paranoid_load = 1; +bool aa_g_paranoid_load = true; module_param_named(paranoid_load, aa_g_paranoid_load, aabool, S_IRUGO); /* Boot time disable flag */ @@ -866,7 +951,7 @@ static int param_get_aauint(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) return param_get_uint(buffer, kp); } -static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; @@ -875,7 +960,7 @@ static int param_get_audit(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) return sprintf(buffer, "%s", audit_mode_names[aa_g_audit]); } -static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_set_audit(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; @@ -896,7 +981,7 @@ static int param_set_audit(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) return -EINVAL; } -static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, const struct kernel_param *kp) { if (!apparmor_enabled) return -EINVAL; @@ -906,7 +991,7 @@ static int param_get_mode(char *buffer, struct kernel_param *kp) return sprintf(buffer, "%s", aa_profile_mode_names[aa_g_profile_mode]); } -static int param_set_mode(const char *val, struct kernel_param *kp) +static int param_set_mode(const char *val, const struct kernel_param *kp) { int i; @@ -1034,7 +1119,7 @@ static int __init apparmor_init(void) if (!apparmor_enabled || !security_module_enable("apparmor")) { aa_info_message("AppArmor disabled by boot time parameter"); - apparmor_enabled = 0; + apparmor_enabled = false; return 0; } @@ -1090,7 +1175,7 @@ alloc_out: aa_destroy_aafs(); aa_teardown_dfa_engine(); - apparmor_enabled = 0; + apparmor_enabled = false; return error; } diff --git a/security/apparmor/mount.c b/security/apparmor/mount.c new file mode 100644 index 000000000000..8c558cbce930 --- /dev/null +++ b/security/apparmor/mount.c @@ -0,0 +1,705 @@ +/* + * AppArmor security module + * + * This file contains AppArmor mediation of files + * + * Copyright (C) 1998-2008 Novell/SUSE + * Copyright 2009-2017 Canonical Ltd. + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as + * published by the Free Software Foundation, version 2 of the + * License. + */ + +#include <linux/fs.h> +#include <linux/mount.h> +#include <linux/namei.h> + +#include "include/apparmor.h" +#include "include/audit.h" +#include "include/context.h" +#include "include/domain.h" +#include "include/file.h" +#include "include/match.h" +#include "include/mount.h" +#include "include/path.h" +#include "include/policy.h" + + +static void audit_mnt_flags(struct audit_buffer *ab, unsigned long flags) +{ + if (flags & MS_RDONLY) + audit_log_format(ab, "ro"); + else + audit_log_format(ab, "rw"); + if (flags & MS_NOSUID) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nosuid"); + if (flags & MS_NODEV) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nodev"); + if (flags & MS_NOEXEC) + audit_log_format(ab, ", noexec"); + if (flags & MS_SYNCHRONOUS) + audit_log_format(ab, ", sync"); + if (flags & MS_REMOUNT) + audit_log_format(ab, ", remount"); + if (flags & MS_MANDLOCK) + audit_log_format(ab, ", mand"); + if (flags & MS_DIRSYNC) + audit_log_format(ab, ", dirsync"); + if (flags & MS_NOATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", noatime"); + if (flags & MS_NODIRATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nodiratime"); + if (flags & MS_BIND) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rbind" : ", bind"); + if (flags & MS_MOVE) + audit_log_format(ab, ", move"); + if (flags & MS_SILENT) + audit_log_format(ab, ", silent"); + if (flags & MS_POSIXACL) + audit_log_format(ab, ", acl"); + if (flags & MS_UNBINDABLE) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", runbindable" : + ", unbindable"); + if (flags & MS_PRIVATE) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rprivate" : + ", private"); + if (flags & MS_SLAVE) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rslave" : + ", slave"); + if (flags & MS_SHARED) + audit_log_format(ab, flags & MS_REC ? ", rshared" : + ", shared"); + if (flags & MS_RELATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", relatime"); + if (flags & MS_I_VERSION) + audit_log_format(ab, ", iversion"); + if (flags & MS_STRICTATIME) + audit_log_format(ab, ", strictatime"); + if (flags & MS_NOUSER) + audit_log_format(ab, ", nouser"); +} + +/** + * audit_cb - call back for mount specific audit fields + * @ab: audit_buffer (NOT NULL) + * @va: audit struct to audit values of (NOT NULL) + */ +static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) +{ + struct common_audit_data *sa = va; + + if (aad(sa)->mnt.type) { + audit_log_format(ab, " fstype="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.type); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.src_name) { + audit_log_format(ab, " srcname="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.src_name); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.trans) { + audit_log_format(ab, " trans="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.trans); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.flags) { + audit_log_format(ab, " flags=\""); + audit_mnt_flags(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.flags); + audit_log_format(ab, "\""); + } + if (aad(sa)->mnt.data) { + audit_log_format(ab, " options="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->mnt.data); + } +} + +/** + * audit_mount - handle the auditing of mount operations + * @profile: the profile being enforced (NOT NULL) + * @op: operation being mediated (NOT NULL) + * @name: name of object being mediated (MAYBE NULL) + * @src_name: src_name of object being mediated (MAYBE_NULL) + * @type: type of filesystem (MAYBE_NULL) + * @trans: name of trans (MAYBE NULL) + * @flags: filesystem idependent mount flags + * @data: filesystem mount flags + * @request: permissions requested + * @perms: the permissions computed for the request (NOT NULL) + * @info: extra information message (MAYBE NULL) + * @error: 0 if operation allowed else failure error code + * + * Returns: %0 or error on failure + */ +static int audit_mount(struct aa_profile *profile, const char *op, + const char *name, const char *src_name, + const char *type, const char *trans, + unsigned long flags, const void *data, u32 request, + struct aa_perms *perms, const char *info, int error) +{ + int audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUTO; + DEFINE_AUDIT_DATA(sa, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NONE, op); + + if (likely(!error)) { + u32 mask = perms->audit; + + if (unlikely(AUDIT_MODE(profile) == AUDIT_ALL)) + mask = 0xffff; + + /* mask off perms that are not being force audited */ + request &= mask; + + if (likely(!request)) + return 0; + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_AUDIT; + } else { + /* only report permissions that were denied */ + request = request & ~perms->allow; + + if (request & perms->kill) + audit_type = AUDIT_APPARMOR_KILL; + + /* quiet known rejects, assumes quiet and kill do not overlap */ + if ((request & perms->quiet) && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_NOQUIET && + AUDIT_MODE(profile) != AUDIT_ALL) + request &= ~perms->quiet; + + if (!request) + return error; + } + + aad(&sa)->name = name; + aad(&sa)->mnt.src_name = src_name; + aad(&sa)->mnt.type = type; + aad(&sa)->mnt.trans = trans; + aad(&sa)->mnt.flags = flags; + if (data && (perms->audit & AA_AUDIT_DATA)) + aad(&sa)->mnt.data = data; + aad(&sa)->info = info; + aad(&sa)->error = error; + + return aa_audit(audit_type, profile, &sa, audit_cb); +} + +/** + * match_mnt_flags - Do an ordered match on mount flags + * @dfa: dfa to match against + * @state: state to start in + * @flags: mount flags to match against + * + * Mount flags are encoded as an ordered match. This is done instead of + * checking against a simple bitmask, to allow for logical operations + * on the flags. + * + * Returns: next state after flags match + */ +static unsigned int match_mnt_flags(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int state, + unsigned long flags) +{ + unsigned int i; + + for (i = 0; i <= 31 ; ++i) { + if ((1 << i) & flags) + state = aa_dfa_next(dfa, state, i + 1); + } + + return state; +} + +/** + * compute_mnt_perms - compute mount permission associated with @state + * @dfa: dfa to match against (NOT NULL) + * @state: state match finished in + * + * Returns: mount permissions + */ +static struct aa_perms compute_mnt_perms(struct aa_dfa *dfa, + unsigned int state) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { + .allow = dfa_user_allow(dfa, state), + .audit = dfa_user_audit(dfa, state), + .quiet = dfa_user_quiet(dfa, state), + .xindex = dfa_user_xindex(dfa, state), + }; + + return perms; +} + +static const char * const mnt_info_table[] = { + "match succeeded", + "failed mntpnt match", + "failed srcname match", + "failed type match", + "failed flags match", + "failed data match" +}; + +/* + * Returns 0 on success else element that match failed in, this is the + * index into the mnt_info_table above + */ +static int do_match_mnt(struct aa_dfa *dfa, unsigned int start, + const char *mntpnt, const char *devname, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data, bool binary, struct aa_perms *perms) +{ + unsigned int state; + + AA_BUG(!dfa); + AA_BUG(!perms); + + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, start, mntpnt); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 1; + + if (devname) + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, devname); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 2; + + if (type) + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, type); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 3; + + state = match_mnt_flags(dfa, state, flags); + if (!state) + return 4; + *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); + if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) + return 0; + + /* only match data if not binary and the DFA flags data is expected */ + if (data && !binary && (perms->allow & AA_MNT_CONT_MATCH)) { + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(dfa, state); + if (!state) + return 4; + + state = aa_dfa_match(dfa, state, data); + if (!state) + return 5; + *perms = compute_mnt_perms(dfa, state); + if (perms->allow & AA_MAY_MOUNT) + return 0; + } + + /* failed at end of flags match */ + return 4; +} + + +static int path_flags(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path) +{ + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!path); + + return profile->path_flags | + (S_ISDIR(path->dentry->d_inode->i_mode) ? PATH_IS_DIR : 0); +} + +/** + * match_mnt_path_str - handle path matching for mount + * @profile: the confining profile + * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) + * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath + * @devnme: string for the devname/src_name (MAY BE NULL OR ERRPTR) + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) + * @flags: mount flags to match + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) + * @binary: whether @data is binary + * @devinfo: error str if (IS_ERR(@devname)) + * + * Returns: 0 on success else error + */ +static int match_mnt_path_str(struct aa_profile *profile, + const struct path *mntpath, char *buffer, + const char *devname, const char *type, + unsigned long flags, void *data, bool binary, + const char *devinfo) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + const char *mntpnt = NULL, *info = NULL; + int pos, error; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!mntpath); + AA_BUG(!buffer); + + if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) + return 0; + + error = aa_path_name(mntpath, path_flags(profile, mntpath), buffer, + &mntpnt, &info, profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + if (IS_ERR(devname)) { + error = PTR_ERR(devname); + devname = NULL; + info = devinfo; + goto audit; + } + + error = -EACCES; + pos = do_match_mnt(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + mntpnt, devname, type, flags, data, binary, &perms); + if (pos) { + info = mnt_info_table[pos]; + goto audit; + } + error = 0; + +audit: + return audit_mount(profile, OP_MOUNT, mntpnt, devname, type, NULL, + flags, data, AA_MAY_MOUNT, &perms, info, error); +} + +/** + * match_mnt - handle path matching for mount + * @profile: the confining profile + * @mntpath: for the mntpnt (NOT NULL) + * @buffer: buffer to be used to lookup mntpath + * @devpath: path devname/src_name (MAYBE NULL) + * @devbuffer: buffer to be used to lookup devname/src_name + * @type: string for the dev type (MAYBE NULL) + * @flags: mount flags to match + * @data: fs mount data (MAYBE NULL) + * @binary: whether @data is binary + * + * Returns: 0 on success else error + */ +static int match_mnt(struct aa_profile *profile, const struct path *path, + char *buffer, struct path *devpath, char *devbuffer, + const char *type, unsigned long flags, void *data, + bool binary) +{ + const char *devname = NULL, *info = NULL; + int error = -EACCES; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(devpath && !devbuffer); + + if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) + return 0; + + if (devpath) { + error = aa_path_name(devpath, path_flags(profile, devpath), + devbuffer, &devname, &info, + profile->disconnected); + if (error) + devname = ERR_PTR(error); + } + + return match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, devname, type, flags, + data, binary, info); +} + +int aa_remount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags, void *data) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + bool binary; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + binary = path->dentry->d_sb->s_type->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; + + get_buffers(buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL, + flags, data, binary)); + put_buffers(buffer); + + return error; +} + +int aa_bind_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *dev_name, unsigned long flags) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; + struct path old_path; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) + return -EINVAL; + + flags &= MS_REC | MS_BIND; + + error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW|LOOKUP_AUTOMOUNT, &old_path); + if (error) + return error; + + get_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer, + NULL, flags, NULL, false)); + put_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + path_put(&old_path); + + return error; +} + +int aa_mount_change_type(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + unsigned long flags) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + /* These are the flags allowed by do_change_type() */ + flags &= (MS_REC | MS_SILENT | MS_SHARED | MS_PRIVATE | MS_SLAVE | + MS_UNBINDABLE); + + get_buffers(buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, NULL, NULL, NULL, + flags, NULL, false)); + put_buffers(buffer); + + return error; +} + +int aa_move_mount(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *path, + const char *orig_name) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL, *old_buffer = NULL; + struct path old_path; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (!orig_name || !*orig_name) + return -EINVAL; + + error = kern_path(orig_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &old_path); + if (error) + return error; + + get_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, &old_path, old_buffer, + NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL, false)); + put_buffers(buffer, old_buffer); + path_put(&old_path); + + return error; +} + +int aa_new_mount(struct aa_label *label, const char *dev_name, + const struct path *path, const char *type, unsigned long flags, + void *data) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL, *dev_buffer = NULL; + bool binary = true; + int error; + int requires_dev = 0; + struct path tmp_path, *dev_path = NULL; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (type) { + struct file_system_type *fstype; + + fstype = get_fs_type(type); + if (!fstype) + return -ENODEV; + binary = fstype->fs_flags & FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA; + requires_dev = fstype->fs_flags & FS_REQUIRES_DEV; + put_filesystem(fstype); + + if (requires_dev) { + if (!dev_name || !*dev_name) + return -ENOENT; + + error = kern_path(dev_name, LOOKUP_FOLLOW, &tmp_path); + if (error) + return error; + dev_path = &tmp_path; + } + } + + get_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer); + if (dev_path) { + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt(profile, path, buffer, dev_path, dev_buffer, + type, flags, data, binary)); + } else { + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + match_mnt_path_str(profile, path, buffer, dev_name, + type, flags, data, binary, NULL)); + } + put_buffers(buffer, dev_buffer); + if (dev_path) + path_put(dev_path); + + return error; +} + +static int profile_umount(struct aa_profile *profile, struct path *path, + char *buffer) +{ + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + const char *name = NULL, *info = NULL; + unsigned int state; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!path); + + if (!PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) + return 0; + + error = aa_path_name(path, path_flags(profile, path), buffer, &name, + &info, profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + name); + perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); + if (AA_MAY_UMOUNT & ~perms.allow) + error = -EACCES; + +audit: + return audit_mount(profile, OP_UMOUNT, name, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL, + AA_MAY_UMOUNT, &perms, info, error); +} + +int aa_umount(struct aa_label *label, struct vfsmount *mnt, int flags) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + char *buffer = NULL; + int error; + struct path path = { .mnt = mnt, .dentry = mnt->mnt_root }; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!mnt); + + get_buffers(buffer); + error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, + profile_umount(profile, &path, buffer)); + put_buffers(buffer); + + return error; +} + +/* helper fn for transition on pivotroot + * + * Returns: label for transition or ERR_PTR. Does not return NULL + */ +static struct aa_label *build_pivotroot(struct aa_profile *profile, + const struct path *new_path, + char *new_buffer, + const struct path *old_path, + char *old_buffer) +{ + const char *old_name, *new_name = NULL, *info = NULL; + const char *trans_name = NULL; + struct aa_perms perms = { }; + unsigned int state; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!profile); + AA_BUG(!new_path); + AA_BUG(!old_path); + + if (profile_unconfined(profile) || + !PROFILE_MEDIATES(profile, AA_CLASS_MOUNT)) + return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); + + error = aa_path_name(old_path, path_flags(profile, old_path), + old_buffer, &old_name, &info, + profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + error = aa_path_name(new_path, path_flags(profile, new_path), + new_buffer, &new_name, &info, + profile->disconnected); + if (error) + goto audit; + + error = -EACCES; + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, + profile->policy.start[AA_CLASS_MOUNT], + new_name); + state = aa_dfa_null_transition(profile->policy.dfa, state); + state = aa_dfa_match(profile->policy.dfa, state, old_name); + perms = compute_mnt_perms(profile->policy.dfa, state); + + if (AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT & perms.allow) + error = 0; + +audit: + error = audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, new_name, old_name, + NULL, trans_name, 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, + &perms, info, error); + if (error) + return ERR_PTR(error); + + return aa_get_newest_label(&profile->label); +} + +int aa_pivotroot(struct aa_label *label, const struct path *old_path, + const struct path *new_path) +{ + struct aa_profile *profile; + struct aa_label *target = NULL; + char *old_buffer = NULL, *new_buffer = NULL, *info = NULL; + int error; + + AA_BUG(!label); + AA_BUG(!old_path); + AA_BUG(!new_path); + + get_buffers(old_buffer, new_buffer); + target = fn_label_build(label, profile, GFP_ATOMIC, + build_pivotroot(profile, new_path, new_buffer, + old_path, old_buffer)); + if (!target) { + info = "label build failed"; + error = -ENOMEM; + goto fail; + } else if (!IS_ERR(target)) { + error = aa_replace_current_label(target); + if (error) { + /* TODO: audit target */ + aa_put_label(target); + goto out; + } + } else + /* already audited error */ + error = PTR_ERR(target); +out: + put_buffers(old_buffer, new_buffer); + + return error; + +fail: + /* TODO: add back in auditing of new_name and old_name */ + error = fn_for_each(label, profile, + audit_mount(profile, OP_PIVOTROOT, NULL /*new_name */, + NULL /* old_name */, + NULL, NULL, + 0, NULL, AA_MAY_PIVOTROOT, &nullperms, info, + error)); + goto out; +} diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy.c b/security/apparmor/policy.c index 244ea4a4a8f0..b0b58848c248 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy.c @@ -289,85 +289,6 @@ fail: return NULL; } -/** - * aa_new_null_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile - * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) - * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat - * @base: name to base the null profile off of - * @gfp: type of allocation - * - * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The - * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX. - * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied - * a unique number - * - * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not - * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when - * not in use. - * - * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure - */ -struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat, - const char *base, gfp_t gfp) -{ - struct aa_profile *profile; - char *name; - - AA_BUG(!parent); - - if (base) { - name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base), - gfp); - if (name) { - sprintf(name, "%s//null-%s", parent->base.hname, base); - goto name; - } - /* fall through to try shorter uniq */ - } - - name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, gfp); - if (!name) - return NULL; - sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, - atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null)); - -name: - /* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */ - profile = aa_find_child(parent, basename(name)); - if (profile) - goto out; - - profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp); - if (!profile) - goto fail; - - profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; - profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL; - if (hat) - profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT; - profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags; - - /* released on free_profile */ - rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent)); - profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns); - profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - - mutex_lock(&profile->ns->lock); - __add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); - mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); - - /* refcount released by caller */ -out: - kfree(name); - - return profile; - -fail: - aa_free_profile(profile); - return NULL; -} - /* TODO: profile accounting - setup in remove */ /** @@ -559,6 +480,94 @@ struct aa_profile *aa_fqlookupn_profile(struct aa_label *base, } /** + * aa_new_null_profile - create or find a null-X learning profile + * @parent: profile that caused this profile to be created (NOT NULL) + * @hat: true if the null- learning profile is a hat + * @base: name to base the null profile off of + * @gfp: type of allocation + * + * Find/Create a null- complain mode profile used in learning mode. The + * name of the profile is