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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-11-02 07:06:18 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2021-11-02 07:06:18 +0300
commitcdab10bf3285ee354e8f50254aa799631b7a95e0 (patch)
treee0b622a649d301346132b4e5ae91966856449fad /security
parent6fedc28076bbbb32edb722e80f9406a3d1d668a8 (diff)
parent15bf32398ad488c0df1cbaf16431422c87e4feea (diff)
downloadlinux-cdab10bf3285ee354e8f50254aa799631b7a95e0.tar.xz
Merge tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux
Pull selinux updates from Paul Moore: - Add LSM/SELinux/Smack controls and auditing for io-uring. As usual, the individual commit descriptions have more detail, but we were basically missing two things which we're adding here: + establishment of a proper audit context so that auditing of io-uring ops works similarly to how it does for syscalls (with some io-uring additions because io-uring ops are *not* syscalls) + additional LSM hooks to enable access control points for some of the more unusual io-uring features, e.g. credential overrides. The additional audit callouts and LSM hooks were done in conjunction with the io-uring folks, based on conversations and RFC patches earlier in the year. - Fixup the binder credential handling so that the proper credentials are used in the LSM hooks; the commit description and the code comment which is removed in these patches are helpful to understand the background and why this is the proper fix. - Enable SELinux genfscon policy support for securityfs, allowing improved SELinux filesystem labeling for other subsystems which make use of securityfs, e.g. IMA. * tag 'selinux-pr-20211101' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/selinux: security: Return xattr name from security_dentry_init_security() selinux: fix a sock regression in selinux_ip_postroute_compat() binder: use cred instead of task for getsecid binder: use cred instead of task for selinux checks binder: use euid from cred instead of using task LSM: Avoid warnings about potentially unused hook variables selinux: fix all of the W=1 build warnings selinux: make better use of the nf_hook_state passed to the NF hooks selinux: fix race condition when computing ocontext SIDs selinux: remove unneeded ipv6 hook wrappers selinux: remove the SELinux lockdown implementation selinux: enable genfscon labeling for securityfs Smack: Brutalist io_uring support selinux: add support for the io_uring access controls lsm,io_uring: add LSM hooks to io_uring io_uring: convert io_uring to the secure anon inode interface fs: add anon_inode_getfile_secure() similar to anon_inode_getfd_secure() audit: add filtering for io_uring records audit,io_uring,io-wq: add some basic audit support to io_uring audit: prepare audit_context for use in calling contexts beyond syscalls
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/security.c35
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c13
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c239
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/classmap.h4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netlabel.c7
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/netport.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c1
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/mls.c4
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/ss/services.c176
-rw-r--r--security/smack/smack_lsm.c46
10 files changed, 272 insertions, 255 deletions
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 9ffa9e9c5c55..95e30fadba78 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -706,7 +706,7 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
#define LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) (NAME##_default)
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_void(DEFAULT, NAME)
#define DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_int(DEFAULT, NAME) \
- static const int LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
+ static const int __maybe_unused LSM_RET_DEFAULT(NAME) = (DEFAULT);
#define LSM_HOOK(RET, DEFAULT, NAME, ...) \
DECLARE_LSM_RET_DEFAULT_##RET(DEFAULT, NAME)
@@ -747,25 +747,25 @@ static int lsm_superblock_alloc(struct super_block *sb)
/* Security operations */
-int security_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+int security_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_set_context_mgr, 0, mgr);
}
-int security_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+int security_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_transaction, 0, from, to);
}
-int security_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+int security_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_binder, 0, from, to);
}
-int security_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to, struct file *file)
+int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to, struct file *file)
{
return call_int_hook(binder_transfer_file, 0, from, to, file);
}
@@ -1052,11 +1052,12 @@ void security_inode_free(struct inode *inode)
}
int security_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
- u32 *ctxlen)
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
+ u32 *ctxlen)
{
return call_int_hook(dentry_init_security, -EOPNOTSUPP, dentry, mode,
- name, ctx, ctxlen);
+ name, xattr_name, ctx, ctxlen);
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_dentry_init_security);
@@ -2625,3 +2626,15 @@ int security_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
return call_int_hook(perf_event_write, 0, event);
}
#endif /* CONFIG_PERF_EVENTS */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+int security_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_override_creds, 0, new);
+}
+
+int security_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ return call_int_hook(uring_sqpoll, 0);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 97f4c944a20f..abcd9740d10f 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -547,6 +547,7 @@ static inline struct avc_node *avc_search_node(struct selinux_avc *avc,
/**
* avc_lookup - Look up an AVC entry.
