diff options
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c | 38 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c | 8 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/power/cpu.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 84 |
5 files changed, 112 insertions, 44 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h index b71f4f2ecdd5..b2da7cb64b31 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h @@ -305,6 +305,9 @@ #define X86_FEATURE_USE_IBPB_FW (11*32+16) /* "" Use IBPB during runtime firmware calls */ #define X86_FEATURE_RSB_VMEXIT_LITE (11*32+17) /* "" Fill RSB on VM exit when EIBRS is enabled */ + +#define X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL (11*32+20) /* "" MSR IA32_TSX_CTRL (Intel) implemented */ + /* Intel-defined CPU features, CPUID level 0x00000007:1 (EAX), word 12 */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX_VNNI (12*32+ 4) /* AVX VNNI instructions */ #define X86_FEATURE_AVX512_BF16 (12*32+ 5) /* AVX512 BFLOAT16 instructions */ diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c index ec7bbac3a9f2..8009c8346d8f 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/tsx.c @@ -58,24 +58,6 @@ static void tsx_enable(void) wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, tsx); } -static bool tsx_ctrl_is_supported(void) -{ - u64 ia32_cap = x86_read_arch_cap_msr(); - - /* - * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. However, support for this - * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. - * - * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a - * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES - * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get - * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus, - * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without - * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support. - */ - return !!(ia32_cap & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR); -} - static enum tsx_ctrl_states x86_get_tsx_auto_mode(void) { if (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA)) @@ -135,7 +117,7 @@ static void tsx_clear_cpuid(void) rdmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, msr); msr |= MSR_TFA_TSX_CPUID_CLEAR; wrmsrl(MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, msr); - } else if (tsx_ctrl_is_supported()) { + } else if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL)) { rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, msr); msr |= TSX_CTRL_CPUID_CLEAR; wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, msr); @@ -158,7 +140,8 @@ static void tsx_dev_mode_disable(void) u64 mcu_opt_ctrl; /* Check if RTM_ALLOW exists */ - if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) || !tsx_ctrl_is_supported() || + if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_TAA) || + !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL) || !cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL)) return; @@ -191,7 +174,20 @@ void __init tsx_init(void) return; } - if (!tsx_ctrl_is_supported()) { + /* + * TSX is controlled via MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL. However, support for this + * MSR is enumerated by ARCH_CAP_TSX_MSR bit in MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES. + * + * TSX control (aka MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL) is only available after a + * microcode update on CPUs that have their MSR_IA32_ARCH_CAPABILITIES + * bit MDS_NO=1. CPUs with MDS_NO=0 are not planned to get + * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support even after a microcode update. Thus, + * tsx= cmdline requests will do nothing on CPUs without + * MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL support. + */ + if (x86_read_arch_cap_msr() & ARCH_CAP_TSX_CTRL_MSR) { + setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL); + } else { tsx_ctrl_state = TSX_CTRL_NOT_SUPPORTED; return; } diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c index 78c5bc654cff..6453fbaedb08 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c @@ -217,9 +217,15 @@ __ioremap_caller(resource_size_t phys_addr, unsigned long size, * Mappings have to be page-aligned */ offset = phys_addr & ~PAGE_MASK; - phys_addr &= PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK; + phys_addr &= PAGE_MASK; size = PAGE_ALIGN(last_addr+1) - phys_addr; + /* + * Mask out any bits not part of the actual physical + * address, like memory encryption bits. + */ + phys_addr &= PHYSICAL_PAGE_MASK; + retval = memtype_reserve(phys_addr, (u64)phys_addr + size, pcm, &new_pcm); if (retval) { diff --git a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c index 4cd39f304e20..93ae33248f42 100644 --- a/arch/x86/power/cpu.c +++ b/arch/x86/power/cpu.c @@ -513,16 +513,23 @@ static int pm_cpu_check(const struct x86_cpu_id *c) static void pm_save_spec_msr(void) { - u32 