unique and follows the format of parent//null-XXX. + * where XXX is based on the @name or if that fails or is not supplied + * a unique number + * + * null profiles are added to the profile list but the list does not + * hold a count on them so that they are automatically released when + * not in use. + * + * Returns: new refcounted profile else NULL on failure + */ +struct aa_profile *aa_new_null_profile(struct aa_profile *parent, bool hat, + const char *base, gfp_t gfp) +{ + struct aa_profile *p, *profile; + const char *bname; + char *name = NULL; + + AA_BUG(!parent); + + if (base) { + name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 8 + strlen(base), + gfp); + if (name) { + sprintf(name, "%s//null-%s", parent->base.hname, base); + goto name; + } + /* fall through to try shorter uniq */ + } + + name = kmalloc(strlen(parent->base.hname) + 2 + 7 + 8, gfp); + if (!name) + return NULL; + sprintf(name, "%s//null-%x", parent->base.hname, + atomic_inc_return(&parent->ns->uniq_null)); + +name: + /* lookup to see if this is a dup creation */ + bname = basename(name); + profile = aa_find_child(parent, bname); + if (profile) + goto out; + + profile = aa_alloc_profile(name, NULL, gfp); + if (!profile) + goto fail; + + profile->mode = APPARMOR_COMPLAIN; + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_NULL; + if (hat) + profile->label.flags |= FLAG_HAT; + profile->path_flags = parent->path_flags; + + /* released on free_profile */ + rcu_assign_pointer(profile->parent, aa_get_profile(parent)); + profile->ns = aa_get_ns(parent->ns); + profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + profile->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + + mutex_lock_nested(&profile->ns->lock, profile->ns->level); + p = __find_child(&parent->base.profiles, bname); + if (p) { + aa_free_profile(profile); + profile = aa_get_profile(p); + } else { + __add_profile(&parent->base.profiles, profile); + } + mutex_unlock(&profile->ns->lock); + + /* refcount released by caller */ +out: + kfree(name); + + return profile; + +fail: + kfree(name); + aa_free_profile(profile); + return NULL; +} + +/** * replacement_allowed - test to see if replacement is allowed * @profile: profile to test if it can be replaced (MAYBE NULL) * @noreplace: true if replacement shouldn't be allowed but addition is okay @@ -897,7 +906,7 @@ ssize_t aa_replace_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *label, } else ns = aa_get_ns(policy_ns ? policy_ns : labels_ns(label)); - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); /* check for duplicate rawdata blobs: space and file dedup */ list_for_each_entry(rawdata_ent, &ns->rawdata_list, list) { if (aa_rawdata_eq(rawdata_ent, udata)) { @@ -1108,13 +1117,13 @@ ssize_t aa_remove_profiles(struct aa_ns *policy_ns, struct aa_label *subj, if (!name) { /* remove namespace - can only happen if fqname[0] == ':' */ - mutex_lock(&ns->parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->parent->lock, ns->level); __aa_remove_ns(ns); __aa_bump_ns_revision(ns); mutex_unlock(&ns->parent->lock); } else { /* remove profile */ - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); profile = aa_get_profile(__lookup_profile(&ns->base, name)); if (!profile) { error = -ENOENT; diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c index 351d3bab3a3d..b1e629cba70b 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_ns.c @@ -112,6 +112,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *alloc_ns(const char *prefix, const char *name) ns->unconfined->label.flags |= FLAG_IX_ON_NAME_ERROR | FLAG_IMMUTIBLE | FLAG_NS_COUNT | FLAG_UNCONFINED; ns->unconfined->mode = APPARMOR_UNCONFINED; + ns->unconfined->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); + ns->unconfined->policy.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); /* ns and ns->unconfined share ns->unconfined refcount */ ns->unconfined->ns = ns; @@ -254,7 +256,8 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, ns = alloc_ns(parent->base.hname, name); if (!ns) return NULL; - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + ns->level = parent->level + 1; + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); error = __aafs_ns_mkdir(ns, ns_subns_dir(parent), name, dir); if (error) { AA_ERROR("Failed to create interface for ns %s\n", @@ -264,7 +267,6 @@ static struct aa_ns *__aa_create_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name, return ERR_PTR(error); } ns->parent = aa_get_ns(parent); - ns->level = parent->level + 1; list_add_rcu(&ns->base.list, &parent->sub_ns); /* add list ref */ aa_get_ns(ns); @@ -311,7 +313,7 @@ struct aa_ns *aa_prepare_ns(struct aa_ns *parent, const char *name) { struct aa_ns *ns; - mutex_lock(&parent->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&parent->lock, parent->level); /* try and find the specified ns and if it doesn't exist create it */ /* released by caller */ ns = aa_get_ns(__aa_find_ns(&parent->sub_ns, name)); @@ -334,7 +336,7 @@ static void destroy_ns(struct aa_ns *ns) if (!ns) return; - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); /* release all profiles in this namespace */ __aa_profile_list_release(&ns->base.profiles); diff --git a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c index c600f4dd1783..59a1a25b7d43 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c +++ b/security/apparmor/policy_unpack.c @@ -85,9 +85,9 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) audit_log_format(ab, " ns="); audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.ns); } - if (aad(sa)->iface.name) { + if (aad(sa)->name) { audit_log_format(ab, " name="); - audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->iface.name); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, aad(sa)->name); } if (aad(sa)->iface.pos) audit_log_format(ab, " offset=%ld", aad(sa)->iface.pos); @@ -114,9 +114,9 @@ static int audit_iface(struct aa_profile *new, const char *ns_name, aad(&sa)->iface.pos = e->pos - e->start; aad(&sa)->iface.ns = ns_name; if (new) - aad(&sa)->iface.name = new->base.hname; + aad(&sa)->name = new->base.hname; else - aad(&sa)->iface.name = name; + aad(&sa)->name = name; aad(&sa)->info = info; aad(&sa)->error = error; @@ -157,7 +157,7 @@ static void do_loaddata_free(struct work_struct *work) struct aa_ns *ns = aa_get_ns(d->ns); if (ns) { - mutex_lock(&ns->lock); + mutex_lock_nested(&ns->lock, ns->level); __aa_fs_remove_rawdata(d); mutex_unlock(&ns->lock); aa_put_ns(ns); @@ -448,7 +448,7 @@ fail: */ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) { - void *pos = e->pos; + void *saved_pos = e->pos; /* exec table is optional */ if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "xtable")) { @@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ static bool unpack_trans_table(struct aa_ext *e, struct aa_profile *profile) fail: aa_free_domain_entries(&profile->file.trans); - e->pos = pos; + e->pos = saved_pos; return 0; } @@ -583,6 +583,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) { struct aa_profile *profile = NULL; const char *tmpname, *tmpns = NULL, *name = NULL; + const char *info = "failed to unpack profile"; size_t ns_len; struct rhashtable_params params = { 0 }; char *key = NULL; @@ -604,8 +605,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) tmpname = aa_splitn_fqname(name, strlen(name), &tmpns, &ns_len); if (tmpns) { *ns_name = kstrndup(tmpns, ns_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!*ns_name) + if (!*ns_name) { + info = "out of memory"; goto fail; + } name = tmpname; } @@ -624,12 +627,15 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (IS_ERR(profile->xmatch)) { error = PTR_ERR(profile->xmatch); profile->xmatch = NULL; + info = "bad xmatch"; goto fail; } /* xmatch_len is not optional if xmatch is set */ if (profile->xmatch) { - if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) + if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) { + info = "missing xmatch len"; goto fail; + } profile->xmatch_len = tmp; } @@ -637,8 +643,11 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) (void) unpack_str(e, &profile->disconnected, "disconnected"); /* per profile debug flags (complain, audit) */ - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "flags")) { + info = "profile missing flags"; goto fail; + } + info = "failed to unpack profile flags"; if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmp, NULL)) goto fail; if (tmp & PACKED_FLAG_HAT) @@ -667,6 +676,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) /* set a default value if path_flags field is not present */ profile->path_flags = PATH_MEDIATE_DELETED; + info = "failed to unpack profile capabilities"; if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[0]), NULL)) goto fail; if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.audit.cap[0]), NULL)) @@ -676,6 +686,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (!unpack_u32(e, &tmpcap.cap[0], NULL)) goto fail; + info = "failed to unpack upper profile capabilities"; if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "caps64")) { /* optional upper half of 64 bit caps */ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.allow.cap[1]), NULL)) @@ -690,6 +701,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } + info = "failed to unpack extended profile capabilities"; if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "capsx")) { /* optional extended caps mediation mask */ if (!unpack_u32(e, &(profile->caps.extended.cap[0]), NULL)) @@ -700,11 +712,14 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) goto fail; } - if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) + if (!unpack_rlimits(e, profile)) { + info = "failed to unpack profile rlimits"; goto fail; + } if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "policydb")) { /* generic policy dfa - optional and may be NULL */ + info = "failed to unpack policydb"; profile->policy.dfa = unpack_dfa(e); if (IS_ERR(profile->policy.dfa)) { error = PTR_ERR(profile->policy.dfa); @@ -734,6 +749,7 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) if (IS_ERR(profile->file.dfa)) { error = PTR_ERR(profile->file.dfa); profile->file.dfa = NULL; + info = "failed to unpack profile file rules"; goto fail; } else if (profile->file.dfa) { if (!unpack_u32(e, &profile->file.start, "dfa_start")) @@ -746,10 +762,13 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) } else profile->file.dfa = aa_get_dfa(nulldfa); - if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) + if (!unpack_trans_table(e, profile)) { + info = "failed to unpack profile transition table"; goto fail; + } if (unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCT, "data")) { + info = "out of memory"; profile->data = kzalloc(sizeof(*profile->data), GFP_KERNEL); if (!profile->data) goto fail; @@ -761,8 +780,10 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) params.hashfn = strhash; params.obj_cmpfn = datacmp; - if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, ¶ms)) + if (rhashtable_init(profile->data, ¶ms)) { + info = "failed to init key, value hash table"; goto fail; + } while (unpack_strdup(e, &key, NULL)) { data = kzalloc(sizeof(*data), GFP_KERNEL); @@ -784,12 +805,16 @@ static struct aa_profile *unpack_profile(struct aa_ext *e, char **ns_name) profile->data->p); } - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) { + info = "failed to unpack end of key, value data table"; goto fail; + } } - if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) + if (!unpack_nameX(e, AA_STRUCTEND, NULL)) { + info = "failed to unpack end of profile"; goto fail; + } return profile; @@ -798,8 +823,7 @@ fail: name = NULL; else if (!name) name = "unknown"; - audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, "failed to unpack profile", e, - error); + audit_iface(profile, NULL, name, info, e, error); aa_free_profile(profile); return ERR_PTR(error); @@ -832,7 +856,7 @@ static int verify_header(struct aa_ext *e, int required, const char **ns) * if not specified use previous version * Mask off everything that is not kernel abi version */ - if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) && VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) { + if (VERSION_LT(e->version, v5) || VERSION_GT(e->version, v7)) { audit_iface(NULL, NULL, NULL, "unsupported interface version", e, error); return error; diff --git a/security/apparmor/resource.c b/security/apparmor/resource.c index d8bc842594ed..cf4d234febe9 100644 --- a/security/apparmor/resource.c +++ b/security/apparmor/resource.c @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void audit_cb(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *va) /** * audit_resource - audit setting resource limit * @profile: profile being enforced (NOT NULL) - * @resoure: rlimit being auditing + * @resource: rlimit being auditing * @value: value being set * @error: error value * @@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ int aa_task_setrlimit(struct aa_label *label, struct task_struct *task, error = fn_for_each(label, profile, audit_resource(profile, resource, new_rlim->rlim_max, peer, - "cap_sys_resoure", -EACCES)); + "cap_sys_resource", -EACCES)); else error = fn_for_each_confined(label, profile, profile_setrlimit(profile, resource, new_rlim)); diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 6bf72b175b49..48620c93d697 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -294,10 +294,10 @@ int cap_capset(struct cred *new, * * Determine if an inode having a change applied that's marked ATTR_KILL_PRIV * affects the security markings on that inode, and if it is, should - * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected? + * inode_killpriv() be invoked or the change rejected. * - * Returns 0 if granted; +ve if granted, but inode_killpriv() is required; and - * -ve to deny the change. + * Returns 1 if security.capability has a value, meaning inode_killpriv() + * is required, 0 otherwise, meaning inode_killpriv() is not required. */ int cap_inode_need_killpriv(struct dentry *dentry) { @@ -348,21 +348,18 @@ static __u32 sansflags(__u32 m) return m & ~VFS_CAP_FLAGS_EFFECTIVE; } -static bool is_v2header(size_t size, __le32 magic) +static bool is_v2header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { - __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic); if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_2) return false; - return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; + return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_2; } -static bool is_v3header(size_t size, __le32 magic) +static bool is_v3header(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { - __u32 m = le32_to_cpu(magic); - if (size != XATTR_CAPS_SZ_3) return false; - return sansflags(m) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; + return sansflags(le32_to_cpu(cap->magic_etc)) == VFS_CAP_REVISION_3; } /* @@ -405,7 +402,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; cap = (struct vfs_cap_data *) tmpbuf; - if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) { + if (is_v2header((size_t) ret, cap)) { /* If this is sizeof(vfs_cap_data) then we're ok with the * on-disk value, so return that. */ if (alloc) @@ -413,7 +410,7 @@ int cap_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name, void **buffer, else kfree(tmpbuf); return ret; - } else if (!is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap->magic_etc)) { + } else if (!is_v3header((size_t) ret, cap)) { kfree(tmpbuf); return -EINVAL; } @@ -470,9 +467,9 @@ static kuid_t rootid_from_xattr(const void *value, size_t size, return make_kuid(task_ns, rootid); } -static bool validheader(size_t size, __le32 magic) +static bool validheader(size_t size, const struct vfs_cap_data *cap) { - return is_v2header(size, magic) || is_v3header(size, magic); + return is_v2header(size, cap) || is_v3header(size, cap); } /* @@ -495,7 +492,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size) if (!*ivalue) return -EINVAL; - if (!validheader(size, cap->magic_etc)) + if (!validheader(size, cap)) return -EINVAL; if (!capable_wrt_inode_uidgid(inode, CAP_SETFCAP)) return -EPERM; @@ -536,7 +533,7 @@ int cap_convert_nscap(struct dentry *dentry, void **ivalue, size_t size) static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, - bool *has_cap) + bool *has_fcap) { struct cred *new = bprm->cred; unsigned i; @@ -546,7 +543,7 @@ static inline int bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data *caps, *effective = true; if (caps->magic_etc & VFS_CAP_REVISION_MASK) - *has_cap = true; + *has_fcap = true; CAP_FOR_EACH_U32(i) { __u32 permitted = caps->permitted.cap[i]; @@ -585,13 +582,14 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data struct vfs_ns_cap_data data, *nscaps = &data; struct vfs_cap_data *caps = (struct vfs_cap_data *) &data; kuid_t rootkuid; - struct user_namespace *fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; + struct user_namespace *fs_ns; memset(cpu_caps, 0, sizeof(struct cpu_vfs_cap_data)); if (!inode) return -ENODATA; + fs_ns = inode->i_sb->s_user_ns; size = __vfs_getxattr((struct dentry *)dentry, inode, XATTR_NAME_CAPS, &data, XATTR_CAPS_SZ); if (size == -ENODATA || size == -EOPNOTSUPP) @@ -652,7 +650,7 @@ int get_vfs_caps_from_disk(const struct dentry *dentry, struct cpu_vfs_cap_data * its xattrs and, if present, apply them to the proposed credentials being * constructed by execve(). */ -static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_cap) +static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_fcap) { int rc = 0; struct cpu_vfs_cap_data vcaps; @@ -683,7 +681,7 @@ static int get_file_caps(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool *effective, bool *has_c goto out; } - rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_cap); + rc = bprm_caps_from_vfs_caps(&vcaps, bprm, effective, has_fcap); if (rc == -EINVAL) printk(KERN_NOTICE "%s: cap_from_disk returned %d for %s\n", __func__, rc, bprm->filename); @@ -695,6 +693,115 @@ out: return rc; } +static inline bool root_privileged(void) { return !issecure(SECURE_NOROOT); } + +static inline bool __is_real(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return uid_eq(cred->uid, uid); } + +static inline bool __is_eff(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return uid_eq(cred->euid, uid); } + +static inline bool __is_suid(kuid_t uid, struct cred *cred) +{ return !__is_real(uid, cred) && __is_eff(uid, cred); } + +/* + * handle_privileged_root - Handle case of privileged root + * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds + * @has_fcap: Are any file capabilities set? + * @effective: Do we have effective root privilege? + * @root_uid: This namespace' root UID WRT initial USER namespace + * + * Handle the case where root is privileged and hasn't been neutered by + * SECURE_NOROOT. If file capabilities are set, they won't be combined with + * set UID root and nothing is changed. If we are root, cap_permitted is + * updated. If we have become set UID root, the effective bit is set. + */ +static void handle_privileged_root(struct linux_binprm *bprm, bool has_fcap, + bool *effective, kuid_t root_uid) +{ + const struct cred *old = current_cred(); + struct cred *new = bprm->cred; + + if (!root_privileged()) + return; + /* + * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs + * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it + * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. + */ + if (has_fcap && __is_suid(root_uid, new)) { + warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); + return; + } + /* + * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root + * executables under compatibility mode, we override the + * capability sets for the file. + */ + if (__is_eff(root_uid, new) || __is_real(root_uid, new)) { + /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ + new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, + old->cap_inheritable); + } + /* + * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. + */ + if (__is_eff(root_uid, new)) + *effective = true; +} + +#define __cap_gained(field, target, source) \ + !cap_issubset(target->cap_##field, source->cap_##field) +#define __cap_grew(target, source, cred) \ + !cap_issubset(cred->cap_##target, cred->cap_##source) +#define __cap_full(field, cred) \ + cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, cred->cap_##field) + +static inline bool __is_setuid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ return !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid); } + +static inline bool __is_setgid(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old) +{ return !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); } + +/* + * 1) Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set + * + * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: + * 1) cap_effective has all caps + * 2) we became root *OR* are were already root + * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) + * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. + * + * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think + * that is interesting information to audit. + * + * A number of other conditions require logging: + * 2) something prevented setuid root getting all caps + * 3) non-setuid root gets fcaps + * 4) non-setuid root gets ambient + */ +static inline bool nonroot_raised_pE(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old, + kuid_t root, bool has_fcap) +{ + bool ret = false; + + if ((__cap_grew(effective, ambient, new) && + !(__cap_full(effective, new) && + (__is_eff(root, new) || __is_real(root, new)) && + root_privileged())) || + (root_privileged() && + __is_suid(root, new) && + !__cap_full(effective, new)) || + (!__is_setuid(new, old) && + ((has_fcap && + __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) || + __cap_gained(ambient, new, old)))) + + ret = true; + + return ret; +} + /** * cap_bprm_set_creds - Set up the proposed credentials for execve(). * @bprm: The execution parameters, including the proposed creds @@ -707,61 +814,33 @@ int cap_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm) { const struct cred *old = current_cred(); struct cred *new = bprm->cred; - bool effective, has_cap = false, is_setid; + bool effective = false, has_fcap = false, is_setid; int ret; kuid_t root_uid; if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(old))) return -EPERM; - effective = false; - ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_cap); + ret = get_file_caps(bprm, &effective, &has_fcap); if (ret < 0) return ret; root_uid = make_kuid(new->user_ns, 0); - if (!issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { - /* - * If the legacy file capability is set, then don't set privs - * for a setuid root binary run by a non-root user. Do set it - * for a root user just to cause least surprise to an admin. - */ - if (has_cap && !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) && uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) { - warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(bprm->filename); - goto skip; - } - /* - * To support inheritance of root-permissions and suid-root - * executables under compatibility mode, we override the - * capability sets for the file. - * - * If only the real uid is 0, we do not set the effective bit. - */ - if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { - /* pP' = (cap_bset & ~0) | (pI & ~0) */ - new->cap_permitted = cap_combine(old->cap_bset, - old->cap_inheritable); - } - if (uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid)) - effective = true; - } -skip: + handle_privileged_root(bprm, has_fcap, &effective, root_uid); /* if we have fs caps, clear dangerous personality flags */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) + if (__cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID; - /* Don't let someone trace a set[ug]id/setpcap binary with the revised * credentials unless they have the appropriate permit. * * In addition, if NO_NEW_PRIVS, then ensure we get no new privs. */ - is_setid = !uid_eq(new->euid, old->uid) || !gid_eq(new->egid, old->gid); + is_setid = __is_setuid(new, old) || __is_setgid(new, old); - if ((is_setid || - !