diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'security/commoncap.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/commoncap.c | 28 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index 232db019f051..f1d117c3d8ae 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) * @cred: The credentials to use * @ns: The user namespace in which we need the capability * @cap: The capability to check for - * @audit: Whether to write an audit message or not + * @opts: Bitmask of options defined in include/linux/security.h * * Determine whether the nominated task has the specified capability amongst * its effective set, returning 0 if it does, -ve if it does not. @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ static void warn_setuid_and_fcaps_mixed(const char *fname) * kernel's capable() and has_capability() returns 1 for this case. */ int cap_capable(const struct cred *cred, struct user_namespace *targ_ns, - int cap, int audit) + int cap, unsigned int opts) { struct user_namespace *ns = targ_ns; @@ -222,12 +222,11 @@ int cap_capget(struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective, */ static inline int cap_inh_is_capped(void) { - /* they are so limited unless the current task has the CAP_SETPCAP * capability */ if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, - CAP_SETPCAP, SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) == 0) + CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) == 0) return 0; return 1; } @@ -1208,8 +1207,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, || ((old->securebits & SECURE_ALL_LOCKS & ~arg2)) /*[2]*/ || (arg2 & ~(SECURE_ALL_LOCKS | SECURE_ALL_BITS)) /*[3]*/ || (cap_capable(current_cred(), - current_cred()->user_ns, CAP_SETPCAP, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT) != 0) /*[4]*/ + current_cred()->user_ns, + CAP_SETPCAP, + CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) /*[4]*/ /* * [1] no changing of bits that are locked * [2] no unlocking of locks @@ -1304,9 +1304,10 @@ int cap_vm_enough_memory(struct mm_struct *mm, long pages) { int cap_sys_admin = 0; - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, - SECURITY_CAP_NOAUDIT) == 0) + if (cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, + CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) == 0) cap_sys_admin = 1; + return cap_sys_admin; } @@ -1325,7 +1326,7 @@ int cap_mmap_addr(unsigned long addr) if (addr < dac_mmap_min_addr) { ret = cap_capable(current_cred(), &init_user_ns, CAP_SYS_RAWIO, - SECURITY_CAP_AUDIT); + CAP_OPT_NONE); /* set PF_SUPERPRIV if it turns out we allow the low mmap */ if (ret == 0) current->flags |= PF_SUPERPRIV; @@ -1362,10 +1363,17 @@ struct security_hook_list capability_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(vm_enough_memory, cap_vm_enough_memory), }; -void __init capability_add_hooks(void) +static int __init capability_init(void) { security_add_hooks(capability_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(capability_hooks), "capability"); + return 0; } +DEFINE_LSM(capability) = { + .name = "capability", + .order = LSM_ORDER_FIRST, + .init = capability_init, +}; + #endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY */ |