diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 20 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/hooks.c | 187 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/audit.h | 46 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 28 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/netlabel.c | 43 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/avtab.c | 7 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/ss/services.c | 36 |
9 files changed, 170 insertions, 205 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index b49c44869dc4..cc0b0af20296 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -134,18 +134,10 @@ static inline u32 avc_hash(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass) */ void __init avc_init(void) { - avc_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_node", sizeof(struct avc_node), - 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - avc_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_node", - sizeof(struct avc_xperms_node), - 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - avc_xperms_decision_cachep = kmem_cache_create( - "avc_xperms_decision_node", - sizeof(struct avc_xperms_decision_node), - 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - avc_xperms_data_cachep = kmem_cache_create("avc_xperms_data", - sizeof(struct extended_perms_data), - 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + avc_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avc_node, SLAB_PANIC); + avc_xperms_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avc_xperms_node, SLAB_PANIC); + avc_xperms_decision_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avc_xperms_decision_node, SLAB_PANIC); + avc_xperms_data_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(extended_perms_data, SLAB_PANIC); } int avc_get_hash_stats(char *page) @@ -396,7 +388,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested, audited = denied & avd->auditdeny; if (audited && xpd) { if (avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_DONTAUDIT)) - audited &= ~requested; + audited = 0; } } else if (result) { audited = denied = requested; @@ -404,7 +396,7 @@ static inline u32 avc_xperms_audit_required(u32 requested, audited = requested & avd->auditallow; if (audited && xpd) { if (!avc_xperms_has_perm(xpd, perm, XPERMS_AUDITALLOW)) - audited &= ~requested; + audited = 0; } } diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 400eca4ad0fb..94c523140125 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -282,8 +282,13 @@ static int __inode_security_revalidate(struct inode *inode, might_sleep_if(may_sleep); + /* + * The check of isec->initialized below is racy but + * inode_doinit_with_dentry() will recheck with + * isec->lock held. + */ if (selinux_initialized() && - isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED) { + data_race(isec->initialized != LABEL_INITIALIZED)) { if (!may_sleep) return -ECHILD; @@ -2202,23 +2207,16 @@ static int selinux_syslog(int type) } /* - * Check that a process has enough memory to allocate a new virtual - * mapping. 0 means there is enough memory for the allocation to - * succeed and -ENOMEM implies there is not. + * Check permission for allocating a new virtual mapping. Returns + * 0 if permission is granted, negative error code if not. * * Do not audit the selinux permission check, as this is applied to all * processes that allocate mappings. */ static int selinux_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { - int rc, cap_sys_admin = 0; - - rc = cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); - if (rc == 0) - cap_sys_admin = 1; - - return cap_sys_admin; + return cred_has_capability(current_cred(), CAP_SYS_ADMIN, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT, true); } /* binprm security operations */ @@ -3538,8 +3536,8 @@ static int selinux_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name) * xattrs up. Instead, filter out SELinux-related xattrs following * policy load. */ - if (selinux_initialized() && strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX) == 0) - return 1; /* Discard */ + if (selinux_initialized() && !strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SELINUX)) + return -ECANCELED; /* Discard */ /* * Any other attribute apart from SELINUX is not claimed, supported * by selinux. @@ -3950,7 +3948,7 @@ static int selinux_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, struct file_security_struct *fsec; /* struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file */ - file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner); + file = fown->file; fsec = selinux_file(file); @@ -4594,7 +4592,7 @@ static int socket_sockcreate_sid(const struct task_security_struct *tsec, static int sock_has_perm(struct sock *sk, u32 perms) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; @@ -4662,7 +4660,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, isec->initialized = LABEL_INITIALIZED; if (sock->sk) { - sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk); sksec->sclass = sclass; sksec->sid = sid; /* Allows detection of the first association on this socket */ @@ -4678,8 +4676,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family, static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, struct socket *sockb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = socka->sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = sockb->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_a = selinux_sock(socka->sk); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_b = selinux_sock(sockb->sk); sksec_a->peer_sid = sksec_b->sid; sksec_b->peer_sid = sksec_a->sid; @@ -4694,7 +4692,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_socketpair(struct socket *socka, static int selinux_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 family; int err; @@ -4834,7 +4832,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_connect_helper(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address, int addrlen) { struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); int err; err = sock_has_perm(sk, SOCKET__CONNECT); @@ -5012,9 +5010,9 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = sock->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = other->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_sock = selinux_sock(sock); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_other = selinux_sock(other); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec_new = selinux_sock(newsk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; int err; @@ -5043,8 +5041,8 @@ static int selinux_socket_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock, static int selinux_socket_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssec = sock->sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *osec = other->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *ssec = selinux_sock(sock->sk); + struct sk_security_struct *osec = selinux_sock(other->sk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; @@ -5081,7 +5079,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, u16 family) { int err = 0; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; @@ -5110,7 +5108,7 @@ static int selinux_sock_rcv_skb_compat(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static int selinux_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { int err, peerlbl_active, secmark_active; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 family = sk->sk_family; u32 sk_sid = sksec->sid; struct common_audit_data ad; @@ -5178,7 +5176,7 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock, int err = 0; char *scontext = NULL; u32 scontext_len; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sock->sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sock->sk); u32 peer_sid = SECSID_NULL; if (sksec->sclass == SECCLASS_UNIX_STREAM_SOCKET || @@ -5238,34 +5236,27 @@ static int selinux_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock, static int selinux_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t priority) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - - sksec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sksec), priority); - if (!sksec) - return -ENOMEM; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); sksec->peer_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED; sksec->sclass = SECCLASS_SOCKET; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset(sksec); - sk->sk_security = sksec; return 0; } static void selinux_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); - sk->sk_security = NULL; selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(sksec); - kfree(sksec); } static void selinux_sk_clone_security(const struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); newsksec->sid = sksec->sid; newsksec->peer_sid = sksec->peer_sid; @@ -5279,7 +5270,7 @@ static void selinux_sk_getsecid(const struct sock *sk, u32 *secid) if (!sk) *secid = SECINITSID_ANY_SOCKET; else { - const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + const struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); *secid = sksec->sid; } @@ -5289,7 +5280,7 @@ static void selinux_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent) { struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode_security_novalidate(SOCK_INODE(parent)); - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); if (sk->sk_family == PF_INET || sk->sk_family == PF_INET6 || sk->sk_family == PF_UNIX) @@ -5306,7 +5297,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, { struct sock *sk = asoc->base.sk; u16 family = sk->sk_family; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct common_audit_data ad; struct lsm_network_audit net; int err; @@ -5361,7 +5352,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_process_new_assoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk); u32 conn_sid; int err; @@ -5394,7 +5385,7 @@ static int selinux_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, static int selinux_sctp_assoc_established(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sk_buff *skb) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk); if (!selinux_policycap_extsockclass()) return 0; @@ -5493,8 +5484,8 @@ static int selinux_sctp_bind_connect(struct sock *sk, int optname, static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); /* If policy does not support SECCLASS_SCTP_SOCKET then call * the non-sctp clone version. @@ -5510,8 +5501,8 @@ static void selinux_sctp_sk_clone(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct sock *sk static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) { - struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = ssk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *ssksec = selinux_sock(ssk); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); ssksec->sclass = sksec->sclass; ssksec->sid = sksec->sid; @@ -5526,7 +5517,7 @@ static int selinux_mptcp_add_subflow(struct sock *sk, struct sock *ssk) static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, struct request_sock *req) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); int err; u16 family = req->rsk_ops->family; u32 connsid; @@ -5547,7 +5538,7 @@ static int selinux_inet_conn_request(const struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb, static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, const struct request_sock *req) { - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); newsksec->sid = req->secid; newsksec->peer_sid = req->peer_secid; @@ -5564,7 +5555,7 @@ static void selinux_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *newsk, static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) { u16 family = sk->sk_family; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); /* handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving via IPv6 sockets */ if (family == PF_INET6 && skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP)) @@ -5595,24 +5586,14 @@ static void selinux_req_classify_flow(const struct request_sock *req, flic->flowic_secid = req->secid; } -static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void **security) +static int selinux_tun_dev_alloc_security(void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); - tunsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*tunsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!tunsec) - return -ENOMEM; tunsec->sid = current_sid(); - - *security = tunsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_tun_dev_free_security(void *security) -{ - kfree(security); -} - static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) { u32 sid = current_sid(); @@ -5630,7 +5611,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_create(void) static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); return avc_has_perm(current_sid(), tunsec->sid, SECCLASS_TUN_SOCKET, TUN_SOCKET__ATTACH_QUEUE, NULL); @@ -5638,8 +5619,8 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security) static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); /* we don't currently perform any NetLabel based labeling here and it * isn't clear that we would want to do so anyway; while we could apply @@ -5656,7 +5637,7 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security) static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security) { - struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = security; + struct tun_security_struct *tunsec = selinux_tun_dev(security); u32 sid = current_sid(); int err; @@ -5762,7 +5743,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb, return NF_ACCEPT; /* standard practice, label using the parent socket */ - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sk); sid = sksec->sid; } else sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL; @@ -5785,7 +5766,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb, sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); if (sk == NULL) return NF_ACCEPT; - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sk); ad_net_init_from_iif(&ad, &net, state->out->ifindex, state->pf); if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto)) @@ -5874,7 +5855,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, u32 skb_sid; struct sk_security_struct *sksec; - sksec = sk->sk_security; + sksec = selinux_sock(sk); if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &skb_sid)) return NF_DROP; /* At this point, if the returned skb peerlbl is SECSID_NULL @@ -5903,7 +5884,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv, } else { /* Locally generated packet, fetch the security label from the * associated socket. */ - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); peer_sid = sksec->sid; secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND; } @@ -5946,7 +5927,7 @@ static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb) unsigned int data_len = skb->len; unsigned char *data = skb->data; struct nlmsghdr *nlh; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); u16 sclass = sksec->sclass; u32 perm; @@ -6680,11 +6661,7 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, unsigned long flags) { const struct task_security_struct *tsec; - struct key_security_struct *ksec; - - ksec = kzalloc(sizeof(struct key_security_struct), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!ksec) - return -ENOMEM; + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(k); tsec = selinux_cred(cred); if (tsec->keycreate_sid) @@ -6692,18 +6669,9 @@ static int selinux_key_alloc(struct key *k, const struct cred *cred, else ksec->sid = tsec->sid; - k->security = ksec; return 0; } -static void selinux_key_free(struct key *k) -{ - struct key_security_struct *ksec = k->security; - - k->security = NULL; - kfree(ksec); -} - static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, const struct cred *cred, enum key_need_perm need_perm) @@ -6744,14 +6712,14 @@ static int selinux_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref, sid = cred_sid(cred); key = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref); - ksec = key->security; + ksec = selinux_key(key); return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, perm, NULL); } static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) { - struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key); char *context = NULL; unsigned len; int rc; @@ -6767,7 +6735,7 @@ static int selinux_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer) #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS static int selinux_watch_key(struct key *key) { - struct key_security_struct *ksec = key->security; + struct key_security_struct *ksec = selinux_key(key); u32 sid = current_sid(); return avc_has_perm(sid, ksec->sid, SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__VIEW, NULL); @@ -6821,23 +6789,13 @@ static int selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet(void *ib_sec, const char *dev_name, INFINIBAND_ENDPORT__MANAGE_SUBNET, &ad); } -static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void **ib_sec) +static int selinux_ib_alloc_security(void *ib_sec) { - struct ib_security_struct *sec; + struct ib_security_struct *sec = selinux_ib(ib_sec); - sec = kzalloc(sizeof(*sec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!sec) - return -ENOMEM; sec->sid = current_sid(); - - *ib_sec = sec; return 0; } - -static void selinux_ib_free_security(void *ib_sec) -{ - kfree(ib_sec); -} #endif #ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL @@ -7003,9 +6961,16 @@ struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = { .lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct), .lbs_inode = sizeof(struct inode_security_struct), .lbs_ipc = sizeof(struct ipc_security_struct), + .lbs_key = sizeof(struct key_security_struct), .lbs_msg_msg = sizeof(struct msg_security_struct), +#ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS + .lbs_perf_event = sizeof(struct perf_event_security_struct), +#endif + .lbs_sock = sizeof(struct sk_security_struct), .lbs_superblock = sizeof(struct superblock_security_struct), .lbs_xattr_count = SELINUX_INODE_INIT_XATTRS, + .lbs_tun_dev = sizeof(struct tun_security_struct), + .lbs_ib = sizeof(struct ib_security_struct), }; #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS @@ -7032,24 +6997,12 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_alloc(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec; - perfsec = kzalloc(sizeof(*perfsec), GFP_KERNEL); - if (!perfsec) - return -ENOMEM; - + perfsec = selinux_perf_event(event->security); perfsec->sid = current_sid(); - event->security = perfsec; return 0; } -static void selinux_perf_event_free(struct perf_event *event) -{ - struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; - - event->security = NULL; - kfree(perfsec); -} - static int selinux_perf_event_read(struct perf_event *event) { struct perf_event_security_struct *perfsec = event->security; @@ -7317,7 +7270,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_inc, selinux_secmark_refcount_inc), LSM_HOOK_INIT(secmark_refcount_dec, selinux_secmark_refcount_dec), LSM_HOOK_INIT(req_classify_flow, selinux_req_classify_flow), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_free_security, selinux_tun_dev_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_create, selinux_tun_dev_create), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach_queue, selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue), LSM_HOOK_INIT(tun_dev_attach, selinux_tun_dev_attach), @@ -7326,7 +7278,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_pkey_access, selinux_ib_pkey_access), LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_endport_manage_subnet, selinux_ib_endport_manage_subnet), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(ib_free_security, selinux_ib_free_security), #endif #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM LSM_HOOK_INIT(xfrm_policy_free_security, selinux_xfrm_policy_free), @@ -7340,7 +7291,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #endif #ifdef CONFIG_KEYS - LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, selinux_key_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, selinux_key_permission), LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, selinux_key_getsecurity), #ifdef CONFIG_KEY_NOTIFICATIONS @@ -7365,7 +7315,6 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = { #ifdef CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_open, selinux_perf_event_open), - LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_free, selinux_perf_event_free), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_read, selinux_perf_event_read), LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write), #endif diff --git a/security/selinux/include/audit.h b/security/selinux/include/audit.h index 29c7d4c86f6d..168d17be7df3 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/audit.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/audit.h @@ -16,45 +16,45 @@ #include <linux/types.h> /** - * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. - * @field: the field this rule refers to - * @op: the operator the rule uses - * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule - * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this - * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc + * selinux_audit_rule_init - alloc/init an selinux audit rule structure. + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operator the rule uses + * @rulestr: the text "target" of the rule + * @rule: pointer to the new rule structure returned via this + * @gfp: GFP flag used for kmalloc * - * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure - * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with - * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. + * Returns 0 if successful, -errno if not. On success, the rule structure + * will be allocated internally. The caller must free this structure with + * selinux_audit_rule_free() after use. */ int