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, old->cap_permitted)) && + if ((is_setid || __cap_gained(permitted, new, old)) && ((bprm->unsafe & ~LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE) || !ptracer_capable(current, new->user_ns))) { /* downgrade; they get no more than they had, and maybe less */ @@ -778,7 +857,7 @@ skip: new->sgid = new->fsgid = new->egid; /* File caps or setid cancels ambient. */ - if (has_cap || is_setid) + if (has_fcap || is_setid) cap_clear(new->cap_ambient); /* @@ -799,26 +878,10 @@ skip: if (WARN_ON(!cap_ambient_invariant_ok(new))) return -EPERM; - /* - * Audit candidate if current->cap_effective is set - * - * We do not bother to audit if 3 things are true: - * 1) cap_effective has all caps - * 2) we are root - * 3) root is supposed to have all caps (SECURE_NOROOT) - * Since this is just a normal root execing a process. - * - * Number 1 above might fail if you don't have a full bset, but I think - * that is interesting information to audit. - */ - if (!cap_issubset(new->cap_effective, new->cap_ambient)) { - if (!cap_issubset(CAP_FULL_SET, new->cap_effective) || - !uid_eq(new->euid, root_uid) || !uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid) || - issecure(SECURE_NOROOT)) { - ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); - if (ret < 0) - return ret; - } + if (nonroot_raised_pE(new, old, root_uid, has_fcap)) { + ret = audit_log_bprm_fcaps(bprm, new, old); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; } new->securebits &= ~issecure_mask(SECURE_KEEP_CAPS); @@ -828,13 +891,11 @@ skip: /* Check for privilege-elevated exec. */ bprm->cap_elevated = 0; - if (is_setid) { + if (is_setid || + (!__is_real(root_uid, new) && + (effective || + __cap_grew(permitted, ambient, new)))) bprm->cap_elevated = 1; - } else if (!uid_eq(new->uid, root_uid)) { - if (effective || - !cap_issubset(new->cap_permitted, new->cap_ambient)) - bprm->cap_elevated = 1; - } return 0; } diff --git a/security/device_cgroup.c b/security/device_cgroup.c index 03c1652c9a1f..c65b39bafdfe 100644 --- a/security/device_cgroup.c +++ b/security/device_cgroup.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * device_cgroup.c - device cgroup subsystem * @@ -14,15 +15,6 @@ #include <linux/rcupdate.h> #include <linux/mutex.h> -#define ACC_MKNOD 1 -#define ACC_READ 2 -#define ACC_WRITE 4 -#define ACC_MASK (ACC_MKNOD | ACC_READ | ACC_WRITE) - -#define DEV_BLOCK 1 -#define DEV_CHAR 2 -#define DEV_ALL 4 /* this represents all devices */ - static DEFINE_MUTEX(devcgroup_mutex); enum devcg_behavior { @@ -245,21 +237,21 @@ static void set_access(char *acc, short access) { int idx = 0; memset(acc, 0, ACCLEN); - if (access & ACC_READ) + if (access & DEVCG_ACC_READ) acc[idx++] = 'r'; - if (access & ACC_WRITE) + if (access & DEVCG_ACC_WRITE) acc[idx++] = 'w'; - if (access & ACC_MKNOD) + if (access & DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) acc[idx++] = 'm'; } static char type_to_char(short type) { - if (type == DEV_ALL) + if (type == DEVCG_DEV_ALL) return 'a'; - if (type == DEV_CHAR) + if (type == DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) return 'c'; - if (type == DEV_BLOCK) + if (type == DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) return 'b'; return 'X'; } @@ -286,10 +278,10 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * This way, the file remains as a "whitelist of devices" */ if (devcgroup->behavior == DEVCG_DEFAULT_ALLOW) { - set_access(acc, ACC_MASK); + set_access(acc, DEVCG_ACC_MASK); set_majmin(maj, ~0); set_majmin(min, ~0); - seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEV_ALL), + seq_printf(m, "%c %s:%s %s\n", type_to_char(DEVCG_DEV_ALL), maj, min, acc); } else { list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, &devcgroup->exceptions, list) { @@ -308,10 +300,10 @@ static int devcgroup_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) /** * match_exception - iterates the exception list trying to find a complete match * @exceptions: list of exceptions - * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR) + * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all - * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD) + * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) * * It is considered a complete match if an exception is found that will * contain the entire range of provided parameters. @@ -324,9 +316,9 @@ static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type, struct dev_exception_item *ex; list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) { - if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK)) continue; - if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)) continue; if (ex->major != ~0 && ex->major != major) continue; @@ -343,10 +335,10 @@ static bool match_exception(struct list_head *exceptions, short type, /** * match_exception_partial - iterates the exception list trying to find a partial match * @exceptions: list of exceptions - * @type: device type (DEV_BLOCK or DEV_CHAR) + * @type: device type (DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK or DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) * @major: device file major number, ~0 to match all * @minor: device file minor number, ~0 to match all - * @access: permission mask (ACC_READ, ACC_WRITE, ACC_MKNOD) + * @access: permission mask (DEVCG_ACC_READ, DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD) * * It is considered a partial match if an exception's range is found to * contain *any* of the devices specified by provided parameters. This is @@ -361,9 +353,9 @@ static bool match_exception_partial(struct list_head *exceptions, short type, struct dev_exception_item *ex; list_for_each_entry_rcu(ex, exceptions, list) { - if ((type & DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEV_BLOCK)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK)) continue; - if ((type & DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEV_CHAR)) + if ((type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR) && !(ex->type & DEVCG_DEV_CHAR)) continue; /* * We must be sure that both the exception and the provided @@ -646,10 +638,10 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, } return 0; case 'b': - ex.type = DEV_BLOCK; + ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_BLOCK; break; case 'c': - ex.type = DEV_CHAR; + ex.type = DEVCG_DEV_CHAR; break; default: return -EINVAL; @@ -702,13 +694,13 @@ static int devcgroup_update_access(struct dev_cgroup *devcgroup, for (b++, count = 0; count < 3; count++, b++) { switch (*b) { case 'r': - ex.access |= ACC_READ; + ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_READ; break; case 'w': - ex.access |= ACC_WRITE; + ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_WRITE; break; case 'm': - ex.access |= ACC_MKNOD; + ex.access |= DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD; break; case '\n': case '\0': @@ -805,12 +797,12 @@ struct cgroup_subsys devices_cgrp_subsys = { * @type: device type * @major: device major number * @minor: device minor number - * @access: combination of ACC_WRITE, ACC_READ and ACC_MKNOD + * @access: combination of DEVCG_ACC_WRITE, DEVCG_ACC_READ and DEVCG_ACC_MKNOD * * returns 0 on success, -EPERM case the operation is not permitted */ -static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, - short access) +int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, + short access) { struct dev_cgroup *dev_cgroup; bool rc; @@ -832,37 +824,3 @@ static int __devcgroup_check_permission(short type, u32 major, u32 minor, return 0; } - -int __devcgroup_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask) -{ - short type, access = 0; - - if (S_ISBLK(inode->i_mode)) - type = DEV_BLOCK; - if (S_ISCHR(inode->i_mode)) - type = DEV_CHAR; - if (mask & MAY_WRITE) - access |= ACC_WRITE; - if (mask & MAY_READ) - access |= ACC_READ; - - return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, imajor(inode), iminor(inode), - access); -} - -int devcgroup_inode_mknod(int mode, dev_t dev) -{ - short type; - - if (!S_ISBLK(mode) && !S_ISCHR(mode)) - return 0; - - if (S_ISBLK(mode)) - type = DEV_BLOCK; - else - type = DEV_CHAR; - - return __devcgroup_check_permission(type, MAJOR(dev), MINOR(dev), - ACC_MKNOD); - -} diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile index 8d1f4bf51087..04d6e462b079 100644 --- a/security/integrity/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for caching inode integrity data (iint) # diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c index 06554c448dce..6f9e4ce568cd 100644 --- a/security/integrity/digsig.c +++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c @@ -112,21 +112,25 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id) int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) { key_ref_t key; - char *data; + void *data; + loff_t size; int rc; if (!keyring[id]) return -EINVAL; - rc = integrity_read_file(path, &data); - if (rc < 0) + rc = kernel_read_file_from_path(path, &data, &size, 0, + READING_X509_CERTIFICATE); + if (rc < 0) { + pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); return rc; + } key = key_create_or_update(make_key_ref(keyring[id], 1), "asymmetric", NULL, data, - rc, + size, ((KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW | KEY_USR_READ), KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA); @@ -139,6 +143,6 @@ int __init integrity_load_x509(const unsigned int id, const char *path) key_ref_to_ptr(key)->description, path); key_ref_put(key); } - kfree(data); + vfree(data); return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h index f5f12727771a..04825393facb 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm.h +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm.h @@ -23,6 +23,12 @@ #define EVM_INIT_HMAC 0x0001 #define EVM_INIT_X509 0x0002 +#define EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES 0x0004 +#define EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE 0x80000000 /* userland has signaled key load */ + +#define EVM_KEY_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509) +#define EVM_INIT_MASK (EVM_INIT_HMAC | EVM_INIT_X509 | EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE | \ + EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) extern int evm_initialized; extern char *evm_hmac; @@ -48,7 +54,7 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, - size_t req_xattr_value_len, char *digest); + size_t req_xattr_value_len, char type, char *digest); int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *xattr, char *hmac_val); int evm_init_secfs(void); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c index 1d32cd20009a..691f3e09154c 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_crypto.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ static struct shash_desc *init_desc(char type) if (type == EVM_XATTR_HMAC) { if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) { - pr_err("HMAC key is not set\n"); + pr_err_once("HMAC key is not set\n"); return ERR_PTR(-ENOKEY); } tfm = &hmac_tfm; @@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ out: * protection.) */ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, - char *digest) + char type, char *digest) { struct h_misc { unsigned long ino; @@ -149,8 +149,13 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, } hmac_misc; memset(&hmac_misc, 0, sizeof(hmac_misc)); - hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; - hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; + /* Don't include the inode or generation number in portable + * signatures + */ + if (type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + hmac_misc.ino = inode->i_ino; + hmac_misc.generation = inode->i_generation; + } /* The hmac uid and gid must be encoded in the initial user * namespace (not the filesystems user namespace) as encoding * them in the filesystems user namespace allows an attack @@ -163,7 +168,8 @@ static void hmac_add_misc(struct shash_desc *desc, struct inode *inode, hmac_misc.gid = from_kgid(&init_user_ns, inode->i_gid); hmac_misc.mode = inode->i_mode; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)&hmac_misc, sizeof(hmac_misc)); - if (evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) + if ((evm_hmac_attrs & EVM_ATTR_FSUUID) && + type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) crypto_shash_update(desc, &inode->i_sb->s_uuid.b[0], sizeof(inode->i_sb->s_uuid)); crypto_shash_final(desc, digest); @@ -189,6 +195,7 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, char *xattr_value = NULL; int error; int size; + bool ima_present = false; if (!(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return -EOPNOTSUPP; @@ -199,11 +206,18 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, error = -ENODATA; for (xattrname = evm_config_xattrnames; *xattrname != NULL; xattrname++) { + bool is_ima = false; + + if (strcmp(*xattrname, XATTR_NAME_IMA) == 0) + is_ima = true; + if ((req_xattr_name && req_xattr_value) && !strcmp(*xattrname, req_xattr_name)) { error = 0; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)req_xattr_value, req_xattr_value_len); + if (is_ima) + ima_present = true; continue; } size = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, *xattrname, @@ -218,9 +232,14 @@ static int evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(struct dentry *dentry, error = 0; xattr_size = size; crypto_shash_update(desc, (const u8 *)xattr_value, xattr_size); + if (is_ima) + ima_present = true; } - hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, digest); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, type, digest); + /* Portable EVM signatures must include an IMA hash */ + if (type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG && !ima_present) + return -EPERM; out: kfree(xattr_value); kfree(desc); @@ -232,17 +251,45 @@ int evm_calc_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, char *digest) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, digest); } int evm_calc_hash(struct dentry *dentry, const char *req_xattr_name, const char *req_xattr_value, size_t req_xattr_value_len, - char *digest) + char type, char *digest) { return evm_calc_hmac_or_hash(dentry, req_xattr_name, req_xattr_value, - req_xattr_value_len, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST, digest); + req_xattr_value_len, type, digest); +} + +static int evm_is_immutable(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode) +{ + const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = NULL; + struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; + int rc = 0; + + iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); + if (iint && (iint->flags & EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG)) + return 1; + + /* Do this the hard way */ + rc = vfs_getxattr_alloc(dentry, XATTR_NAME_EVM, (char **)&xattr_data, 0, + GFP_NOFS); + if (rc <= 0) { + if (rc == -ENODATA) + return 0; + return rc; + } + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) + rc = 1; + else + rc = 0; + + kfree(xattr_data); + return rc; } + /* * Calculate the hmac and update security.evm xattr * @@ -255,6 +302,16 @@ int evm_update_evmxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, struct evm_ima_xattr_data xattr_data; int rc = 0; + /* + * Don't permit any transformation of the EVM xattr if the signature + * is of an immutable type + */ + rc = evm_is_immutable(dentry, inode); + if (rc < 0) + return rc; + if (rc) + return -EPERM; + rc = evm_calc_hmac(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len, xattr_data.digest); if (rc == 0) { @@ -280,7 +337,7 @@ int evm_init_hmac(struct inode *inode, const struct xattr *lsm_xattr, } crypto_shash_update(desc, lsm_xattr->value, lsm_xattr->value_len); - hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, hmac_val); + hmac_add_misc(desc, inode, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, hmac_val); kfree(desc); return 0; } diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 063d38aef64e..a8d502827270 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ int evm_initialized; static char *integrity_status_msg[] = { - "pass", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" + "pass", "pass_immutable", "fail", "no_label", "no_xattrs", "unknown" }; char *evm_hmac = "hmac(sha1)"; char *evm_hash = "sha1"; @@ -49,6 +49,9 @@ char *evm_config_xattrnames[] = { XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, #endif #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_APPARMOR + XATTR_NAME_APPARMOR, +#endif #ifdef CONFIG_IMA_APPRAISE XATTR_NAME_IMA, #endif @@ -73,6 +76,11 @@ static void __init evm_init_config(void) pr_info("HMAC attrs: 0x%x\n", evm_hmac_attrs); } +static bool evm_key_loaded(void) +{ + return (bool)(evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK); +} + static int evm_find_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); @@ -120,7 +128,8 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, enum integrity_status evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS; int rc, xattr_len; - if (iint && iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS) + if (iint && (iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS || + iint->evm_status == INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE)) return iint->evm_status; /* if status is not PASS, try to check again - against -ENOMEM */ @@ -161,22 +170,26 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, rc = -EINVAL; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: + case EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG: rc = evm_calc_hash(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, - xattr_value_len, calc.digest); + xattr_value_len, xattr_data->type, + calc.digest); if (rc) break; rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM, (const char *)xattr_data, xattr_len, calc.digest, sizeof(calc.digest)); if (!rc) { - /* Replace RSA with HMAC if not mounted readonly and - * not immutable - */ - if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) && - !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) + if (xattr_data->type == EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) { + if (iint) + iint->flags |= EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG; + evm_status = INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE; + } else if (!IS_RDONLY(d_backing_inode(dentry)) && + !IS_IMMUTABLE(d_backing_inode(dentry))) { evm_update_evmxattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + } } break; default: @@ -238,7 +251,7 @@ enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry, void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint) { - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; if (!iint) { @@ -262,7 +275,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); - if (!evm_initialized || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || evm_fixmode) return 0; return evm_verify_hmac(dentry, NULL, NULL, 0, NULL); } @@ -277,7 +290,7 @@ static enum integrity_status evm_verify_current_integrity(struct dentry *dentry) * affect security.evm. An interesting side affect of writing posix xattr * acls is their modifying of the i_mode, which is included in security.evm. * For posix xattr acls only, permit security.evm, even if it currently - * doesn't exist, to be updated. + * doesn't exist, to be updated unless the EVM signature is immutable. */ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) @@ -296,6 +309,7 @@ static int evm_protect_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, return 0; goto out; } + evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); if (evm_status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS) { struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; @@ -342,10 +356,17 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, { const struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data = xattr_value; + /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though + * there's no HMAC key loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) + return 0; + if (strcmp(xattr_name, XATTR_NAME_EVM) == 0) { if (!xattr_value_len) return -EINVAL; - if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) + if (xattr_data->type != EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG && + xattr_data->type != EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG) return -EPERM; } return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value, @@ -362,6 +383,12 @@ int evm_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ int evm_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { + /* Policy permits modification of the protected xattrs even though + * there's no HMAC key loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) + return 0; + return evm_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, NULL, 0); } @@ -390,8 +417,8 @@ static void evm_reset_status(struct inode *inode) void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, const void *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len) { - if (!evm_initialized || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) - && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || (!evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name) + && !posix_xattr_acl(xattr_name))) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -411,7 +438,7 @@ void evm_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, */ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) { - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(xattr_name)) return; evm_reset_status(dentry->d_inode); @@ -422,12 +449,21 @@ void evm_inode_post_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name) /** * evm_inode_setattr - prevent updating an invalid EVM extended attribute * @dentry: pointer to the affected dentry + * + * Permit update of file attributes when files have a valid EVM signature, + * except in the case of them having an immutable portable signature. */ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) { unsigned int ia_valid = attr->ia_valid; enum integrity_status evm_status; + /* Policy permits modification of the protected attrs even though + * there's no HMAC key loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) + return 0; + if (!(ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID))) return 0; evm_status = evm_verify_current_integrity(dentry); @@ -453,7 +489,7 @@ int evm_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *attr) */ void evm_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, int ia_valid) { - if (!evm_initialized) + if (!evm_key_loaded()) return; if (ia_valid & (ATTR_MODE | ATTR_UID | ATTR_GID)) @@ -470,7 +506,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_data; int rc; - if (!evm_initialized || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) + if (!evm_key_loaded() || !evm_protected_xattr(lsm_xattr->name)) return 0; xattr_data = kzalloc(sizeof(*xattr_data), GFP_NOFS); diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c index c8dccd54d501..feba03bbedae 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_secfs.c @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, if (*ppos != 0) return 0; - sprintf(temp, "%d", evm_initialized); + sprintf(temp, "%d", (evm_initialized & ~EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)); rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp)); return rc; @@ -61,24 +61,43 @@ static ssize_t evm_read_key(struct file *filp, char __user *buf, static ssize_t evm_write_key(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos) { - char temp[80]; - int i; + int i, ret; - if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) || (evm_initialized & EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE)) return -EPERM; - if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0) - return -EINVAL; - - if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0) - return -EFAULT; + ret = kstrtoint_from_user(buf, count, 0, &i); - temp[count] = '\0'; + if (ret) + return ret; - if ((sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1) || (i != 1)) + /* Reject invalid values */ + if (!i || (i & ~EVM_INIT_MASK) != 0) return -EINVAL; - evm_init_key(); + /* Don't allow a request to freshly enable metadata writes if + * keys are loaded. + */ + if ((i & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES) && + ((evm_initialized & EVM_KEY_MASK) != 0) && + !