Merge git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next

Pull networking updates from David Miller:
 "Most notable changes in here:

   1) By far the biggest accomplishment, thanks to a large range of
      contributors, is the addition of multi-send for transmit.  This is
      the result of discussions back in Chicago, and the hard work of
      several individuals.

      Now, when the ->ndo_start_xmit() method of a driver sees
      skb->xmit_more as true, it can choose to defer the doorbell
      telling the driver to start processing the new TX queue entires.

      skb->xmit_more means that the generic networking is guaranteed to
      call the driver immediately with another SKB to send.

      There is logic added to the qdisc layer to dequeue multiple
      packets at a time, and the handling mis-predicted offloads in
      software is now done with no locks held.

      Finally, pktgen is extended to have a "burst" parameter that can
      be used to test a multi-send implementation.

      Several drivers have xmit_more support: i40e, igb, ixgbe, mlx4,
      virtio_net

      Adding support is almost trivial, so export more drivers to
      support this optimization soon.

      I want to thank, in no particular or implied order, Jesper
      Dangaard Brouer, Eric Dumazet, Alexander Duyck, Tom Herbert, Jamal
      Hadi Salim, John Fastabend, Florian Westphal, Daniel Borkmann,
      David Tat, Hannes Frederic Sowa, and Rusty Russell.

   2) PTP and timestamping support in bnx2x, from Michal Kalderon.

   3) Allow adjusting the rx_copybreak threshold for a driver via
      ethtool, and add rx_copybreak support to enic driver.  From
      Govindarajulu Varadarajan.

   4) Significant enhancements to the generic PHY layer and the bcm7xxx
      driver in particular (EEE support, auto power down, etc.) from
      Florian Fainelli.

   5) Allow raw buffers to be used for flow dissection, allowing drivers
      to determine the optimal "linear pull" size for devices that DMA
      into pools of pages.  The objective is to get exactly the
      necessary amount of headers into the linear SKB area pre-pulled,
      but no more.  The new interface drivers use is eth_get_headlen().
      From WANG Cong, with driver conversions (several had their own
      by-hand duplicated implementations) by Alexander Duyck and Eric
      Dumazet.

   6) Support checksumming more smoothly and efficiently for
      encapsulations, and add "foo over UDP" facility.  From Tom
      Herbert.

   7) Add Broadcom SF2 switch driver to DSA layer, from Florian
      Fainelli.

   8) eBPF now can load programs via a system call and has an extensive
      testsuite.  Alexei Starovoitov and Daniel Borkmann.

   9) Major overhaul of the packet scheduler to use RCU in several major
      areas such as the classifiers and rate estimators.  From John
      Fastabend.

  10) Add driver for Intel FM10000 Ethernet Switch, from Alexander
      Duyck.

  11) Rearrange TCP_SKB_CB() to reduce cache line misses, from Eric
      Dumazet.

  12) Add Datacenter TCP congestion control algorithm support, From
      Florian Westphal.

  13) Reorganize sk_buff so that __copy_skb_header() is significantly
      faster.  From Eric Dumazet"

* git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/davem/net-next: (1558 commits)
  netlabel: directly return netlbl_unlabel_genl_init()
  net: add netdev_txq_bql_{enqueue, complete}_prefetchw() helpers
  net: description of dma_cookie cause make xmldocs warning
  cxgb4: clean up a type issue
  cxgb4: potential shift wrapping bug
  i40e: skb->xmit_more support
  net: fs_enet: Add NAPI TX
  net: fs_enet: Remove non NAPI RX
  r8169:add support for RTL8168EP
  net_sched: copy exts->type in tcf_exts_change()
  wimax: convert printk to pr_foo()
  af_unix: remove 0 assignment on static
  ipv6: Do not warn for informational ICMP messages, regardless of type.
  Update Intel Ethernet Driver maintainers list
  bridge: Save frag_max_size between PRE_ROUTING and POST_ROUTING
  tipc: fix bug in multicast congestion handling
  net: better IFF_XMIT_DST_RELEASE support
  net/mlx4_en: remove NETDEV_TX_BUSY
  3c59x: fix bad split of cpu_to_le32(pci_map_single())
  net: bcmgenet: fix Tx ring priority programming
  ...