selinux_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **rule, gfp_t gfp); /** - * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. - * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed + * selinux_audit_rule_free - free an selinux audit rule structure. + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to be freed * - * This will free all memory associated with the given rule. - * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed. + * This will free all memory associated with the given rule. + * If @rule is NULL, no operation is performed. */ void selinux_audit_rule_free(void *rule); /** - * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. - * @sid: the context ID to check - * @field: the field this rule refers to - * @op: the operator the rule uses - * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against + * selinux_audit_rule_match - determine if a context ID matches a rule. + * @sid: the context ID to check + * @field: the field this rule refers to + * @op: the operator the rule uses + * @rule: pointer to the audit rule to check against * - * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and - * -errno on failure. + * Returns 1 if the context id matches the rule, 0 if it does not, and + * -errno on failure. */ int selinux_audit_rule_match(u32 sid, u32 field, u32 op, void *rule); /** - * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields. - * @rule: rule to be checked - * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. + * selinux_audit_rule_known - check to see if rule contains selinux fields. + * @rule: rule to be checked + * Returns 1 if there are selinux fields specified in the rule, 0 otherwise. */ int selinux_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *rule); diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index dea1d6f3ed2d..c88cae81ee4c 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -195,4 +195,32 @@ selinux_superblock(const struct super_block *superblock) return superblock->s_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_superblock; } +#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS +static inline struct key_security_struct *selinux_key(const struct key *key) +{ + return key->security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_key; +} +#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */ + +static inline struct sk_security_struct *selinux_sock(const struct sock *sock) +{ + return sock->sk_security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_sock; +} + +static inline struct tun_security_struct *selinux_tun_dev(void *security) +{ + return security + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_tun_dev; +} + +static inline struct ib_security_struct *selinux_ib(void *ib_sec) +{ + return ib_sec + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_ib; +} + +static inline struct perf_event_security_struct * +selinux_perf_event(void *perf_event) +{ + return perf_event + selinux_blob_sizes.lbs_perf_event; +} + #endif /* _SELINUX_OBJSEC_H_ */ diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c index 55885634e880..d51dfe892312 100644 --- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c +++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ #include <linux/gfp.h> #include <linux/ip.h> #include <linux/ipv6.h> +#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/netlabel.h> #include <net/ip.h> @@ -62,13 +63,13 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached(struct sk_buff *skb, * Description: * Generate the NetLabel security attributes for a socket, making full use of * the socket's attribute cache. Returns a pointer to the security attributes - * on success, NULL on failure. + * on success, or an ERR_PTR on failure. * */ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk) { int rc; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; if (sksec->nlbl_secattr != NULL) @@ -76,11 +77,12 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(struct sock *sk) secattr = netlbl_secattr_alloc(GFP_ATOMIC); if (secattr == NULL) - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); + rc = security_netlbl_sid_to_secattr(sksec->sid, secattr); if (rc != 0) { netlbl_secattr_free(secattr); - return NULL; + return ERR_PTR(rc); } sksec->nlbl_secattr = secattr; @@ -100,7 +102,7 @@ static struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *selinux_netlbl_sock_getattr( const struct sock *sk, u32 sid) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr = sksec->nlbl_secattr; if (secattr == NULL) @@ -240,7 +242,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(struct sk_buff *skb, * being labeled by it's parent socket, if it is just exit */ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb); if (sk != NULL) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB) return 0; @@ -277,7 +279,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_sctp_assoc_request(struct sctp_association *asoc, { int rc; struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = asoc->base.sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(asoc->base.sk); struct sockaddr_in addr4; struct sockaddr_in6 addr6; @@ -356,9 +358,9 @@ inet_conn_request_return: */ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); - if (family == PF_INET) + if (family == PF_INET || family == PF_INET6) sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_LABELED; else sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_UNSET; @@ -374,8 +376,8 @@ void selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk, u16 family) */ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; - struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = newsk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); + struct sk_security_struct *newsksec = selinux_sock(newsk); newsksec->nlbl_state = sksec->nlbl_state; } @@ -393,15 +395,15 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk) int selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create(struct sock *sk, u16 family) { int rc; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; if (family != PF_INET && family != PF_INET6) return 0; secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk); - if (secattr == NULL) - return -ENOMEM; + if (IS_ERR(secattr)) + return PTR_ERR(secattr); /* On socket creation, replacement of IP options is safe even if * the caller does not hold the socket lock. */ @@ -510,7 +512,7 @@ int selinux_netlbl_socket_setsockopt(struct socket *sock, { int rc = 0; struct sock *sk = sock->sk; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr; if (selinux_netlbl_option(level, optname) && @@ -548,7 +550,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) { int rc; - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *secattr; /* connected sockets are allowed to disconnect when the address family @@ -561,10 +563,9 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, return rc; } secattr = selinux_netlbl_sock_genattr(sk); - if (secattr == NULL) { - rc = -ENOMEM; - return rc; - } + if (IS_ERR(secattr)) + return PTR_ERR(secattr); + rc = netlbl_conn_setattr(sk, addr, secattr); if (rc == 0) sksec->nlbl_state = NLBL_CONNLABELED; @@ -587,7 +588,7 @@ static int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_helper(struct sock *sk, int selinux_netlbl_socket_connect_locked(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr *addr) { - struct sk_security_struct *sksec = sk->sk_security; + struct sk_security_struct *sksec = selinux_sock(sk); if (sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_REQSKB && sksec->nlbl_state != NLBL_CONNLABELED) diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c index 2ad98732d052..8e400dd736b7 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/avtab.c @@ -604,9 +604,6 @@ int avtab_write(struct policydb *p, struct avtab *a, void *fp) void __init avtab_cache_init(void) { - avtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create( - "avtab_node", sizeof(struct avtab_node), 0, SLAB_PANIC, NULL); - avtab_xperms_cachep = kmem_cache_create( - "avtab_extended_perms", sizeof(struct avtab_extended_perms), 0, - SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + avtab_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avtab_node, SLAB_PANIC); + avtab_xperms_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(avtab_extended_perms, SLAB_PANIC); } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c index 04d7f4907a06..99c01be15115 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/ebitmap.c @@ -572,7 +572,5 @@ u32 ebitmap_hash(const struct ebitmap *e, u32 hash) void __init ebitmap_cache_init(void) { - ebitmap_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("ebitmap_node", - sizeof(struct ebitmap_node), 0, - SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + ebitmap_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(ebitmap_node, SLAB_PANIC); } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c index 32c4cb37f3d2..383fd2d70878 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c @@ -194,7 +194,5 @@ error: void __init hashtab_cache_init(void) { - hashtab_node_cachep = kmem_cache_create("hashtab_node", - sizeof(struct hashtab_node), 0, - SLAB_PANIC, NULL); + hashtab_node_cachep = KMEM_CACHE(hashtab_node, SLAB_PANIC); } diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c index e33e55384b75..a9830fbfc5c6 100644 --- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c +++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c @@ -1804,22 +1804,9 @@ retry: newcontext.role = OBJECT_R_VAL; } - /* Set the type to default values. */ - if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { - newcontext.type = scontext->type; - } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) { - newcontext.type = tcontext->type; - } else { - if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) { - /* Use the type of process. */ - newcontext.type = scontext->type; - } else { - /* Use the type of the related object. */ - newcontext.type = tcontext->type; - } - } - - /* Look for a type transition/member/change rule. */ + /* Set the type. + * Look for a type transition/member/change rule. + */ avkey.source_type = scontext->type; avkey.target_type = tcontext->type; avkey.target_class = tclass; @@ -1837,9 +1824,24 @@ retry: } } + /* If a permanent rule is found, use the type from + * the type transition/member/change rule. Otherwise, + * set the type to its default values. + */ if (avnode) { - /* Use the type from the type transition/member/change rule. */ newcontext.type = avnode->datum.u.data; + } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_SOURCE) { + newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else if (cladatum && cladatum->default_type == DEFAULT_TARGET) { + newcontext.type = tcontext->type; + } else { + if ((tclass == policydb->process_class) || sock) { + /* Use the type of process. */ + newcontext.type = scontext->type; + } else { + /* Use the type of the related object. */ + newcontext.type = tcontext->type; + } } /* if we have a objname this is a file trans check so check those rules */ |