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -597,6 +598,7 @@ static int avc_latest_notif_update(struct selinux_avc *avc,
/**
* avc_insert - Insert an AVC entry.
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -825,9 +827,14 @@ out:
/**
* avc_update_node - Update an AVC entry
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @event : Updating event
* @perms : Permission mask bits
- * @ssid,@tsid,@tclass : identifier of an AVC entry
+ * @driver: xperm driver information
+ * @xperm: xperm permissions
+ * @ssid: AVC entry source sid
+ * @tsid: AVC entry target sid
+ * @tclass : AVC entry target object class
* @seqno : sequence number when decision was made
* @xpd: extended_perms_decision to be added to the node
* @flags: the AVC_* flags, e.g. AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS, or 0.
@@ -928,6 +935,7 @@ out:
/**
* avc_flush - Flush the cache
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
*/
static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
{
@@ -956,6 +964,7 @@ static void avc_flush(struct selinux_avc *avc)
/**
* avc_ss_reset - Flush the cache and revalidate migrated permissions.
+ * @avc: the access vector cache
* @seqno: policy sequence number
*/
int avc_ss_reset(struct selinux_avc *avc, u32 seqno)
@@ -1105,6 +1114,7 @@ decision:
/**
* avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.
+ * @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -1156,6 +1166,7 @@ inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(struct selinux_state *state,
/**
* avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.
+ * @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index e7ebd45ca345..ea7b2876a5ae 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -255,29 +255,6 @@ static inline u32 task_sid_obj(const struct task_struct *task)
return sid;
}
-/*
- * get the security ID of a task for use with binder
- */
-static inline u32 task_sid_binder(const struct task_struct *task)
-{
- /*
- * In many case where this function is used we should be using the
- * task's subjective SID, but we can't reliably access the subjective
- * creds of a task other than our own so we must use the objective
- * creds/SID, which are safe to access. The downside is that if a task
- * is temporarily overriding it's creds it will not be reflected here;
- * however, it isn't clear that binder would handle that case well
- * anyway.
- *
- * If this ever changes and we can safely reference the subjective
- * creds/SID of another task, this function will make it easier to
- * identify the various places where we make use of the task SIDs in
- * the binder code. It is also likely that we will need to adjust
- * the main drivers/android binder code as well.