1 files changed, 598 insertions, 305 deletions

diff --git a/net/bluetooth/smp.c b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
index fd3294300803..f09b6b65cf6b 100644
--- a/net/bluetooth/smp.c
+++ b/net/bluetooth/smp.c
@@ -31,9 +31,12 @@
 
 #include "smp.h"
 
+#define SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, code)	set_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd)
+
 #define SMP_TIMEOUT	msecs_to_jiffies(30000)
 
 #define AUTH_REQ_MASK   0x07
+#define KEY_DIST_MASK	0x07
 
 enum {
 	SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID,
@@ -44,7 +47,10 @@ enum {
 };
 
 struct smp_chan {
-	struct l2cap_conn *conn;
+	struct l2cap_conn	*conn;
+	struct delayed_work	security_timer;
+	unsigned long           allow_cmd; /* Bitmask of allowed commands */
+
 	u8		preq[7]; /* SMP Pairing Request */
 	u8		prsp[7]; /* SMP Pairing Response */
 	u8		prnd[16]; /* SMP Pairing Random (local) */
@@ -139,12 +145,18 @@ static int smp_ah(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], u8 r[3], u8 res[3])
 	return 0;
 }
 
-bool smp_irk_matches(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16],
-		     bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
+bool smp_irk_matches(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *bdaddr)
 {
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
 	u8 hash[3];
 	int err;
 
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return false;
+
+	tfm = chan->data;
+
 	BT_DBG("RPA %pMR IRK %*phN", bdaddr, 16, irk);
 
 	err = smp_ah(tfm, irk, &bdaddr->b[3], hash);
@@ -154,10 +166,17 @@ bool smp_irk_matches(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16],
 	return !memcmp(bdaddr->b, hash, 3);
 }
 
-int smp_generate_rpa(struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
+int smp_generate_rpa(struct hci_dev *hdev, u8 irk[16], bdaddr_t *rpa)
 {
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm;
 	int err;
 
+	if (!chan || !chan->data)
+		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+	tfm = chan->data;
+
 	get_random_bytes(&rpa->b[3], 3);
 
 	rpa->b[5] &= 0x3f;	/* Clear two most significant bits */
@@ -235,47 +254,38 @@ static int smp_s1(struct smp_chan *smp, u8 k[16], u8 r1[16], u8 r2[16],
 	return err;
 }
 
-static struct sk_buff *smp_build_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code,
-				     u16 dlen, void *data)
+static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
 {
-	struct sk_buff *skb;
-	struct l2cap_hdr *lh;
-	int len;
-
-	len = L2CAP_HDR_SIZE + sizeof(code) + dlen;
-
-	if (len > conn->mtu)
-		return NULL;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	struct kvec iv[2];
+	struct msghdr msg;
 
-	skb = bt_skb_alloc(len, GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!skb)
-		return NULL;
+	if (!chan)
+		return;
 
-	lh = (struct l2cap_hdr *) skb_put(skb, L2CAP_HDR_SIZE);
-	lh->len = cpu_to_le16(sizeof(code) + dlen);
-	lh->cid = cpu_to_le16(L2CAP_CID_SMP);
+	BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
 
-	memcpy(skb_put(skb, sizeof(code)), &code, sizeof(code));
+	iv[0].iov_base = &code;
+	iv[0].iov_len = 1;
 
-	memcpy(skb_put(skb, dlen), data, dlen);
+	iv[1].iov_base = data;
+	iv[1].iov_len = len;
 
-	return skb;
-}
+	memset(&msg, 0, sizeof(msg));
 
-static void smp_send_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 code, u16 len, void *data)
-{
-	struct sk_buff *skb = smp_build_cmd(conn, code, len, data);
+	msg.msg_iov = (struct iovec *) &iv;
+	msg.msg_iovlen = 2;
 
-	BT_DBG("code 0x%2.2x", code);
+	l2cap_chan_send(chan, &msg, 1 + len);
 
-	if (!skb)
+	if (!chan->data)
 		return;
 
-	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
-	hci_send_acl(conn->hchan, skb, 0);
+	smp = chan->data;
 
-	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
-	schedule_delayed_work(&conn->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+	schedule_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer, SMP_TIMEOUT);
 }
 