(evm_initialized & EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES)) + return -EPERM; + + if (i & EVM_INIT_HMAC) { + ret = evm_init_key(); + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + /* Forbid further writes after the symmetric key is loaded */ + i |= EVM_SETUP_COMPLETE; + } + + evm_initialized |= i; + + /* Don't allow protected metadata modification if a symmetric key + * is loaded + */ + if (evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) + evm_initialized &= ~(EVM_ALLOW_METADATA_WRITES); return count; } diff --git a/security/integrity/iint.c b/security/integrity/iint.c index 6fc888ca468e..fc38ca08dbb5 100644 --- a/security/integrity/iint.c +++ b/security/integrity/iint.c @@ -153,14 +153,12 @@ static void init_once(void *foo) struct integrity_iint_cache *iint = foo; memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); - iint->version = 0; - iint->flags = 0UL; iint->ima_file_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_mmap_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_bprm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->ima_read_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; iint->evm_status = INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN; - iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + mutex_init(&iint->mutex); } static int __init integrity_iintcache_init(void) @@ -200,55 +198,6 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, } /* - * integrity_read_file - read entire file content into the buffer - * - * This is function opens a file, allocates the buffer of required - * size, read entire file content to the buffer and closes the file - * - * It is used only by init code. - * - */ -int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data) -{ - struct file *file; - loff_t size; - char *buf; - int rc = -EINVAL; - - if (!path || !*path) - return -EINVAL; - - file = filp_open(path, O_RDONLY, 0); - if (IS_ERR(file)) { - rc = PTR_ERR(file); - pr_err("Unable to open file: %s (%d)", path, rc); - return rc; - } - - size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); - if (size <= 0) - goto out; - - buf = kmalloc(size, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!buf) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - goto out; - } - - rc = integrity_kernel_read(file, 0, buf, size); - if (rc == size) { - *data = buf; - } else { - kfree(buf); - if (rc >= 0) - rc = -EIO; - } -out: - fput(file); - return rc; -} - -/* * integrity_load_keys - load integrity keys hook * * Hooks is called from init/main.c:kernel_init_freeable() diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile index 29f198bde02b..d921dc4f9eb0 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/Makefile +++ b/security/integrity/ima/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for building Trusted Computing Group's(TCG) runtime Integrity # Measurement Architecture(IMA). diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index c2edba8de35e..08fe405338e1 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/evm.h> +#include <linux/iversion.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -174,7 +175,7 @@ err_out: */ int ima_get_action(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func, int *pcr) { - int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE; + int flags = IMA_MEASURE | IMA_AUDIT | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH; flags &= ima_policy_flag; @@ -199,42 +200,59 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; int result = 0; + int length; + void *tmpbuf; + u64 i_version; struct { struct ima_digest_data hdr; char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; } hash; - if (!(iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED)) { - u64 i_version = file_inode(file)->i_version; + if (iint->flags & IMA_COLLECTED) + goto out; - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { - audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; - result = -EACCES; - goto out; - } + /* + * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems + * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial + * measurement/appraisal/audit. + */ + i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); + hash.hdr.algo = algo; - hash.hdr.algo = algo; - - result = (!buf) ? ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr) : - ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); - if (!result) { - int length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; - void *tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, - GFP_NOFS); - if (tmpbuf) { - iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; - memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); - iint->version = i_version; - iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; - } else - result = -ENOMEM; - } + /* Initialize hash digest to 0's in case of failure */ + memset(&hash.digest, 0, sizeof(hash.digest)); + + if (buf) + result = ima_calc_buffer_hash(buf, size, &hash.hdr); + else + result = ima_calc_file_hash(file, &hash.hdr); + + if (result && result != -EBADF && result != -EINVAL) + goto out; + + length = sizeof(hash.hdr) + hash.hdr.length; + tmpbuf = krealloc(iint->ima_hash, length, GFP_NOFS); + if (!tmpbuf) { + result = -ENOMEM; + goto out; } + + iint->ima_hash = tmpbuf; + memcpy(iint->ima_hash, &hash, length); + iint->version = i_version; + + /* Possibly temporary failure due to type of read (eg. O_DIRECT) */ + if (!result) + iint->flags |= IMA_COLLECTED; out: - if (result) + if (result) { + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) + audit_cause = "failed(directio)"; + integrity_audit_msg(AUDIT_INTEGRITY_DATA, inode, filename, "collect_data", audit_cause, result, 0); + } return result; } @@ -278,7 +296,7 @@ void ima_store_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, } result = ima_store_template(entry, violation, inode, filename, pcr); - if (!result || result == -EEXIST) { + if ((!result || result == -EEXIST) && !(file->f_flags & O_DIRECT)) { iint->flags |= IMA_MEASURED; iint->measured_pcrs |= (0x1 << pcr); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c index 809ba70fbbbf..f2803a40ff82 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c @@ -40,20 +40,21 @@ __setup("ima_appraise=", default_appraise_setup); */ bool is_ima_appraise_enabled(void) { - return (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) ? 1 : 0; + return ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE; } /* * ima_must_appraise - set appraise flag * - * Return 1 to appraise + * Return 1 to appraise or hash */ int ima_must_appraise(struct inode *inode, int mask, enum ima_hooks func) { if (!ima_appraise) return 0; - return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE, NULL); + return ima_match_policy(inode, func, mask, IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_HASH, + NULL); } static int ima_fix_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, @@ -223,13 +224,16 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, if (opened & FILE_CREATED) iint->flags |= IMA_NEW_FILE; if ((iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE) && - !(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED)) + (!(iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED) || + (inode->i_size == 0))) status = INTEGRITY_PASS; goto out; } status = evm_verifyxattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA, xattr_value, rc, iint); - if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) { + if ((status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && + (status != INTEGRITY_PASS_IMMUTABLE) && + (status != INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN)) { if ((status == INTEGRITY_NOLABEL) || (status == INTEGRITY_NOXATTRS)) cause = "missing-HMAC"; @@ -248,6 +252,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_FAIL; break; } + clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); if (xattr_len - sizeof(xattr_value->type) - hash_start >= iint->ima_hash->length) /* xattr length may be longer. md5 hash in previous @@ -266,7 +271,7 @@ int ima_appraise_measurement(enum ima_hooks func, status = INTEGRITY_PASS; break; case EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG: - iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); rc = integrity_digsig_verify(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA, (const char *)xattr_value, rc, iint->ima_hash->digest, @@ -317,14 +322,20 @@ void ima_update_xattr(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct file *file) int rc = 0; /* do not collect and update hash for digital signatures */ - if (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) + if (test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags)) + return; + + if ((iint->ima_file_status != INTEGRITY_PASS) && + !(iint->flags & IMA_HASH)) return; rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, NULL, 0, ima_hash_algo); if (rc < 0) return; + inode_lock(file_inode(file)); ima_fix_xattr(dentry, iint); + inode_unlock(file_inode(file)); } /** @@ -340,23 +351,21 @@ void ima_inode_post_setattr(struct dentry *dentry) { struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry); struct integrity_iint_cache *iint; - int must_appraise; + int action; if (!(ima_policy_flag & IMA_APPRAISE) || !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) || !(inode->i_opflags & IOP_XATTR)) return; - must_appraise = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); + action = ima_must_appraise(inode, MAY_ACCESS, POST_SETATTR); + if (!action) + __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (iint) { - iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | - IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | - IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS); - if (must_appraise) - iint->flags |= IMA_APPRAISE; + set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + if (!action) + clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); } - if (!must_appraise) - __vfs_removexattr(dentry, XATTR_NAME_IMA); } /* @@ -385,12 +394,12 @@ static void ima_reset_appraise_flags(struct inode *inode, int digsig) iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); if (!iint) return; - - iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; iint->measured_pcrs = 0; + set_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); if (digsig) - iint->flags |= IMA_DIGSIG; - return; + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + else + clear_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); } int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, @@ -405,7 +414,7 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name, if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST)) return -EINVAL; ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), - (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0); + xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG); result = 0; } return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c index 802d5d20f36f..205bc69361ea 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_crypto.c @@ -27,11 +27,6 @@ #include "ima.h" -struct ahash_completion { - struct completion completion; - int err; -}; - /* minimum file size for ahash use */ static unsigned long ima_ahash_minsize; module_param_named(ahash_minsize, ima_ahash_minsize, ulong, 0644); @@ -196,30 +191,13 @@ static void ima_free_atfm(struct crypto_ahash *tfm) crypto_free_ahash(tfm); } -static void ahash_complete(struct crypto_async_request *req, int err) +static inline int ahash_wait(int err, struct crypto_wait *wait) { - struct ahash_completion *res = req->data; - if (err == -EINPROGRESS) - return; - res->err = err; - complete(&res->completion); -} + err = crypto_wait_req(err, wait); -static int ahash_wait(int err, struct ahash_completion *res) -{ - switch (err) { - case 0: - break; - case -EINPROGRESS: - case -EBUSY: - wait_for_completion(&res->completion); - reinit_completion(&res->completion); - err = res->err; - /* fall through */ - default: + if (err) pr_crit_ratelimited("ahash calculation failed: err: %d\n", err); - } return err; } @@ -233,7 +211,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, int rc, read = 0, rbuf_len, active = 0, ahash_rc = 0; struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg[1]; - struct ahash_completion res; + struct crypto_wait wait; size_t rbuf_size[2]; hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); @@ -242,12 +220,12 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, if (!req) return -ENOMEM; - init_completion(&res.completion); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - ahash_complete, &res); + crypto_req_done, &wait); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait); if (rc) goto out1; @@ -288,7 +266,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, * read/request, wait for the completion of the * previous ahash_update() request. */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); if (rc) goto out3; } @@ -304,7 +282,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, * read/request, wait for the completion of the * previous ahash_update() request. */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); if (rc) goto out3; } @@ -318,7 +296,7 @@ static int ima_calc_file_hash_atfm(struct file *file, active = !active; /* swap buffers, if we use two */ } /* wait for the last update request to complete */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); out3: if (read) file->f_mode &= ~FMODE_READ; @@ -327,7 +305,7 @@ out3: out2: if (!rc) { ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait); } out1: ahash_request_free(req); @@ -441,6 +419,16 @@ int ima_calc_file_hash(struct file *file, struct ima_digest_data *hash) loff_t i_size; int rc; + /* + * For consistency, fail file's opened with the O_DIRECT flag on + * filesystems mounted with/without DAX option. + */ + if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) { + hash->length = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; + hash->algo = ima_hash_algo; + return -EINVAL; + } + i_size = i_size_read(file_inode(file)); if (ima_ahash_minsize && i_size >= ima_ahash_minsize) { @@ -527,7 +515,7 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len, { struct ahash_request *req; struct scatterlist sg; - struct ahash_completion res; + struct crypto_wait wait; int rc, ahash_rc = 0; hash->length = crypto_ahash_digestsize(tfm); @@ -536,12 +524,12 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len, if (!req) return -ENOMEM; - init_completion(&res.completion); + crypto_init_wait(&wait); ahash_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - ahash_complete, &res); + crypto_req_done, &wait); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_init(req), &wait); if (rc) goto out; @@ -551,10 +539,10 @@ static int calc_buffer_ahash_atfm(const void *buf, loff_t len, ahash_rc = crypto_ahash_update(req); /* wait for the update request to complete */ - rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &res); + rc = ahash_wait(ahash_rc, &wait); if (!rc) { ahash_request_set_crypt(req, NULL, hash->digest, 0); - rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &res); + rc = ahash_wait(crypto_ahash_final(req), &wait); } out: ahash_request_free(req); @@ -644,7 +632,7 @@ static void __init ima_pcrread(int idx, u8 *pcr) if (!ima_used_chip) return; - if (tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, idx, pcr) != 0) + if (tpm_pcr_read(NULL, idx, pcr) != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip\n"); } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index ad491c51e833..fa540c0469da 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ bool ima_canonical_fmt; static int __init default_canonical_fmt_setup(char *str) { #ifdef __BIG_ENDIAN - ima_canonical_fmt = 1; + ima_canonical_fmt = true; #endif return 1; } @@ -429,10 +429,10 @@ static int ima_release_policy(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) } ima_update_policy(); -#ifndef CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY +#if !defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) && !defined(CONFIG_IMA_READ_POLICY) securityfs_remove(ima_policy); ima_policy = NULL; -#else +#elif defined(CONFIG_IMA_WRITE_POLICY) clear_bit(IMA_FS_BUSY, &ima_fs_flags); #endif return 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index 2967d497a665..29b72cd2502e 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ int __init ima_init(void) int rc; ima_used_chip = 0; - rc = tpm_pcr_read(TPM_ANY_NUM, 0, pcr_i); + rc = tpm_pcr_read(NULL, 0, pcr_i); if (rc == 0) ima_used_chip = 1; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 2aebb7984437..061425dd6400 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/xattr.h> #include <linux/ima.h> +#include <linux/iversion.h> #include "ima.h" @@ -51,6 +52,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_SHA1; else if (strncmp(str, "md5", 3) == 0) ima_hash_algo = HASH_ALGO_MD5; + else + return 1; goto out; } @@ -60,6 +63,8 @@ static int __init hash_setup(char *str) break; } } + if (i == HASH_ALGO__LAST) + return 1; out: hash_setup_done = 1; return 1; @@ -80,10 +85,10 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, int must_measure, char **pathbuf, - const char **pathname) + const char **pathname, + char *filename) { struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); - char filename[NAME_MAX]; fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; bool send_tomtou = false, send_writers = false; @@ -92,10 +97,13 @@ static void ima_rdwr_violation_check(struct file *file, if (!iint) iint = integrity_iint_find(inode); /* IMA_MEASURE is set from reader side */ - if (iint && (iint->flags & IMA_MEASURE)) + if (iint && test_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, + &iint->atomic_flags)) send_tomtou = true; } } else { + if (must_measure) + set_bit(IMA_MUST_MEASURE, &iint->atomic_flags); if ((atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) > 0) && must_measure) send_writers = true; } @@ -117,21 +125,25 @@ static void ima_check_last_writer(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, struct inode *inode, struct file *file) { fmode_t mode = file->f_mode; + bool update; if (!(mode & FMODE_WRITE)) return; - inode_lock(inode); + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); if (atomic_read(&inode->i_writecount) == 1) { - if ((iint->version != inode->i_version) || + update = test_and_clear_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, + &iint->atomic_flags); + if (!IS_I_VERSION(inode) || + inode_cmp_iversion(inode, iint->version) || (iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) { iint->flags &= ~(IMA_DONE_MASK | IMA_NEW_FILE); iint->measured_pcrs = 0; - if (iint->flags & IMA_APPRAISE) + if (update) ima_update_xattr(iint, file); } } - inode_unlock(inode); + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); } /** @@ -164,7 +176,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, char *pathbuf = NULL; char filename[NAME_MAX]; const char *pathname = NULL; - int rc = -ENOMEM, action, must_appraise; + int rc = 0, action, must_appraise = 0; int pcr = CONFIG_IMA_MEASURE_PCR_IDX; struct evm_ima_xattr_data *xattr_value = NULL; int xattr_len = 0; @@ -195,17 +207,31 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if (action) { iint = integrity_inode_get(inode); if (!iint) - goto out; + rc = -ENOMEM; } - if (violation_check) { + if (!rc && violation_check) ima_rdwr_violation_check(file, iint, action & IMA_MEASURE, - &pathbuf, &pathname); - if (!action) { - rc = 0; - goto out_free; - } - } + &pathbuf, &pathname, filename); + + inode_unlock(inode); + + if (rc) + goto out; + if (!action) + goto out; + + mutex_lock(&iint->mutex); + + if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_ATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) + /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */ + iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | + IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | + IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); + + if (test_and_clear_bit(IMA_CHANGE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags)) + /* reset all flags if ima_inode_setxattr was called */ + iint->flags &= ~IMA_DONE_MASK; /* Determine if already appraised/measured based on bitmask * (IMA_MEASURE, IMA_MEASURED, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISE, IMA_XXXX_APPRAISED, @@ -219,11 +245,23 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if ((action & IMA_MEASURE) && (iint->measured_pcrs & (0x1 << pcr))) action ^= IMA_MEASURE; + /* HASH sets the digital signature and update flags, nothing else */ + if ((action & IMA_HASH) && + !(test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags))) { + xattr_len = ima_read_xattr(file_dentry(file), &xattr_value); + if ((xattr_value && xattr_len > 2) && + (xattr_value->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG)) + set_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags); + iint->flags |= IMA_HASHED; + action ^= IMA_HASH; + set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + } + /* Nothing to do, just return existing appraised status */ if (!action) { if (must_appraise) rc = ima_get_cache_status(iint, func); - goto out_digsig; + goto out_locked; } template_desc = ima_template_desc_current(); @@ -235,11 +273,8 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, hash_algo = ima_get_hash_algo(xattr_value, xattr_len); rc = ima_collect_measurement(iint, file, buf, size, hash_algo); - if (rc != 0) { - if (file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) - rc = (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO) ? 0 : -EACCES; - goto out_digsig; - } + if (rc != 0 && rc != -EBADF && rc != -EINVAL) + goto out_locked; if (!pathbuf) /* ima_rdwr_violation possibly pre-fetched */ pathname = ima_d_path(&file->f_path, &pathbuf, filename); @@ -247,24 +282,32 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, char *buf, loff_t size, if (action & IMA_MEASURE) ima_store_measurement(iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, pcr); - if (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + if (rc == 0 && (action & IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK)) { + inode_lock(inode); rc = ima_appraise_measurement(func, iint, file, pathname, xattr_value, xattr_len, opened); + inode_unlock(inode); + } if (action & IMA_AUDIT) ima_audit_measurement(iint, pathname); -out_digsig: - if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && (iint->flags & IMA_DIGSIG) && + if ((file->f_flags & O_DIRECT) && (iint->flags & IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO)) + rc = 0; +out_locked: + if ((mask & MAY_WRITE) && test_bit(IMA_DIGSIG, &iint->atomic_flags) && !