diff options
| author | Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com> | 2016-06-29 20:55:06 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com> | 2016-07-11 22:50:43 +0300 |
| commit | 65b80179f9b8171b74625febf3457f41e792fa23 (patch) | |
| tree | 91ed3dcb91c5bab4967ddfdf85132bb7b579a700 /net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | |
| parent | 64695bde6c289a62250eb0a078916703c8cf639a (diff) | |
| download | linux-65b80179f9b8171b74625febf3457f41e792fa23.tar.xz | |
xprtrdma: No direct data placement with krb5i and krb5p
Direct data placement is not allowed when using flavors that
guarantee integrity or privacy. When such security flavors are in
effect, don't allow the use of Read and Write chunks for moving
individual data items. All messages larger than the inline threshold
are sent via Long Call or Long Reply.
On my systems (CX-3 Pro on FDR), for small I/O operations, the use
of Long messages adds only around 5 usecs of latency in each
direction.
Note that when integrity or encryption is used, the host CPU touches
every byte in these messages. Even if it could be used, data
movement offload doesn't buy much in this case.
Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever <chuck.lever@oracle.com>
Tested-by: Steve Wise <swise@opengridcomputing.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <Anna.Schumaker@Netapp.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c index e64ae93d5b4f..bca3537efffd 100644 --- a/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c +++ b/net/sunrpc/auth_gss/auth_gss.c @@ -1017,6 +1017,8 @@ gss_create_new(struct rpc_auth_create_args *args, struct rpc_clnt *clnt) auth->au_rslack = GSS_VERF_SLACK >> 2; auth->au_ops = &authgss_ops; auth->au_flavor = flavor; + if (gss_pseudoflavor_to_datatouch(gss_auth->mech, flavor)) + auth->au_flags |= RPCAUTH_AUTH_DATATOUCH; atomic_set(&auth->au_count, 1); kref_init(&gss_auth->kref); |