summaryrefslogtreecommitdiff
path: root/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
diff options
context:
space:
mode:
Diffstat (limited to 'fs/crypto/keysetup.c')
-rw-r--r--fs/crypto/keysetup.c102
1 files changed, 63 insertions, 39 deletions
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index f577bb6613f9..65cb09fa6ead 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include "fscrypt_private.h"
-static struct fscrypt_mode available_modes[] = {
+struct fscrypt_mode fscrypt_modes[] = {
[FSCRYPT_MODE_AES_256_XTS] = {
.friendly_name = "AES-256-XTS",
.cipher_str = "xts(aes)",
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@ select_encryption_mode(const union fscrypt_policy *policy,
const struct inode *inode)
{
if (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
- return &available_modes[fscrypt_policy_contents_mode(policy)];
+ return &fscrypt_modes[fscrypt_policy_contents_mode(policy)];
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) || S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
- return &available_modes[fscrypt_policy_fnames_mode(policy)];
+ return &fscrypt_modes[fscrypt_policy_fnames_mode(policy)];
WARN_ONCE(1, "fscrypt: filesystem tried to load encryption info for inode %lu, which is not encryptable (file type %d)\n",
inode->i_ino, (inode->i_mode & S_IFMT));
@@ -89,8 +89,11 @@ struct crypto_skcipher *fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(struct fscrypt_mode *mode,
* first time a mode is used.
*/
pr_info("fscrypt: %s using implementation \"%s\"\n",
- mode->friendly_name,
- crypto_skcipher_alg(tfm)->base.cra_driver_name);
+ mode->friendly_name, crypto_skcipher_driver_name(tfm));
+ }
+ if (WARN_ON(crypto_skcipher_ivsize(tfm) != mode->ivsize)) {
+ err = -EINVAL;
+ goto err_free_tfm;
}
crypto_skcipher_set_flags(tfm, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_FORBID_WEAK_KEYS);
err = crypto_skcipher_setkey(tfm, raw_key, mode->keysize);
@@ -104,12 +107,12 @@ err_free_tfm:
return ERR_PTR(err);
}
-/* Given the per-file key, set up the file's crypto transform object */
-int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *derived_key)
+/* Given a per-file encryption key, set up the file's crypto transform object */
+int fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *raw_key)
{
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm;
- tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, derived_key, ci->ci_inode);
+ tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, raw_key, ci->ci_inode);
if (IS_ERR(tfm))
return PTR_ERR(tfm);
@@ -118,15 +121,15 @@ int fscrypt_set_derived_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci, const u8 *derived_key)
return 0;
}
-static int setup_per_mode_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
- struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
- struct crypto_skcipher **tfms,
- u8 hkdf_context, bool include_fs_uuid)
+static int setup_per_mode_enc_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
+ struct crypto_skcipher **tfms,
+ u8 hkdf_context, bool include_fs_uuid)
{
const struct inode *inode = ci->ci_inode;
const struct super_block *sb = inode->i_sb;
struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode;
- u8 mode_num = mode - available_modes;
+ const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes;
struct crypto_skcipher *tfm, *prev_tfm;
u8 mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)];
@@ -171,29 +174,37 @@ done:
return 0;
}
+int fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
+ const struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRHASH_KEY,
+ ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE,
+ (u8 *)&ci->ci_dirhash_key,
+ sizeof(ci->ci_dirhash_key));
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ ci->ci_dirhash_key_initialized = true;
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
struct fscrypt_master_key *mk)
{
- u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
int err;
if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY) {
/*
- * DIRECT_KEY: instead of deriving per-file keys, the per-file
- * nonce will be included in all the IVs. But unlike v1
- * policies, for v2 policies in this case we don't encrypt with
- * the master key directly but rather derive a per-mode key.
- * This ensures that the master key is consistently used only
- * for HKDF, avoiding key reuse issues.
+ * DIRECT_KEY: instead of deriving per-file encryption keys, the
+ * per-file nonce will be included in all the IVs. But unlike
+ * v1 policies, for v2 policies in this case we don't encrypt
+ * with the master key directly but rather derive a per-mode
+ * encryption key. This ensures that the master key is
+ * consistently used only for HKDF, avoiding key reuse issues.
*/
- if (!fscrypt_mode_supports_direct_key(ci->ci_mode)) {
- fscrypt_warn(ci->ci_inode,
- "Direct key flag not allowed with %s",
- ci->ci_mode->friendly_name);
- return -EINVAL;
- }
- return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_tfms,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false);
+ err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_direct_tfms,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_DIRECT_KEY, false);
} else if (ci->ci_policy.v2.flags &
FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) {
/*
@@ -202,21 +213,34 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_info *ci,
* the IVs. This format is optimized for use with inline
* encryption hardware compliant with the UFS or eMMC standards.
*/
- return setup_per_mode_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY,
- true);
+ err = setup_per_mode_enc_key(ci, mk, mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_tfms,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY,
+ true);
+ } else {
+ u8 derived_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
+
+ err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_ENC_KEY,
+ ci->ci_nonce,
+ FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE,
+ derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+
+ err = fscrypt_set_per_file_enc_key(ci, derived_key);
+ memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
}
-
- err = fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf,
- HKDF_CONTEXT_PER_FILE_KEY,
- ci->ci_nonce, FS_KEY_DERIVATION_NONCE_SIZE,
- derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
if (err)
return err;
- err = fscrypt_set_derived_key(ci, derived_key);
- memzero_explicit(derived_key, ci->ci_mode->keysize);
- return err;
+ /* Derive a secret dirhash key for directories that need it. */
+ if (S_ISDIR(ci->ci_inode->i_mode) && IS_CASEFOLDED(ci->ci_inode)) {
+ err = fscrypt_derive_dirhash_key(ci, mk);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
}
/*