diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto')
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 19 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/hooks.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/keyring.c | 8 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 20 |
4 files changed, 21 insertions, 34 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h index 322ecae9a758..a61d4dbf0a0b 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h +++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h @@ -439,16 +439,9 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { * FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY can be retried, or * FS_IOC_ADD_ENCRYPTION_KEY can add the secret again. * - * Locking: protected by key->sem (outer) and mk_secret_sem (inner). - * The reason for two locks is that key->sem also protects modifying - * mk_users, which ranks it above the semaphore for the keyring key - * type, which is in turn above page faults (via keyring_read). But - * sometimes filesystems call fscrypt_get_encryption_info() from within - * a transaction, which ranks it below page faults. So we need a - * separate lock which protects mk_secret but not also mk_users. + * Locking: protected by this master key's key->sem. */ struct fscrypt_master_key_secret mk_secret; - struct rw_semaphore mk_secret_sem; /* * For v1 policy keys: an arbitrary key descriptor which was assigned by @@ -467,8 +460,8 @@ struct fscrypt_master_key { * * This is NULL for v1 policy keys; those can only be added by root. * - * Locking: in addition to this keyrings own semaphore, this is - * protected by the master key's key->sem, so we can do atomic + * Locking: in addition to this keyring's own semaphore, this is + * protected by this master key's key->sem, so we can do atomic * search+insert. It can also be searched without taking any locks, but * in that case the returned key may have already been removed. */ @@ -510,9 +503,9 @@ is_master_key_secret_present(const struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret) /* * The READ_ONCE() is only necessary for fscrypt_drop_inode() and * fscrypt_key_describe(). These run in atomic context, so they can't - * take ->mk_secret_sem and thus 'secret' can change concurrently which - * would be a data race. But they only need to know whether the secret - * *was* present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices. + * take the key semaphore and thus 'secret' can change concurrently + * which would be a data race. But they only need to know whether the + * secret *was* present at the time of check, so READ_ONCE() suffices. */ return READ_ONCE(secret->size) != 0; } diff --git a/fs/crypto/hooks.c b/fs/crypto/hooks.c index c582e2ddb39c..c809a4afa057 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/hooks.c +++ b/fs/crypto/hooks.c @@ -129,6 +129,7 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, unsigned int oldflags, unsigned int flags) { struct fscrypt_info *ci; + struct key *key; struct fscrypt_master_key *mk; int err; @@ -144,13 +145,14 @@ int fscrypt_prepare_setflags(struct inode *inode, ci = inode->i_crypt_info; if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2) return -EINVAL; - mk = ci->ci_master_key->payload.data[0]; - down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); + key = ci->ci_master_key; + mk = key->payload.data[0]; + down_read(&key->sem); if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk); else err = -ENOKEY; - up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); + up_read(&key->sem); return err; } return 0; diff --git a/fs/crypto/keyring.c b/fs/crypto/keyring.c index d7ec52cb3d9a..0b3ffbb4faf4 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keyring.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keyring.c @@ -347,7 +347,6 @@ static int add_new_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key_secret *secret, mk->mk_spec = *mk_spec; move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret); - init_rwsem(&mk->mk_secret_sem); refcount_set(&mk->mk_refcount, 1); /* secret is present */ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&mk->mk_decrypted_inodes); @@ -427,11 +426,8 @@ static int add_existing_master_key(struct fscrypt_master_key *mk, } /* Re-add the secret if needed. */ - if (rekey) { - down_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem); + if (rekey) move_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret, secret); - up_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem); - } return 0; } @@ -975,10 +971,8 @@ static int do_remove_key(struct file *filp, void __user *_uarg, bool all_users) /* No user claims remaining. Go ahead and wipe the secret. */ dead = false; if (is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) { - down_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem); wipe_master_key_secret(&mk->mk_secret); dead = refcount_dec_and_test(&mk->mk_refcount); - up_write(&mk->mk_secret_sem); } up_write(&key->sem); if (dead) { diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c index 31fb08d94f87..50675b42d5b7 100644 --- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c +++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c @@ -337,11 +337,11 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, * Find the master key, then set up the inode's actual encryption key. * * If the master key is found in the filesystem-level keyring, then the - * corresponding 'struct key' is returned in *master_key_ret with - * ->mk_secret_sem read-locked. This is needed to ensure that only one task - * links the fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as multiple tasks may race - * to create an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to synchronize the master - * key being removed with a new inode starting to use it. + * corresponding 'struct key' is returned in *master_key_ret with its semaphore + * read-locked. This is needed to ensure that only one task links the + * fscrypt_info into ->mk_decrypted_inodes (as multiple tasks may race to create + * an fscrypt_info for the same inode), and to synchronize the master key being + * removed with a new inode starting to use it. */ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, bool need_dirhash_key, @@ -390,7 +390,7 @@ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, } mk = key->payload.data[0]; - down_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); + down_read(&key->sem); /* Has the secret been removed (via FS_IOC_REMOVE_ENCRYPTION_KEY)? */ if (!is_master_key_secret_present(&mk->mk_secret)) { @@ -433,7 +433,7 @@ static int setup_file_encryption_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, return 0; out_release_key: - up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); + up_read(&key->sem); key_put(key); return err; } @@ -536,9 +536,7 @@ fscrypt_setup_encryption_info(struct inode *inode, res = 0; out: if (master_key) { - struct fscrypt_master_key *mk = master_key->payload.data[0]; - - up_read(&mk->mk_secret_sem); + up_read(&master_key->sem); key_put(master_key); } put_crypt_info(crypt_info); @@ -712,7 +710,7 @@ int fscrypt_drop_inode(struct inode *inode) return 0; /* - * Note: since we aren't holding ->mk_secret_sem, the result here can + * Note: since we aren't holding the key semaphore, the result here can * immediately become outdated. But there's no correctness problem with * unnecessarily evicting. Nor is there a correctness problem with not * evicting while iput() is racing with the key being removed, since |