diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm/fault.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/fault.c | 288 |
1 files changed, 189 insertions, 99 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c index 0d45f6debb3a..2b1519bc5381 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/fault.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/fault.c @@ -851,6 +851,15 @@ show_signal_msg(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, show_opcodes(regs, loglvl); } +/* + * The (legacy) vsyscall page is the long page in the kernel portion + * of the address space that has user-accessible permissions. + */ +static bool is_vsyscall_vaddr(unsigned long vaddr) +{ + return unlikely((vaddr & PAGE_MASK) == VSYSCALL_ADDR); +} + static void __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address, u32 *pkey, int si_code) @@ -874,18 +883,6 @@ __bad_area_nosemaphore(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, if (is_errata100(regs, address)) return; -#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 - /* - * Instruction fetch faults in the vsyscall page might need - * emulation. - */ - if (unlikely((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && - ((address & ~0xfff) == VSYSCALL_ADDR))) { - if (emulate_vsyscall(regs, address)) - return; - } -#endif - /* * To avoid leaking information about the kernel page table * layout, pretend that user-mode accesses to kernel addresses @@ -1043,19 +1040,13 @@ mm_fault_error(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, } } -static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte) +static int spurious_kernel_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte) { if ((error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) && !pte_write(*pte)) return 0; if ((error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && !pte_exec(*pte)) return 0; - /* - * Note: We do not do lazy flushing on protection key - * changes, so no spurious fault will ever set X86_PF_PK. - */ - if ((error_code & X86_PF_PK)) - return 1; return 1; } @@ -1082,7 +1073,7 @@ static int spurious_fault_check(unsigned long error_code, pte_t *pte) * (Optional Invalidation). */ static noinline int -spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) +spurious_kernel_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) { pgd_t *pgd; p4d_t *p4d; @@ -1113,27 +1104,27 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) return 0; if (p4d_large(*p4d)) - return spurious_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d); + return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) p4d); pud = pud_offset(p4d, address); if (!pud_present(*pud)) return 0; if (pud_large(*pud)) - return spurious_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pud); + return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pud); pmd = pmd_offset(pud, address); if (!pmd_present(*pmd)) return 0; if (pmd_large(*pmd)) - return spurious_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); + return spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); pte = pte_offset_kernel(pmd, address); if (!pte_present(*pte)) return 0; - ret = spurious_fault_check(error_code, pte); + ret = spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, pte); if (!ret) return 0; @@ -1141,12 +1132,12 @@ spurious_fault(unsigned long error_code, unsigned long address) * Make sure we have permissions in PMD. * If not, then there's a bug in the page tables: */ - ret = spurious_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); + ret = spurious_kernel_fault_check(error_code, (pte_t *) pmd); WARN_ONCE(!ret, "PMD has incorrect permission bits\n"); return ret; } -NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(spurious_fault); +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(spurious_kernel_fault); int show_unhandled_signals = 1; @@ -1193,6 +1184,14 @@ access_error(unsigned long error_code, struct vm_area_struct *vma) static int fault_in_kernel_space(unsigned long address) { + /* + * On 64-bit systems, the vsyscall page is at an address above + * TASK_SIZE_MAX, but is not considered part of the kernel + * address space. + */ + if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64) && is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) + return false; + return address >= TASK_SIZE_MAX; } @@ -1214,31 +1213,23 @@ static inline bool smap_violation(int error_code, struct pt_regs *regs) } /* - * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, - * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate - * routines. + * Called for all faults where 'address' is part of the kernel address + * space. Might get called for faults that originate from *code* that + * ran in userspace or the kernel. */ -static noinline void -__do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, - unsigned long address) +static void +do_kern_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, + unsigned long address) { - struct vm_area_struct *vma; - struct task_struct *tsk; - struct mm_struct *mm; - vm_fault_t fault, major = 0; - unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE; - u32 pkey; - - tsk = current; - mm = tsk->mm; - - prefetchw(&mm->mmap_sem); - - if (unlikely(kmmio_fault(regs, address))) - return; + /* + * Protection keys exceptions only happen on user pages. We + * have no user pages in