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-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/core.c54
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/syscall.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c336
-rw-r--r--kernel/compat.c18
-rw-r--r--kernel/events/core.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/exit.c6
-rw-r--r--kernel/futex.c35
-rw-r--r--kernel/printk/printk.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/ptrace.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/rseq.c6
-rw-r--r--kernel/sched/core.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/signal.c8
-rw-r--r--kernel/sys.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c2
14 files changed, 359 insertions, 124 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/core.c b/kernel/bpf/core.c
index 38de580abcc2..f908b9356025 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/core.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/core.c
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#define DST regs[insn->dst_reg]
#define SRC regs[insn->src_reg]
#define FP regs[BPF_REG_FP]
+#define AX regs[BPF_REG_AX]
#define ARG1 regs[BPF_REG_ARG1]
#define CTX regs[BPF_REG_CTX]
#define IMM insn->imm
@@ -857,6 +858,26 @@ static int bpf_jit_blind_insn(const struct bpf_insn *from,
BUILD_BUG_ON(BPF_REG_AX + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
BUILD_BUG_ON(MAX_BPF_REG + 1 != MAX_BPF_JIT_REG);
+ /* Constraints on AX register:
+ *
+ * AX register is inaccessible from user space. It is mapped in
+ * all JITs, and used here for constant blinding rewrites. It is
+ * typically "stateless" meaning its contents are only valid within
+ * the executed instruction, but not across several instructions.
+ * There are a few exceptions however which are further detailed
+ * below.
+ *
+ * Constant blinding is only used by JITs, not in the interpreter.
+ * The interpreter uses AX in some occasions as a local temporary
+ * register e.g. in DIV or MOD instructions.
+ *
+ * In restricted circumstances, the verifier can also use the AX
+ * register for rewrites as long as they do not interfere with
+ * the above cases!
+ */
+ if (from->dst_reg == BPF_REG_AX || from->src_reg == BPF_REG_AX)
+ goto out;
+
if (from->imm == 0 &&
(from->code == (BPF_ALU | BPF_MOV | BPF_K) ||
from->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_MOV | BPF_K))) {
@@ -1188,7 +1209,6 @@ bool bpf_opcode_in_insntable(u8 code)
*/
static u64 ___bpf_prog_run(u64 *regs, const struct bpf_insn *insn, u64 *stack)
{
- u64 tmp;
#define BPF_INSN_2_LBL(x, y) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y] = &&x##_##y
#define BPF_INSN_3_LBL(x, y, z) [BPF_##x | BPF_##y | BPF_##z] = &&x##_##y##_##z
static const void *jumptable[256] = {
@@ -1268,36 +1288,36 @@ select_insn:
(*(s64 *) &DST) >>= IMM;
CONT;
ALU64_MOD_X:
- div64_u64_rem(DST, SRC, &tmp);
- DST = tmp;
+ div64_u64_rem(DST, SRC, &AX);
+ DST = AX;
CONT;
ALU_MOD_X:
- tmp = (u32) DST;
- DST = do_div(tmp, (u32) SRC);
+ AX = (u32) DST;
+ DST = do_div(AX, (u32) SRC);
CONT;
ALU64_MOD_K:
- div64_u64_rem(DST, IMM, &tmp);
- DST = tmp;
+ div64_u64_rem(DST, IMM, &AX);
+ DST = AX;
CONT;
ALU_MOD_K:
- tmp = (u32) DST;
- DST = do_div(tmp, (u32) IMM);
+ AX = (u32) DST;
+ DST = do_div(AX, (u32) IMM);
CONT;
ALU64_DIV_X:
DST = div64_u64(DST, SRC);
CONT;
ALU_DIV_X:
- tmp = (u32) DST;
- do_div(tmp, (u32) SRC);
- DST = (u32) tmp;
+ AX = (u32) DST;
+ do_div(AX, (u32) SRC);
+ DST = (u32) AX;
CONT;
ALU64_DIV_K:
DST = div64_u64(DST, IMM);
CONT;
ALU_DIV_K:
- tmp = (u32) DST;
- do_div(tmp, (u32) IMM);
- DST = (u32) tmp;
+ AX = (u32) DST;
+ do_div(AX, (u32) IMM);
+ DST = (u32) AX;
CONT;
ALU_END_TO_BE:
switch (IMM) {
@@ -1553,7 +1573,7 @@ STACK_FRAME_NON_STANDARD(___bpf_prog_run); /* jump table */
static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
{ \
u64 stack[stack_size / sizeof(u64)]; \
- u64 regs[MAX_BPF_REG]; \
+ u64 regs[MAX_BPF_EXT_REG]; \
\
FP = (u64) (unsigned long) &stack[ARRAY_SIZE(stack)]; \
ARG1 = (u64) (unsigned long) ctx; \
@@ -1566,7 +1586,7 @@ static u64 PROG_NAME_ARGS(stack_size)(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5, \
const struct bpf_insn *insn) \
{ \
u64 stack[stack_size / sizeof(u64)]; \
- u64 regs[MAX_BPF_REG]; \
+ u64 regs[MAX_BPF_EXT_REG]; \
\
FP = (u64) (unsigned long) &stack[ARRAY_SIZE(stack)]; \
BPF_R1 = r1; \
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
index 0607db304def..b155cd17c1bd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/syscall.c
@@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ int bpf_check_uarg_tail_zero(void __user *uaddr,
if (unlikely(actual_size > PAGE_SIZE)) /* silly large */
return -E2BIG;
- if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, uaddr, actual_size)))
+ if (unlikely(!access_ok(uaddr, actual_size)))
return -EFAULT;
if (actual_size <= expected_size)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 71d86e3024ae..f6bc62a9ee8e 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -710,6 +710,7 @@ static int copy_verifier_state(struct bpf_verifier_state *dst_state,
free_func_state(dst_state->frame[i]);
dst_state->frame[i] = NULL;
}