- */
- return task_sid_obj(task);
-}
-
static int inode_doinit_with_dentry(struct inode *inode, struct dentry *opt_dentry);
/*
@@ -760,7 +737,8 @@ static int selinux_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "tracefs") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "binder") ||
!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "bpf") ||
- !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore"))
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "pstore") ||
+ !strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "securityfs"))
sbsec->flags |= SE_SBGENFS;
if (!strcmp(sb->s_type->name, "sysfs") ||
@@ -2066,18 +2044,19 @@ static inline u32 open_file_to_av(struct file *file)
/* Hook functions begin here. */
-static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(struct task_struct *mgr)
+static int selinux_binder_set_context_mgr(const struct cred *mgr)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- current_sid(), task_sid_binder(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
+ current_sid(), cred_sid(mgr), SECCLASS_BINDER,
BINDER__SET_CONTEXT_MGR, NULL);
}
-static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+static int selinux_binder_transaction(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
u32 mysid = current_sid();
- u32 fromsid = task_sid_binder(from);
+ u32 fromsid = cred_sid(from);
+ u32 tosid = cred_sid(to);
int rc;
if (mysid != fromsid) {
@@ -2088,24 +2067,24 @@ static int selinux_binder_transaction(struct task_struct *from,
return rc;
}
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, task_sid_binder(to),
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, fromsid, tosid,
SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__CALL, NULL);
}
-static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to)
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_binder(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to)
{
return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- task_sid_binder(from), task_sid_binder(to),
+ cred_sid(from), cred_sid(to),
SECCLASS_BINDER, BINDER__TRANSFER,
NULL);
}
-static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(struct task_struct *from,
- struct task_struct *to,
+static int selinux_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
+ const struct cred *to,
struct file *file)
{
- u32 sid = task_sid_binder(to);
+ u32 sid = cred_sid(to);
struct file_security_struct *fsec = selinux_file(file);
struct dentry *dentry = file->f_path.dentry;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
@@ -2948,7 +2927,8 @@ static void selinux_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
}
static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
- const struct qstr *name, void **ctx,
+ const struct qstr *name,
+ const char **xattr_name, void **ctx,
u32 *ctxlen)
{
u32 newsid;
@@ -2961,6 +2941,9 @@ static int selinux_dentry_init_security(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ if (xattr_name)
+ *xattr_name = XATTR_NAME_SELINUX;
+
return security_sid_to_context(&selinux_state, newsid, (char **)ctx,
ctxlen);
}
@@ -5688,40 +5671,41 @@ static int selinux_tun_dev_open(void *security)
#ifdef CONFIG_NETFILTER
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct net_device *indev,
- u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
- int err;
+ int ifindex;
+ u16 family;
char *addrp;
u32 peer_sid;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
- u8 secmark_active;
- u8 netlbl_active;
- u8 peerlbl_active;
+ int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
return NF_ACCEPT;
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
- netlbl_active = netlbl_enabled();
peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
if (!secmark_active && !peerlbl_active)
return NF_ACCEPT;
+ family = state->pf;
if (selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &peer_sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
+ ifindex = state->in->ifindex;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
- ad.u.net->netif = indev->ifindex;
+ ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
ad.u.net->family = family;
if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 1, NULL) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
if (peerlbl_active) {
- err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(dev_net(indev), indev->ifindex,
+ int err;
+
+ err = selinux_inet_sys_rcv_skb(state->net, ifindex,
addrp, family, peer_sid, &ad);
if (err) {
selinux_netlbl_err(skb, family, err, 1);
@@ -5735,7 +5719,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
SECCLASS_PACKET, PACKET__FORWARD_IN, &ad))
return NF_DROP;
- if (netlbl_active)
+ if (netlbl_enabled())
/* we do this in the FORWARD path and not the POST_ROUTING
* path because we want to make sure we apply the necessary
* labeling before IPsec is applied so we can leverage AH
@@ -5746,24 +5730,8 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_forward(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_forward(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET);
-}
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_forward(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_forward(skb, state->in, PF_INET6);
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
-
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
- u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(void *priv, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
struct sock *sk;
u32 sid;
@@ -5798,48 +5766,32 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_output(struct sk_buff *skb,
sid = sksec->sid;
} else
sid = SECINITSID_KERNEL;
- if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, family, sid) != 0)
+ if (selinux_netlbl_skbuff_setsid(skb, state->pf, sid) != 0)
return NF_DROP;
