diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-25 23:29:51 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-25 23:29:51 +0300 |
commit | e80bc229691a4f601a2476e07cbdf08a289a2ad6 (patch) | |
tree | cb00f0bf7888470004fa18bfcff803da31a2a01e /security/smack/smack_lsm.c | |
parent | 52ff0779d6cfcce24c0204c22b0b4899dc55449d (diff) | |
parent | f0f9756b7260f4e78a2e4e412a55167178721ca2 (diff) | |
download | linux-e80bc229691a4f601a2476e07cbdf08a289a2ad6.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull smack updates from James Morris:
"From Casey: three patches for Smack for 4.20. Two clean up warnings
and one is a rarely encountered ptrace capability check"
* 'next-smack' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
Smack: Mark expected switch fall-through
Smack: ptrace capability use fixes
Smack: remove set but not used variable 'root_inode'
Diffstat (limited to 'security/smack/smack_lsm.c')
-rw-r--r-- | security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 11 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c index 934dabe150fa..81fb4c1631e9 100644 --- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c +++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c @@ -421,6 +421,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL; struct task_smack *tsp; struct smack_known *tracer_known; + const struct cred *tracercred; if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) { smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); @@ -429,7 +430,8 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, } rcu_read_lock(); - tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security; + tracercred = __task_cred(tracer); + tsp = tracercred->security; tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp); if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) && @@ -439,7 +441,7 @@ static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer, rc = 0; else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN) rc = -EACCES; - else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + else if (smack_privileged_cred(CAP_SYS_PTRACE, tracercred)) rc = 0; else rc = -EACCES; @@ -1841,6 +1843,7 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, { struct smack_known *skp; struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security); + const struct cred *tcred; struct file *file; int rc; struct smk_audit_info ad; @@ -1854,8 +1857,12 @@ static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk, skp = file->f_security; rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, NULL); rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_DELIVER, rc); - if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) + + rcu_read_lock(); + tcred = __task_cred(tsk); + if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged_cred(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE, tcred)) rc = 0; + rcu_read_unlock(); smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK); smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk); @@ -3467,7 +3474,7 @@ static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode) */ final = &smack_known_star; /* - * No break. + * Fall through. * * If a smack value has been set we want to use it, * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity |