diff options
author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-15 22:44:02 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-07-15 22:44:02 +0300 |
commit | 52f6c588c77b76d548201470c2a28263a41b462b (patch) | |
tree | cbb4207714e82f10932a546469bfb3db84051c33 /net | |
parent | 78dcf73421a879d22319d3889119945b85954a68 (diff) | |
parent | 72e5c740f6335e27253b8ff64d23d00337091535 (diff) | |
download | linux-52f6c588c77b76d548201470c2a28263a41b462b.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull random updates from Ted Ts'o:
"Add wait_for_random_bytes() and get_random_*_wait() functions so that
callers can more safely get random bytes if they can block until the
CRNG is initialized.
Also print a warning if get_random_*() is called before the CRNG is
initialized. By default, only one single-line warning will be printed
per boot. If CONFIG_WARN_ALL_UNSEEDED_RANDOM is defined, then a
warning will be printed for each function which tries to get random
bytes before the CRNG is initialized. This can get spammy for certain
architecture types, so it is not enabled by default"
* tag 'random_for_linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: reorder READ_ONCE() in get_random_uXX
random: suppress spammy warnings about unseeded randomness
random: warn when kernel uses unseeded randomness
net/route: use get_random_int for random counter
net/neighbor: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit hash random
rhashtable: use get_random_u32 for hash_rnd
ceph: ensure RNG is seeded before using
iscsi: ensure RNG is seeded before use
cifs: use get_random_u32 for 32-bit lock random
random: add get_random_{bytes,u32,u64,int,long,once}_wait family
random: add wait_for_random_bytes() API
Diffstat (limited to 'net')
-rw-r--r-- | net/ceph/ceph_common.c | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/core/neighbour.c | 3 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | net/ipv4/route.c | 3 |
3 files changed, 7 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c index 3d265c5cb6d0..5c036d2f401e 100644 --- a/net/ceph/ceph_common.c +++ b/net/ceph/ceph_common.c @@ -599,7 +599,11 @@ struct ceph_client *ceph_create_client(struct ceph_options *opt, void *private) { struct ceph_client *client; struct ceph_entity_addr *myaddr = NULL; - int err = -ENOMEM; + int err; + + err = wait_for_random_bytes(); + if (err < 0) + return ERR_PTR(err); client = kzalloc(sizeof(*client), GFP_KERNEL); if (client == NULL) diff --git a/net/core/neighbour.c b/net/core/neighbour.c index e31fc11a8000..d0713627deb6 100644 --- a/net/core/neighbour.c +++ b/net/core/neighbour.c @@ -347,8 +347,7 @@ out_entries: static void neigh_get_hash_rnd(u32 *x) { - get_random_bytes(x, sizeof(*x)); - *x |= 1; + *x = get_random_u32() | 1; } static struct neigh_hash_table *neigh_hash_alloc(unsigned int shift) diff --git a/net/ipv4/route.c b/net/ipv4/route.c index c816cd53f7fc..0383e66f59bc 100644 --- a/net/ipv4/route.c +++ b/net/ipv4/route.c @@ -2979,8 +2979,7 @@ static __net_init int rt_genid_init(struct net *net) { atomic_set(&net->ipv4.rt_genid, 0); atomic_set(&net->fnhe_genid, 0); - get_random_bytes(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid, - sizeof(net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid)); + atomic_set(&net->ipv4.dev_addr_genid, get_random_int()); return 0; } |