spec_msr_id[] = { - MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, - MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, - MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, - MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, - MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, - MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, + struct msr_enumeration { + u32 msr_no; + u32 feature; + } msr_enum[] = { + { MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, X86_FEATURE_MSR_SPEC_CTRL }, + { MSR_IA32_TSX_CTRL, X86_FEATURE_MSR_TSX_CTRL }, + { MSR_TSX_FORCE_ABORT, X86_FEATURE_TSX_FORCE_ABORT }, + { MSR_IA32_MCU_OPT_CTRL, X86_FEATURE_SRBDS_CTRL }, + { MSR_AMD64_LS_CFG, X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD }, + { MSR_AMD64_DE_CFG, X86_FEATURE_LFENCE_RDTSC }, }; + int i; - msr_build_context(spec_msr_id, ARRAY_SIZE(spec_msr_id)); + for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(msr_enum); i++) { + if (boot_cpu_has(msr_enum[i].feature)) + msr_build_context(&msr_enum[i].msr_no, 1); + } } static int pm_check_save_msr(void) diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c index f422f9c58ba7..1ea6d2e5b218 100644 --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c @@ -67,8 +67,27 @@ static bool is_vmpck_empty(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) return true; } +/* + * If an error is received from the host or AMD Secure Processor (ASP) there + * are two options. Either retry the exact same encrypted request or discontinue + * using the VMPCK. + * + * This is because in the current encryption scheme GHCB v2 uses AES-GCM to + * encrypt the requests. The IV for this scheme is the sequence number. GCM + * cannot tolerate IV reuse. + * + * The ASP FW v1.51 only increments the sequence numbers on a successful + * guest<->ASP back and forth and only accepts messages at its exact sequence + * number. + * + * So if the sequence number were to be reused the encryption scheme is + * vulnerable. If the sequence number were incremented for a fresh IV the ASP + * will reject the request. + */ static void snp_disable_vmpck(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev) { + dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, "Disabling vmpck_id %d to prevent IV reuse.\n", + vmpck_id); memzero_explicit(snp_dev->vmpck, VMPCK_KEY_LEN); snp_dev->vmpck = NULL; } @@ -321,34 +340,71 @@ static int handle_guest_request(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, u64 exit_code, in if (rc) return rc; - /* Call firmware to process the request */ + /* + * Call firmware to process the request. In this function the encrypted + * message enters shared memory with the host. So after this call the + * sequence number must be incremented or the VMPCK must be deleted to + * prevent reuse of the IV. + */ rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err); + + /* + * If the extended guest request fails due to having too small of a + * certificate data buffer, retry the same guest request without the + * extended data request in order to increment the sequence number + * and thus avoid IV reuse. + */ + if (exit_code == SVM_VMGEXIT_EXT_GUEST_REQUEST && + err == SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN) { + const unsigned int certs_npages = snp_dev->input.data_npages; + + exit_code = SVM_VMGEXIT_GUEST_REQUEST; + + /* + * If this call to the firmware succeeds, the sequence number can + * be incremented allowing for continued use of the VMPCK. If + * there is an error reflected in the return value, this value + * is checked further down and the result will be the deletion + * of the VMPCK and the error code being propagated back to the + * user as an ioctl() return code. + */ + rc = snp_issue_guest_request(exit_code, &snp_dev->input, &err); + + /* + * Override the error to inform callers the given extended + * request buffer size was too small and give the caller the + * required buffer size. + */ + err = SNP_GUEST_REQ_INVALID_LEN; + snp_dev->input.data_npages = certs_npages; + } + if (fw_err) *fw_err = err; - if (rc) - return rc; + if (rc) { + dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, + "Detected error from ASP request. rc: %d, fw_err: %llu\n", + rc, *fw_err); + goto disable_vmpck; + } - /* - * The verify_and_dec_payload() will fail only if the hypervisor is - * actively modifying the message header or corrupting the encrypted payload. - * This hints that hypervisor is acting in a bad faith. Disable the VMPCK so that - * the key cannot be used for any communication. The key is disabled to ensure - * that AES-GCM does not use the same IV while encrypting the request payload. - */ rc = verify_and_dec_payload(snp_dev, resp_buf, resp_sz); if (rc) { dev_alert(snp_dev->dev, - "Detected unexpected decode failure, disabling the vmpck_id %d\n", - vmpck_id); - snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev); - return rc; + "Detected unexpected decode failure from ASP. rc: %d\n", + rc); + goto disable_vmpck; } /* Increment to new message sequence after payload decryption was successful. */ snp_inc_msg_seqno(snp_dev); return 0; + +disable_vmpck: + snp_disable_vmpck(snp_dev); + return rc; } static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_ioctl *arg) |