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-rw-r--r--security/integrity/Kconfig13
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/Makefile1
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig.c15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c15
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c9
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c10
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity.h17
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/integrity_audit.c2
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c18
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h5
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c4
-rw-r--r--security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c77
13 files changed, 171 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/Kconfig b/security/integrity/Kconfig
index 71f0177e8716..599429f99f99 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Kconfig
+++ b/security/integrity/Kconfig
@@ -62,6 +62,19 @@ config INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
provided by the platform for verifying the kexec'ed kerned image
and, possibly, the initramfs signature.
+config INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+ bool "Provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys may be added"
+ depends on SECONDARY_TRUSTED_KEYRING
+ depends on INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS
+ depends on SYSTEM_BLACKLIST_KEYRING
+ depends on LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
+ depends on !IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
+ help
+ If set, provide a keyring to which Machine Owner Keys (MOK) may
+ be added. This keyring shall contain just MOK keys. Unlike keys
+ in the platform keyring, keys contained in the .machine keyring will
+ be trusted within the kernel.
+
config LOAD_UEFI_KEYS
depends on INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING
depends on EFI
diff --git a/security/integrity/Makefile b/security/integrity/Makefile
index 7ee39d66cf16..d0ffe37dc1d6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/Makefile
+++ b/security/integrity/Makefile
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_AUDIT) += integrity_audit.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_SIGNATURE) += digsig.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_ASYMMETRIC_KEYS) += digsig_asymmetric.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING) += platform_certs/platform_keyring.o
+integrity-$(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) += platform_certs/machine_keyring.o
integrity-$(CONFIG_LOAD_UEFI_KEYS) += platform_certs/efi_parser.o \
platform_certs/load_uefi.o \
platform_certs/keyring_handler.o
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig.c b/security/integrity/digsig.c
index 3b06a01bd0fd..c8c8a4a4e7a0 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static const char * const keyring_name[INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX] = {
".ima",
#endif
".platform",
+ ".machine",
};
#ifdef CONFIG_IMA_KEYRINGS_PERMIT_SIGNED_BY_BUILTIN_OR_SECONDARY
@@ -111,6 +112,8 @@ static int __init __integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id,
} else {
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM)
set_platform_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
+ if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE && trust_moklist())
+ set_machine_trusted_keys(keyring[id]);
if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA)
load_module_cert(keyring[id]);
}
@@ -126,7 +129,8 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW
| KEY_USR_READ | KEY_USR_SEARCH;
- if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM) {
+ if (id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM ||
+ id == INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE) {
restriction = NULL;
goto out;
}
@@ -139,7 +143,14 @@ int __init integrity_init_keyring(const unsigned int id)
return -ENOMEM;
restriction->check = restrict_link_to_ima;
- perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
+
+ /*
+ * MOK keys can only be added through a read-only runtime services
+ * UEFI variable during boot. No additional keys shall be allowed to
+ * load into the machine keyring following init from userspace.