 static __u8 authreq_to_seclevel(__u8 authreq)
@@ -302,7 +312,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 			      struct smp_cmd_pairing *req,
 			      struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp, __u8 authreq)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
 	u8 local_dist = 0, remote_dist = 0;
@@ -345,7 +356,8 @@ static void build_pairing_cmd(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 
 static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
 	if ((max_key_size > SMP_MAX_ENC_KEY_SIZE) ||
 	    (max_key_size < SMP_MIN_ENC_KEY_SIZE))
@@ -356,21 +368,60 @@ static u8 check_enc_key_size(struct l2cap_conn *conn, __u8 max_key_size)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	bool complete;
+
+	BUG_ON(!smp);
+
+	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+
+	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+	mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
+
+	kfree(smp->csrk);
+	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+
+	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+
+	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
+	if (!complete) {
+		if (smp->ltk) {
+			list_del(&smp->ltk->list);
+			kfree(smp->ltk);
+		}
+
+		if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+			list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
+			kfree(smp->slave_ltk);
+		}
+
+		if (smp->remote_irk) {
+			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+		}
+	}
+
+	chan->data = NULL;
+	kfree(smp);
+	hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
+}
+
 static void smp_failure(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 reason)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 
 	if (reason)
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL, sizeof(reason),
 			     &reason);
 
 	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags);
-	mgmt_auth_failed(hcon->hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->type, hcon->dst_type,
-			 HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
-
-	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
+	mgmt_auth_failed(hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 
-	if (test_and_clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+	if (chan->data)
 		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
 }
 
@@ -405,7 +456,8 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 						u8 local_io, u8 remote_io)
 {
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	u8 method;
 	u32 passkey = 0;
 	int ret = 0;
@@ -442,8 +494,11 @@ static int tk_request(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 remote_oob, u8 auth,
 	}
 
 	/* Not Just Works/Confirm results in MITM Authentication */
-	if (method != JUST_CFM)
+	if (method != JUST_CFM) {
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_MITM_AUTH, &smp->flags);
+		if (hcon->pending_sec_level < BT_SECURITY_HIGH)
+			hcon->pending_sec_level = BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+	}
 
 	/* If both devices have Keyoard-Display I/O, the master
 	 * Confirms and the slave Enters the passkey.
@@ -503,6 +558,11 @@ static u8 smp_confirm(struct smp_chan *smp)
 
 	smp_send_cmd(smp->conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM, sizeof(cp), &cp);
 
+	if (conn->hcon->out)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
+	else
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -574,82 +634,262 @@ static u8 smp_random(struct smp_chan *smp)
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+	bool persistent;
 
-	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
-	if (!smp) {
-		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
-		return NULL;
+	if (smp->remote_irk) {
+		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
+		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
+		 * identity address track the connection based on it
+		 * from now on.
+		 */
+		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
+		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
+		queue_work(hdev->workqueue, &conn->id_addr_update_work);
+
+		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
+		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
+		 * private address, just remove the key so that
+		 * it is possible to use the controller white
+		 * list for scanning.
+		 *
+		 * Userspace will have been told to not store
+		 * this key at this point. So it is safe to
+		 * just remove it.
+		 */
+		if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
+			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
+			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+			smp->remote_irk = NULL;
+		}
 	}
 
-	smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
-	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
-		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
-		kfree(smp);
-		clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags);
-		return NULL;
+	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
+	 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
+	 */
+	persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+
+	if (smp->csrk) {
+		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
 	}
 
-	smp->conn = conn;
-	conn->smp_chan = smp;
+	if (smp->slave_csrk) {
+		smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
+	}
 
-	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
+	if (smp->ltk) {
+		smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
+	}
 
-	return smp;
+	if (smp->slave_ltk) {
+		smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
+		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
+		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
+	}
 }
 
-void smp_chan_destroy(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+static void smp_allow_key_dist(struct smp_chan *smp)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	bool complete;
+	/* Allow the first expected phase 3 PDU. The rest of the PDUs
+	 * will be allowed in each PDU handler to ensure we receive
+	 * them in the correct order.
+	 */
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO);
+	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+}
 
-	BUG_ON(!smp);
+static void smp_distribute_keys(struct smp_chan *smp)
+{
+	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
+	__u8 *keydist;
 
-	complete = test_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
-	mgmt_smp_complete(conn->hcon, complete);
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
-	kfree(smp->csrk);
-	kfree(smp->slave_csrk);
+	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
 
-	crypto_free_blkcipher(smp->tfm_aes);
+	/* The responder sends its keys first */
+	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK)) {
+		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+		return;
+	}
 
-	/* If pairing failed clean up any keys we might have */
-	if (!complete) {
-		if (smp->ltk) {
-			list_del(&smp->ltk->list);
-			kfree(smp->ltk);
-		}
+	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
 
-		if (smp->slave_ltk) {
-			list_del(&smp->slave_ltk->list);
-			kfree(smp->slave_ltk);
-		}
+	if (hcon->out) {
+		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
+		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
+	} else {
+		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
+		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+	}
 
