diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 17 |
1 files changed, 14 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 2e6fb6e2ffd2..23d484e05e6f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -457,10 +457,21 @@ static int evm_xattr_acl_change(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, int rc; /* - * user_ns is not relevant here, ACL_USER/ACL_GROUP don't have impact - * on the inode mode (see posix_acl_equiv_mode()). + * An earlier comment here mentioned that the idmappings for + * ACL_{GROUP,USER} don't matter since EVM is only interested in the + * mode stored as part of POSIX ACLs. Nonetheless, if it must translate + * from the uapi POSIX ACL representation to the VFS internal POSIX ACL + * representation it should do so correctly. There's no guarantee that + * we won't change POSIX ACLs in a way that ACL_{GROUP,USER} matters + * for the mode at some point and it's difficult to keep track of all + * the LSM and integrity modules and what they do to POSIX ACLs. + * + * Frankly, EVM shouldn't try to interpret the uapi struct for POSIX + * ACLs it received. It requires knowledge that only the VFS is + * guaranteed to have. */ - acl = posix_acl_from_xattr(&init_user_ns, xattr_value, xattr_value_len); + acl = vfs_set_acl_prepare(mnt_userns, i_user_ns(inode), + xattr_value, xattr_value_len); if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(acl)) return 1; |