(iint->flags & IMA_NEW_FILE)) rc = -EACCES; + mutex_unlock(&iint->mutex); kfree(xattr_value); -out_free: +out: if (pathbuf) __putname(pathbuf); -out: - inode_unlock(inode); - if ((rc && must_appraise) && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) - return -EACCES; + if (must_appraise) { + if (rc && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + return -EACCES; + if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE) + set_bit(IMA_UPDATE_XATTR, &iint->atomic_flags); + } return 0; } @@ -359,12 +402,14 @@ void ima_post_path_mknod(struct dentry *dentry) */ int ima_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id read_id) { + bool sig_enforce = is_module_sig_enforced(); + if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) { -#ifndef CONFIG_MODULE_SIG_FORCE - if ((ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && - (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) + if (!sig_enforce && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_MODULES) && + (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE)) { + pr_err("impossible to appraise a module without a file descriptor. sig_enforce kernel parameter might help\n"); return -EACCES; /* INTEGRITY_UNKNOWN */ -#endif + } return 0; /* We rely on module signature checking */ } return 0; @@ -406,6 +451,10 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, if (!file && read_id == READING_MODULE) /* MODULE_SIG_FORCE enabled */ return 0; + /* permit signed certs */ + if (!file && read_id == READING_X509_CERTIFICATE) + return 0; + if (!file || !buf || size == 0) { /* should never happen */ if (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE) return -EACCES; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 95209a5f8595..915f5572c6ff 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -40,6 +40,8 @@ #define APPRAISE 0x0004 /* same as IMA_APPRAISE */ #define DONT_APPRAISE 0x0008 #define AUDIT 0x0040 +#define HASH 0x0100 +#define DONT_HASH 0x0200 #define INVALID_PCR(a) (((a) < 0) || \ (a) >= (FIELD_SIZEOF(struct integrity_iint_cache, measured_pcrs) * 8)) @@ -196,9 +198,9 @@ static int __init policy_setup(char *str) if ((strcmp(p, "tcb") == 0) && !ima_policy) ima_policy = DEFAULT_TCB; else if (strcmp(p, "appraise_tcb") == 0) - ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; else if (strcmp(p, "secure_boot") == 0) - ima_use_secure_boot = 1; + ima_use_secure_boot = true; } return 1; @@ -207,7 +209,7 @@ __setup("ima_policy=", policy_setup); static int __init default_appraise_policy_setup(char *str) { - ima_use_appraise_tcb = 1; + ima_use_appraise_tcb = true; return 1; } __setup("ima_appraise_tcb", default_appraise_policy_setup); @@ -380,8 +382,10 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct inode *inode, enum ima_hooks func, int mask, action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK; - if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) + if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) { action |= get_subaction(entry, func); + action ^= IMA_HASH; + } if (entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK) actmask &= ~(entry->action | entry->action << 1); @@ -521,7 +525,7 @@ enum { Opt_err = -1, Opt_measure = 1, Opt_dont_measure, Opt_appraise, Opt_dont_appraise, - Opt_audit, + Opt_audit, Opt_hash, Opt_dont_hash, Opt_obj_user, Opt_obj_role, Opt_obj_type, Opt_subj_user, Opt_subj_role, Opt_subj_type, Opt_func, Opt_mask, Opt_fsmagic, @@ -538,6 +542,8 @@ static match_table_t policy_tokens = { {Opt_appraise, "appraise"}, {Opt_dont_appraise, "dont_appraise"}, {Opt_audit, "audit"}, + {Opt_hash, "hash"}, + {Opt_dont_hash, "dont_hash"}, {Opt_obj_user, "obj_user=%s"}, {Opt_obj_role, "obj_role=%s"}, {Opt_obj_type, "obj_type=%s"}, @@ -671,6 +677,22 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) entry->action = AUDIT; break; + case Opt_hash: + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "hash"); + + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + entry->action = HASH; + break; + case Opt_dont_hash: + ima_log_string(ab, "action", "dont_hash"); + + if (entry->action != UNKNOWN) + result = -EINVAL; + + entry->action = DONT_HASH; + break; case Opt_func: ima_log_string(ab, "func", args[0].from); @@ -743,7 +765,7 @@ static int ima_parse_rule(char *rule, struct ima_rule_entry *entry) case Opt_fsuuid: ima_log_string(ab, "fsuuid", args[0].from); - if (uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) { + if (!uuid_is_null(&entry->fsuuid)) { result = -EINVAL; break; } @@ -1040,6 +1062,10 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_appraise)); if (entry->action & AUDIT) seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_audit)); + if (entry->action & HASH) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_hash)); + if (entry->action & DONT_HASH) + seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_dont_hash)); seq_puts(m, " "); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c index a02a86d51102..418f35e38015 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_queue.c @@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static int ima_pcr_extend(const u8 *hash, int pcr) if (!ima_used_chip) return result; - result = tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcr, hash); + result = tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcr, hash); if (result != 0) pr_err("Error Communicating to TPM chip, result: %d\n", result); return result; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c index 7412d0291ab9..30db39b23804 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c @@ -377,8 +377,7 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) break; if (hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len >= MAX_TEMPLATE_NAME_LEN) { - pr_err("attempting to restore a template name \ - that is too long\n"); + pr_err("attempting to restore a template name that is too long\n"); ret = -EINVAL; break; } @@ -389,8 +388,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) template_name[hdr[HDR_TEMPLATE_NAME].len] = 0; if (strcmp(template_name, "ima") == 0) { - pr_err("attempting to restore an unsupported \ - template \"%s\" failed\n", template_name); + pr_err("attempting to restore an unsupported template \"%s\" failed\n", + template_name); ret = -EINVAL; break; } @@ -410,8 +409,8 @@ int ima_restore_measurement_list(loff_t size, void *buf) &(template_desc->fields), &(template_desc->num_fields)); if (ret < 0) { - pr_err("attempting to restore the template fmt \"%s\" \ - failed\n", template_desc->fmt); + pr_err("attempting to restore the template fmt \"%s\" failed\n", + template_desc->fmt); ret = -EINVAL; break; } diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index a53e7e4ab06c..50a8e3365df7 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -25,39 +25,50 @@ #define IMA_COLLECTED 0x00000020 #define IMA_AUDIT 0x00000040 #define IMA_AUDITED 0x00000080 +#define IMA_HASH 0x00000100 +#define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200 /* iint cache flags */ #define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 #define IMA_ACTION_RULE_FLAGS 0x06000000 -#define IMA_DIGSIG 0x01000000 -#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x02000000 -#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x04000000 -#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x08000000 +#define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000 +#define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000 +#define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000 +#define EVM_IMMUTABLE_DIGSIG 0x08000000 #define IMA_DO_MASK (IMA_MEASURE | IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_AUDIT | \ - IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) + IMA_HASH | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK) #define IMA_DONE_MASK (IMA_MEASURED | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_AUDITED | \ - IMA_COLLECTED | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK) + IMA_HASHED | IMA_COLLECTED | \ + IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK) /* iint subaction appraise cache flags */ -#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00000100 -#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00000200 -#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00000400 -#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00000800 -#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00001000 -#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00002000 -#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00004000 -#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISE 0x00001000 +#define IMA_FILE_APPRAISED 0x00002000 +#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE 0x00004000 +#define IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED 0x00008000 +#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE 0x00010000 +#define IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED 0x00020000 +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISE 0x00040000 +#define IMA_READ_APPRAISED 0x00080000 #define IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISE | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISE | \ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISE | IMA_READ_APPRAISE) #define IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK (IMA_FILE_APPRAISED | IMA_MMAP_APPRAISED | \ IMA_BPRM_APPRAISED | IMA_READ_APPRAISED) +/* iint cache atomic_flags */ +#define IMA_CHANGE_XATTR 0 +#define IMA_UPDATE_XATTR 1 +#define IMA_CHANGE_ATTR 2 +#define IMA_DIGSIG 3 +#define IMA_MUST_MEASURE 4 + enum evm_ima_xattr_type { IMA_XATTR_DIGEST = 0x01, EVM_XATTR_HMAC, EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_DIGEST_NG, + EVM_XATTR_PORTABLE_DIGSIG, IMA_XATTR_LAST }; @@ -100,10 +111,12 @@ struct signature_v2_hdr { /* integrity data associated with an inode */ struct integrity_iint_cache { struct rb_node rb_node; /* rooted in integrity_iint_tree */ + struct mutex mutex; /* protects: version, flags, digest */ struct inode *inode; /* back pointer to inode in question */ u64 version; /* track inode changes */ unsigned long flags; unsigned long measured_pcrs; + unsigned long atomic_flags; enum integrity_status ima_file_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_mmap_status:4; enum integrity_status ima_bprm_status:4; @@ -120,8 +133,6 @@ struct integrity_iint_cache *integrity_iint_find(struct inode *inode); int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset, void *addr, unsigned long count); -int __init integrity_read_file(const char *path, char **data); - #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1 #define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MODULE 2 diff --git a/security/keys/Kconfig b/security/keys/Kconfig index a7a23b5541f8..6462e6654ccf 100644 --- a/security/keys/Kconfig +++ b/security/keys/Kconfig @@ -45,10 +45,9 @@ config BIG_KEYS bool "Large payload keys" depends on KEYS depends on TMPFS - depends on (CRYPTO_ANSI_CPRNG = y || CRYPTO_DRBG = y) + select CRYPTO select CRYPTO_AES - select CRYPTO_ECB - select CRYPTO_RNG + select CRYPTO_GCM help This option provides support for holding large keys within the kernel (for example Kerberos ticket caches). The data may be stored out to diff --git a/security/keys/Makefile b/security/keys/Makefile index 57dff0c15809..ef1581b337a3 100644 --- a/security/keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for key management # diff --git a/security/keys/big_key.c b/security/keys/big_key.c index 6acb00f6f22c..929e14978c42 100644 --- a/security/keys/big_key.c +++ b/security/keys/big_key.c @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ /* Large capacity key type * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All Rights Reserved. * Copyright (C) 2013 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. * Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) * @@ -16,10 +17,10 @@ #include <linux/shmem_fs.h> #include <linux/err.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> +#include <linux/random.h> #include <keys/user-type.h> #include <keys/big_key-type.h> -#include <crypto/rng.h> -#include <crypto/skcipher.h> +#include <crypto/aead.h> /* * Layout of key payload words. @@ -49,7 +50,12 @@ enum big_key_op { /* * Key size for big_key data encryption */ -#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 16 +#define ENC_KEY_SIZE 32 + +/* + * Authentication tag length + */ +#define ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE 16 /* * big_key defined keys take an arbitrary string as the description and an @@ -64,57 +70,62 @@ struct key_type key_type_big_key = { .destroy = big_key_destroy, .describe = big_key_describe, .read = big_key_read, + /* no ->update(); don't add it without changing big_key_crypt() nonce */ }; /* - * Crypto names for big_key data encryption + * Crypto names for big_key data authenticated encryption */ -static const char big_key_rng_name[] = "stdrng"; -static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "ecb(aes)"; +static const char big_key_alg_name[] = "gcm(aes)"; /* - * Crypto algorithms for big_key data encryption + * Crypto algorithms for big_key data authenticated encryption */ -static struct crypto_rng *big_key_rng; -static struct crypto_skcipher *big_key_skcipher; +static struct crypto_aead *big_key_aead; /* - * Generate random key to encrypt big_key data + * Since changing the key affects the entire object, we need a mutex. */ -static inline int big_key_gen_enckey(u8 *key) -{ - return crypto_rng_get_bytes(big_key_rng, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE); -} +static DEFINE_MUTEX(big_key_aead_lock); /* * Encrypt/decrypt big_key data */ static int big_key_crypt(enum big_key_op op, u8 *data, size_t datalen, u8 *key) { - int ret = -EINVAL; + int ret; struct scatterlist sgio; - SKCIPHER_REQUEST_ON_STACK(req, big_key_skcipher); - - if (crypto_skcipher_setkey(big_key_skcipher, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { + struct aead_request *aead_req; + /* We always use a zero nonce. The reason we can get away with this is + * because we're using a different randomly generated key for every + * different encryption. Notably, too, key_type_big_key doesn't define + * an .update function, so there's no chance we'll wind up reusing the + * key to encrypt updated data. Simply put: one key, one encryption. + */ + u8 zero_nonce[crypto_aead_ivsize(big_key_aead)]; + + aead_req = aead_request_alloc(big_key_aead, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!aead_req) + return -ENOMEM; + + memset(zero_nonce, 0, sizeof(zero_nonce)); + sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen + (op == BIG_KEY_ENC ? ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE : 0)); + aead_request_set_crypt(aead_req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, zero_nonce); + aead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, NULL, NULL); + aead_request_set_ad(aead_req, 0); + + mutex_lock(&big_key_aead_lock); + if (crypto_aead_setkey(big_key_aead, key, ENC_KEY_SIZE)) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto error; } - - skcipher_request_set_tfm(req, big_key_skcipher); - skcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, - NULL, NULL); - - sg_init_one(&sgio, data, datalen); - skcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sgio, &sgio, datalen, NULL); - if (op == BIG_KEY_ENC) - ret = crypto_skcipher_encrypt(req); + ret = crypto_aead_encrypt(aead_req); else - ret = crypto_skcipher_decrypt(req); - - skcipher_request_zero(req); - + ret = crypto_aead_decrypt(aead_req); error: + mutex_unlock(&big_key_aead_lock); + aead_request_free(aead_req); return ret; } @@ -146,16 +157,13 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) * * File content is stored encrypted with randomly generated key. */ - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); + size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; - /* prepare aligned data to encrypt */ data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); if (!data) return -ENOMEM; - memcpy(data, prep->data, datalen); - memset(data + datalen, 0x00, enclen - datalen); /* generate random key */ enckey = kmalloc(ENC_KEY_SIZE, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -163,13 +171,12 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) ret = -ENOMEM; goto error; } - - ret = big_key_gen_enckey(enckey); - if (ret) + ret = get_random_bytes_wait(enckey, ENC_KEY_SIZE); + if (unlikely(ret)) goto err_enckey; /* encrypt aligned data */ - ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, enclen, enckey); + ret = big_key_crypt(BIG_KEY_ENC, data, datalen, enckey); if (ret) goto err_enckey; @@ -195,7 +202,7 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) *path = file->f_path; path_get(path); fput(file); - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); } else { /* Just store the data in a buffer */ void *data = kmalloc(datalen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -211,9 +218,9 @@ int big_key_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) err_fput: fput(file); err_enckey: - kfree(enckey); + kzfree(enckey); error: - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); return ret; } @@ -227,7 +234,7 @@ void big_key_free_preparse(struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) path_put(path); } - kfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); + kzfree(prep->payload.data[big_key_data]); } /* @@ -240,7 +247,7 @@ void big_key_revoke(struct key *key) /* clear the quota */ key_payload_reserve(key, 0); - if (key_is_instantiated(key) && + if (key_is_positive(key) && (size_t)key->payload.data[big_key_len] > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD) vfs_truncate(path, 0); } @@ -259,7 +266,7 @@ void big_key_destroy(struct key *key) path->mnt = NULL; path->dentry = NULL; } - kfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); + kzfree(key->payload.data[big_key_data]); key->payload.data[big_key_data] = NULL; } @@ -272,7 +279,7 @@ void big_key_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %zu [%s]", datalen, datalen > BIG_KEY_FILE_THRESHOLD ? "file" : "buff"); @@ -295,7 +302,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) struct file *file; u8 *data; u8 *enckey = (u8 *)key->payload.data[big_key_data]; - size_t enclen = ALIGN(datalen, crypto_skcipher_blocksize(big_key_skcipher)); + size_t enclen = datalen + ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE; loff_t pos = 0; data = kmalloc(enclen, GFP_KERNEL); @@ -328,7 +335,7 @@ long big_key_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) err_fput: fput(file); error: - kfree(data); + kzfree(data); } else { ret = datalen; if (copy_to_user(buffer, key->payload.data[big_key_data], @@ -344,47 +351,31 @@ error: */ static int __init big_key_init(void) { - struct crypto_skcipher *cipher; - struct crypto_rng *rng; int ret; - rng = crypto_alloc_rng(big_key_rng_name, 0, 0); - if (IS_ERR(rng)) { - pr_err("Can't alloc rng: %ld\n", PTR_ERR(rng)); - return PTR_ERR(rng); - } - - big_key_rng = rng; - - /* seed RNG */ - ret = crypto_rng_reset(rng, NULL, crypto_rng_seedsize(rng)); - if (ret) { - pr_err("Can't reset rng: %d\n", ret); - goto error_rng; - } - /* init block cipher */ - cipher = crypto_alloc_skcipher(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); - if (IS_ERR(cipher)) { - ret = PTR_ERR(cipher); + big_key_aead = crypto_alloc_aead(big_key_alg_name, 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC); + if (IS_ERR(big_key_aead)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(big_key_aead); pr_err("Can't alloc crypto: %d\n", ret); - goto error_rng; + return ret; + } + ret = crypto_aead_setauthsize(big_key_aead, ENC_AUTHTAG_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_err("Can't set crypto auth tag len: %d\n", ret); + goto free_aead; } - - big_key_skcipher = cipher; ret = register_key_type(&key_type_big_key); if (ret < 0) { pr_err("Can't register type: %d\n", ret); - goto error_cipher; + goto free_aead; } return 0; -error_cipher: - crypto_free_skcipher(big_key_skcipher); -error_rng: - crypto_free_rng(big_key_rng); +free_aead: + crypto_free_aead(big_key_aead); return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile index d6f8433250a5..7a44dce6f69d 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for encrypted keys # diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c index 69855ba0d3b3..d92cbf9687c3 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c @@ -309,6 +309,13 @@ static struct key *request_user_key(const char *master_desc, const u8 **master_k down_read(&ukey->sem); upayload = user_key_payload_locked(ukey); + if (!upayload) { + /* key was revoked before we acquired its semaphore */ + up_read(&ukey->sem); + key_put(ukey); + ukey = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); + goto error; + } *master_key = upayload->data; *master_keylen = upayload->datalen; error: @@ -847,7 +854,7 @@ static int encrypted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) size_t datalen = prep->datalen; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; if (datalen <= 0 || datalen > 32767 || !prep->data) return -EINVAL; diff --git a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h index 47802c0de735..1809995db452 100644 --- a/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h +++ b/security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H #define __ENCRYPTED_KEY_H diff --git a/security/keys/gc.c b/security/keys/gc.c index 87cb260e4890..7207e6094dc1 100644 --- a/security/keys/gc.c +++ b/security/keys/gc.c @@ -29,10 +29,10 @@ DECLARE_WORK(key_gc_work, key_garbage_collector); /* * Reaper for links from keyrings to dead keys. */ -static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long); -static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func, 0, 0); +static void key_gc_timer_func(struct timer_list *); +static DEFINE_TIMER(key_gc_timer, key_gc_timer_func); -static time_t key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX; +static time64_t key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX; static struct key_type *key_gc_dead_keytype; static unsigned long key_gc_flags; @@ -53,12 +53,12 @@ struct key_type key_type_dead = { * Schedule a garbage collection run. * - time precision isn't particularly important */ -void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at) +void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at) { unsigned long expires; - time_t now = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + time64_t now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); - kenter("%ld", gc_at - now); + kenter("%lld", gc_at - now); if (gc_at <= now || test_bit(KEY_GC_REAP_KEYTYPE, &key_gc_flags)) { kdebug("IMMEDIATE"); @@ -84,10 +84,10 @@ void key_schedule_gc_links(void) * Some key's cleanup time was met after it expired, so we need to get the * reaper to go through a cycle finding expired keys. */ -static void key_gc_timer_func(unsigned long data) +static void key_gc_timer_func(struct timer_list *unused) { kenter(""); - key_gc_next_run = LONG_MAX; + key_gc_next_run = TIME64_MAX; key_schedule_gc_links(); } @@ -129,15 +129,15 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) while (!list_empty(keys)) { struct key *key = list_entry(keys->next, struct key, graveyard_link); + short state = key->state; + list_del(&key->graveyard_link); kdebug("- %u", key->serial); key_check(key); /* Throw away the key data if the key is instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags) && - key->type->destroy) + if (state == KEY_IS_POSITIVE && key->type->destroy) key->type->destroy(key); security_key_free(key); @@ -151,7 +151,7 @@ static noinline void key_gc_unused_keys(struct list_head *keys) } atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + if (state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); key_user_put(key->user); @@ -184,11 +184,11 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work) struct rb_node *cursor; struct key *key; - time_t new_timer, limit; + time64_t new_timer, limit; kenter("[%lx,%x]", key_gc_flags, gc_state); - limit = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + limit = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (limit > key_gc_delay) limit -= key_gc_delay; else @@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ static void key_garbage_collector(struct work_struct *work) gc_state |= KEY_GC_REAPING_DEAD_1; kdebug("new pass %x", gc_state); - new_timer = LONG_MAX; + new_timer = TIME64_MAX; /* As only this function is permitted to remove things from the key * serial tree, if cursor is non-NULL then it will always point to a @@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ continue_scanning: if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER) { if (key->expiry > limit && key->expiry < new_timer) { - kdebug("will expire %x in %ld", + kdebug("will expire %x in %lld", key_serial(key), key->expiry - limit); new_timer = key->expiry; } @@ -276,7 +276,7 @@ maybe_resched: */ kdebug("pass complete"); - if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time_t)LONG_MAX) { + if (gc_state & KEY_GC_SET_TIMER && new_timer != (time64_t)TIME64_MAX) { new_timer += key_gc_delay; key_schedule_gc(new_timer); } diff --git a/security/keys/internal.h b/security/keys/internal.h index 1c02c6547038..9f8208dc0e55 100644 --- a/security/keys/internal.h +++ b/security/keys/internal.h @@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ struct keyring_search_context { int skipped_ret; bool possessed; key_ref_t result; - struct timespec now; + time64_t now; }; extern bool key_default_cmp(const struct key *key, @@ -141,7 +141,7 @@ extern key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, extern key_ref_t search_my_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx); extern key_ref_t search_process_keyrings(struct keyring_search_context *ctx); -extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check); +extern struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring); extern int install_user_keyrings(void); extern int install_thread_keyring_to_cred(struct cred *); @@ -169,10 +169,10 @@ extern void key_change_session_keyring(struct callback_head *twork); extern struct work_struct key_gc_work; extern unsigned key_gc_delay; -extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit); +extern void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit); extern void keyring_restriction_gc(struct key *keyring, struct key_type *dead_type); -extern void key_schedule_gc(time_t gc_at); +extern void key_schedule_gc(time64_t gc_at); extern void key_schedule_gc_links(void); extern void key_gc_keytype(struct key_type *ktype); @@ -211,7 +211,7 @@ extern struct key *key_get_instantiation_authkey(key_serial_t target_id); /* * Determine whether a key is dead. */ -static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time_t limit) +static inline bool key_is_dead(const struct key *key, time64_t limit) { return key->flags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_DEAD) | diff --git a/security/keys/key.c b/security/keys/key.c index 83da68d98b40..d97c9394b5dd 100644 --- a/security/keys/key.c +++ b/security/keys/key.c @@ -54,10 +54,10 @@ void __key_check(const struct key *key) struct key_user *key_user_lookup(kuid_t uid) { struct key_user *candidate = NULL, *user; - struct rb_node *parent = NULL; - struct rb_node **p; + struct rb_node *parent, **p; try_again: + parent = NULL; p = &key_user_tree.rb_node; spin_lock(&key_user_lock); @@ -302,6 +302,8 @@ struct key *key_alloc(struct key_type *type, const char *desc, key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA; if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_BUILT_IN) key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_BUILTIN; + if (flags & KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING) + key->flags |= 1 << KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING; #ifdef KEY_DEBUGGING key->magic = KEY_DEBUG_MAGIC; @@ -400,6 +402,18 @@ int key_payload_reserve(struct key *key, size_t datalen) EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_payload_reserve); /* + * Change the key state to being instantiated. + */ +static void mark_key_instantiated(struct key *key, int reject_error) +{ + /* Commit the payload before setting the state; barrier versus + * key_read_state(). + */ + smp_store_release(&key->state, + (reject_error < 0) ? reject_error : KEY_IS_POSITIVE); +} + +/* * Instantiate a key and link it into the target keyring atomically. Must be * called with the target keyring's semaphore writelocked. The target key's * semaphore need not be locked as instantiation is serialised by @@ -422,14 +436,14 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* instantiate the key */ ret = key->type->instantiate(key, prep); if (ret == 0) { /* mark the key as being instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) awaken = 1; @@ -446,7 +460,7 @@ static int __key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, if (authkey) key_revoke(authkey); - if (prep->expiry != TIME_T_MAX) { + if (prep->expiry != TIME64_MAX) { key->expiry = prep->expiry; key_schedule_gc(prep->expiry + key_gc_delay); } @@ -492,7 +506,7 @@ int key_instantiate_and_link(struct key *key, prep.data = data; prep.datalen = datalen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -556,7 +570,6 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, struct key *authkey) { struct assoc_array_edit *edit; - struct timespec now; int ret, awaken, link_ret = 0; key_check(key); @@ -575,15 +588,11 @@ int key_reject_and_link(struct key *key, mutex_lock(&key_construction_mutex); /* can't instantiate twice */ - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { /* mark the key as being negatively instantiated */ atomic_inc(&key->user->nikeys); - key->reject_error = -error; - smp_wmb(); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); - set_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags); - now = current_kernel_time(); - key->expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; + mark_key_instantiated(key, -error); + key->expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); if (test_and_clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) @@ -699,16 +708,13 @@ found_kernel_type: void key_set_timeout(struct key *key, unsigned timeout) { - struct timespec now; - time_t expiry = 0; + time64_t expiry = 0; /* make the changes with the locks held to prevent races */ down_write(&key->sem); - if (timeout > 0) { - now = current_kernel_time(); - expiry = now.tv_sec + timeout; - } + if (timeout > 0) + expiry = ktime_get_real_seconds() + timeout; key->expiry = expiry; key_schedule_gc(key->expiry + key_gc_delay); @@ -750,8 +756,8 @@ static inline key_ref_t __key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, ret = key->type->update(key, prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); @@ -827,7 +833,6 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, key_check(keyring); - key_ref = ERR_PTR(-EPERM); if (!(flags & KEY_ALLOC_BYPASS_RESTRICTION)) restrict_link = keyring->restrict_link; @@ -839,7 +844,7 @@ key_ref_t key_create_or_update(key_ref_t keyring_ref, prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = index_key.type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (index_key.type->preparse) { ret = index_key.type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) { @@ -934,6 +939,16 @@ error: */ __key_link_end(keyring, &index_key, edit); + key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT, &key->flags)) { + ret = wait_for_key_construction(key, true); + if (ret < 0) { + key_ref_put(key_ref); + key_ref = ERR_PTR(ret); + goto error_free_prep; + } + } + key_ref = __key_update(key_ref, &prep); goto error_free_prep; } @@ -973,7 +988,7 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) prep.data = payload; prep.datalen = plen; prep.quotalen = key->type->def_datalen; - prep.expiry = TIME_T_MAX; + prep.expiry = TIME64_MAX; if (key->type->preparse) { ret = key->type->preparse(&prep); if (ret < 0) @@ -984,8 +999,8 @@ int key_update(key_ref_t key_ref, const void *payload, size_t plen) ret = key->type->update(key, &prep); if (ret == 0) - /* updating a negative key instantiates it */ - clear_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags); + /* Updating a negative key positively instantiates it */ + mark_key_instantiated(key, 0); up_write(&key->sem); @@ -1007,8 +1022,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_update); */ void key_revoke(struct key *key) { - struct timespec now; - time_t time; + time64_t time; key_check(key); @@ -1023,8 +1037,7 @@ void key_revoke(struct key *key) key->type->revoke(key); /* set the death time to no more than the expiry time */ - now = current_kernel_time(); - time = now.tv_sec; + time = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (key->revoked_at == 0 || key->revoked_at > time) { key->revoked_at = time; key_schedule_gc(key->revoked_at + key_gc_delay); diff --git a/security/keys/keyctl.c b/security/keys/keyctl.c index ab0b337c84b4..1ffe60bb2845 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyctl.c +++ b/security/keys/keyctl.c @@ -766,12 +766,16 @@ long keyctl_read_key(key_serial_t keyid, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + goto error2; /* Negatively instantiated */ + /* see if we can read it directly */ ret = key_permission(key_ref, KEY_NEED_READ); if (ret == 0) goto can_read_key; if (ret != -EACCES) - goto error; + goto error2; /* we can't; see if it's searchable from this process's keyrings * - we automatically take account of the fact that it may be @@ -896,7 +900,7 @@ long keyctl_chown_key(key_serial_t id, uid_t user, gid_t group) atomic_dec(&key->user->nkeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nkeys); - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) { + if (key->state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) { atomic_dec(&key->user->nikeys); atomic_inc(&newowner->nikeys); } @@ -1406,11 +1410,9 @@ long keyctl_assume_authority(key_serial_t id) } ret = keyctl_change_reqkey_auth(authkey); - if (ret < 0) - goto error; + if (ret == 0) + ret = authkey->serial; key_put(authkey); - - ret = authkey->serial; error: return ret; } @@ -1586,9 +1588,8 @@ error_keyring: * The caller must have Setattr permission to change keyring restrictions. * * The requested type name may be a NULL pointer to reject all attempts - * to link to the keyring. If _type is non-NULL, _restriction can be - * NULL or a pointer to a string describing the restriction. If _type is - * NULL, _restriction must also be NULL. + * to link to the keyring. In this case, _restriction must also be NULL. + * Otherwise, both _type and _restriction must be non-NULL. * * Returns 0 if successful. */ @@ -1596,7 +1597,6 @@ long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type, const char __user *_restriction) { key_ref_t key_ref; - bool link_reject = !_type; char type[32]; char *restriction = NULL; long ret; @@ -1605,31 +1605,29 @@ long keyctl_restrict_keyring(key_serial_t id, const char __user *_type, if (IS_ERR(key_ref)) return PTR_ERR(key_ref); + ret = -EINVAL; if (_type) { + if (!_restriction) + goto error; + ret = key_get_type_from_user(type, _type, sizeof(type)); if (ret < 0) goto error; - } - - if (_restriction) { - if (!_type) { - ret = -EINVAL; - goto error; - } restriction = strndup_user(_restriction, PAGE_SIZE); if (IS_ERR(restriction)) { ret = PTR_ERR(restriction); goto error; } + } else { + if (_restriction) + goto error; } - ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, link_reject ? NULL : type, restriction); + ret = keyring_restrict(key_ref, _type ? type : NULL, restriction); kfree(restriction); - error: key_ref_put(key_ref); - return ret; } diff --git a/security/keys/keyring.c b/security/keys/keyring.c index de81793f9920..41bcf57e96f2 100644 --- a/security/keys/keyring.c +++ b/security/keys/keyring.c @@ -414,7 +414,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) else seq_puts(m, "[anon]"); - if (key_is_instantiated(keyring)) { + if (key_is_positive(keyring)) { if (keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree != 0) seq_printf(m, ": %lu", keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree); else @@ -423,7 +423,7 @@ static void keyring_describe(const struct key *keyring, struct seq_file *m) } struct keyring_read_iterator_context { - size_t qty; + size_t buflen; size_t count; key_serial_t __user *buffer; }; @@ -435,9 +435,9 @@ static int keyring_read_iterator(const void *object, void *data) int ret; kenter("{%s,%d},,{%zu/%zu}", - key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->qty); + key->type->name, key->serial, ctx->count, ctx->buflen); - if (ctx->count >= ctx->qty) + if (ctx->count >= ctx->buflen) return 1; ret = put_user(key->serial, ctx->buffer); @@ -459,38 +459,33 @@ static long keyring_read(const struct key *keyring, char __user *buffer, size_t buflen) { struct keyring_read_iterator_context ctx; - unsigned long nr_keys; - int ret; + long ret; kenter("{%d},,%zu", key_serial(keyring), buflen); if (buflen & (sizeof(key_serial_t) - 1)) return -EINVAL; - nr_keys = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree; - if (nr_keys == 0) - return 0; - - /* Calculate how much data we could return */ - ctx.qty = nr_keys * sizeof(key_serial_t); - - if (!buffer || !buflen) - return ctx.qty; - - if (buflen > ctx.qty) - ctx.qty = buflen; - - /* Copy the IDs of the subscribed keys into the buffer */ - ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; - ctx.count = 0; - ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); - if (ret < 0) { - kleave(" = %d [iterate]", ret); - return ret; + /* Copy as many key IDs as fit into the buffer */ + if (buffer && buflen) { + ctx.buffer = (key_serial_t __user *)buffer; + ctx.buflen = buflen; + ctx.count = 0; + ret = assoc_array_iterate(&keyring->keys, + keyring_read_iterator, &ctx); + if (ret < 0) { + kleave(" = %ld [iterate]", ret); + return ret; + } } - kleave(" = %zu [ok]", ctx.count); - return ctx.count; + /* Return the size of the buffer needed */ + ret = keyring->keys.nr_leaves_on_tree * sizeof(key_serial_t); + if (ret <= buflen) + kleave("= %ld [ok]", ret); + else + kleave("= %ld [buffer too small]", ret); + return ret; } /* @@ -557,7 +552,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct keyring_search_context *ctx = iterator_data; const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - unsigned long kflags = key->flags; + unsigned long kflags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + short state = READ_ONCE(key->state); kenter("{%d}", key->serial); @@ -569,6 +565,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) /* skip invalidated, revoked and expired keys */ if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { + time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (kflags & ((1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED) | (1 << KEY_FLAG_REVOKED))) { ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); @@ -576,7 +574,7 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) goto skipped; } - if (key->expiry && ctx->now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + if (expiry && ctx->now >= expiry) { if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_SKIP_EXPIRED)) ctx->result = ERR_PTR(-EKEYEXPIRED); kleave(" = %d [expire]", ctx->skipped_ret); @@ -601,9 +599,8 @@ static int keyring_search_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) if (ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_DO_STATE_CHECK) { /* we set a different error code if we pass a negative key */ - if (kflags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE)) { - smp_rmb(); - ctx->result = ERR_PTR(key->reject_error); + if (state < 0) { + ctx->result = ERR_PTR(state); kleave(" = %d [neg]", ctx->skipped_ret); goto skipped; } @@ -716,7 +713,6 @@ descend_to_keyring: * doesn't contain any keyring pointers. */ shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr); - smp_read_barrier_depends(); if ((shortcut->index_key[0] & ASSOC_ARRAY_FAN_MASK) != 0) goto not_this_keyring; @@ -726,8 +722,6 @@ descend_to_keyring: } node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); - smp_read_barrier_depends(); - ptr = node->slots[0]; if (!assoc_array_ptr_is_meta(ptr)) goto begin_node; @@ -739,7 +733,6 @@ descend_to_node: kdebug("descend"); if (assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) { shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr); - smp_read_barrier_depends(); ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->next_node); BUG_ON(!assoc_array_ptr_is_node(ptr)); } @@ -747,7 +740,6 @@ descend_to_node: begin_node: kdebug("begin_node"); - smp_read_barrier_depends(); slot = 0; ascend_to_node: /* Go through the slots in a node */ @@ -795,14 +787,12 @@ ascend_to_node: if (ptr && assoc_array_ptr_is_shortcut(ptr)) { shortcut = assoc_array_ptr_to_shortcut(ptr); - smp_read_barrier_depends(); ptr = READ_ONCE(shortcut->back_pointer); slot = shortcut->parent_slot; } if (!ptr) goto not_this_keyring; node = assoc_array_ptr_to_node(ptr); - smp_read_barrier_depends(); slot++; /* If we've ascended to the root (zero backpointer), we must have just @@ -837,10 +827,10 @@ found: key = key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result); key_check(key); if (!(ctx->flags & KEYRING_SEARCH_NO_UPDATE_TIME)) { - key->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; - keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; + key->last_used_at = ctx->now; + keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now; while (sp > 0) - stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now.tv_sec; + stack[--sp].keyring->last_used_at = ctx->now; } kleave(" = true"); return true; @@ -901,7 +891,7 @@ key_ref_t keyring_search_aux(key_ref_t keyring_ref, } rcu_read_lock(); - ctx->now = current_kernel_time(); + ctx->now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (search_nested_keyrings(keyring, ctx)) __key_get(key_ref_to_ptr(ctx->result)); rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1101,15 +1091,15 @@ found: /* * Find a keyring with the specified name. * - * All named keyrings in the current user namespace are searched, provided they - * grant Search permission directly to the caller (unless this check is - * skipped). Keyrings whose usage points have reached zero or who have been - * revoked are skipped. + * Only keyrings that have nonzero refcount, are not revoked, and are owned by a + * user in the current user namespace are considered. If @uid_keyring is %true, + * the keyring additionally must have been allocated as a user or user session + * keyring; otherwise, it must grant Search permission directly to the caller. * * Returns a pointer to the keyring with the keyring's refcount having being * incremented on success. -ENOKEY is returned if a key could not be found. */ -struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) +struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool uid_keyring) { struct key *keyring; int bucket; @@ -1137,17 +1127,22 @@ struct key *find_keyring_by_name(const char *name, bool skip_perm_check) if (strcmp(keyring->description, name) != 0) continue; - if (!skip_perm_check && - key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0), - KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) - continue; + if (uid_keyring) { + if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_UID_KEYRING, + &keyring->flags)) + continue; + } else { + if (key_permission(make_key_ref(keyring, 0), + KEY_NEED_SEARCH) < 0) + continue; + } /* we've got a match but we might end up racing with * key_cleanup() if the keyring is currently 'dead' * (ie. it has a zero usage count) */ if (!refcount_inc_not_zero(&keyring->usage)) continue; - keyring->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + keyring->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds(); goto out; } } @@ -1487,7 +1482,7 @@ static void keyring_revoke(struct key *keyring) static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) { struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - time_t *limit = iterator_data; + time64_t *limit = iterator_data; if (key_is_dead(key, *limit)) return false; @@ -1498,7 +1493,7 @@ static bool keyring_gc_select_iterator(void *object, void *iterator_data) static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) { const struct key *key = keyring_ptr_to_key(object); - time_t *limit = iterator_data; + time64_t *limit = iterator_data; key_check(key); return key_is_dead(key, *limit); @@ -1510,7 +1505,7 @@ static int keyring_gc_check_iterator(const void *object, void *iterator_data) * Not called with any locks held. The keyring's key struct will not be * deallocated under us as only our caller may deallocate it. */ -void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time_t limit) +void keyring_gc(struct key *keyring, time64_t limit) { int result; diff --git a/security/keys/permission.c b/security/keys/permission.c index 732cc0beffdf..f68dc04d614e 100644 --- a/security/keys/permission.c +++ b/security/keys/permission.c @@ -88,7 +88,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(key_task_permission); */ int key_validate(const struct key *key) { - unsigned long flags = key->flags; + unsigned long flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); + time64_t expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); if (flags & (1 << KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED)) return -ENOKEY; @@ -99,9 +100,8 @@ int key_validate(const struct key *key) return -EKEYREVOKED; /* check it hasn't expired */ - if (key->expiry) { - struct timespec now = current_kernel_time(); - if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) + if (expiry) { + if (ktime_get_real_seconds() >= expiry) return -EKEYEXPIRED; } diff --git a/security/keys/proc.c b/security/keys/proc.c index bf08d02b6646..fbc4af5c6c9f 100644 --- a/security/keys/proc.c +++ b/security/keys/proc.c @@ -178,16 +178,18 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) { struct rb_node *_p = v; struct key *key = rb_entry(_p, struct key, serial_node); - struct timespec now; - unsigned long timo; + unsigned long flags; key_ref_t key_ref, skey_ref; + time64_t now, expiry; char xbuf[16]; + short state; + u64 timo; int rc; struct keyring_search_context ctx = { .index_key.type = key->type, .index_key.description = key->description, - .cred = current_cred(), + .cred = m->file->f_cred, .match_data.cmp = lookup_user_key_possessed, .match_data.raw_data = key, .match_data.lookup_type = KEYRING_SEARCH_LOOKUP_DIRECT, @@ -207,51 +209,51 @@ static int proc_keys_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) } } - /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key (assuming - * non-possession) - * - the caller holds a spinlock, and thus the RCU read lock, making our - * access to __current_cred() safe - */ + /* check whether the current task is allowed to view the key */ rc = key_task_permission(key_ref, ctx.cred, KEY_NEED_VIEW); if (rc < 0) return 0; - now = current_kernel_time(); + now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); rcu_read_lock(); /* come up with a suitable timeout value */ - if (key->expiry == 0) { + expiry = READ_ONCE(key->expiry); + if (expiry == 0) { memcpy(xbuf, "perm", 5); - } else if (now.tv_sec >= key->expiry) { + } else if (now >= expiry) { memcpy(xbuf, "expd", 5); } else { - timo = key->expiry - now.tv_sec; + timo = expiry - now; if (timo < 60) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lus", timo); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llus", timo); else if (timo < 60*60) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lum", timo / 60); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llum", div_u64(timo, 60)); else if (timo < 60*60*24) - sprintf(xbuf, "%luh", timo / (60*60)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%lluh", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60)); else if (timo < 60*60*24*7) - sprintf(xbuf, "%lud", timo / (60*60*24)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%llud", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24)); else - sprintf(xbuf, "%luw", timo / (60*60*24*7)); + sprintf(xbuf, "%lluw", div_u64(timo, 60 * 60 * 24 * 7)); } -#define showflag(KEY, LETTER, FLAG) \ - (test_bit(FLAG, &(KEY)->flags) ? LETTER : '-') + state = key_read_state(key); + +#define showflag(FLAGS, LETTER, FLAG) \ + ((FLAGS & (1 << FLAG)) ? LETTER : '-') + flags = READ_ONCE(key->flags); seq_printf(m, "%08x %c%c%c%c%c%c%c %5d %4s %08x %5d %5d %-9.9s ", key->serial, - showflag(key, 'I', KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED), - showflag(key, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), - showflag(key, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), - showflag(key, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), - showflag(key, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), - showflag(key, 'N', KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE), - showflag(key, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), + state != KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED ? 