diff options
| author | Matthew Garrett <mjg59@srcf.ucam.org> | 2019-08-20 03:17:47 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | James Morris <jmorris@namei.org> | 2019-08-20 07:54:15 +0300 |
| commit | eb627e17727ebeede70697ae1798688b0d328b54 (patch) | |
| tree | 9551483d5fd043ebee8c15e1e580d7587aa070ee /security | |
| parent | 38bd94b8a1bd46e6d3d9718c7ff582e4c8ccb440 (diff) | |
| download | linux-eb627e17727ebeede70697ae1798688b0d328b54.tar.xz | |
PCI: Lock down BAR access when the kernel is locked down
Any hardware that can potentially generate DMA has to be locked down in
order to avoid it being possible for an attacker to modify kernel code,
allowing them to circumvent disabled module loading or module signing.
Default to paranoid - in future we can potentially relax this for
sufficiently IOMMU-isolated devices.
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Matthew Garrett <mjg59@google.com>
Acked-by: Bjorn Helgaas <bhelgaas@google.com>
Reviewed-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
cc: linux-pci@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
| -rw-r--r-- | security/lockdown/lockdown.c | 1 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c index 3462f7edcaac..410e90eda848 100644 --- a/security/lockdown/lockdown.c +++ b/security/lockdown/lockdown.c @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@ static char *lockdown_reasons[LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX+1] = { [LOCKDOWN_DEV_MEM] = "/dev/mem,kmem,port", [LOCKDOWN_KEXEC] = "kexec of unsigned images", [LOCKDOWN_HIBERNATION] = "hibernation", + [LOCKDOWN_PCI_ACCESS] = "direct PCI access", [LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX] = "integrity", [LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX] = "confidentiality", }; |