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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-22 06:44:37 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-03-22 06:44:37 +0300 |
commit | 7f313ff0acdecf0926ab127533a2a93948a2f547 (patch) | |
tree | a82dc675035d735820656c7fa21ed409b257bd4b /security/integrity | |
parent | 2c5a5358feff2c1e035a67a9b352c4358e669e5b (diff) | |
parent | 4a48b4c428dc92b5e0b19de83e7eb8d530dddd48 (diff) | |
download | linux-7f313ff0acdecf0926ab127533a2a93948a2f547.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity
Pull integrity subsystem updates from Mimi Zohar:
"Except for extending the 'encrypted' key type to support user provided
data, the rest is code cleanup, __setup() usage bug fix, and a trivial
change"
* tag 'integrity-v5.18' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/zohar/linux-integrity:
MAINTAINERS: add missing security/integrity/platform_certs
EVM: fix the evm= __setup handler return value
KEYS: encrypted: Instantiate key with user-provided decrypted data
ima: define ima_max_digest_data struct without a flexible array variable
ima: rename IMA_ACTION_FLAGS to IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS
ima: Return error code obtained from securityfs functions
MAINTAINERS: add missing "security/integrity" directory
ima: Fix trivial typos in the comments
Diffstat (limited to 'security/integrity')
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c | 12 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c | 31 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c | 5 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c | 9 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c | 7 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/integrity/integrity.h | 14 |
8 files changed, 49 insertions, 35 deletions
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c index 08f907382c61..7d87772f0ce6 100644 --- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c @@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ static int __init evm_set_fixmode(char *str) else pr_err("invalid \"%s\" mode", str); - return 0; + return 1; } __setup("evm=", evm_set_fixmode); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c index a64fb0130b01..c6805af46211 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_api.c @@ -217,14 +217,11 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, const char *audit_cause = "failed"; struct inode *inode = file_inode(file); const char *filename = file->f_path.dentry->d_name.name; + struct ima_max_digest_data hash; int result = 0; int length; void *tmpbuf; u64 i_version; - struct { - struct ima_digest_data hdr; - char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - } hash; /* * Always collect the modsig, because IMA might have already collected @@ -238,9 +235,10 @@ int ima_collect_measurement(struct integrity_iint_cache *iint, goto out; /* - * Dectecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems - * which do not support i_version, support is limited to an initial - * measurement/appraisal/audit. + * Detecting file change is based on i_version. On filesystems + * which do not support i_version, support was originally limited + * to an initial measurement/appraisal/audit, but was modified to + * assume the file changed. */ i_version = inode_query_iversion(inode); hash.hdr.algo = algo; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c index 3ad8f7734208..cd1683dad3bf 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_fs.c @@ -452,47 +452,61 @@ static const struct file_operations ima_measure_policy_ops = { int __init ima_fs_init(void) { + int ret; + ima_dir = securityfs_create_dir("ima", integrity_dir); if (IS_ERR(ima_dir)) - return -1; + return PTR_ERR(ima_dir); ima_symlink = securityfs_create_symlink("ima", NULL, "integrity/ima", NULL); - if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink)) + if (IS_ERR(ima_symlink)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ima_symlink); goto out; + } binary_runtime_measurements = securityfs_create_file("binary_runtime_measurements", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measurements_ops); - if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) + if (IS_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(binary_runtime_measurements); goto out; + } ascii_runtime_measurements = securityfs_create_file("ascii_runtime_measurements", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_ascii_measurements_ops); - if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) + if (IS_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ascii_runtime_measurements); goto out; + } runtime_measurements_count = securityfs_create_file("runtime_measurements_count", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measurements_count_ops); - if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) + if (IS_ERR(runtime_measurements_count)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(runtime_measurements_count); goto out; + } violations = securityfs_create_file("violations", S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_htable_violations_ops); - if (IS_ERR(violations)) + if (IS_ERR(violations)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(violations); goto out; + } ima_policy = securityfs_create_file("policy", POLICY_FILE_FLAGS, ima_dir, NULL, &ima_measure_policy_ops); - if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) + if (IS_ERR(ima_policy)) { + ret = PTR_ERR(ima_policy); goto out; + } return 0; out: @@ -503,5 +517,6 @@ out: securityfs_remove(binary_runtime_measurements); securityfs_remove(ima_symlink); securityfs_remove(ima_dir); - return -1; + + return ret; } diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c index b26fa67476b4..63979aefc95f 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_init.c @@ -47,12 +47,9 @@ static int __init ima_add_boot_aggregate(void) struct integrity_iint_cache tmp_iint, *iint = &tmp_iint; struct ima_event_data event_data = { .iint = iint, .filename = boot_aggregate_name }; + struct ima_max_digest_data hash; int result = -ENOMEM; int violation = 0; - struct { - struct ima_digest_data hdr; - char digest[TPM_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - } hash; memset(iint, 0, sizeof(*iint)); memset(&hash, 0, sizeof(hash)); diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c index 8c6e4514d494..c6412dec3810 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_main.c @@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static int process_measurement(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred, /* reset appraisal flags if ima_inode_post_setattr was called */ iint->flags &= ~(IMA_APPRAISE | IMA_APPRAISED | IMA_APPRAISE_SUBMASK | IMA_APPRAISED_SUBMASK | - IMA_ACTION_FLAGS); + IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS); /* * Re-evaulate the file if either the xattr has changed or the @@ -764,7 +764,7 @@ int ima_post_read_file(struct file *file, void *buf, loff_t size, * call to ima_post_load_data(). * * Callers of this LSM hook can not measure, appraise, or audit the - * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requring a file + * data provided by userspace. Enforce policy rules requiring a file * signature (eg. kexec'ed kernel image). * * For permission return 0, otherwise return -EACCES. @@ -874,10 +874,7 @@ int process_buffer_measurement(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, .buf = buf, .buf_len = size}; struct ima_template_desc *template; - struct { - struct ima_digest_data hdr; - char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - } hash = {}; + struct ima_max_digest_data hash; char digest_hash[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; int digest_hash_len = hash_digest_size[ima_hash_algo]; int violation = 0; diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c index 99d23ac4c35d..eea6e92500b8 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_policy.c @@ -428,7 +428,7 @@ static int ima_lsm_update_rule(struct ima_rule_entry *entry) /* * ima_lsm_copy_rule() shallow copied all references, except for the * LSM references, from entry to nentry so we only want to free the LSM - * references and the entry itself. All other memory refrences will now + * references and the entry itself. All other memory references will now * be owned by nentry. */ ima_lsm_free_rule(entry); @@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ int ima_match_policy(struct user_namespace *mnt_userns, struct inode *inode, func, mask, func_data)) continue; - action |= entry->flags & IMA_ACTION_FLAGS; + action |= entry->flags & IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS; action |= entry->action & IMA_DO_MASK; if (entry->action & IMA_APPRAISE) { diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c index ca017cae73eb..7155d17a3b75 100644 --- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c +++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_template_lib.c @@ -272,7 +272,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, * digest formats: * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST: digest * - DATA_FMT_DIGEST_WITH_ALGO: [<hash algo>] + ':' + '\0' + digest, - * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algoritm is not + * where <hash algo> is provided if the hash algorithm is not * SHA1 or MD5 */ u8 buffer[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME + 2 + IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE] = { 0 }; @@ -307,10 +307,7 @@ static int ima_eventdigest_init_common(const u8 *digest, u32 digestsize, int ima_eventdigest_init(struct ima_event_data *event_data, struct ima_field_data *field_data) { - struct { - struct ima_digest_data hdr; - char digest[IMA_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE]; - } hash; + struct ima_max_digest_data hash; u8 *cur_digest = NULL; u32 cur_digestsize = 0; struct inode *inode; diff --git a/security/integrity/integrity.h b/security/integrity/integrity.h index 2e214c761158..3510e413ea17 100644 --- a/security/integrity/integrity.h +++ b/security/integrity/integrity.h @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/integrity.h> #include <crypto/sha1.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> #include <linux/key.h> #include <linux/audit.h> @@ -30,8 +31,8 @@ #define IMA_HASH 0x00000100 #define IMA_HASHED 0x00000200 -/* iint cache flags */ -#define IMA_ACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 +/* iint policy rule cache flags */ +#define IMA_NONACTION_FLAGS 0xff000000 #define IMA_DIGSIG_REQUIRED 0x01000000 #define IMA_PERMIT_DIRECTIO 0x02000000 #define IMA_NEW_FILE 0x04000000 @@ -111,6 +112,15 @@ struct ima_digest_data { } __packed; /* + * Instead of wrapping the ima_digest_data struct inside a local structure + * with the maximum hash size, define ima_max_digest_data struct. + */ +struct ima_max_digest_data { + struct ima_digest_data hdr; + u8 digest[HASH_MAX_DIGESTSIZE]; +} __packed; + +/* * signature format v2 - for using with asymmetric keys */ struct signature_v2_hdr { |