+ */
+ if (id != INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE)
+ perm |= KEY_USR_WRITE;
out:
return __integrity_init_keyring(id, perm, restriction);
diff --git a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
index 23240d793b07..895f4b9ce8c6 100644
--- a/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
+++ b/security/integrity/digsig_asymmetric.c
@@ -109,22 +109,25 @@ int asymmetric_verify(struct key *keyring, const char *sig,
pk = asymmetric_key_public_key(key);
pks.pkey_algo = pk->pkey_algo;
- if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa"))
+ if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "rsa")) {
pks.encoding = "pkcs1";
- else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6))
+ } else if (!strncmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecdsa-", 6)) {
/* edcsa-nist-p192 etc. */
pks.encoding = "x962";
- else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") ||
- !strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "sm2"))
+ } else if (!strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "ecrdsa") ||
+ !strcmp(pk->pkey_algo, "sm2")) {
pks.encoding = "raw";
- else
- return -ENOPKG;
+ } else {
+ ret = -ENOPKG;
+ goto out;
+ }
pks.digest = (u8 *)data;
pks.digest_size = datalen;
pks.s = hdr->sig;
pks.s_size = siglen;
ret = verify_signature(key, &pks);
+out:
key_put(key);
pr_debug("%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret);
return ret;
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
index 3d8e9d5db5aa..3ad8f7734208 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c
@@ -496,12 +496,12 @@ int __init ima_fs_init(void)
return 0;
out:
+ securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
securityfs_remove(violations);
securityfs_remove(runtime_measurements_count);
securityfs_remove(ascii_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements);
securityfs_remove(ima_symlink);
securityfs_remove(ima_dir);
- securityfs_remove(ima_policy);
return -1;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
index 320ca80aacab..99d23ac4c35d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c
@@ -16,7 +16,6 @@
#include <linux/parser.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/rculist.h>
-#include <linux/genhd.h>
#include <linux/seq_file.h>
#include <linux/ima.h>
@@ -1967,6 +1966,14 @@ int ima_policy_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
rcu_read_lock();
+ /* Do not print rules with inactive LSM labels */
+ for (i = 0; i < MAX_LSM_RULES; i++) {
+ if (entry->lsm[i].args_p && !entry->lsm[i].rule) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+
if (entry->action & MEASURE)
seq_puts(m, pt(Opt_measure));
if (entry->action & DONT_MEASURE)
diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
index 694560396be0..db1ad6d7a57f 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ static struct ima_template_desc builtin_templates[] = {
static LIST_HEAD(defined_templates);
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(template_list);
+static int template_setup_done;
static const struct ima_template_field supported_fields[] = {
{.field_id = "d", .field_init = ima_eventdigest_init,
@@ -101,10 +102,11 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
struct ima_template_desc *template_desc;
int template_len = strlen(str);
- if (ima_template)
+ if (template_setup_done)
return 1;
- ima_init_template_list();
+ if (!ima_template)
+ ima_init_template_list();
/*
* Verify that a template with the supplied name exists.
@@ -128,6 +130,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_setup(char *str)
}
ima_template = template_desc;
+ template_setup_done = 1;
return 1;
}
__setup("ima_template=", ima_template_setup);
@@ -136,7 +139,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
{
int num_templates = ARRAY_SIZE(builtin_templates);
- if (ima_template)
+ if (template_setup_done)
return 1;
if (template_desc_init_fields(str, NULL, NULL) < 0) {
@@ -147,6 +150,7 @@ static int __init ima_template_fmt_setup(char *str)
builtin_templates[num_templates - 1].fmt = str;
ima_template = builtin_templates + num_templates - 1;
+ template_setup_done = 1;
return 1;
}
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h
index 547425c20e11..2e214c761158 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity.h
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h
@@ -151,7 +151,8 @@ int integrity_kernel_read(struct file *file, loff_t offset,
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_EVM 0
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_IMA 1
#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM 2
-#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 3
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE 3
+#define INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MAX 4
extern struct dentry *integrity_dir;
@@ -283,3 +284,17 @@ static inline void __init add_to_platform_keyring(const char *source,
{
}
#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING
+void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
+bool __init trust_moklist(void);
+#else
+static inline void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source,
+ const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+}
+static inline bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+#endif
diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
index 29220056207f..0ec5e4c22cb2 100644
--- a/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
+++ b/security/integrity/integrity_audit.c
@@ -45,6 +45,8 @@ void integrity_audit_message(int audit_msgno, struct inode *inode,
return;
ab = audit_log_start(audit_context(), GFP_KERNEL, audit_msgno);
+ if (!ab)
+ return;
audit_log_format(ab, "pid=%d uid=%u auid=%u ses=%u",
task_pid_nr(current),
from_kuid(&init_user_ns, current_uid()),
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
index 5604bd57c990..1db4d3b4356d 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.c
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <keys/asymmetric-type.h>
#include <keys/system_keyring.h>
#include "../integrity.h"
+#include "keyring_handler.h"
static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_guid __initdata = EFI_CERT_X509_GUID;
static efi_guid_t efi_cert_x509_sha256_guid __initdata =
@@ -66,7 +67,7 @@ static __init void uefi_revocation_list_x509(const char *source,
/*
* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
- * the UEFI db and MokListRT tables.
+ * the UEFI db tables.
*/
__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
{
@@ -77,6 +78,21 @@ __init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
/*
* Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
+ * the MokListRT tables.
+ */
+__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
+{
+ if (efi_guidcmp(*sig_type, efi_cert_x509_guid) == 0) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_MACHINE_KEYRING) && trust_moklist())
+ return add_to_machine_keyring;
+ else
+ return add_to_platform_keyring;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Return the appropriate handler for particular signature list types found in
* the UEFI dbx and MokListXRT tables.
*/
__init efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type)
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
index 2462bfa08fe3..284558f30411 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/keyring_handler.h
@@ -25,6 +25,11 @@ void blacklist_binary(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len);
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_db(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
/*
+ * Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the mok.
+ */
+efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_mok(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
+
+/*
* Return the handler for particular signature list types found in the dbx.
*/
efi_element_handler_t get_handler_for_dbx(const efi_guid_t *sig_type);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
index 08b6d12f99b4..5f45c3c07dbd 100644
--- a/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/load_uefi.c
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT (MOKvar table)",
mokvar_entry->data,
mokvar_entry->data_size,
- get_handler_for_db);
+ get_handler_for_mok);
/* All done if that worked. */
if (!rc)
return rc;
@@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ static int __init load_moklist_certs(void)
mok = get_cert_list(L"MokListRT", &mok_var, &moksize, &status);
if (mok) {
rc = parse_efi_signature_list("UEFI:MokListRT",
- mok, moksize, get_handler_for_db);
+ mok, moksize, get_handler_for_mok);
kfree(mok);
if (rc)
pr_err("Couldn't parse MokListRT signatures: %d\n", rc);
diff --git a/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..7aaed7950b6e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/integrity/platform_certs/machine_keyring.c
@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Machine keyring routines.
+ *
+ * Copyright (c) 2021, Oracle and/or its affiliates.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/efi.h>
+#include "../integrity.h"
+
+static bool trust_mok;
+
+static __init int machine_keyring_init(void)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = integrity_init_keyring(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ pr_notice("Machine keyring initialized\n");
+ return 0;
+}
+device_initcall(machine_keyring_init);
+
+void __init add_to_machine_keyring(const char *source, const void *data, size_t len)
+{
+ key_perm_t perm;
+ int rc;
+
+ perm = (KEY_POS_ALL & ~KEY_POS_SETATTR) | KEY_USR_VIEW;
+ rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_MACHINE, source, data, len, perm);
+
+ /*
+ * Some MOKList keys may not pass the machine keyring restrictions.
+ * If the restriction check does not pass and the platform keyring
+ * is configured, try to add it into that keyring instead.
+ */
+ if (rc && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_INTEGRITY_PLATFORM_KEYRING))
+ rc = integrity_load_cert(INTEGRITY_KEYRING_PLATFORM, source,
+ data, len, perm);
+
+ if (rc)
+ pr_info("Error adding keys to machine keyring %s\n", source);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Try to load the MokListTrustedRT MOK variable to see if we should trust
+ * the MOK keys within the kernel. It is not an error if this variable
+ * does not exist. If it does not exist, MOK keys should not be trusted
+ * within the machine keyring.
+ */
+static __init bool uefi_check_trust_mok_keys(void)
+{
+ struct efi_mokvar_table_entry *mokvar_entry;
+
+ mokvar_entry = efi_mokvar_entry_find("MokListTrustedRT");
+
+ if (mokvar_entry)
+ return true;
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+bool __init trust_moklist(void)
+{
+ static bool initialized;
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ initialized = true;
+
+ if (uefi_check_trust_mok_keys())
+ trust_mok = true;
+ }
+
+ return trust_mok;
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2025-01-15 06:52:53 +0300