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_output(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET);
-}
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_output(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_output(skb, PF_INET6);
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
- int ifindex,
- u16 family)
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
- struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ struct sock *sk;
struct sk_security_struct *sksec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
- char *addrp;
u8 proto;
+ sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
if (sk == NULL)
return NF_ACCEPT;
sksec = sk->sk_security;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
- ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
- ad.u.net->family = family;
- if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, &addrp, 0, &proto))
+ ad.u.net->netif = state->out->ifindex;
+ ad.u.net->family = state->pf;
+ if (selinux_parse_skb(skb, &ad, NULL, 0, &proto))
return NF_DROP;
if (selinux_secmark_enabled())
@@ -5854,26 +5806,26 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute_compat(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct net_device *outdev,
- u16 family)
+static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
{
+ u16 family;
u32 secmark_perm;
u32 peer_sid;
- int ifindex = outdev->ifindex;
+ int ifindex;
struct sock *sk;
struct common_audit_data ad;
struct lsm_network_audit net = {0,};
char *addrp;
- u8 secmark_active;
- u8 peerlbl_active;
+ int secmark_active, peerlbl_active;
/* If any sort of compatibility mode is enabled then handoff processing
* to the selinux_ip_postroute_compat() function to deal with the
* special handling. We do this in an attempt to keep this function
* as fast and as clean as possible. */
if (!selinux_policycap_netpeer())
- return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, ifindex, family);
+ return selinux_ip_postroute_compat(skb, state);
secmark_active = selinux_secmark_enabled();
peerlbl_active = selinux_peerlbl_enabled();
@@ -5899,6 +5851,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
#endif
+ family = state->pf;
if (sk == NULL) {
/* Without an associated socket the packet is either coming
* from the kernel or it is being forwarded; check the packet
@@ -5959,6 +5912,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
secmark_perm = PACKET__SEND;
}
+ ifindex = state->out->ifindex;
ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET;
ad.u.net = &net;
ad.u.net->netif = ifindex;
@@ -5976,7 +5930,7 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
u32 if_sid;
u32 node_sid;
- if (sel_netif_sid(dev_net(outdev), ifindex, &if_sid))
+ if (sel_netif_sid(state->net, ifindex, &if_sid))
return NF_DROP;
if (avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
peer_sid, if_sid,
@@ -5993,23 +5947,6 @@ static unsigned int selinux_ip_postroute(struct sk_buff *skb,
return NF_ACCEPT;
}
-
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv4_postroute(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET);
-}
-
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
-static unsigned int selinux_ipv6_postroute(void *priv,
- struct sk_buff *skb,
- const struct nf_hook_state *state)
-{
- return selinux_ip_postroute(skb, state->out, PF_INET6);
-}
-#endif /* IPV6 */
-
#endif /* CONFIG_NETFILTER */
static int selinux_netlink_send(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
@@ -7013,34 +6950,6 @@ static void selinux_bpf_prog_free(struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)
}
#endif
-static int selinux_lockdown(enum lockdown_reason what)
-{
- struct common_audit_data ad;
- u32 sid = current_sid();
- int invalid_reason = (what <= LOCKDOWN_NONE) ||
- (what == LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX) ||
- (what >= LOCKDOWN_CONFIDENTIALITY_MAX);
-
- if (WARN(invalid_reason, "Invalid lockdown reason")) {
- audit_log(audit_context(),
- GFP_ATOMIC, AUDIT_SELINUX_ERR,
- "lockdown_reason=invalid");
- return -EINVAL;
- }
-
- ad.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_LOCKDOWN;
- ad.u.reason = what;
-
- if (what <= LOCKDOWN_INTEGRITY_MAX)
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
- LOCKDOWN__INTEGRITY, &ad);
- else
- return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state,
- sid, sid, SECCLASS_LOCKDOWN,
- LOCKDOWN__CONFIDENTIALITY, &ad);
-}
-
struct lsm_blob_sizes selinux_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_security_struct),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct file_security_struct),
@@ -7111,6 +7020,35 @@ static int selinux_perf_event_write(struct perf_event *event)
}
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_override_creds - check the requested cred override
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, current_sid(), cred_sid(new),
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__OVERRIDE_CREDS, NULL);
+}
+
+/**
+ * selinux_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int selinux_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ int sid = current_sid();
+
+ return avc_has_perm(&selinux_state, sid, sid,
+ SECCLASS_IO_URING, IO_URING__SQPOLL, NULL);
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7349,7 +7287,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(perf_event_write, selinux_perf_event_write),
#endif
- LSM_HOOK_INIT(locked_down, selinux_lockdown),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, selinux_uring_override_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, selinux_uring_sqpoll),
+#endif
/*
* PUT "CLONING" (ACCESSING + ALLOCATING) HOOKS HERE
@@ -7470,38 +7411,38 @@ DEFINE_LSM(selinux) = {
static const struct nf_hook_ops selinux_nf_ops[] = {