+ dst_state->speculative = src->speculative;
dst_state->curframe = src->curframe;
for (i = 0; i <= src->curframe; i++) {
dst = dst_state->frame[i];
@@ -754,7 +755,8 @@ static int pop_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int *prev_insn_idx,
}
static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
- int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx)
+ int insn_idx, int prev_insn_idx,
+ bool speculative)
{
struct bpf_verifier_state *cur = env->cur_state;
struct bpf_verifier_stack_elem *elem;
@@ -772,6 +774,7 @@ static struct bpf_verifier_state *push_stack(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
err = copy_verifier_state(&elem->st, cur);
if (err)
goto err;
+ elem->st.speculative |= speculative;
if (env->stack_size > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_STACK) {
verbose(env, "BPF program is too complex\n");
goto err;
@@ -1387,6 +1390,31 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
}
+static int check_stack_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *reg,
+ int off, int size)
+{
+ /* Stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we
+ * can determine what type of data were returned. See
+ * check_stack_read().
+ */
+ if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
+ char tn_buf[48];
+
+ tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
+ verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
+ tn_buf, off, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
+ verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off, size);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
/* check read/write into map element returned by bpf_map_lookup_elem() */
static int __check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno, int off,
int size, bool zero_size_allowed)
@@ -1418,13 +1446,17 @@ static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 regno,
*/
if (env->log.level)
print_verifier_state(env, state);
+
/* The minimum value is only important with signed
* comparisons where we can't assume the floor of a
* value is 0. If we are using signed variables for our
* index'es we need to make sure that whatever we use
* will have a set floor within our range.
*/
- if (reg->smin_value < 0) {
+ if (reg->smin_value < 0 &&
+ (reg->smin_value == S64_MIN ||
+ (off + reg->smin_value != (s64)(s32)(off + reg->smin_value)) ||
+ reg->smin_value + off < 0)) {
verbose(env, "R%d min value is negative, either use unsigned index or do a if (index >=0) check.\n",
regno);
return -EACCES;
@@ -1954,24 +1986,10 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn
}
} else if (reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK) {
- /* stack accesses must be at a fixed offset, so that we can
- * determine what type of data were returned.
- * See check_stack_read().
- */
- if (!tnum_is_const(reg->var_off)) {
- char tn_buf[48];
-
- tnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg->var_off);
- verbose(env, "variable stack access var_off=%s off=%d size=%d",
- tn_buf, off, size);
- return -EACCES;
- }
off += reg->var_off.value;
- if (off >= 0 || off < -MAX_BPF_STACK) {
- verbose(env, "invalid stack off=%d size=%d\n", off,
- size);
- return -EACCES;
- }
+ err = check_stack_access(env, reg, off, size);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
state = func(env, reg);
err = update_stack_depth(env, state, off);
@@ -3052,6 +3070,102 @@ static bool check_reg_sane_offset(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
return true;
}
+static struct bpf_insn_aux_data *cur_aux(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
+{
+ return &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx];
+}
+
+static int retrieve_ptr_limit(const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
+ u32 *ptr_limit, u8 opcode, bool off_is_neg)
+{
+ bool mask_to_left = (opcode == BPF_ADD && off_is_neg) ||
+ (opcode == BPF_SUB && !off_is_neg);
+ u32 off;
+
+ switch (ptr_reg->type) {
+ case PTR_TO_STACK:
+ off = ptr_reg->off + ptr_reg->var_off.value;
+ if (mask_to_left)
+ *ptr_limit = MAX_BPF_STACK + off;
+ else
+ *ptr_limit = -off;
+ return 0;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (mask_to_left) {
+ *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->umax_value + ptr_reg->off;
+ } else {
+ off = ptr_reg->smin_value + ptr_reg->off;
+ *ptr_limit = ptr_reg->map_ptr->value_size - off;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+}
+
+static int sanitize_ptr_alu(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ struct bpf_insn *insn,
+ const struct bpf_reg_state *ptr_reg,
+ struct bpf_reg_state *dst_reg,
+ bool off_is_neg)
+{
+ struct bpf_verifier_state *vstate = env->cur_state;
+ struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = cur_aux(env);
+ bool ptr_is_dst_reg = ptr_reg == dst_reg;
+ u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
+ u32 alu_state, alu_limit;
+ struct bpf_reg_state tmp;
+ bool ret;
+
+ if (env->allow_ptr_leaks || BPF_SRC(insn->code) == BPF_K)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* We already marked aux for masking from non-speculative
+ * paths, thus we got here in the first place. We only care
+ * to explore bad access from here.
+ */
+ if (vstate->speculative)
+ goto do_sim;
+
+ alu_state = off_is_neg ? BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE : 0;
+ alu_state |= ptr_is_dst_reg ?
+ BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC : BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_DST;
+
+ if (retrieve_ptr_limit(ptr_reg, &alu_limit, opcode, off_is_neg))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* If we arrived here from different branches with different
+ * limits to sanitize, then this won't work.
+ */
+ if (aux->alu_state &&
+ (aux->alu_state != alu_state ||
+ aux->alu_limit != alu_limit))
+ return -EACCES;
+
+ /* Corresponding fixup done in fixup_bpf_calls(). */
+ aux->alu_state = alu_state;
+ aux->alu_limit = alu_limit;
+
+do_sim:
+ /* Simulate and find potential out-of-bounds access under
+ * speculative execution from truncation as a result of
+ * masking when off was not within expected range. If off
+ * sits in dst, then we temporarily need to move ptr there
+ * to simulate dst (== 0) +/-= ptr. Needed, for example,
+ * for cases where we use K-based arithmetic in one direction
+ * and truncated reg-based in the other in order to explore
+ * bad access.
+ */
+ if (!ptr_is_dst_reg) {
+ tmp = *dst_reg;
+ *dst_reg = *ptr_reg;
+ }
+ ret = push_stack(env, env->insn_idx + 1, env->insn_idx, true);
+ if (!ptr_is_dst_reg)
+ *dst_reg = tmp;
+ return !ret ? -EFAULT : 0;
+}
+
/* Handles arithmetic on a pointer and a scalar: computes new min/max and var_off.
* Caller should also handle BPF_MOV case separately.
* If we return -EACCES, caller may want to try again treating pointer as a
@@ -3070,8 +3184,9 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
smin_ptr = ptr_reg->smin_value, smax_ptr = ptr_reg->smax_value;
u64 umin_val = off_reg->umin_value, umax_val = off_reg->umax_value,
umin_ptr = ptr_reg->umin_value, umax_ptr = ptr_reg->umax_value;
+ u32 dst = insn->dst_reg, src = insn->src_reg;
u8 opcode = BPF_OP(insn->code);
- u32 dst = insn->dst_reg;
+ int ret;
dst_reg = &regs[dst];
@@ -3104,6 +3219,13 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic on %s prohibited\n",
dst, reg_type_str[ptr_reg->type]);
return -EACCES;
+ case PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks && !known && (smin_val < 0) != (smax_val < 0)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d has unknown scalar with mixed signed bounds, pointer arithmetic with it prohibited for !root\n",
+ off_reg == dst_reg ? dst : src);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ /* fall-through */
default:
break;
}
@@ -3120,6 +3242,11 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
switch (opcode) {
case BPF_ADD:
+ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to add from different maps or paths\n", dst);
+ return ret;
+ }
/* We can take a fixed offset as long as it doesn't overflow
* the s32 'off' field
*/
@@ -3170,6 +3297,11 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
break;
case BPF_SUB:
+ ret = sanitize_ptr_alu(env, insn, ptr_reg, dst_reg, smin_val < 0);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d tried to sub from different maps or paths\n", dst);
+ return ret;
+ }
if (dst_reg == off_reg) {
/* scalar -= pointer. Creates an unknown scalar */
verbose(env, "R%d tried to subtract pointer from scalar\n",
@@ -3249,6 +3381,25 @@ static int adjust_ptr_min_max_vals(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
__update_reg_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_deduce_bounds(dst_reg);
__reg_bound_offset(dst_reg);
+
+ /* For unprivileged we require that resulting offset must be in bounds
+ * in order to be able to sanitize access later on.
+ */
+ if (!env->allow_ptr_leaks) {
+ if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE &&
+ check_map_access(env, dst, dst_reg->off, 1, false)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d pointer arithmetic of map value goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ } else if (dst_reg->type == PTR_TO_STACK &&
+ check_stack_access(env, dst_reg, dst_reg->off +
+ dst_reg->var_off.value, 1)) {
+ verbose(env, "R%d stack pointer arithmetic goes out of range, "
+ "prohibited for !root\n", dst);
+ return -EACCES;
+ }
+ }
+
return 0;
}
@@ -4348,7 +4499,8 @@ static int check_cond_jmp_op(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
}
}
- other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx);
+ other_branch = push_stack(env, *insn_idx + insn->off + 1, *insn_idx,
+ false);
if (!other_branch)
return -EFAULT;
other_branch_regs = other_branch->frame[other_branch->curframe]->regs;
@@ -5458,6 +5610,12 @@ static bool states_equal(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
if (old->curframe != cur->curframe)
return false;
+ /* Verification state from speculative execution simulation
+ * must never prune a non-speculative execution one.
