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-rw-r--r--kernel/panic.c63
-rw-r--r--kernel/params.c4
-rw-r--r--kernel/pid.c2
-rw-r--r--kernel/sysctl.c24
-rw-r--r--kernel/utsname.c20
5 files changed, 66 insertions, 47 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/panic.c b/kernel/panic.c
index 6c3b08cd1139..42e487488554 100644
--- a/kernel/panic.c
+++ b/kernel/panic.c
@@ -34,7 +34,8 @@
#define PANIC_BLINK_SPD 18
int panic_on_oops = CONFIG_PANIC_ON_OOPS_VALUE;
-static unsigned long tainted_mask;
+static unsigned long tainted_mask =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT) ? (1 << TAINT_RANDSTRUCT) : 0;
static int pause_on_oops;
static int pause_on_oops_flag;
static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pause_on_oops_lock);
@@ -308,52 +309,40 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL(panic);
* is being removed anyway.
*/
const struct taint_flag taint_flags[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT] = {
- { 'P', 'G', true }, /* TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE */
- { 'F', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_FORCED_MODULE */
- { 'S', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC */
- { 'R', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD */
- { 'M', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK */
- { 'B', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_BAD_PAGE */
- { 'U', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_USER */
- { 'D', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_DIE */
- { 'A', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE */
- { 'W', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_WARN */
- { 'C', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_CRAP */
- { 'I', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND */
- { 'O', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_OOT_MODULE */
- { 'E', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE */
- { 'L', ' ', false }, /* TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP */
- { 'K', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_LIVEPATCH */
- { 'X', ' ', true }, /* TAINT_AUX */
+ [ TAINT_PROPRIETARY_MODULE ] = { 'P', 'G', true },
+ [ TAINT_FORCED_MODULE ] = { 'F', ' ', true },
+ [ TAINT_CPU_OUT_OF_SPEC ] = { 'S', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_FORCED_RMMOD ] = { 'R', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_MACHINE_CHECK ] = { 'M', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_BAD_PAGE ] = { 'B', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_USER ] = { 'U', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_DIE ] = { 'D', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_OVERRIDDEN_ACPI_TABLE ] = { 'A', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_WARN ] = { 'W', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_CRAP ] = { 'C', ' ', true },
+ [ TAINT_FIRMWARE_WORKAROUND ] = { 'I', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_OOT_MODULE ] = { 'O', ' ', true },
+ [ TAINT_UNSIGNED_MODULE ] = { 'E', ' ', true },
+ [ TAINT_SOFTLOCKUP ] = { 'L', ' ', false },
+ [ TAINT_LIVEPATCH ] = { 'K', ' ', true },
+ [ TAINT_AUX ] = { 'X', ' ', true },
+ [ TAINT_RANDSTRUCT ] = { 'T', ' ', true },
};
/**
- * print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
+ * print_tainted - return a string to represent the kernel taint state.
*
- * 'P' - Proprietary module has been loaded.
- * 'F' - Module has been forcibly loaded.
- * 'S' - SMP with CPUs not designed for SMP.
- * 'R' - User forced a module unload.
- * 'M' - System experienced a machine check exception.
- * 'B' - System has hit bad_page.
- * 'U' - Userspace-defined naughtiness.
- * 'D' - Kernel has oopsed before
- * 'A' - ACPI table overridden.
- * 'W' - Taint on warning.
- * 'C' - modules from drivers/staging are loaded.
- * 'I' - Working around severe firmware bug.
- * 'O' - Out-of-tree module has been loaded.
- * 'E' - Unsigned module has been loaded.
- * 'L' - A soft lockup has previously occurred.
- * 'K' - Kernel has been live patched.
- * 'X' - Auxiliary taint, for distros' use.
+ * For individual taint flag meanings, see Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
*
- * The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted().
+ * The string is overwritten by the next call to print_tainted(),
+ * but is always NULL terminated.