-		if (smp->remote_irk) {
-			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
-			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
+	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
+		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
+		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
+		struct smp_ltk *ltk;
+		u8 authenticated;
+		__le16 ediv;
+		__le64 rand;
+
+		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
+		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
+		get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+
+		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
+		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
+				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
+				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
+		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+
+		ident.ediv = ediv;
+		ident.rand = rand;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
+		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
+		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+
+		memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+
+		/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
+		 * after the connection has been established.
+		 *
+		 * This is true even when the connection has been
+		 * established using a resolvable random address.
+		 */
+		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
+		addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
+			     &addrinfo);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
+	}
+
+	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
+		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
+		struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+
+		/* Generate a new random key */
+		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+
+		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
+		if (csrk) {
+			csrk->master = 0x00;
+			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
 		}
+		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+
+		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+
+		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 	}
 
-	kfree(smp);
-	conn->smp_chan = NULL;
-	hci_conn_drop(conn->hcon);
+	/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK) {
+		smp_allow_key_dist(smp);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
+	smp_notify_keys(conn);
+
+	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+}
+
+static void smp_timeout(struct work_struct *work)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = container_of(work, struct smp_chan,
+					    security_timer.work);
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = smp->conn;
+
+	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+
+	hci_disconnect(conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_REMOTE_USER_TERM);
+}
+
+static struct smp_chan *smp_chan_create(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
+
+	smp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smp), GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!smp)
+		return NULL;
+
+	smp->tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(smp->tfm_aes)) {
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create ECB crypto context");
+		kfree(smp);
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
+	smp->conn = conn;
+	chan->data = smp;
+
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL);
+
+	INIT_DELAYED_WORK(&smp->security_timer, smp_timeout);
+
+	hci_conn_hold(conn->hcon);
+
+	return smp;
 }
 
 int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u32 value;
+	int err;
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 
-	if (!conn || !test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
+	if (!conn)
+		return -ENOTCONN;
+
+	chan = conn->smp;
+	if (!chan)
 		return -ENOTCONN;
 
-	smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+	if (!chan->data) {
+		err = -ENOTCONN;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
+
+	smp = chan->data;
 
 	switch (mgmt_op) {
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_REPLY:
@@ -664,12 +904,16 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_PASSKEY_NEG_REPLY:
 	case MGMT_OP_USER_CONFIRM_NEG_REPLY:
 		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
-		return 0;
+		err = 0;
+		goto unlock;
 	default:
 		smp_failure(conn, SMP_PASSKEY_ENTRY_FAILED);
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+		goto unlock;
 	}
 
+	err = 0;
+
 	/* If it is our turn to send Pairing Confirm, do so now */
 	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags)) {
 		u8 rsp = smp_confirm(smp);
@@ -677,12 +921,15 @@ int smp_user_confirm_reply(struct hci_conn *hcon, u16 mgmt_op, __le32 passkey)
 			smp_failure(conn, rsp);
 	}
 
-	return 0;
+unlock:
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+	return err;
 }
 
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing rsp, *req = (void *) skb->data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	u8 key_size, auth, sec_level;
@@ -696,26 +943,30 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (conn->hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_SLAVE)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	if (!test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &conn->hcon->flags))
+	if (!chan->data)
 		smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
 	else
-		smp = conn->smp_chan;
+		smp = chan->data;
 
 	if (!smp)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
+	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
+	auth = req->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hdev->dev_flags) &&
-	    (req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
 		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
 	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], req, sizeof(*req));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*req));
 
-	/* We didn't start the pairing, so match remote */
-	auth = req->auth_req;
+	if (conn->hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
 
-	sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
 	if (sec_level > conn->hcon->pending_sec_level)
 		conn->hcon->pending_sec_level = sec_level;
 
@@ -741,6 +992,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(&smp->prsp[1], &rsp, sizeof(rsp));
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP, sizeof(rsp), &rsp);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_CONFIRM);
 
 	/* Request setup of TK */
 	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, rsp.io_capability, req->io_capability);
@@ -753,8 +1005,9 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	u8 key_size, auth = SMP_AUTH_NONE;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	u8 key_size, auth;
 	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
@@ -773,6 +1026,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (check_enc_key_size(conn, key_size))
 		return SMP_ENC_KEY_SIZE;
 
+	auth = rsp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
 	/* If we need MITM check that it can be acheived */
 	if (conn->hcon->pending_sec_level >= BT_SECURITY_HIGH) {
 		u8 method;
@@ -793,11 +1048,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	 */
 	smp->remote_key_dist &= rsp->resp_key_dist;
 