+ */
+ if (old->speculative && !cur->speculative)
+ return false;
+
/* for states to be equal callsites have to be the same
* and all frame states need to be equivalent
*/
@@ -5650,7 +5808,6 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
struct bpf_insn *insns = env->prog->insnsi;
struct bpf_reg_state *regs;
int insn_cnt = env->prog->len, i;
- int insn_idx, prev_insn_idx = 0;
int insn_processed = 0;
bool do_print_state = false;
@@ -5660,6 +5817,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (!state)
return -ENOMEM;
state->curframe = 0;
+ state->speculative = false;
state->frame[0] = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_func_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!state->frame[0]) {
kfree(state);
@@ -5670,19 +5828,19 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
BPF_MAIN_FUNC /* callsite */,
0 /* frameno */,
0 /* subprogno, zero == main subprog */);
- insn_idx = 0;
+
for (;;) {
struct bpf_insn *insn;
u8 class;
int err;
- if (insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
+ if (env->insn_idx >= insn_cnt) {
verbose(env, "invalid insn idx %d insn_cnt %d\n",
- insn_idx, insn_cnt);
+ env->insn_idx, insn_cnt);
return -EFAULT;
}
- insn = &insns[insn_idx];
+ insn = &insns[env->insn_idx];
class = BPF_CLASS(insn->code);
if (++insn_processed > BPF_COMPLEXITY_LIMIT_INSNS) {
@@ -5692,17 +5850,19 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -E2BIG;
}
- err = is_state_visited(env, insn_idx);
+ err = is_state_visited(env, env->insn_idx);
if (err < 0)
return err;
if (err == 1) {
/* found equivalent state, can prune the search */
if (env->log.level) {
if (do_print_state)
- verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d: safe\n",
- prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s: safe\n",
+ env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
+ env->cur_state->speculative ?
+ " (speculative execution)" : "");
else
- verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "%d: safe\n", env->insn_idx);
}
goto process_bpf_exit;
}
@@ -5715,10 +5875,12 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (env->log.level > 1 || (env->log.level && do_print_state)) {
if (env->log.level > 1)
- verbose(env, "%d:", insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "%d:", env->insn_idx);
else
- verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d:",
- prev_insn_idx, insn_idx);
+ verbose(env, "\nfrom %d to %d%s:",
+ env->prev_insn_idx, env->insn_idx,
+ env->cur_state->speculative ?
+ " (speculative execution)" : "");
print_verifier_state(env, state->frame[state->curframe]);
do_print_state = false;
}
@@ -5729,20 +5891,20 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
.private_data = env,
};
- verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
- verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx);
+ verbose_linfo(env, env->insn_idx, "; ");
+ verbose(env, "%d: ", env->insn_idx);
print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
}
if (bpf_prog_is_dev_bound(env->prog->aux)) {
- err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, insn_idx,
- prev_insn_idx);
+ err = bpf_prog_offload_verify_insn(env, env->insn_idx,
+ env->prev_insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
regs = cur_regs(env);
- env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true;
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
if (class == BPF_ALU || class == BPF_ALU64) {
err = check_alu_op(env, insn);
@@ -5768,13 +5930,13 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
/* check that memory (src_reg + off) is readable,
* the state of dst_reg will be updated by this func
*/
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->src_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_READ,
- insn->dst_reg, false);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->src_reg,
+ insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
+ BPF_READ, insn->dst_reg, false);
if (err)
return err;
- prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+ prev_src_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_src_type == NOT_INIT) {
/* saw a valid insn
@@ -5799,10 +5961,10 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
enum bpf_reg_type *prev_dst_type, dst_reg_type;
if (BPF_MODE(insn->code) == BPF_XADD) {
- err = check_xadd(env, insn_idx, insn);
+ err = check_xadd(env, env->insn_idx, insn);
if (err)
return err;
