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-rw-r--r--Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt106
1 files changed, 84 insertions, 22 deletions
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 19f4423e70d9..ff4daa780ae8 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -674,6 +674,9 @@
cpuidle.off=1 [CPU_IDLE]
disable the cpuidle sub-system
+ cpuidle.governor=
+ [CPU_IDLE] Name of the cpuidle governor to use.
+
cpufreq.off=1 [CPU_FREQ]
disable the cpufreq sub-system
@@ -856,7 +859,8 @@
causing system reset or hang due to sending
INIT from AP to BSP.
- disable_counter_freezing [HW]
+ perf_v4_pmi= [X86,INTEL]
+ Format: <bool>
Disable Intel PMU counter freezing feature.
The feature only exists starting from
Arch Perfmon v4 (Skylake and newer).
@@ -2095,6 +2099,9 @@
off
Disables hypervisor mitigations and doesn't
emit any warnings.
+ It also drops the swap size and available
+ RAM limit restriction on both hypervisor and
+ bare metal.
Default is 'flush'.
@@ -2826,7 +2833,7 @@
check bypass). With this option data leaks are possible
in the system.
- nospectre_v2 [X86] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
+ nospectre_v2 [X86,PPC_FSL_BOOK3E] Disable all mitigations for the Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch prediction) vulnerability. System may
allow data leaks with this option, which is equivalent
to spectre_v2=off.
@@ -3504,6 +3511,10 @@
before loading.
See Documentation/blockdev/ramdisk.txt.
+ psi= [KNL] Enable or disable pressure stall information
+ tracking.
+ Format: <bool>
+
psmouse.proto= [HW,MOUSE] Highest PS2 mouse protocol extension to
probe for; one of (bare|imps|exps|lifebook|any).
psmouse.rate= [HW,MOUSE] Set desired mouse report rate, in reports
@@ -3743,24 +3754,6 @@
in microseconds. The default of zero says
no holdoff.
- rcutorture.cbflood_inter_holdoff= [KNL]
- Set holdoff time (jiffies) between successive
- callback-flood tests.
-
- rcutorture.cbflood_intra_holdoff= [KNL]
- Set holdoff time (jiffies) between successive
- bursts of callbacks within a given callback-flood
- test.
-
- rcutorture.cbflood_n_burst= [KNL]
- Set the number of bursts making up a given
- callback-flood test. Set this to zero to
- disable callback-flood testing.
-
- rcutorture.cbflood_n_per_burst= [KNL]
- Set the number of callbacks to be registered
- in a given burst of a callback-flood test.
-
rcutorture.fqs_duration= [KNL]
Set duration of force_quiescent_state bursts
in microseconds.
@@ -3773,6 +3766,23 @@
Set wait time between force_quiescent_state bursts
in seconds.
+ rcutorture.fwd_progress= [KNL]
+ Enable RCU grace-period forward-progress testing
+ for the types of RCU supporting this notion.
+
+ rcutorture.fwd_progress_div= [KNL]
+ Specify the fraction of a CPU-stall-warning
+ period to do tight-loop forward-progress testing.
+
+ rcutorture.fwd_progress_holdoff= [KNL]
+ Number of seconds to wait between successive
+ forward-progress tests.
+
+ rcutorture.fwd_progress_need_resched= [KNL]
+ Enclose cond_resched() calls within checks for
+ need_resched() during tight-loop forward-progress
+ testing.
+
rcutorture.gp_cond= [KNL]
Use conditional/asynchronous update-side
primitives, if available.
@@ -4194,9 +4204,13 @@
spectre_v2= [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
(indirect branch speculation) vulnerability.
+ The default operation protects the kernel from
+ user space attacks.
- on - unconditionally enable
- off - unconditionally disable
+ on - unconditionally enable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=on
+ off - unconditionally disable, implies
+ spectre_v2_user=off
auto - kernel detects whether your CPU model is
vulnerable
@@ -4206,6 +4220,12 @@
CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
compiler with which the kernel was built.
+ Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
+ against user space to user space task attacks.
+
+ Selecting 'off' will disable both the kernel and
+ the user space protections.
+
Specific mitigations can also be selected manually:
retpoline - replace indirect branches
@@ -4215,6 +4235,48 @@
Not specifying this option is equivalent to
spectre_v2=auto.
+ spectre_v2_user=
+ [X86] Control mitigation of Spectre variant 2
+ (indirect branch speculation) vulnerability between
+ user space tasks
+
+ on - Unconditionally enable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=on
+
+ off - Unconditionally disable mitigations. Is
+ enforced by spectre_v2=off
+
+ prctl - Indirect branch speculation is enabled,
+ but mitigation can be enabled via prctl
+ per thread. The mitigation control state
+ is inherited on fork.
+
+ prctl,ibpb
+ - Like "prctl" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different user
+ space processes.
+
+ seccomp
+ - Same as "prctl" above, but all seccomp
+ threads will enable the mitigation unless
+ they explicitly opt out.
+
+ seccomp,ibpb
+ - Like "seccomp" above, but only STIBP is
+ controlled per thread. IBPB is issued
+ always when switching between different
+ user space processes.
+
+ auto - Kernel selects the mitigation depending on
+ the available CPU features and vulnerability.
+
+ Default mitigation:
+ If CONFIG_SECCOMP=y then "seccomp", otherwise "prctl"
+
+ Not specifying this option is equivalent to
+ spectre_v2_user=auto.
+
spec_store_bypass_disable=
[HW] Control Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) Disable mitigation
(Speculative Store Bypass vulnerability)