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Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c18
-rw-r--r--kernel/fail_function.c5
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c12
3 files changed, 29 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 6200519582a6..1388bf733071 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -7786,9 +7786,11 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
struct tnum range = tnum_range(0, 1);
enum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env->prog);
int err;
+ const bool is_subprog = env->cur_state->frame[0]->subprogno;
/* LSM and struct_ops func-ptr's return type could be "void" */
- if ((prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
+ if (!is_subprog &&
+ (prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_STRUCT_OPS ||
prog_type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_LSM) &&
!prog->aux->attach_func_proto->type)
return 0;
@@ -7808,6 +7810,16 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return -EACCES;
}
+ reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
+ if (is_subprog) {
+ if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
+ verbose(env, "At subprogram exit the register R0 is not a scalar value (%s)\n",
+ reg_type_str[reg->type]);
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
switch (prog_type) {
case BPF_PROG_TYPE_CGROUP_SOCK_ADDR:
if (env->prog->expected_attach_type == BPF_CGROUP_UDP4_RECVMSG ||
@@ -7861,7 +7873,6 @@ static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return 0;
}
- reg = cur_regs(env) + BPF_REG_0;
if (reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE) {
verbose(env, "At program exit the register R0 is not a known value (%s)\n",
reg_type_str[reg->type]);
@@ -9572,12 +9583,13 @@ static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
struct bpf_insn *insn,
struct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux)
{
- u32 datasec_id, type, id = insn->imm;
const struct btf_var_secinfo *vsi;
const struct btf_type *datasec;
const struct btf_type *t;
const char *sym_name;
bool percpu = false;
+ u32 type, id = insn->imm;
+ s32 datasec_id;
u64 addr;
int i;
diff --git a/kernel/fail_function.c b/kernel/fail_function.c
index 63b349168da7..b0b1ad93fa95 100644
--- a/kernel/fail_function.c
+++ b/kernel/fail_function.c
@@ -253,7 +253,7 @@ static ssize_t fei_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
if (copy_from_user(buf, buffer, count)) {
ret = -EFAULT;
- goto out;
+ goto out_free;
}
buf[count] = '\0';
sym = strstrip(buf);
@@ -307,8 +307,9 @@ static ssize_t fei_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buffer,
ret = count;
}
out:
- kfree(buf);
mutex_unlock(&fei_lock);
+out_free:
+ kfree(buf);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
index 4517c8b66518..048c655315f1 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/bpf_trace.c
@@ -181,6 +181,16 @@ bpf_probe_read_user_str_common(void *dst, u32 size,
{
int ret;
+ /*
+ * NB: We rely on strncpy_from_user() not copying junk past the NUL
+ * terminator into `dst`.
+ *
+ * strncpy_from_user() does long-sized strides in the fast path. If the
+ * strncpy does not mask out the bytes after the NUL in `unsafe_ptr`,
+ * then there could be junk after the NUL in `dst`. If user takes `dst`
+ * and keys a hash map with it, then semantically identical strings can
+ * occupy multiple entries in the map.
+ */
ret = strncpy_from_user_nofault(dst, unsafe_ptr, size);
if (unlikely(ret < 0))
memset(dst, 0, size);
@@ -1198,7 +1208,7 @@ static int bpf_btf_printf_prepare(struct btf_ptr *ptr, u32 btf_ptr_size,
*btf = bpf_get_btf_vmlinux();
if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(*btf))
- return PTR_ERR(*btf);
+ return IS_ERR(*btf) ? PTR_ERR(*btf) : -EINVAL;
if (ptr->type_id > 0)
*btf_id = ptr->type_id;