- insn_idx++;
+ env->insn_idx++;
continue;
}
@@ -5818,13 +5980,13 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
dst_reg_type = regs[insn->dst_reg].type;
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
- insn->src_reg, false);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
+ BPF_WRITE, insn->src_reg, false);
if (err)
return err;
- prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].ptr_type;
+ prev_dst_type = &env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].ptr_type;
if (*prev_dst_type == NOT_INIT) {
*prev_dst_type = dst_reg_type;
@@ -5852,9 +6014,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
/* check that memory (dst_reg + off) is writeable */
- err = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, insn->dst_reg, insn->off,
- BPF_SIZE(insn->code), BPF_WRITE,
- -1, false);
+ err = check_mem_access(env, env->insn_idx, insn->dst_reg,
+ insn->off, BPF_SIZE(insn->code),
+ BPF_WRITE, -1, false);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5872,9 +6034,9 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
}
if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
- err = check_func_call(env, insn, &insn_idx);
+ err = check_func_call(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
else
- err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, insn_idx);
+ err = check_helper_call(env, insn->imm, env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -5887,7 +6049,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EINVAL;
}
- insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
+ env->insn_idx += insn->off + 1;
continue;
} else if (opcode == BPF_EXIT) {
@@ -5901,8 +6063,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (state->curframe) {
/* exit from nested function */
- prev_insn_idx = insn_idx;
- err = prepare_func_exit(env, &insn_idx);
+ env->prev_insn_idx = env->insn_idx;
+ err = prepare_func_exit(env, &env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
do_print_state = true;
@@ -5932,7 +6094,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
if (err)
return err;
process_bpf_exit:
- err = pop_stack(env, &prev_insn_idx, &insn_idx);
+ err = pop_stack(env, &env->prev_insn_idx,
+ &env->insn_idx);
if (err < 0) {
if (err != -ENOENT)
return err;
@@ -5942,7 +6105,7 @@ process_bpf_exit:
continue;
}
} else {
- err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &insn_idx);
+ err = check_cond_jmp_op(env, insn, &env->insn_idx);
if (err)
return err;
}
@@ -5959,8 +6122,8 @@ process_bpf_exit:
if (err)
return err;
- insn_idx++;
- env->insn_aux_data[insn_idx].seen = true;
+ env->insn_idx++;
+ env->insn_aux_data[env->insn_idx].seen = true;
} else {
verbose(env, "invalid BPF_LD mode\n");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -5970,7 +6133,7 @@ process_bpf_exit:
return -EINVAL;
}
- insn_idx++;
+ env->insn_idx++;
}
verbose(env, "processed %d insns (limit %d), stack depth ",
@@ -6709,6 +6872,57 @@ static int fixup_bpf_calls(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
continue;
}
+ if (insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X) ||
+ insn->code == (BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X)) {
+ const u8 code_add = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_ADD | BPF_X;
+ const u8 code_sub = BPF_ALU64 | BPF_SUB | BPF_X;
+ struct bpf_insn insn_buf[16];
+ struct bpf_insn *patch = &insn_buf[0];
+ bool issrc, isneg;
+ u32 off_reg;
+
+ aux = &env->insn_aux_data[i + delta];
+ if (!aux->alu_state)
+ continue;
+
+ isneg = aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_NEG_VALUE;
+ issrc = (aux->alu_state & BPF_ALU_SANITIZE) ==
+ BPF_ALU_SANITIZE_SRC;
+
+ off_reg = issrc ? insn->src_reg : insn->dst_reg;
+ if (isneg)
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
+ *patch++ = BPF_MOV32_IMM(BPF_REG_AX, aux->alu_limit - 1);
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_SUB, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_OR, BPF_REG_AX, off_reg);
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_NEG, BPF_REG_AX, 0);
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_ARSH, BPF_REG_AX, 63);
+ if (issrc) {
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, BPF_REG_AX,
+ off_reg);
+ insn->src_reg = BPF_REG_AX;
+ } else {
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_REG(BPF_AND, off_reg,
+ BPF_REG_AX);
+ }
+ if (isneg)
+ insn->code = insn->code == code_add ?