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv4_postroute,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv4_forward,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv4_output,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv6_postroute,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_postroute,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_POST_ROUTING,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_LAST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv6_forward,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_forward,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_FORWARD,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
},
{
- .hook = selinux_ipv6_output,
+ .hook = selinux_ip_output,
.pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
.hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
.priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
index 084757ff4390..35aac62a662e 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/classmap.h
@@ -250,10 +250,10 @@ struct security_class_mapping secclass_map[] = {
{ COMMON_SOCK_PERMS, NULL } },
{ "perf_event",
{ "open", "cpu", "kernel", "tracepoint", "read", "write", NULL } },
- { "lockdown",
- { "integrity", "confidentiality", NULL } },
{ "anon_inode",
{ COMMON_FILE_PERMS, NULL } },
+ { "io_uring",
+ { "override_creds", "sqpoll", NULL } },
{ NULL }
};
diff --git a/security/selinux/netlabel.c b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
index abaab7683840..29b88e81869b 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netlabel.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netlabel.c
@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sidlookup_cached - Cache a SID lookup
* @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
* @sid: the SID
*
@@ -128,6 +129,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_cache_invalidate(void)
/**
* selinux_netlbl_err - Handle a NetLabel packet error
* @skb: the packet
+ * @family: the packet's address family
* @error: the error code
* @gateway: true if host is acting as a gateway, false otherwise
*
@@ -160,7 +162,6 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sk_security_free(struct sk_security_struct *sksec)
/**
* selinux_netlbl_sk_security_reset - Reset the NetLabel fields
* @sksec: the sk_security_struct
- * @family: the socket family
*
* Description:
* Called when the NetLabel state of a sk_security_struct needs to be reset.
@@ -313,6 +314,7 @@ assoc_request_return:
/**
* selinux_netlbl_inet_conn_request - Label an incoming stream connection
* @req: incoming connection request socket
+ * @family: the request socket's address family
*
* Description:
* A new incoming connection request is represented by @req, we need to label
@@ -343,6 +345,7 @@ inet_conn_request_return:
/**
* selinux_netlbl_inet_csk_clone - Initialize the newly created sock
* @sk: the new sock
+ * @family: the sock's address family
*
* Description:
* A new connection has been established using @sk, we've already labeled the
@@ -378,7 +381,7 @@ void selinux_netlbl_sctp_sk_clone(struct sock *sk, struct sock *newsk)
/**
* selinux_netlbl_socket_post_create - Label a socket using NetLabel
- * @sock: the socket to label
+ * @sk: the sock to label
* @family: protocol family
*
* Description:
diff --git a/security/selinux/netport.c b/security/selinux/netport.c
index b8bc3897891d..9ba09d11c0f5 100644
--- a/security/selinux/netport.c
+++ b/security/selinux/netport.c
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static unsigned int sel_netport_hashfn(u16 pnum)
/**
* sel_netport_find - Search for a port record
* @protocol: protocol
- * @port: pnum
+ * @pnum: port
*
* Description:
* Search the network port table and return the matching record. If an entry
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
index b8f6b3e0a921..727c3b484bd3 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/hashtab.c
@@ -8,6 +8,7 @@
#include <linux/slab.h>
#include <linux/errno.h>
#include "hashtab.h"
+#include "security.h"
static struct kmem_cache *hashtab_node_cachep __ro_after_init;
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
index d338962fb0c4..3f5fd124342c 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/mls.c
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ int mls_compute_sid(struct policydb *p,
#ifdef CONFIG_NETLABEL
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_lvl - Export the MLS sensitivity levels to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
@@ -574,6 +575,7 @@ void mls_export_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_lvl - Import the NetLabel MLS sensitivity levels
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
@@ -595,6 +597,7 @@ void mls_import_netlbl_lvl(struct policydb *p,
/**
* mls_export_netlbl_cat - Export the MLS categories to NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
@@ -622,6 +625,7 @@ int mls_export_netlbl_cat(struct policydb *p,
/**
* mls_import_netlbl_cat - Import the MLS categories from NetLabel
+ * @p: the policy
* @context: the security context
* @secattr: the NetLabel security attributes
*
diff --git a/security/selinux/ss/services.c b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
index e5f1b2757a83..8e92af7dd284 100644
--- a/security/selinux/ss/services.c
+++ b/security/selinux/ss/services.c
@@ -1102,7 +1102,7 @@ allow:
* @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
- * @tclass: target security class
+ * @orig_tclass: target security class
* @avd: access vector decisions
* @xperms: extended permissions
*
@@ -1626,6 +1626,7 @@ int security_context_str_to_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
* @scontext_len: length in bytes
* @sid: security identifier, SID
* @def_sid: default SID to assign on error
+ * @gfp_flags: the allocator get-free-page (GFP) flags
*
* Obtains a SID associated with the security context that
* has the string representation specified by @scontext.