*/
const char *print_tainted(void)
{
static char buf[TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT + sizeof("Tainted: ")];
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(taint_flags) != TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT);
+
if (tainted_mask) {
char *s;
int i;
diff --git a/kernel/params.c b/kernel/params.c
index cc9108c2a1fd..ce89f757e6da 100644
--- a/kernel/params.c
+++ b/kernel/params.c
@@ -111,8 +111,8 @@ bool parameq(const char *a, const char *b)
static void param_check_unsafe(const struct kernel_param *kp)
{
if (kp->flags & KERNEL_PARAM_FL_UNSAFE) {
- pr_warn("Setting dangerous option %s - tainting kernel\n",
- kp->name);
+ pr_notice("Setting dangerous option %s - tainting kernel\n",
+ kp->name);
add_taint(TAINT_USER, LOCKDEP_STILL_OK);
}
}
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index ed6c343fe50d..157fe4b19971 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int pid_max_max = PID_MAX_LIMIT;
*/
struct pid_namespace init_pid_ns = {
.kref = KREF_INIT(2),
- .idr = IDR_INIT,
+ .idr = IDR_INIT(init_pid_ns.idr),
.pid_allocated = PIDNS_ADDING,
.level = 0,
.child_reaper = &init_task,
diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
index bdf7090b106d..6a78cf70761d 100644
--- a/kernel/sysctl.c
+++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
@@ -1340,7 +1340,7 @@ static struct ctl_table vm_table[] = {
{
.procname = "dirtytime_expire_seconds",
.data = &dirtytime_expire_interval,
- .maxlen = sizeof(dirty_expire_interval),
+ .maxlen = sizeof(dirtytime_expire_interval),
.mode = 0644,
.proc_handler = dirtytime_interval_handler,
.extra1 = &zero,
@@ -2511,6 +2511,15 @@ static int proc_dointvec_minmax_sysadmin(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
}
#endif
+/**
+ * struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_dointvec_minmax() range checking structure
+ * @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
+ * @max: pointer to maximum allowable value
+ *
+ * The do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param structure provides the
+ * minimum and maximum values for doing range checking for those sysctl
+ * parameters that use the proc_dointvec_minmax() handler.
+ */
struct do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv_param {
int *min;
int *max;
@@ -2554,7 +2563,7 @@ static int do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv(bool *negp, unsigned long *lvalp,
* This routine will ensure the values are within the range specified by
* table->extra1 (min) and table->extra2 (max).
*
- * Returns 0 on success.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -EINVAL on write when the range check fails.
*/
int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
@@ -2567,6 +2576,15 @@ int proc_dointvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
do_proc_dointvec_minmax_conv, &param);
}
+/**
+ * struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param - proc_douintvec_minmax() range checking structure
+ * @min: pointer to minimum allowable value
+ * @max: pointer to maximum allowable value
+ *
+ * The do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param structure provides the
+ * minimum and maximum values for doing range checking for those sysctl
+ * parameters that use the proc_douintvec_minmax() handler.
+ */
struct do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv_param {
unsigned int *min;
unsigned int *max;
@@ -2614,7 +2632,7 @@ static int do_proc_douintvec_minmax_conv(unsigned long *lvalp,
* check for UINT_MAX to avoid having to support wrap around uses from
* userspace.
*
- * Returns 0 on success.
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ERANGE on write when the range check fails.
*/
int proc_douintvec_minmax(struct ctl_table *table, int write,
void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos)
diff --git a/kernel/utsname.c b/kernel/utsname.c
index 913fe4336d2b..dcd6be1996fe 100644
--- a/kernel/utsname.c
+++ b/kernel/utsname.c
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@
#include <linux/proc_ns.h>
#include <linux/sched/task.h>
+static struct kmem_cache *uts_ns_cache __ro_after_init;
+
static struct ucounts *inc_uts_namespaces(struct user_namespace *ns)
{
return inc_ucount(ns, current_euid(), UCOUNT_UTS_NAMESPACES);
@@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ static struct uts_namespace *create_uts_ns(void)
{
struct uts_namespace *uts_ns;
- uts_ns = kmalloc(sizeof(struct uts_namespace), GFP_KERNEL);
+ uts_ns = kmem_cache_alloc(uts_ns_cache, GFP_KERNEL);
if (uts_ns)
kref_init(&uts_ns->kref);
return uts_ns;
@@ -42,7 +44,7 @@ static struct uts_namespace *create_uts_ns(void)
/*
* Clone a new ns copying an original utsname, setting refcount to 1
* @old_ns: namespace to clone
- * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to kmalloc), new ns otherwise
+ * Return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM) on error (failure to allocate), new ns otherwise
*/
static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
struct uts_namespace *old_ns)
@@ -75,7 +77,7 @@ static struct uts_namespace *clone_uts_ns(struct user_namespace *user_ns,
return ns;
fail_free:
- kfree(ns);
+ kmem_cache_free(uts_ns_cache, ns);
fail_dec:
dec_uts_namespaces(ucounts);
fail:
@@ -113,7 +115,7 @@ void free_uts_ns(struct kref *kref)
dec_uts_namespaces(ns->ucounts);
put_user_ns(ns->user_ns);
ns_free_inum(&ns->ns);
- kfree(ns);
+ kmem_cache_free(uts_ns_cache, ns);
}
static inline struct uts_namespace *to_uts_ns(struct ns_common *ns)
@@ -169,3 +171,13 @@ const struct proc_ns_operations utsns_operations = {
.install = utsns_install,
.owner = utsns_owner,
};
+
+void __init uts_ns_init(void)
+{
+ uts_ns_cache = kmem_cache_create_usercopy(
+ "uts_namespace", sizeof(struct uts_namespace), 0,
+ SLAB_PANIC|SLAB_ACCOUNT,
+ offsetof(struct uts_namespace, name),
+ sizeof_field(struct uts_namespace, name),
+ NULL);
+}
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.0) at 2025-01-10 02:03:38 +0300