+ code_sub : code_add;
+ *patch++ = *insn;
+ if (issrc && isneg)
+ *patch++ = BPF_ALU64_IMM(BPF_MUL, off_reg, -1);
+ cnt = patch - insn_buf;
+
+ new_prog = bpf_patch_insn_data(env, i + delta, insn_buf, cnt);
+ if (!new_prog)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ delta += cnt - 1;
+ env->prog = prog = new_prog;
+ insn = new_prog->insnsi + i + delta;
+ continue;
+ }
+
if (insn->code != (BPF_JMP | BPF_CALL))
continue;
if (insn->src_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_CALL)
diff --git a/kernel/compat.c b/kernel/compat.c
index 089d00d0da9c..f01affa17e22 100644
--- a/kernel/compat.c
+++ b/kernel/compat.c
@@ -95,28 +95,28 @@ int compat_put_timex(struct compat_timex __user *utp, const struct timex *txc)
static int __compat_get_timeval(struct timeval *tv, const struct old_timeval32 __user *ctv)
{
- return (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, ctv, sizeof(*ctv)) ||
+ return (!access_ok(ctv, sizeof(*ctv)) ||
__get_user(tv->tv_sec, &ctv->tv_sec) ||
__get_user(tv->tv_usec, &ctv->tv_usec)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
static int __compat_put_timeval(const struct timeval *tv, struct old_timeval32 __user *ctv)
{
- return (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ctv, sizeof(*ctv)) ||
+ return (!access_ok(ctv, sizeof(*ctv)) ||
__put_user(tv->tv_sec, &ctv->tv_sec) ||
__put_user(tv->tv_usec, &ctv->tv_usec)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
static int __compat_get_timespec(struct timespec *ts, const struct old_timespec32 __user *cts)
{
- return (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, cts, sizeof(*cts)) ||
+ return (!access_ok(cts, sizeof(*cts)) ||
__get_user(ts->tv_sec, &cts->tv_sec) ||
__get_user(ts->tv_nsec, &cts->tv_nsec)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
static int __compat_put_timespec(const struct timespec *ts, struct old_timespec32 __user *cts)
{
- return (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, cts, sizeof(*cts)) ||
+ return (!access_ok(cts, sizeof(*cts)) ||
__put_user(ts->tv_sec, &cts->tv_sec) ||
__put_user(ts->tv_nsec, &cts->tv_nsec)) ? -EFAULT : 0;
}
@@ -335,7 +335,7 @@ int get_compat_sigevent(struct sigevent *event,
const struct compat_sigevent __user *u_event)
{
memset(event, 0, sizeof(*event));
- return (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, u_event, sizeof(*u_event)) ||
+ return (!access_ok(u_event, sizeof(*u_event)) ||
__get_user(event->sigev_value.sival_int,
&u_event->sigev_value.sival_int) ||
__get_user(event->sigev_signo, &u_event->sigev_signo) ||
@@ -354,10 +354,9 @@ long compat_get_bitmap(unsigned long *mask, const compat_ulong_t __user *umask,
bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG);
nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size);
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, umask, bitmap_size / 8))
+ if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8))
return -EFAULT;
- user_access_begin();
while (nr_compat_longs > 1) {
compat_ulong_t l1, l2;
unsafe_get_user(l1, umask++, Efault);
@@ -384,10 +383,9 @@ long compat_put_bitmap(compat_ulong_t __user *umask, unsigned long *mask,
bitmap_size = ALIGN(bitmap_size, BITS_PER_COMPAT_LONG);
nr_compat_longs = BITS_TO_COMPAT_LONGS(bitmap_size);
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, umask, bitmap_size / 8))
+ if (!user_access_begin(umask, bitmap_size / 8))
return -EFAULT;
- user_access_begin();
while (nr_compat_longs > 1) {
unsigned long m = *mask++;
unsafe_put_user((compat_ulong_t)m, umask++, Efault);
@@ -438,7 +436,7 @@ void __user *compat_alloc_user_space(unsigned long len)
ptr = arch_compat_alloc_user_space(len);
- if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, ptr, len)))
+ if (unlikely(!access_ok(ptr, len)))
return NULL;
return ptr;
diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 67ecac337374..3cd13a30f732 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -10135,7 +10135,7 @@ static int perf_copy_attr(struct perf_event_attr __user *uattr,
u32 size;
int ret;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
+ if (!access_ok(uattr, PERF_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
return -EFAULT;
/*
diff --git a/kernel/exit.c b/kernel/exit.c
index 0e21e6d21f35..2d14979577ee 100644
--- a/kernel/exit.c
+++ b/kernel/exit.c
@@ -1604,10 +1604,9 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid, int, which, pid_t, upid, struct siginfo __user *,
if (!infop)
return err;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, infop, sizeof(*infop)))
+ if (!user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop)))
return -EFAULT;
- user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
@@ -1732,10 +1731,9 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE5(waitid,
if (!infop)
return err;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, infop, sizeof(*infop)))
+ if (!user_access_begin(infop, sizeof(*infop)))
return -EFAULT;
- user_access_begin();
unsafe_put_user(signo, &infop->si_signo, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(0, &infop->si_errno, Efault);
unsafe_put_user(info.cause, &infop->si_code, Efault);
diff --git a/kernel/futex.c b/kernel/futex.c
index 054105854e0e..be3bff2315ff 100644
--- a/kernel/futex.c
+++ b/kernel/futex.c
@@ -481,13 +481,18 @@ static void drop_futex_key_refs(union futex_key *key)
}
}
+enum futex_access {
+ FUTEX_READ,
+ FUTEX_WRITE
+};
+
/**
* get_futex_key() - Get parameters which are the keys for a futex
* @uaddr: virtual address of the futex
* @fshared: 0 for a PROCESS_PRIVATE futex, 1 for PROCESS_SHARED
* @key: address where result is stored.
- * @rw: mapping needs to be read/write (values: VERIFY_READ,
- * VERIFY_WRITE)
+ * @rw: mapping needs to be read/write (values: FUTEX_READ,
+ * FUTEX_WRITE)
*
* Return: a negative error code or 0
*
@@ -500,7 +505,7 @@ static void drop_futex_key_refs(union futex_key *key)
* lock_page() might sleep, the caller should not hold a spinlock.