-	if ((req->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING) &&
-	    (rsp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
-		auth = SMP_AUTH_BONDING;
-
-	auth |= (req->auth_req | rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_MITM;
+	auth |= req->auth_req;
 
 	ret = tk_request(conn, 0, auth, req->io_capability, rsp->io_capability);
 	if (ret)
@@ -814,7 +1065,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_rsp(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p %s", conn, conn->hcon->out ? "master" : "slave");
 
@@ -824,10 +1076,14 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	memcpy(smp->pcnf, skb->data, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(smp->pcnf));
 
-	if (conn->hcon->out)
+	if (conn->hcon->out) {
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM, sizeof(smp->prnd),
 			     smp->prnd);
-	else if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RANDOM);
+		return 0;
+	}
+
+	if (test_bit(SMP_FLAG_TK_VALID, &smp->flags))
 		return smp_confirm(smp);
 	else
 		set_bit(SMP_FLAG_CFM_PENDING, &smp->flags);
@@ -837,7 +1093,8 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_confirm(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 static u8 smp_cmd_pairing_random(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -860,7 +1117,7 @@ static bool smp_ltk_encrypt(struct l2cap_conn *conn, u8 sec_level)
 	if (!key)
 		return false;
 
-	if (sec_level > BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM && !key->authenticated)
+	if (smp_ltk_sec_level(key) < sec_level)
 		return false;
 
 	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT_PEND, &hcon->flags))
@@ -903,7 +1160,7 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	struct smp_cmd_pairing cp;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
-	u8 sec_level;
+	u8 sec_level, auth;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
@@ -913,7 +1170,13 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (hcon->role != HCI_ROLE_MASTER)
 		return SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
 
-	sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(rp->auth_req);
+	auth = rp->auth_req & AUTH_REQ_MASK;
+
+	if (hcon->io_capability == HCI_IO_NO_INPUT_OUTPUT)
+		sec_level = BT_SECURITY_MEDIUM;
+	else
+		sec_level = authreq_to_seclevel(auth);
+
 	if (smp_sufficient_security(hcon, sec_level))
 		return 0;
 
@@ -923,26 +1186,24 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
 		return 0;
 
-	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
-		return 0;
-
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
 	if (!smp)
 		return SMP_UNSPECIFIED;
 
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_BONDABLE, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags) &&
-	    (rp->auth_req & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
+	    (auth & SMP_AUTH_BONDING))
 		return SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
 	memset(&cp, 0, sizeof(cp));
-	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, rp->auth_req);
+	build_pairing_cmd(conn, &cp, NULL, auth);
 
 	smp->preq[0] = SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ;
 	memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
 	smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
 
 	return 0;
 }
@@ -950,8 +1211,10 @@ static u8 smp_cmd_security_req(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 {
 	struct l2cap_conn *conn = hcon->l2cap_data;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	__u8 authreq;
+	int ret;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p hcon %p level 0x%2.2x", conn, hcon, sec_level);
 
@@ -959,6 +1222,8 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 	if (!conn)
 		return 1;
 
+	chan = conn->smp;
+
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags))
 		return 1;
 
@@ -972,12 +1237,19 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 		if (smp_ltk_encrypt(conn, hcon->pending_sec_level))
 			return 0;
 
-	if (test_and_set_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
-		return 0;
+	l2cap_chan_lock(chan);
+
+	/* If SMP is already in progress ignore this request */
+	if (chan->data) {
+		ret = 0;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
 
 	smp = smp_chan_create(conn);
-	if (!smp)
-		return 1;
+	if (!smp) {
+		ret = 1;
+		goto unlock;
+	}
 
 	authreq = seclevel_to_authreq(sec_level);
 
@@ -996,30 +1268,34 @@ int smp_conn_security(struct hci_conn *hcon, __u8 sec_level)
 		memcpy(&smp->preq[1], &cp, sizeof(cp));
 
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_RSP);
 	} else {
 		struct smp_cmd_security_req cp;
 		cp.auth_req = authreq;
 		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ, sizeof(cp), &cp);
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ);
 	}
 
 	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_INITIATOR, &smp->flags);
+	ret = 0;
 
-	return 0;
+unlock:
+	l2cap_chan_unlock(chan);
+	return ret;
 }
 
 static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
 	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
-		return 0;
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT);
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
@@ -1031,7 +1307,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_encrypt_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_master_ident *rp = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	struct smp_ltk *ltk;
@@ -1042,13 +1319,14 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY))
-		return 0;
-
 	/* Mark the information as received */
 	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
 