the kernel portion of the address + * space, so do not expect them here. + */ + WARN_ON_ONCE(hw_error_code & X86_PF_PK); /* - * We fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The + * We can fault-in kernel-space virtual memory on-demand. The * 'reference' page table is init_mm.pgd. * * NOTE! We MUST NOT take any locks for this case. We may @@ -1246,41 +1237,74 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * only copy the information from the master page table, * nothing more. * - * This verifies that the fault happens in kernel space - * (error_code & 4) == 0, and that the fault was not a - * protection error (error_code & 9) == 0. + * Before doing this on-demand faulting, ensure that the + * fault is not any of the following: + * 1. A fault on a PTE with a reserved bit set. + * 2. A fault caused by a user-mode access. (Do not demand- + * fault kernel memory due to user-mode accesses). + * 3. A fault caused by a page-level protection violation. + * (A demand fault would be on a non-present page which + * would have X86_PF_PROT==0). */ - if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) { - if (!(error_code & (X86_PF_RSVD | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_PROT))) { - if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0) - return; - } - - /* Can handle a stale RO->RW TLB: */ - if (spurious_fault(error_code, address)) + if (!(hw_error_code & (X86_PF_RSVD | X86_PF_USER | X86_PF_PROT))) { + if (vmalloc_fault(address) >= 0) return; + } - /* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */ - if (kprobes_fault(regs)) - return; - /* - * Don't take the mm semaphore here. If we fixup a prefetch - * fault we could otherwise deadlock: - */ - bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL); + /* Was the fault spurious, caused by lazy TLB invalidation? */ + if (spurious_kernel_fault(hw_error_code, address)) + return; + /* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */ + if (kprobes_fault(regs)) return; - } + + /* + * Note, despite being a "bad area", there are quite a few + * acceptable reasons to get here, such as erratum fixups + * and handling kernel code that can fault, like get_user(). + * + * Don't take the mm semaphore here. If we fixup a prefetch + * fault we could otherwise deadlock: + */ + bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, hw_error_code, address, NULL); +} +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_kern_addr_fault); + +/* Handle faults in the user portion of the address space */ +static inline +void do_user_addr_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, + unsigned long hw_error_code, + unsigned long address) +{ + unsigned long sw_error_code; + struct vm_area_struct *vma; + struct task_struct *tsk; + struct mm_struct *mm; + vm_fault_t fault, major = 0; + unsigned int flags = FAULT_FLAG_ALLOW_RETRY | FAULT_FLAG_KILLABLE; + u32 pkey; + + tsk = current; + mm = tsk->mm; /* kprobes don't want to hook the spurious faults: */ if (unlikely(kprobes_fault(regs))) return; - if (unlikely(error_code & X86_PF_RSVD)) - pgtable_bad(regs, error_code, address); + /* + * Reserved bits are never expected to be set on + * entries in the user portion of the page tables. + */ + if (unlikely(hw_error_code & X86_PF_RSVD)) + pgtable_bad(regs, hw_error_code, address); - if (unlikely(smap_violation(error_code, regs))) { - bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL); + /* + * Check for invalid kernel (supervisor) access to user + * pages in the user address space. + */ + if (unlikely(smap_violation(hw_error_code, regs))) { + bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, hw_error_code, address, NULL); return; } @@ -1289,11 +1313,18 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, * in a region with pagefaults disabled then we must not take the fault */ if (unlikely(faulthandler_disabled() || !mm)) { - bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL); + bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, hw_error_code, address, NULL); return; } /* + * hw_error_code is literally the "page fault error code" passed to + * the kernel directly from the hardware. But, we will shortly be + * modifying it in software, so give it a new name. + */ + sw_error_code = hw_error_code; + + /* * It's safe to allow irq's after cr2 has been saved and the * vmalloc fault has been handled. * @@ -1302,7 +1333,26 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, */ if (user_mode(regs)) { local_irq_enable(); - error_code |= X86_PF_USER; + /* + * Up to this point, X86_PF_USER set in hw_error_code + * indicated a user-mode access. But, after this, + * X86_PF_USER in sw_error_code will indicate either + * that, *or* an implicit kernel(supervisor)-mode access + * which originated from user mode. + */ + if (!(hw_error_code & X86_PF_USER)) { + /* + * The CPU was in user mode, but the CPU says + * the fault was not a user-mode access. + * Must be an implicit kernel-mode access, + * which we do not expect to happen in the + * user address space. + */ + pr_warn_once("kernel-mode error from user-mode: %lx\n", + hw_error_code); + + sw_error_code |= X86_PF_USER; + } flags |= FAULT_FLAG_USER; } else { if (regs->flags & X86_EFLAGS_IF) @@ -1311,31 +1361,49 @@ __do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code, perf_sw_event(PERF_COUNT_SW_PAGE_FAULTS, 1, regs, address); - if (error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) + if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_WRITE) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_WRITE; - if (error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) + if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) flags |= FAULT_FLAG_INSTRUCTION; +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64 /* - * When running in the kernel we expect faults to occur only to - * addresses in user space. All other faults represent errors in - * the kernel and should generate an OOPS. Unfortunately, in the - * case of an erroneous fault occurring in a code path which already - * holds mmap_sem we will deadlock attempting to validate the fault - * against the address space. Luckily the kernel only validly - * references user space from well defined areas of code, which are - * listed in the exceptions table. + * Instruction fetch faults in the vsyscall page might need + * emulation. The vsyscall page is at a high address + * (>PAGE_OFFSET), but is considered to be part of the user + * address space. * - * As the vast majority of faults will be valid we will only perform - * the source reference check when there is a possibility of a - * deadlock. Attempt to lock the address space, if we cannot we then - * validate the source. If this is invalid we can skip the address - * space check, thus avoiding the deadlock: + * The vsyscall page does not have a "real" VMA, so do this + * emulation before we go searching for VMAs. + */ + if ((sw_error_code & X86_PF_INSTR) && is_vsyscall_vaddr(address)) { + if (emulate_vsyscall(regs, address)) + return; + } +#endif + + /* + * Kernel-mode access to the user address space should only occur + * on well-defined single instructions listed in the exception + * tables. But, an erroneous kernel fault occurring outside one of + * those areas which also holds mmap_sem might deadlock attempting + * to validate the fault against the address space. + * + * Only do the expensive exception table search when we might be at + * risk of a deadlock. This happens if we + * 1. Failed to acquire mmap_sem, and + * 2. The access did not originate in userspace. Note: either the + * hardware or earlier page fault code may set X86_PF_USER + * in sw_error_code. */ if (unlikely(!down_read_trylock(&mm->mmap_sem))) { - if (!(error_code & X86_PF_USER) && + if (!(sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) && !search_exception_tables(regs->ip)) { - bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, error_code, address, NULL); + /* + * Fault from code in kernel from + * which we do not expect faults. + */ + bad_area_nosemaphore(regs, sw_error_code, address, NULL); return; } retry: @@ -1351,16 +1419,16 @@ retry: vma = find_vma(mm, address); if (unlikely(!vma)) { - bad_area(regs, error_code, address); + bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); return; } if (likely(vma->vm_start <= address)) goto good_area; if (unlikely(!(vma->vm_flags & VM_GROWSDOWN))) { - bad_area(regs, error_code, address); + bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); return; } - if (error_code & X86_PF_USER) { + if (sw_error_code & X86_PF_USER) { /* * Accessing the stack below %sp is always a bug. * The large cushion allows instructions like enter @@ -1368,12 +1436,12 @@ retry: * 32 pointers and then decrements %sp by 65535.) */ if (unlikely(address + 65536 + 32 * sizeof(unsigned long) < regs->sp)) { - bad_area(regs, error_code, address); + bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); return; } } if (unlikely(expand_stack(vma, address))) { - bad_area(regs, error_code, address); + bad_area(regs, sw_error_code, address); return; } @@ -1382,8 +1450,8 @@ retry: * we can handle it.. */ good_area: - if (unlikely(access_error(error_code, vma))) { - bad_area_access_error(regs, error_code, address, vma); + if (unlikely(access_error(sw_error_code, vma))) { + bad_area_access_error(regs, sw_error_code, address, vma); return; } @@ -1425,13 +1493,13 @@ good_area: return; /* Not returning to user mode? Handle exceptions or die: */ - no_context(regs, error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR); + no_context(regs, sw_error_code, address, SIGBUS, BUS_ADRERR); return; } up_read(&mm->mmap_sem); if (unlikely(fault & VM_FAULT_ERROR)) { - mm_fault_error(regs, error_code, address, &pkey, fault); + mm_fault_error(regs, sw_error_code, address, &pkey, fault); return; } @@ -1449,6 +1517,28 @@ good_area: check_v8086_mode(regs, address, tsk); } +NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(do_user_addr_fault); + +/* + * This routine handles page faults. It determines the address, + * and the problem, and then passes it off to one of the appropriate + * routines. + */ +static noinline void +__do_page_fault(struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long hw_error_code, + unsigned long address) +{ + prefetchw(¤t->mm->mmap_sem); + + if (unlikely(kmmio_fault(regs, address))) + return; + + /* Was the fault on kernel-controlled part of the address space? */ + if (unlikely(fault_in_kernel_space(address))) + do_kern_addr_fault(regs, hw_error_code, address); + else + do_user_addr_fault(regs, hw_error_code, address); +} NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__do_page_fault); static nokprobe_inline void |