*/
static int
-get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, int rw)
+get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, enum futex_access rw)
{
unsigned long address = (unsigned long)uaddr;
struct mm_struct *mm = current->mm;
@@ -516,7 +521,7 @@ get_futex_key(u32 __user *uaddr, int fshared, union futex_key *key, int rw)
return -EINVAL;
address -= key->both.offset;
- if (unlikely(!access_ok(rw, uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
+ if (unlikely(!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32))))
return -EFAULT;
if (unlikely(should_fail_futex(fshared)))
@@ -546,7 +551,7 @@ again:
* If write access is not required (eg. FUTEX_WAIT), try
* and get read-only access.
*/
- if (err == -EFAULT && rw == VERIFY_READ) {
+ if (err == -EFAULT && rw == FUTEX_READ) {
err = get_user_pages_fast(address, 1, 0, &page);
ro = 1;
}
@@ -1583,7 +1588,7 @@ futex_wake(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags, int nr_wake, u32 bitset)
if (!bitset)
return -EINVAL;
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_READ);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
@@ -1642,7 +1647,7 @@ static int futex_atomic_op_inuser(unsigned int encoded_op, u32 __user *uaddr)
oparg = 1 << oparg;
}
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uaddr, sizeof(u32)))
+ if (!access_ok(uaddr, sizeof(u32)))
return -EFAULT;
ret = arch_futex_atomic_op_inuser(op, oparg, &oldval, uaddr);
@@ -1682,10 +1687,10 @@ futex_wake_op(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags, u32 __user *uaddr2,
DEFINE_WAKE_Q(wake_q);
retry:
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, VERIFY_READ);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out_put_key1;
@@ -1961,11 +1966,11 @@ static int futex_requeue(u32 __user *uaddr1, unsigned int flags,
}
retry:
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, VERIFY_READ);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr1, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key1, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2,
- requeue_pi ? VERIFY_WRITE : VERIFY_READ);
+ requeue_pi ? FUTEX_WRITE : FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out_put_key1;
@@ -2634,7 +2639,7 @@ static int futex_wait_setup(u32 __user *uaddr, u32 val, unsigned int flags,
* while the syscall executes.
*/
retry:
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q->key, VERIFY_READ);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q->key, FUTEX_READ);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
return ret;
@@ -2793,7 +2798,7 @@ static int futex_lock_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
}
retry:
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q.key, VERIFY_WRITE);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &q.key, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
@@ -2972,7 +2977,7 @@ retry:
if ((uval & FUTEX_TID_MASK) != vpid)
return -EPERM;
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, VERIFY_WRITE);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -3199,7 +3204,7 @@ static int futex_wait_requeue_pi(u32 __user *uaddr, unsigned int flags,
*/
rt_mutex_init_waiter(&rt_waiter);
- ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, VERIFY_WRITE);
+ ret = get_futex_key(uaddr2, flags & FLAGS_SHARED, &key2, FUTEX_WRITE);
if (unlikely(ret != 0))
goto out;
diff --git a/kernel/printk/printk.c b/kernel/printk/printk.c
index 1306fe0c1dc6..d3d170374ceb 100644
--- a/kernel/printk/printk.c
+++ b/kernel/printk/printk.c
@@ -1466,7 +1466,7 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
return -EINVAL;
if (!len)
return 0;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
+ if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
error = wait_event_interruptible(log_wait,
syslog_seq != log_next_seq);
@@ -1484,7 +1484,7 @@ int do_syslog(int type, char __user *buf, int len, int source)
return -EINVAL;
if (!len)
return 0;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, buf, len))
+ if (!access_ok(buf, len))
return -EFAULT;
error = syslog_print_all(buf, len, clear);
break;
diff --git a/kernel/ptrace.c b/kernel/ptrace.c
index c2cee9db5204..771e93f9c43f 100644
--- a/kernel/ptrace.c
+++ b/kernel/ptrace.c
@@ -1073,7 +1073,7 @@ int ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, long request,
struct iovec kiov;
struct iovec __user *uiov = datavp;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
+ if (!access_ok(uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
return -EFAULT;
if (__get_user(kiov.iov_base, &uiov->iov_base) ||
@@ -1229,7 +1229,7 @@ int compat_ptrace_request(struct task_struct *child, compat_long_t request,
compat_uptr_t ptr;
compat_size_t len;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
+ if (!access_ok(uiov, sizeof(*uiov)))
return -EFAULT;
if (__get_user(ptr, &uiov->iov_base) ||