@@ -1919,6 +1920,7 @@ out:
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
+ * @qstr: object name
* @out_sid: security identifier for new subject/object
*
* Compute a SID to use for labeling a new subject or object in the
@@ -1947,6 +1949,7 @@ int security_transition_sid_user(struct selinux_state *state,
/**
* security_member_sid - Compute the SID for member selection.
+ * @state: SELinux state
* @ssid: source security identifier
* @tsid: target security identifier
* @tclass: target security class
@@ -2273,6 +2276,7 @@ void selinux_policy_commit(struct selinux_state *state,
* @state: SELinux state
* @data: binary policy data
* @len: length of data in bytes
+ * @load_state: policy load state
*
* Load a new set of security policy configuration data,
* validate it and convert the SID table as necessary.
@@ -2377,6 +2381,43 @@ err_policy:
}
/**
+ * ocontext_to_sid - Helper to safely get sid for an ocontext
+ * @sidtab: SID table
+ * @c: ocontext structure
+ * @index: index of the context entry (0 or 1)
+ * @out_sid: pointer to the resulting SID value
+ *
+ * For all ocontexts except OCON_ISID the SID fields are populated
+ * on-demand when needed. Since updating the SID value is an SMP-sensitive
+ * operation, this helper must be used to do that safely.
+ *
+ * WARNING: This function may return -ESTALE, indicating that the caller
+ * must retry the operation after re-acquiring the policy pointer!
+ */
+static int ocontext_to_sid(struct sidtab *sidtab, struct ocontext *c,
+ size_t index, u32 *out_sid)
+{
+ int rc;
+ u32 sid;
+
+ /* Ensure the associated sidtab entry is visible to this thread. */
+ sid = smp_load_acquire(&c->sid[index]);
+ if (!sid) {
+ rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[index], &sid);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Ensure the new sidtab entry is visible to other threads
+ * when they see the SID.
+ */
+ smp_store_release(&c->sid[index], sid);
+ }
+ *out_sid = sid;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
* security_port_sid - Obtain the SID for a port.
* @state: SELinux state
* @protocol: protocol number
@@ -2414,17 +2455,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_PORT;
}
@@ -2473,18 +2510,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -2497,7 +2529,7 @@ out:
* security_ib_endport_sid - Obtain the SID for a subnet management interface.
