diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 147 |
1 files changed, 105 insertions, 42 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index dc77548167ef..fd023ac24e10 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ #include <linux/compat.h> #include <linux/coredump.h> #include <linux/kmemleak.h> +#include <linux/nospec.h> +#include <linux/prctl.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/task_stack.h> #include <linux/seccomp.h> @@ -227,8 +229,11 @@ static inline bool seccomp_may_assign_mode(unsigned long seccomp_mode) return true; } +void __weak arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(struct task_struct *task) { } + static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task, - unsigned long seccomp_mode) + unsigned long seccomp_mode, + unsigned long flags) { assert_spin_locked(&task->sighand->siglock); @@ -238,6 +243,9 @@ static inline void seccomp_assign_mode(struct task_struct *task, * filter) is set. */ smp_mb__before_atomic(); + /* Assume default seccomp processes want spec flaw mitigation. */ + if ((flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_SPEC_ALLOW) == 0) + arch_seccomp_spec_mitigate(task); set_tsk_thread_flag(task, TIF_SECCOMP); } @@ -305,7 +313,7 @@ static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void) * without dropping the locks. * */ -static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void) +static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(unsigned long flags) { struct task_struct *thread, *caller; @@ -346,7 +354,8 @@ static inline void seccomp_sync_threads(void) * allow one thread to transition the other. */ if (thread->seccomp.mode == SECCOMP_MODE_DISABLED) - seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER); + seccomp_assign_mode(thread, SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER, + flags); } } @@ -469,7 +478,7 @@ static long seccomp_attach_filter(unsigned int flags, /* Now that the new filter is in place, synchronize to all threads. */ if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) - seccomp_sync_threads(); + seccomp_sync_threads(flags); return 0; } @@ -584,18 +593,15 @@ static inline void seccomp_log(unsigned long syscall, long signr, u32 action, } /* - * Force an audit message to be emitted when the action is RET_KILL_*, - * RET_LOG, or the FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set and the action is - * allowed to be logged by the admin. + * Emit an audit message when the action is RET_KILL_*, RET_LOG, or the + * FILTER_FLAG_LOG bit was set. The admin has the ability to silence + * any action from being logged by removing the action name from the + * seccomp_actions_logged sysctl. */ - if (log) - return __audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); + if (!log) + return; - /* - * Let the audit subsystem decide if the action should be audited based - * on whether the current task itself is being audited. - */ - return audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); + audit_seccomp(syscall, signr, action); } /* @@ -818,7 +824,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_strict(void) #ifdef TIF_NOTSC disable_TSC(); #endif - seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode); + seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, 0); ret = 0; out: @@ -876,7 +882,7 @@ static long seccomp_set_mode_filter(unsigned int flags, /* Do not free the successfully attached filter. */ prepared = NULL; - seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode); + seccomp_assign_mode(current, seccomp_mode, flags); out: spin_unlock_irq(¤t->sighand->siglock); if (flags & SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC) @@ -1135,10 +1141,11 @@ static const struct seccomp_log_name seccomp_log_names[] = { }; static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size, - u32 actions_logged) + u32 actions_logged, + const char *sep) { const struct seccomp_log_name *cur; - bool append_space = false; + bool append_sep = false; for (cur = seccomp_log_names; cur->name && size; cur++) { ssize_t ret; @@ -1146,15 +1153,15 @@ static bool seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(char *names, size_t size, if (!(actions_logged & cur->log)) continue; - if (append_space) { - ret = strscpy(names, " ", size); + if (append_sep) { + ret = strscpy(names, sep, size); if (ret < 0) return false; names += ret; size -= ret; } else - append_space = true; + append_sep = true; ret = strscpy(names, cur->name, size); if (ret < 0) @@ -1199,46 +1206,102 @@ static bool seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(u32 *actions_logged, char *names) return true; } -static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, - void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, - loff_t *ppos) +static int read_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos) +{ + char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + struct ctl_table table; + + memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); + + if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), + seccomp_actions_logged, " ")) + return -EINVAL; + + table = *ro_table; + table.data = names; + table.maxlen = sizeof(names); + return proc_dostring(&table, 0, buffer, lenp, ppos); +} + +static int write_actions_logged(struct ctl_table *ro_table, void __user *buffer, + size_t *lenp, loff_t *ppos, u32 *actions_logged) { char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; struct ctl_table table; int ret; - if (write && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); - if (!write) { - if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), - seccomp_actions_logged)) - return -EINVAL; - } - table = *ro_table; table.data = names; table.maxlen = sizeof(names); - ret = proc_dostring(&table, write, buffer, lenp, ppos); + ret = proc_dostring(&table, 1, buffer, lenp, ppos); if (ret) return ret; - if (write) { - u32 actions_logged; + if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(actions_logged, table.data)) + return -EINVAL; - if (!seccomp_actions_logged_from_names(&actions_logged, - table.data)) - return -EINVAL; + if (*actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) + return -EINVAL; - if (actions_logged & SECCOMP_LOG_ALLOW) - return -EINVAL; + seccomp_actions_logged = *actions_logged; + return 0; +} - seccomp_actions_logged = actions_logged; - } +static void audit_actions_logged(u32 actions_logged, u32 old_actions_logged, + int ret) +{ + char names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + char old_names[sizeof(seccomp_actions_avail)]; + const char *new = names; + const char *old = old_names; - return 0; + if (!audit_enabled) + return; + + memset(names, 0, sizeof(names)); + memset(old_names, 0, sizeof(old_names)); + + if (ret) + new = "?"; + else if (!actions_logged) + new = "(none)"; + else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(names, sizeof(names), + actions_logged, ",")) + new = "?"; + + if (!old_actions_logged) + old = "(none)"; + else if (!seccomp_names_from_actions_logged(old_names, + sizeof(old_names), + old_actions_logged, ",")) + old = "?"; + + return audit_seccomp_actions_logged(new, old, !ret); +} + +static int seccomp_actions_logged_handler(struct ctl_table *ro_table, int write, + void __user *buffer, size_t *lenp, + loff_t *ppos) +{ + int ret; + + if (write) { + u32 actions_logged = 0; + u32 old_actions_logged = seccomp_actions_logged; + + ret = write_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos, + &actions_logged); + audit_actions_logged(actions_logged, old_actions_logged, ret); + } else + ret = read_actions_logged(ro_table, buffer, lenp, ppos); + + return ret; } static struct ctl_path seccomp_sysctl_path[] = { |