diff --git a/kernel/rseq.c b/kernel/rseq.c
index c6242d8594dc..25e9a7b60eba 100644
--- a/kernel/rseq.c
+++ b/kernel/rseq.c
@@ -267,7 +267,7 @@ void __rseq_handle_notify_resume(struct ksignal *ksig, struct pt_regs *regs)
if (unlikely(t->flags & PF_EXITING))
return;
- if (unlikely(!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, t->rseq, sizeof(*t->rseq))))
+ if (unlikely(!access_ok(t->rseq, sizeof(*t->rseq))))
goto error;
ret = rseq_ip_fixup(regs);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
@@ -295,7 +295,7 @@ void rseq_syscall(struct pt_regs *regs)
if (!t->rseq)
return;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, t->rseq, sizeof(*t->rseq)) ||
+ if (!access_ok(t->rseq, sizeof(*t->rseq)) ||
rseq_get_rseq_cs(t, &rseq_cs) || in_rseq_cs(ip, &rseq_cs))
force_sig(SIGSEGV, t);
}
@@ -351,7 +351,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE4(rseq, struct rseq __user *, rseq, u32, rseq_len,
if (!IS_ALIGNED((unsigned long)rseq, __alignof__(*rseq)) ||
rseq_len != sizeof(*rseq))
return -EINVAL;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, rseq, rseq_len))
+ if (!access_ok(rseq, rseq_len))
return -EFAULT;
current->rseq = rseq;
current->rseq_len = rseq_len;
diff --git a/kernel/sched/core.c b/kernel/sched/core.c
index 17a954c9e153..223f78d5c111 100644
--- a/kernel/sched/core.c
+++ b/kernel/sched/core.c
@@ -4450,7 +4450,7 @@ static int sched_copy_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr, struct sched_attr *a
u32 size;
int ret;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
+ if (!access_ok(uattr, SCHED_ATTR_SIZE_VER0))
return -EFAULT;
/* Zero the full structure, so that a short copy will be nice: */
@@ -4650,7 +4650,7 @@ static int sched_read_attr(struct sched_attr __user *uattr,
{
int ret;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, uattr, usize))
+ if (!access_ok(uattr, usize))
return -EFAULT;
/*
diff --git a/kernel/signal.c b/kernel/signal.c
index 53e07d97ffe0..e1d7ad8e6ab1 100644
--- a/kernel/signal.c
+++ b/kernel/signal.c
@@ -3997,7 +3997,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
if (act) {
old_sigset_t mask;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, act, sizeof(*act)) ||
+ if (!access_ok(act, sizeof(*act)) ||
__get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_handler, &act->sa_handler) ||
__get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_restorer, &act->sa_restorer) ||
__get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_flags, &act->sa_flags) ||
@@ -4012,7 +4012,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
ret = do_sigaction(sig, act ? &new_ka : NULL, oact ? &old_ka : NULL);
if (!ret && oact) {
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, oact, sizeof(*oact)) ||
+ if (!access_ok(oact, sizeof(*oact)) ||
__put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_handler, &oact->sa_handler) ||
__put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_restorer, &oact->sa_restorer) ||
__put_user(old_ka.sa.sa_flags, &oact->sa_flags) ||
@@ -4034,7 +4034,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
compat_uptr_t handler, restorer;
if (act) {
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_READ, act, sizeof(*act)) ||
+ if (!access_ok(act, sizeof(*act)) ||
__get_user(handler, &act->sa_handler) ||
__get_user(restorer, &act->sa_restorer) ||
__get_user(new_ka.sa.sa_flags, &act->sa_flags) ||
@@ -4052,7 +4052,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE3(sigaction, int, sig,
ret = do_sigaction(sig, act ? &new_ka : NULL, oact ? &old_ka : NULL);
if (!ret && oact) {
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, oact, sizeof(*oact)) ||
+ if (!access_ok(oact, sizeof(*oact)) ||
__put_user(ptr_to_compat(old_ka.sa.sa_handler),
&oact->sa_handler) ||
__put_user(ptr_to_compat(old_ka.sa.sa_restorer),
diff --git a/kernel/sys.c b/kernel/sys.c
index 64b5a230f38d..a48cbf1414b8 100644
--- a/kernel/sys.c
+++ b/kernel/sys.c
@@ -2627,7 +2627,7 @@ COMPAT_SYSCALL_DEFINE1(sysinfo, struct compat_sysinfo __user *, info)
s.freehigh >>= bitcount;
}
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) ||
+ if (!access_ok(info, sizeof(struct compat_sysinfo)) ||
__put_user(s.uptime, &info->uptime) ||
__put_user(s.loads[0], &info->loads[0]) ||
__put_user(s.loads[1], &info->loads[1]) ||
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 9ddb6fddb4e0..8b068adb9da1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -170,7 +170,7 @@ BPF_CALL_3(bpf_probe_write_user, void *, unsafe_ptr, const void *, src,
return -EPERM;
if (unlikely(uaccess_kernel()))
return -EPERM;
- if (!access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, unsafe_ptr, size))
+ if (!access_ok(unsafe_ptr, size))
return -EPERM;
return probe_kernel_write(unsafe_ptr, src, size);
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2024-11-23 21:36:28 +0300