* @state: SELinux state
* @dev_name: device name
- * @port: port number
+ * @port_num: port number
* @out_sid: security identifier
*/
int security_ib_endport_sid(struct selinux_state *state,
@@ -2533,17 +2565,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*out_sid = SECINITSID_UNLABELED;
@@ -2587,25 +2615,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0] || !c->sid[1]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[1],
- &c->sid[1]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, if_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *if_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else
*if_sid = SECINITSID_NETIF;
@@ -2697,18 +2713,13 @@ retry:
}
if (c) {
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab,
- &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, out_sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- *out_sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
*out_sid = SECINITSID_NODE;
}
@@ -2849,9 +2860,10 @@ out_unlock:
/**
* __security_genfs_sid - Helper to obtain a SID for a file in a filesystem
+ * @policy: policy
* @fstype: filesystem type
* @path: path from root of mount
- * @sclass: file security class
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
* @sid: SID for path
*
* Obtain a SID to use for a file in a filesystem that
@@ -2873,7 +2885,7 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
u16 sclass;
struct genfs *genfs;
struct ocontext *c;
- int rc, cmp = 0;
+ int cmp = 0;
while (path[0] == '/' && path[1] == '/')
path++;
@@ -2887,9 +2899,8 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
break;
}
- rc = -ENOENT;
if (!genfs || cmp)
- goto out;
+ return -ENOENT;
for (c = genfs->head; c; c = c->next) {
len = strlen(c->u.name);
@@ -2898,20 +2909,10 @@ static inline int __security_genfs_sid(struct selinux_policy *policy,
break;
}
- rc = -ENOENT;
if (!c)
- goto out;
-
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0], &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc)
- goto out;
- }
+ return -ENOENT;
- *sid = c->sid[0];
- rc = 0;
-out:
- return rc;
+ return ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, sid);
}
/**
@@ -2919,7 +2920,7 @@ out:
* @state: SELinux state
* @fstype: filesystem type
* @path: path from root of mount
- * @sclass: file security class
+ * @orig_sclass: file security class
* @sid: SID for path
*
* Acquire policy_rwlock before calling __security_genfs_sid() and release
@@ -2996,17 +2997,13 @@ retry:
if (c) {
sbsec->behavior = c->v.behavior;
- if (!c->sid[0]) {
- rc = sidtab_context_to_sid(sidtab, &c->context[0],
- &c->sid[0]);
- if (rc == -ESTALE) {
- rcu_read_unlock();
- goto retry;
- }
- if (rc)
- goto out;
+ rc = ocontext_to_sid(sidtab, c, 0, &sbsec->sid);
+ if (rc == -ESTALE) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ goto retry;
}
- sbsec->sid = c->sid[0];
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
} else {
rc = __security_genfs_sid(policy, fstype, "/",
SECCLASS_DIR, &sbsec->sid);
@@ -3305,6 +3302,7 @@ out_unlock:
* @nlbl_sid: NetLabel SID
* @nlbl_type: NetLabel labeling protocol type
* @xfrm_sid: XFRM SID
+ * @peer_sid: network peer sid
*
* Description:
* Compare the @nlbl_sid and @xfrm_sid values and if the two SIDs can be
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index 0622e67c73e9..efd35b07c7f8 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -4700,6 +4700,48 @@ static int smack_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
return 0;
}
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+/**
+ * smack_uring_override_creds - Is io_uring cred override allowed?
+ * @new: the target creds
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to override it's credentials
+ * to service an io_uring operation.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_override_creds(const struct cred *new)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
+ struct task_smack *nsp = smack_cred(new);
+
+ /*
+ * Allow the degenerate case where the new Smack value is
+ * the same as the current Smack value.
+ */
+ if (tsp->smk_task == nsp->smk_task)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, current_cred()))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_uring_sqpoll - check if a io_uring polling thread can be created
+ *
+ * Check to see if the current task is allowed to create a new io_uring
+ * kernel polling thread.
+ */
+static int smack_uring_sqpoll(void)
+{
+ if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_ADMIN, current_cred()))
+ return 0;
+
+ return -EPERM;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+
struct lsm_blob_sizes smack_blob_sizes __lsm_ro_after_init = {
.lbs_cred = sizeof(struct task_smack),
.lbs_file = sizeof(struct smack_known *),
@@ -4852,6 +4894,10 @@ static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up, smack_inode_copy_up),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_copy_up_xattr, smack_inode_copy_up_xattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(dentry_create_files_as, smack_dentry_create_files_as),
+#ifdef CONFIG_IO_URING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_override_creds, smack_uring_override_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(uring_sqpoll, smack_uring_sqpoll),
+#endif
};