diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/arm64/Kconfig')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/arm64/Kconfig | 108 |
1 files changed, 47 insertions, 61 deletions
diff --git a/arch/arm64/Kconfig b/arch/arm64/Kconfig index e11b4ea06127..893130ce1626 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/Kconfig +++ b/arch/arm64/Kconfig @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ config ARM64 select ARCH_HAS_SETUP_DMA_OPS select ARCH_HAS_SET_DIRECT_MAP select ARCH_HAS_SET_MEMORY + select ARCH_STACKWALK select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_KERNEL_RWX select ARCH_HAS_STRICT_MODULE_RWX select ARCH_HAS_SYNC_DMA_FOR_DEVICE @@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ config ARM64 select GENERIC_CPU_VULNERABILITIES select GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP select GENERIC_IDLE_POLL_SETUP + select GENERIC_IRQ_IPI select GENERIC_IRQ_MULTI_HANDLER select GENERIC_IRQ_PROBE select GENERIC_IRQ_SHOW @@ -211,12 +213,18 @@ config ARM64_PAGE_SHIFT default 14 if ARM64_16K_PAGES default 12 -config ARM64_CONT_SHIFT +config ARM64_CONT_PTE_SHIFT int default 5 if ARM64_64K_PAGES default 7 if ARM64_16K_PAGES default 4 +config ARM64_CONT_PMD_SHIFT + int + default 5 if ARM64_64K_PAGES + default 5 if ARM64_16K_PAGES + default 4 + config ARCH_MMAP_RND_BITS_MIN default 14 if ARM64_64K_PAGES default 16 if ARM64_16K_PAGES @@ -1033,19 +1041,6 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_SPLIT_PMD_PTLOCK config CC_HAVE_SHADOW_CALL_STACK def_bool $(cc-option, -fsanitize=shadow-call-stack -ffixed-x18) -config SECCOMP - bool "Enable seccomp to safely compute untrusted bytecode" - help - This kernel feature is useful for number crunching applications - that may need to compute untrusted bytecode during their - execution. By using pipes or other transports made available to - the process as file descriptors supporting the read/write - syscalls, it's possible to isolate those applications in - their own address space using seccomp. Once seccomp is - enabled via prctl(PR_SET_SECCOMP), it cannot be disabled - and the task is only allowed to execute a few safe syscalls - defined by each seccomp mode. - config PARAVIRT bool "Enable paravirtualization code" help @@ -1165,48 +1160,6 @@ config UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 If unsure, say Y. -config HARDEN_BRANCH_PREDICTOR - bool "Harden the branch predictor against aliasing attacks" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors rely on - being able to manipulate the branch predictor for a victim context by - executing aliasing branches in the attacker context. Such attacks - can be partially mitigated against by clearing internal branch - predictor state and limiting the prediction logic in some situations. - - This config option will take CPU-specific actions to harden the - branch predictor against aliasing attacks and may rely on specific - instruction sequences or control bits being set by the system - firmware. - - If unsure, say Y. - -config HARDEN_EL2_VECTORS - bool "Harden EL2 vector mapping against system register leak" if EXPERT - default y - help - Speculation attacks against some high-performance processors can - be used to leak privileged information such as the vector base - register, resulting in a potential defeat of the EL2 layout - randomization. - - This config option will map the vectors to a fixed location, - independent of the EL2 code mapping, so that revealing VBAR_EL2 - to an attacker does not give away any extra information. This - only gets enabled on affected CPUs. - - If unsure, say Y. - -config ARM64_SSBD - bool "Speculative Store Bypass Disable" if EXPERT - default y - help - This enables mitigation of the bypassing of previous stores - by speculative loads. - - If unsure, say Y. - config RODATA_FULL_DEFAULT_ENABLED bool "Apply r/o permissions of VM areas also to their linear aliases" default y @@ -1520,7 +1473,6 @@ menu "ARMv8.3 architectural features" config ARM64_PTR_AUTH bool "Enable support for pointer authentication" default y - depends on !KVM || ARM64_VHE depends on (CC_HAS_SIGN_RETURN_ADDRESS || CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET) && AS_HAS_PAC # Modern compilers insert a .note.gnu.property section note for PAC # which is only understood by binutils starting with version 2.33.1. @@ -1547,8 +1499,7 @@ config ARM64_PTR_AUTH The feature is detected at runtime. If the feature is not present in hardware it will not be advertised to userspace/KVM guest nor will it - be enabled. However, KVM guest also require VHE mode and hence - CONFIG_ARM64_VHE=y option to use this feature. + be enabled. If the feature is present on the boot CPU but not on a late CPU, then the late CPU will be parked. Also, if the boot CPU does not have @@ -1648,8 +1599,6 @@ config ARM64_BTI_KERNEL depends on CC_HAS_BRANCH_PROT_PAC_RET_BTI # https://gcc.gnu.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=94697 depends on !CC_IS_GCC || GCC_VERSION >= 100100 - # https://reviews.llvm.org/rGb8ae3fdfa579dbf366b1bb1cbfdbf8c51db7fa55 - depends on !CC_IS_CLANG || CLANG_VERSION >= 100001 depends on !(CC_IS_CLANG && GCOV_KERNEL) depends on (!FUNCTION_GRAPH_TRACER || DYNAMIC_FTRACE_WITH_REGS) help @@ -1682,6 +1631,39 @@ config ARCH_RANDOM provides a high bandwidth, cryptographically secure hardware random number generator. +config ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE + # Initial support for MTE went in binutils 2.32.0, checked with + # ".arch armv8.5-a+memtag" below. However, this was incomplete + # as a late addition to the final architecture spec (LDGM/STGM) + # is only supported in the newer 2.32.x and 2.33 binutils + # versions, hence the extra "stgm" instruction check below. + def_bool $(as-instr,.arch armv8.5-a+memtag\nstgm xzr$(comma)[x0]) + +config ARM64_MTE + bool "Memory Tagging Extension support" + default y + depends on ARM64_AS_HAS_MTE && ARM64_TAGGED_ADDR_ABI + select ARCH_USES_HIGH_VMA_FLAGS + help + Memory Tagging (part of the ARMv8.5 Extensions) provides + architectural support for run-time, always-on detection of + various classes of memory error to aid with software debugging + to eliminate vulnerabilities arising from memory-unsafe + languages. + + This option enables the support for the Memory Tagging + Extension at EL0 (i.e. for userspace). + + Selecting this option allows the feature to be detected at + runtime. Any secondary CPU not implementing this feature will + not be allowed a late bring-up. + + Userspace binaries that want to use this feature must + explicitly opt in. The mechanism for the userspace is + described in: + + Documentation/arm64/memory-tagging-extension.rst. + endmenu config ARM64_SVE @@ -1894,6 +1876,10 @@ config ARCH_ENABLE_HUGEPAGE_MIGRATION def_bool y depends on HUGETLB_PAGE && MIGRATION +config ARCH_ENABLE_THP_MIGRATION + def_bool y + depends on TRANSPARENT_HUGEPAGE + menu "Power management options" source "kernel/power/Kconfig" |