'I' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'R', KEY_FLAG_REVOKED), + showflag(flags, 'D', KEY_FLAG_DEAD), + showflag(flags, 'Q', KEY_FLAG_IN_QUOTA), + showflag(flags, 'U', KEY_FLAG_USER_CONSTRUCT), + state < 0 ? 'N' : '-', + showflag(flags, 'i', KEY_FLAG_INVALIDATED), refcount_read(&key->usage), xbuf, key->perm, diff --git a/security/keys/process_keys.c b/security/keys/process_keys.c index 86bced9fdbdf..d5b25e535d3a 100644 --- a/security/keys/process_keys.c +++ b/security/keys/process_keys.c @@ -77,7 +77,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { uid_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, user_keyring_perm, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, + KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING | + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(uid_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(uid_keyring); @@ -94,7 +95,8 @@ int install_user_keyrings(void) session_keyring = keyring_alloc(buf, user->uid, INVALID_GID, cred, user_keyring_perm, - KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, + KEY_ALLOC_UID_KEYRING | + KEY_ALLOC_IN_QUOTA, NULL, NULL); if (IS_ERR(session_keyring)) { ret = PTR_ERR(session_keyring); @@ -728,7 +730,7 @@ try_again: ret = -EIO; if (!(lflags & KEY_LOOKUP_PARTIAL) && - !test_bit(KEY_FLAG_INSTANTIATED, &key->flags)) + key_read_state(key) == KEY_IS_UNINSTANTIATED) goto invalid_key; /* check the permissions */ @@ -736,7 +738,7 @@ try_again: if (ret < 0) goto invalid_key; - key->last_used_at = current_kernel_time().tv_sec; + key->last_used_at = ktime_get_real_seconds(); error: put_cred(ctx.cred); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key.c b/security/keys/request_key.c index 63e63a42db3c..114f7408feee 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key.c @@ -251,11 +251,12 @@ static int construct_key(struct key *key, const void *callout_info, * The keyring selected is returned with an extra reference upon it which the * caller must release. */ -static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) +static int construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) { struct request_key_auth *rka; const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); struct key *dest_keyring = *_dest_keyring, *authkey; + int ret; kenter("%p", dest_keyring); @@ -264,6 +265,8 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) /* the caller supplied one */ key_get(dest_keyring); } else { + bool do_perm_check = true; + /* use a default keyring; falling through the cases until we * find one that we actually have */ switch (cred->jit_keyring) { @@ -278,8 +281,10 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) dest_keyring = key_get(rka->dest_keyring); up_read(&authkey->sem); - if (dest_keyring) + if (dest_keyring) { + do_perm_check = false; break; + } } case KEY_REQKEY_DEFL_THREAD_KEYRING: @@ -314,11 +319,29 @@ static void construct_get_dest_keyring(struct key **_dest_keyring) default: BUG(); } + + /* + * Require Write permission on the keyring. This is essential + * because the default keyring may be the session keyring, and + * joining a keyring only requires Search permission. + * + * However, this check is skipped for the "requestor keyring" so + * that /sbin/request-key can itself use request_key() to add + * keys to the original requestor's destination keyring. + */ + if (dest_keyring && do_perm_check) { + ret = key_permission(make_key_ref(dest_keyring, 1), + KEY_NEED_WRITE); + if (ret) { + key_put(dest_keyring); + return ret; + } + } } *_dest_keyring = dest_keyring; kleave(" [dk %d]", key_serial(dest_keyring)); - return; + return 0; } /* @@ -444,11 +467,15 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, if (ctx->index_key.type == &key_type_keyring) return ERR_PTR(-EPERM); - user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); - if (!user) - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + ret = construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + if (ret) + goto error; - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); + user = key_user_lookup(current_fsuid()); + if (!user) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; + } ret = construct_alloc_key(ctx, dest_keyring, flags, user, &key); key_user_put(user); @@ -463,7 +490,7 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, } else if (ret == -EINPROGRESS) { ret = 0; } else { - goto couldnt_alloc_key; + goto error_put_dest_keyring; } key_put(dest_keyring); @@ -473,8 +500,9 @@ static struct key *construct_key_and_link(struct keyring_search_context *ctx, construction_failed: key_negate_and_link(key, key_negative_timeout, NULL, NULL); key_put(key); -couldnt_alloc_key: +error_put_dest_keyring: key_put(dest_keyring); +error: kleave(" = %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } @@ -546,9 +574,7 @@ struct key *request_key_and_link(struct key_type *type, if (!IS_ERR(key_ref)) { key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); if (dest_keyring) { - construct_get_dest_keyring(&dest_keyring); ret = key_link(dest_keyring, key); - key_put(dest_keyring); if (ret < 0) { key_put(key); key = ERR_PTR(ret); @@ -595,10 +621,9 @@ int wait_for_key_construction(struct key *key, bool intr) intr ? TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE : TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE); if (ret) return -ERESTARTSYS; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) { - smp_rmb(); - return key->reject_error; - } + ret = key_read_state(key); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; return key_validate(key); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(wait_for_key_construction); diff --git a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c index afe9d22ab361..424e1d90412e 100644 --- a/security/keys/request_key_auth.c +++ b/security/keys/request_key_auth.c @@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_describe(const struct key *key, seq_puts(m, "key:"); seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, " pid:%d ci:%zu", rka->pid, rka->callout_len); } @@ -120,6 +120,18 @@ static void request_key_auth_revoke(struct key *key) } } +static void free_request_key_auth(struct request_key_auth *rka) +{ + if (!rka) + return; + key_put(rka->target_key); + key_put(rka->dest_keyring); + if (rka->cred) + put_cred(rka->cred); + kfree(rka->callout_info); + kfree(rka); +} + /* * Destroy an instantiation authorisation token key. */ @@ -129,15 +141,7 @@ static void request_key_auth_destroy(struct key *key) kenter("{%d}", key->serial); - if (rka->cred) { - put_cred(rka->cred); - rka->cred = NULL; - } - - key_put(rka->target_key); - key_put(rka->dest_keyring); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); + free_request_key_auth(rka); } /* @@ -151,22 +155,18 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, const struct cred *cred = current->cred; struct key *authkey = NULL; char desc[20]; - int ret; + int ret = -ENOMEM; kenter("%d,", target->serial); /* allocate a auth record */ - rka = kmalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rka) { - kleave(" = -ENOMEM"); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } - rka->callout_info = kmalloc(callout_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!rka->callout_info) { - kleave(" = -ENOMEM"); - kfree(rka); - return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); - } + rka = kzalloc(sizeof(*rka), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rka) + goto error; + rka->callout_info = kmemdup(callout_info, callout_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!rka->callout_info) + goto error_free_rka; + rka->callout_len = callout_len; /* see if the calling process is already servicing the key request of * another process */ @@ -176,8 +176,12 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, /* if the auth key has been revoked, then the key we're * servicing is already instantiated */ - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) - goto auth_key_revoked; + if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_REVOKED, + &cred->request_key_auth->flags)) { + up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); + ret = -EKEYREVOKED; + goto error_free_rka; + } irka = cred->request_key_auth->payload.data[0]; rka->cred = get_cred(irka->cred); @@ -193,8 +197,6 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, rka->target_key = key_get(target); rka->dest_keyring = key_get(dest_keyring); - memcpy(rka->callout_info, callout_info, callout_len); - rka->callout_len = callout_len; /* allocate the auth key */ sprintf(desc, "%x", target->serial); @@ -205,32 +207,22 @@ struct key *request_key_auth_new(struct key *target, const void *callout_info, KEY_USR_VIEW, KEY_ALLOC_NOT_IN_QUOTA, NULL); if (IS_ERR(authkey)) { ret = PTR_ERR(authkey); - goto error_alloc; + goto error_free_rka; } /* construct the auth key */ ret = key_instantiate_and_link(authkey, rka, 0, NULL, NULL); if (ret < 0) - goto error_inst; + goto error_put_authkey; kleave(" = {%d,%d}", authkey->serial, refcount_read(&authkey->usage)); return authkey; -auth_key_revoked: - up_read(&cred->request_key_auth->sem); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); - kleave("= -EKEYREVOKED"); - return ERR_PTR(-EKEYREVOKED); - -error_inst: - key_revoke(authkey); +error_put_authkey: key_put(authkey); -error_alloc: - key_put(rka->target_key); - key_put(rka->dest_keyring); - kfree(rka->callout_info); - kfree(rka); +error_free_rka: + free_request_key_auth(rka); +error: kleave("= %d", ret); return ERR_PTR(ret); } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.c b/security/keys/trusted.c index ddfaebf60fc8..423776682025 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.c +++ b/security/keys/trusted.c @@ -355,13 +355,12 @@ out: * For key specific tpm requests, we will generate and send our * own TPM command packets using the drivers send function. */ -static int trusted_tpm_send(const u32 chip_num, unsigned char *cmd, - size_t buflen) +static int trusted_tpm_send(unsigned char *cmd, size_t buflen) { int rc; dump_tpm_buf(cmd); - rc = tpm_send(chip_num, cmd, buflen); + rc = tpm_send(NULL, cmd, buflen); dump_tpm_buf(cmd); if (rc > 0) /* Can't return positive return codes values to keyctl */ @@ -382,10 +381,10 @@ static int pcrlock(const int pcrnum) if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, hash, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); if (ret != SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE) return ret; - return tpm_pcr_extend(TPM_ANY_NUM, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; + return tpm_pcr_extend(NULL, pcrnum, hash) ? -EINVAL : 0; } /* @@ -398,7 +397,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, unsigned char ononce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; int ret; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) return ret; @@ -410,7 +409,7 @@ static int osap(struct tpm_buf *tb, struct osapsess *s, store32(tb, handle); storebytes(tb, ononce, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -434,7 +433,7 @@ static int oiap(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t *handle, unsigned char *nonce) store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); store32(tb, TPM_OIAP_SIZE); store32(tb, TPM_ORD_OIAP); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -493,7 +492,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, if (ret < 0) goto out; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, td->nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) goto out; ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_SEAL); @@ -542,7 +541,7 @@ static int tpm_seal(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint16_t keytype, store8(tb, cont); storebytes(tb, td->pubauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) goto out; @@ -603,7 +602,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_UNSEAL); keyhndl = htonl(SRKHANDLE); - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); if (ret != TPM_NONCE_SIZE) { pr_info("trusted_key: tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; @@ -635,7 +634,7 @@ static int tpm_unseal(struct tpm_buf *tb, store8(tb, cont); storebytes(tb, authdata2, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); - ret = trusted_tpm_send(TPM_ANY_NUM, tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); if (ret < 0) { pr_info("trusted_key: authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); return ret; @@ -748,7 +747,7 @@ static int getoptions(char *c, struct trusted_key_payload *pay, int i; int tpm2; - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; @@ -917,7 +916,7 @@ static struct trusted_key_options *trusted_options_alloc(void) struct trusted_key_options *options; int tpm2; - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); if (tpm2 < 0) return NULL; @@ -967,7 +966,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, size_t key_len; int tpm2; - tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(TPM_ANY_NUM); + tpm2 = tpm_is_tpm2(NULL); if (tpm2 < 0) return tpm2; @@ -1008,7 +1007,7 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, switch (key_cmd) { case Opt_load: if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + ret = tpm_unseal_trusted(NULL, payload, options); else ret = key_unseal(payload, options); dump_payload(payload); @@ -1018,13 +1017,13 @@ static int trusted_instantiate(struct key *key, break; case Opt_new: key_len = payload->key_len; - ret = tpm_get_random(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload->key, key_len); + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, payload->key, key_len); if (ret != key_len) { pr_info("trusted_key: key_create failed (%d)\n", ret); goto out; } if (tpm2) - ret = tpm_seal_trusted(TPM_ANY_NUM, payload, options); + ret = tpm_seal_trusted(NULL, payload, options); else ret = key_seal(payload, options); if (ret < 0) @@ -1066,7 +1065,7 @@ static int trusted_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) char *datablob; int ret = 0; - if (test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_negative(key)) return -ENOKEY; p = key->payload.data[0]; if (!p->migratable) @@ -1147,20 +1146,21 @@ static long trusted_read(const struct key *key, char __user *buffer, p = dereference_key_locked(key); if (!p) return -EINVAL; - if (!buffer || buflen <= 0) - return 2 * p->blob_len; - ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ascii_buf) - return -ENOMEM; - bufp = ascii_buf; - for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) - bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); - if ((copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len)) != 0) { + if (buffer && buflen >= 2 * p->blob_len) { + ascii_buf = kmalloc(2 * p->blob_len, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!ascii_buf) + return -ENOMEM; + + bufp = ascii_buf; + for (i = 0; i < p->blob_len; i++) + bufp = hex_byte_pack(bufp, p->blob[i]); + if (copy_to_user(buffer, ascii_buf, 2 * p->blob_len) != 0) { + kzfree(ascii_buf); + return -EFAULT; + } kzfree(ascii_buf); - return -EFAULT; } - kzfree(ascii_buf); return 2 * p->blob_len; } diff --git a/security/keys/trusted.h b/security/keys/trusted.h index ff001a5dcb24..8d5fe9eafb22 100644 --- a/security/keys/trusted.h +++ b/security/keys/trusted.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #ifndef __TRUSTED_KEY_H #define __TRUSTED_KEY_H diff --git a/security/keys/user_defined.c b/security/keys/user_defined.c index 3d8c68eba516..9f558bedba23 100644 --- a/security/keys/user_defined.c +++ b/security/keys/user_defined.c @@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ int user_update(struct key *key, struct key_preparsed_payload *prep) /* attach the new data, displacing the old */ key->expiry = prep->expiry; - if (!test_bit(KEY_FLAG_NEGATIVE, &key->flags)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) zap = dereference_key_locked(key); rcu_assign_keypointer(key, prep->payload.data[0]); prep->payload.data[0] = NULL; @@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(user_destroy); void user_describe(const struct key *key, struct seq_file *m) { seq_puts(m, key->description); - if (key_is_instantiated(key)) + if (key_is_positive(key)) seq_printf(m, ": %u", key->datalen); } diff --git a/security/min_addr.c b/security/min_addr.c index f728728f193b..94d2b0cf0e7b 100644 --- a/security/min_addr.c +++ b/security/min_addr.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 #include <linux/init.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/security.h> diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c index 4bf0f571b4ef..1cd8526cb0b7 100644 --- a/security/security.c +++ b/security/security.c @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ * (at your option) any later version. */ +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/dcache.h> #include <linux/module.h> @@ -1703,3 +1704,34 @@ int security_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *lsmrule, actx); } #endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */ + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +int security_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, unsigned int size) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf, 0, cmd, attr, size); +} +int security_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_map, 0, map, fmode); +} +int security_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_prog, 0, prog); +} +int security_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_map_alloc_security, 0, map); +} +int security_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + return call_int_hook(bpf_prog_alloc_security, 0, aux); +} +void security_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + call_void_hook(bpf_map_free_security, map); +} +void security_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + call_void_hook(bpf_prog_free_security, aux); +} +#endif /* CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL */ diff --git a/security/selinux/Makefile b/security/selinux/Makefile index ff5895ede96f..c7161f8792b2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/Makefile +++ b/security/selinux/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 # # Makefile for building the SELinux module as part of the kernel tree. # diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index f21f1e0e6452..8644d864e3c1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/msg.h> #include <linux/shm.h> +#include <linux/bpf.h> #include "avc.h" #include "objsec.h" @@ -1814,6 +1815,10 @@ static inline int file_path_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, return inode_has_perm(cred, file_inode(file), av, &ad); } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid); +#endif + /* Check whether a task can use an open file descriptor to access an inode in a given way. Check access to the descriptor itself, and then use dentry_has_perm to @@ -1844,6 +1849,12 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred, goto out; } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, cred_sid(cred)); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + /* av is zero if only checking access to the descriptor. */ rc = 0; if (av) @@ -2164,6 +2175,12 @@ static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from, return rc; } +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + rc = bpf_fd_pass(file, sid); + if (rc) + return rc; +#endif + if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(d_backing_inode(dentry)))) return 0; @@ -6243,6 +6260,139 @@ static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) } #endif +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL +static int selinux_bpf(int cmd, union bpf_attr *attr, + unsigned int size) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + int ret; + + switch (cmd) { + case BPF_MAP_CREATE: + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__MAP_CREATE, + NULL); + break; + case BPF_PROG_LOAD: + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, sid, SECCLASS_BPF, BPF__PROG_LOAD, + NULL); + break; + default: + ret = 0; + break; + } + + return ret; +} + +static u32 bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode_t fmode) +{ + u32 av = 0; + + if (fmode & FMODE_READ) + av |= BPF__MAP_READ; + if (fmode & FMODE_WRITE) + av |= BPF__MAP_WRITE; + return av; +} + +/* This function will check the file pass through unix socket or binder to see + * if it is a bpf related object. And apply correspinding checks on the bpf + * object based on the type. The bpf maps and programs, not like other files and + * socket, are using a shared anonymous inode inside the kernel as their inode. + * So checking that inode cannot identify if the process have privilege to + * access the bpf object and that's why we have to add this additional check in + * selinux_file_receive and selinux_binder_transfer_files. + */ +static int bpf_fd_pass(struct file *file, u32 sid) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + struct bpf_prog *prog; + struct bpf_map *map; + int ret; + + if (file->f_op == &bpf_map_fops) { + map = file->private_data; + bpfsec = map->security; + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(file->f_mode), NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + } else if (file->f_op == &bpf_prog_fops) { + prog = file->private_data; + bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + ret = avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); + if (ret) + return ret; + } + return 0; +} + +static int selinux_bpf_map(struct bpf_map *map, fmode_t fmode) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = map->security; + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + bpf_map_fmode_to_av(fmode), NULL); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_prog(struct bpf_prog *prog) +{ + u32 sid = current_sid(); + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = prog->aux->security; + return avc_has_perm(sid, bpfsec->sid, SECCLASS_BPF, + BPF__PROG_RUN, NULL); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_map_alloc(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bpfsec) + return -ENOMEM; + + bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); + map->security = bpfsec; + + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_bpf_map_free(struct bpf_map *map) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = map->security; + + map->security = NULL; + kfree(bpfsec); +} + +static int selinux_bpf_prog_alloc(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec; + + bpfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*bpfsec), GFP_KERNEL); + if (!bpfsec) + return -ENOMEM; + + bpfsec->sid = current_sid(); + aux->security = bpfsec; + + return 0; +} + +static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux) +{ + struct bpf_security_struct *bpfsec = aux->security; + + aux->security = NULL; + kfree(bpfsec); +} +#endif + static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_set_context_mgr, selinux_binder_set_context_mgr), LSM_HOOK_INIT(binder_transaction, selinux_binder_transaction), @@ -6462,6 +6612,16 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, selinux_audit_rule_match), LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, selinux_audit_rule_free), #endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf, selinux_bpf), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map, selinux_bpf_map), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog, selinux_bpf_prog), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_map_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_alloc_security, selinux_bpf_prog_alloc), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_map_free_security, selinux_bpf_map_free), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(bpf_prog_free_security, selinux_bpf_prog_free), +#endif }; static __init int selinux_init(void) diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc.h b/security/selinux/include/avc.h index a5004e9de11a..57d61cf36500 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Access vector cache interface for object managers. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h index 37d57dadd476..3bcc72769b87 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/avc_ss.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Access vector cache interface for the security server. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h index 35ffb29a69cb..acdee7795297 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ #include <linux/capability.h> #define COMMON_FILE_SOCK_PERMS "ioctl", "read", "write", "create", \ @@ -237,6 +238,8 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = { { "access", NULL } }, { "infiniband_endport", { "manage_subnet", NULL } }, + { "bpf", + {"map_create", "map_read", "map_write", "prog_load", "prog_run"} }, { NULL } }; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h index a59b64e3fd02..4f93f697f71c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/initial_sid_to_string.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* This file is automatically generated. Do not edit. */ static const char *initial_sid_to_string[] = { diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 1649cd18eb0b..3d54468ce334 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -150,6 +150,10 @@ struct pkey_security_struct { u32 sid; /* SID of pkey */ }; +struct bpf_security_struct { + u32 sid; /*SID of bpf obj creater*/ +}; + extern unsigned int selinux_checkreqprot; #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/include/security.h b/security/selinux/include/security.h index 28dfb2f93e4d..02f0412d42f2 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/security.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/security.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Security server interface. * diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index 36a7ce9e11ff..1f173a7a4daa 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * SELinux support for the XFRM LSM hooks * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h index 33ae2aec4f36..4e563be9ef5f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/constraint.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A constraint is a condition that must be satisfied in * order for one or more permissions to be granted. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/context.h b/security/selinux/ss/context.h index a2c0f37c42ae..2260c44a568c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/context.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/context.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A security context is a set of security attributes * associated with each subject and object controlled diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index fc28149a4f2e..b6a78b09235c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the extensible bitmap type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h index da1325dda550..edf4fa39c60a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * An extensible bitmap is a bitmap that supports an * arbitrary number of bits. Extensible bitmaps are diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index e0443f4afea5..fe25b3fb2154 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the hash table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h index d6883d3e7c5b..6183ee2a2e7a 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A hash table (hashtab) maintains associations between * key values and datum values. The type of the key values diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c index d9dc34f4fade..ad982ce8bfa4 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h index 0f0a1d65b2ce..131d76266ea5 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Multi-level security (MLS) policy operations. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h index 47f3702cd596..068e0d7809db 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls_types.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Type definitions for the multi-level security (MLS) policy. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.h b/security/selinux/ss/services.h index 3d9fa9556b4f..356bdd36cf6d 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * Implementation of the security services. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c index 6ae08efc5ae7..5be31b7af225 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the SID table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h index de5d0ea583d2..a1a1d2617b6f 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/sidtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A security identifier table (sidtab) is a hash table * of security context structures indexed by SID value. diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c index d1a6745849a7..dc2ce94165d3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * Implementation of the symbol table type. * diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h index 0bc12d587d3a..d75fcafe7281 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h +++ b/security/selinux/ss/symtab.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * A symbol table (symtab) maintains associations between symbol * strings and datum values. The type of the datum values diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h index 6a71fc7831ab..f7db791fb566 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack.h +++ b/security/smack/smack.h @@ -321,6 +321,7 @@ struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int); void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp); struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *); bool smack_privileged(int cap); +bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred); void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list); /* diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c index 1a3004189447..9a4c0ad46518 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_access.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c @@ -623,26 +623,24 @@ struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid) LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list); DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock); -/* +/** + * smack_privileged_cred - are all privilege requirements met by cred + * @cap: The requested capability + * @cred: the credential to use + * * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged * by the onlycap rule. * * Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not. */ -bool smack_privileged(int cap) +bool smack_privileged_cred(int cap, const struct cred *cred) { - struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current(); + struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security; + struct smack_known *skp = tsp->smk_task; struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep; int rc; - /* - * All kernel tasks are privileged - */ - if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) - return true; - - rc = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, cap, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + rc = cap_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, cap, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); if (rc) return false; @@ -662,3 +660,23 @@ bool smack_privileged(int cap) return false; } + +/** + * smack_privileged - are all privilege requirements met + * @cap: The requested capability + * + * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged + * by the onlycap rule. + * + * Returns true if the task is allowed to be privileged, false if it's not. + */ +bool smack_privileged(int cap) +{ + /* + * All kernel tasks are privileged + */ + if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) + return true; + + return smack_privileged_cred(cap, current_cred()); +} diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 319add31b4a4..03fdecba93bb 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -1473,7 +1473,7 @@ static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * @inode: the object * @name: attribute name * @buffer: where to put the result - * @alloc: unused + * @alloc: duplicate memory * * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code */ @@ -1486,43 +1486,38 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecurity(struct inode *inode, struct super_block *sbp; struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode; struct smack_known *isp; - int ilen; - int rc = 0; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) { + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) isp = smk_of_inode(inode); - ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known); - *buffer = isp->smk_known; - return ilen; - } - - /* - * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. - */ - sbp = ip->i_sb; - if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + else { + /* + * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets. + */ + sbp = ip->i_sb; + if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - sock = SOCKET_I(ip); - if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + sock = SOCKET_I(ip); + if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL) + return -EOPNOTSUPP; - ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; - if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_in; - else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) - isp = ssp->smk_out; - else - return -EOPNOTSUPP; + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_in; + else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) + isp = ssp->smk_out; + else + return -EOPNOTSUPP; + } - ilen = strlen(isp->smk_known); - if (rc == 0) { - *buffer = isp->smk_known; - rc = ilen; + if (alloc) { + *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL); + if (*buffer == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; } - return rc; + return strlen(isp->smk_known); } @@ -2871,12 +2866,16 @@ static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap, #endif #ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING struct smack_known *rsp; - struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct socket_smack *ssp; #endif if (sock->sk == NULL) return 0; +#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING + ssp = sock->sk->sk_security; +#endif + switch (sock->sk->sk_family) { case PF_INET: if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in)) @@ -4370,6 +4369,10 @@ static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, */ if (tkp == NULL) return -EACCES; + + if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, cred)) + return 0; + #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY); ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial; @@ -4605,6 +4608,82 @@ static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen) return 0; } +static int smack_inode_copy_up(struct dentry *dentry, struct cred **new) +{ + + struct task_smack *tsp; + struct smack_known *skp; + struct inode_smack *isp; + struct cred *new_creds = *new; + + if (new_creds == NULL) { + new_creds = prepare_creds(); + if (new_creds == NULL) + return -ENOMEM; + } + + tsp = new_creds->security; + + /* + * Get label from overlay inode and set it in create_sid + */ + isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security; + skp = isp->smk_inode; + tsp->smk_task = skp; + *new = new_creds; + return 0; +} + +static int smack_inode_copy_up_xattr(const char *name) +{ + /* + * Return 1 if this is the smack access Smack attribute. + */ + if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) + return 1; + + return -EOPNOTSUPP; +} + +static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode, + struct qstr *name, + const struct cred *old, + struct cred *new) +{ + struct task_smack *otsp = old->security; + struct task_smack *ntsp = new->security; + struct inode_smack *isp; + int may; + + /* + * Use the process credential unless all of + * the transmuting criteria are met + */ + ntsp->smk_task = otsp->smk_task; + + /* + * the attribute of the containing directory + */ + isp = d_inode(dentry->d_parent)->i_security; + + if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) { + rcu_read_lock(); + may = smk_access_entry(otsp->smk_task->smk_known, + isp->smk_inode->smk_known, + &otsp->smk_task->smk_rules); + rcu_read_unlock(); + + /* + * If the directory is transmuting and the rule + * providing access is transmuting use the containing + * directory label instead of the process label. + */ + if (may > 0 && (may & MAY_TRANSMUTE)) + ntsp->smk_task = isp->smk_inode; + } + return 0; +} + static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme), @@ -4740,6 +4819,9 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx), LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr), + LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as), }; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/Makefile b/security/tomoyo/Makefile index 65dbcb2fd850..b7c6a7ffc058 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/Makefile +++ b/security/tomoyo/Makefile @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 obj-y = audit.o common.o condition.o domain.o environ.o file.o gc.o group.o load_policy.o memory.o mount.o network.o realpath.o securityfs_if.o tomoyo.o util.o targets += builtin-policy.h diff --git a/security/tomoyo/audit.c b/security/tomoyo/audit.c index 3ffa4f5509d8..558e3076d38c 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/audit.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/audit.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/audit.c * @@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ static char *tomoyo_print_header(struct tomoyo_request_info *r) if (!buffer) return NULL; - tomoyo_convert_time(get_seconds(), &stamp); + tomoyo_convert_time(ktime_get_real_seconds(), &stamp); pos = snprintf(buffer, tomoyo_buffer_len - 1, "#%04u/%02u/%02u %02u:%02u:%02u# profile=%u mode=%s " @@ -457,7 +458,7 @@ void tomoyo_read_log(struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head) * * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM when ready to read an audit log. */ -unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { if (tomoyo_log_count) return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.c b/security/tomoyo/common.c index e0fb75052550..70c73bf66c88 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/common.c * @@ -2119,7 +2120,7 @@ static struct tomoyo_domain_info *tomoyo_find_domain_by_qid * * Waits for access requests which violated policy in enforcing mode. */ -static unsigned int tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +static __poll_t tomoyo_poll_query(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { if (!list_empty(&tomoyo_query_list)) return POLLIN | POLLRDNORM; @@ -2256,7 +2257,7 @@ static const char * const tomoyo_memory_headers[TOMOYO_MAX_MEMORY_STAT] = { /* Timestamp counter for last updated. */ static unsigned int tomoyo_stat_updated[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT]; /* Counter for number of updates. */ -static unsigned int tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT]; +static time64_t tomoyo_stat_modified[TOMOYO_MAX_POLICY_STAT]; /** * tomoyo_update_stat - Update statistic counters. @@ -2271,7 +2272,7 @@ void tomoyo_update_stat(const u8 index) * I don't use atomic operations because race condition is not fatal. */ tomoyo_stat_updated[index]++; - tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = get_seconds(); + tomoyo_stat_modified[index] = ktime_get_real_seconds(); } /** @@ -2452,7 +2453,7 @@ int tomoyo_open_control(const u8 type, struct file *file) * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write, * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise. */ -unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { struct tomoyo_io_buffer *head = file->private_data; if (head->poll) diff --git a/security/tomoyo/common.h b/security/tomoyo/common.h index 361e7a284699..539bcdd30bb8 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/common.h +++ b/security/tomoyo/common.h @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */ /* * security/tomoyo/common.h * @@ -788,7 +789,7 @@ struct tomoyo_acl_param { struct tomoyo_io_buffer { void (*read) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); int (*write) (struct tomoyo_io_buffer *); - unsigned int (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait); + __poll_t (*poll) (struct file *file, poll_table *wait); /* Exclusive lock for this structure. */ struct mutex io_sem; char __user *read_user_buf; @@ -980,8 +981,8 @@ int tomoyo_path_number_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path, unsigned long number); int tomoyo_path_perm(const u8 operation, const struct path *path, const char *target); -unsigned int tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); -unsigned int tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); +__poll_t tomoyo_poll_control(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); +__poll_t tomoyo_poll_log(struct file *file, poll_table *wait); int tomoyo_socket_bind_permission(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *addr, int addr_len); int tomoyo_socket_connect_permission(struct socket *sock, @@ -1036,7 +1037,7 @@ void tomoyo_check_acl(struct tomoyo_request_info *r, bool (*check_entry) (struct tomoyo_request_info *, const struct tomoyo_acl_info *)); void tomoyo_check_profile(void); -void tomoyo_convert_time(time_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp); +void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp); void tomoyo_del_condition(struct list_head *element); void tomoyo_fill_path_info(struct tomoyo_path_info *ptr); void tomoyo_get_attributes(struct tomoyo_obj_info *obj); diff --git a/security/tomoyo/condition.c b/security/tomoyo/condition.c index 6c4528d4b48f..8d0e1b9c9c57 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/condition.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/condition.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/condition.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/domain.c b/security/tomoyo/domain.c index 00d223e9fb37..f6758dad981f 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/domain.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/domain.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/domain.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/environ.c b/security/tomoyo/environ.c index ad4c6e18a437..7f0a471f19b2 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/environ.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/environ.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/environ.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/file.c b/security/tomoyo/file.c index 223f21ffa632..2a374b4da8f5 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/file.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/file.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/file.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/gc.c b/security/tomoyo/gc.c index 540bc29e1b5a..e22bea811c57 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/gc.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/gc.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/gc.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/group.c b/security/tomoyo/group.c index 944ad77d8fba..21b0cc3a7e1a 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/group.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/group.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/group.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c index 078fac0bb4c5..81b951652051 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/load_policy.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/load_policy.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/memory.c b/security/tomoyo/memory.c index 1598b559ac42..12477e0b0a11 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/memory.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/memory.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/memory.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/mount.c b/security/tomoyo/mount.c index 14b53fb2a0cf..807fd91dbb54 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/mount.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/mount.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/mount.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/network.c b/security/tomoyo/network.c index 6c02ac478247..cd6932e5225c 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/network.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/network.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/network.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c index a97b275ca3af..6ff8c21e4fff 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/realpath.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/realpath.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/realpath.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c index 06ab41b1ff28..fb9bf99deb35 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/securityfs_if.c * @@ -156,7 +157,7 @@ static int tomoyo_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) * Returns POLLIN | POLLRDNORM | POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM if ready to read/write, * POLLOUT | POLLWRNORM otherwise. */ -static unsigned int tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) +static __poll_t tomoyo_poll(struct file *file, poll_table *wait) { return tomoyo_poll_control(file, wait); } diff --git a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c index d25b705360e0..213b8c593668 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/tomoyo.c * diff --git a/security/tomoyo/util.c b/security/tomoyo/util.c index 848317fea704..d3d9d9f1edb0 100644 --- a/security/tomoyo/util.c +++ b/security/tomoyo/util.c @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 /* * security/tomoyo/util.c * @@ -86,38 +87,17 @@ const u8 tomoyo_index2category[TOMOYO_MAX_MAC_INDEX] = { * @stamp: Pointer to "struct tomoyo_time". * * Returns nothing. - * - * This function does not handle Y2038 problem. */ -void tomoyo_convert_time(time_t time, struct tomoyo_time *stamp) +void tomoyo_convert_time(time64_t time64, struct tomoyo_time *stamp) { - static const u16 tomoyo_eom[2][12] = { - { 31, 59, 90, 120, 151, 181, 212, 243, 273, 304, 334, 365 }, - { 31, 60, 91, 121, 152, 182, 213, 244, 274, 305, 335, 366 } - }; - u16 y; - u8 m; - bool r; - stamp->sec = time % 60; - time /= 60; - stamp->min = time % 60; - time /= 60; - stamp->hour = time % 24; - time /= 24; - for (y = 1970; ; y++) { - const unsigned short days = (y & 3) ? 365 : 366; - if (time < days) - break; - time -= days; - } - r = (y & 3) == 0; - for (m = 0; m < 11 && time >= tomoyo_eom[r][m]; m++) - ; - if (m) - time -= tomoyo_eom[r][m - 1]; - stamp->year = y; - stamp->month = ++m; - stamp->day = ++time; + struct tm tm; + time64_to_tm(time64, 0, &tm); + stamp->sec = tm.tm_sec; + stamp->min = tm.tm_min; + stamp->hour = tm.tm_hour; + stamp->day = tm.tm_mday; + stamp->month = tm.tm_mon + 1; + stamp->year = tm.tm_year + 1900; } /** |