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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-02-27 08:16:07 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2013-02-27 08:16:07 +0400
commitd895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b (patch)
tree895dc9157e28f603d937a58be664e4e440d5530c /security/selinux
parent9626357371b519f2b955fef399647181034a77fe (diff)
parentd3d009cb965eae7e002ea5badf603ea8f4c34915 (diff)
downloadlinux-d895cb1af15c04c522a25c79cc429076987c089b.tar.xz
Merge branch 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs
Pull vfs pile (part one) from Al Viro: "Assorted stuff - cleaning namei.c up a bit, fixing ->d_name/->d_parent locking violations, etc. The most visible changes here are death of FS_REVAL_DOT (replaced with "has ->d_weak_revalidate()") and a new helper getting from struct file to inode. Some bits of preparation to xattr method interface changes. Misc patches by various people sent this cycle *and* ocfs2 fixes from several cycles ago that should've been upstream right then. PS: the next vfs pile will be xattr stuff." * 'for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/viro/vfs: (46 commits) saner proc_get_inode() calling conventions proc: avoid extra pde_put() in proc_fill_super() fs: change return values from -EACCES to -EPERM fs/exec.c: make bprm_mm_init() static ocfs2/dlm: use GFP_ATOMIC inside a spin_lock ocfs2: fix possible use-after-free with AIO ocfs2: Fix oops in ocfs2_fast_symlink_readpage() code path get_empty_filp()/alloc_file() leave both ->f_pos and ->f_version zero target: writev() on single-element vector is pointless export kernel_write(), convert open-coded instances fs: encode_fh: return FILEID_INVALID if invalid fid_type kill f_vfsmnt vfs: kill FS_REVAL_DOT by adding a d_weak_revalidate dentry op nfsd: handle vfs_getattr errors in acl protocol switch vfs_getattr() to struct path default SET_PERSONALITY() in linux/elf.h ceph: prepopulate inodes only when request is aborted d_hash_and_lookup(): export, switch open-coded instances 9p: switch v9fs_set_create_acl() to inode+fid, do it before d_instantiate() 9p: split dropping the acls from v9fs_set_create_acl() ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c10
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/selinuxfs.c20
2 files changed, 13 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index ef26e9611ffb..84b591711eec 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -1528,7 +1528,7 @@ static int file_has_perm(const struct cred *cred,
u32 av)
{
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
- struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct common_audit_data ad;
u32 sid = cred_sid(cred);
int rc;
@@ -1957,7 +1957,7 @@ static int selinux_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
struct task_security_struct *new_tsec;
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
struct common_audit_data ad;
- struct inode *inode = bprm->file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
int rc;
rc = cap_bprm_set_creds(bprm);
@@ -2929,7 +2929,7 @@ static void selinux_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
const struct cred *cred = current_cred();
- struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
/* file_mask_to_av won't add FILE__WRITE if MAY_APPEND is set */
if ((file->f_flags & O_APPEND) && (mask & MAY_WRITE))
@@ -2941,7 +2941,7 @@ static int selinux_revalidate_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
static int selinux_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
{
- struct inode *inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
struct file_security_struct *fsec = file->f_security;
struct inode_security_struct *isec = inode->i_security;
u32 sid = current_sid();
@@ -3218,7 +3218,7 @@ static int selinux_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
struct inode_security_struct *isec;
fsec = file->f_security;
- isec = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_security;
+ isec = file_inode(file)->i_security;
/*
* Save inode label and policy sequence number
* at open-time so that selinux_file_permission
diff --git a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
index 3a6e8731646c..ff427733c290 100644
--- a/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
+++ b/security/selinux/selinuxfs.c
@@ -202,7 +202,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_handle_unknown(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
{
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
- ino_t ino = filp->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ ino_t ino = file_inode(filp)->i_ino;
int handle_unknown = (ino == SEL_REJECT_UNKNOWN) ?
security_get_reject_unknown() : !security_get_allow_unknown();
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static ssize_t (*write_op[])(struct file *, char *, size_t) = {
static ssize_t selinux_transaction_write(struct file *file, const char __user *buf, size_t size, loff_t *pos)
{
- ino_t ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ ino_t ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
char *data;
ssize_t rv;
@@ -1042,8 +1042,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_bool(struct file *filep, char __user *buf,
ssize_t length;
ssize_t ret;
int cur_enforcing;
- struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+ unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
@@ -1077,8 +1076,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_write_bool(struct file *filep, const char __user *buf,
char *page = NULL;
ssize_t length;
int new_value;
- struct inode *inode = filep->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- unsigned index = inode->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
+ unsigned index = file_inode(filep)->i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK;
const char *name = filep->f_path.dentry->d_name.name;
mutex_lock(&sel_mutex);
@@ -1486,13 +1484,11 @@ static int sel_make_avc_files(struct dentry *dir)
static ssize_t sel_read_initcon(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- struct inode *inode;
char *con;
u32 sid, len;
ssize_t ret;
- inode = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode;
- sid = inode->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
+ sid = file_inode(file)->i_ino&SEL_INO_MASK;
ret = security_sid_to_context(sid, &con, &len);
if (ret)
return ret;
@@ -1553,7 +1549,7 @@ static inline u32 sel_ino_to_perm(unsigned long ino)
static ssize_t sel_read_class(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
char res[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_class(ino));
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
@@ -1567,7 +1563,7 @@ static const struct file_operations sel_class_ops = {
static ssize_t sel_read_perm(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
{
- unsigned long ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ unsigned long ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
char res[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t len = snprintf(res, sizeof(res), "%d", sel_ino_to_perm(ino));
return simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, res, len);
@@ -1584,7 +1580,7 @@ static ssize_t sel_read_policycap(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
int value;
char tmpbuf[TMPBUFLEN];
ssize_t length;
- unsigned long i_ino = file->f_path.dentry->d_inode->i_ino;
+ unsigned long i_ino = file_inode(file)->i_ino;
value = security_policycap_supported(i_ino & SEL_INO_MASK);
length = scnprintf(tmpbuf, TMPBUFLEN, "%d", value);