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO);
+	else if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*rp));
 
 	hci_dev_lock(hdev);
@@ -1057,8 +1335,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 			  authenticated, smp->tk, smp->enc_key_size,
 			  rp->ediv, rp->rand);
 	smp->ltk = ltk;
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
-		smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
 	return 0;
@@ -1067,16 +1345,15 @@ static int smp_cmd_master_ident(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 static int smp_cmd_ident_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_ident_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
 	BT_DBG("");
 
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
-		return 0;
+	SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO);
 
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
 
@@ -1089,7 +1366,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 				   struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info *info = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 	bdaddr_t rpa;
 
@@ -1098,13 +1376,12 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*info))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY))
-		return 0;
-
 	/* Mark the information as received */
 	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
 
+	if (smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN)
+		SMP_ALLOW_CMD(smp, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO);
+
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(*info));
 
 	hci_dev_lock(hcon->hdev);
@@ -1133,7 +1410,8 @@ static int smp_cmd_ident_addr_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn,
 				      smp->id_addr_type, smp->irk, &rpa);
 
 distribute:
-	smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & KEY_DIST_MASK))
+		smp_distribute_keys(smp);
 
 	hci_dev_unlock(hcon->hdev);
 
@@ -1143,7 +1421,8 @@ distribute:
 static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
 	struct smp_cmd_sign_info *rp = (void *) skb->data;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = conn->smp;
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 	struct hci_dev *hdev = conn->hcon->hdev;
 	struct smp_csrk *csrk;
 
@@ -1152,10 +1431,6 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	if (skb->len < sizeof(*rp))
 		return SMP_INVALID_PARAMS;
 
-	/* Ignore this PDU if it wasn't requested */
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN))
-		return 0;
-
 	/* Mark the information as received */
 	smp->remote_key_dist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
 
@@ -1168,16 +1443,17 @@ static int smp_cmd_sign_info(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		memcpy(csrk->val, rp->csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
 	}
 	smp->csrk = csrk;
-	if (!(smp->remote_key_dist & SMP_DIST_SIGN))
-		smp_distribute_keys(conn);
+	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
 	hci_dev_unlock(hdev);
 
 	return 0;
 }
 
-int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
+static int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
+	struct smp_chan *smp;
 	__u8 code, reason;
 	int err = 0;
 
@@ -1186,13 +1462,10 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 		return 0;
 	}
 
-	if (skb->len < 1) {
-		kfree_skb(skb);
+	if (skb->len < 1)
 		return -EILSEQ;
-	}
 
 	if (!test_bit(HCI_LE_ENABLED, &hcon->hdev->dev_flags)) {
-		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		reason = SMP_PAIRING_NOTSUPP;
 		goto done;
 	}
@@ -1200,18 +1473,19 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 	code = skb->data[0];
 	skb_pull(skb, sizeof(code));
 
-	/*
-	 * The SMP context must be initialized for all other PDUs except
-	 * pairing and security requests. If we get any other PDU when
-	 * not initialized simply disconnect (done if this function
-	 * returns an error).
+	smp = chan->data;
+
+	if (code > SMP_CMD_MAX)
+		goto drop;
+
+	if (smp && !test_and_clear_bit(code, &smp->allow_cmd))
+		goto drop;
+
+	/* If we don't have a context the only allowed commands are
+	 * pairing request and security request.
 	 */
-	if (code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ &&
-	    !conn->smp_chan) {
-		BT_ERR("Unexpected SMP command 0x%02x. Disconnecting.", code);
-		kfree_skb(skb);
-		return -EOPNOTSUPP;
-	}
+	if (!smp && code != SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ && code != SMP_CMD_SECURITY_REQ)
+		goto drop;
 
 	switch (code) {
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_REQ:
@@ -1220,7 +1494,6 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	case SMP_CMD_PAIRING_FAIL:
 		smp_failure(conn, 0);
-		reason = 0;
 		err = -EPERM;
 		break;
 
@@ -1262,197 +1535,217 @@ int smp_sig_channel(struct l2cap_conn *conn, struct sk_buff *skb)
 
 	default:
 		BT_DBG("Unknown command code 0x%2.2x", code);
-
 		reason = SMP_CMD_NOTSUPP;
-		err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
 		goto done;
 	}
 
 done:
-	if (reason)
-		smp_failure(conn, reason);
+	if (!err) {
+		if (reason)
+			smp_failure(conn, reason);
+		kfree_skb(skb);
+	}
 
-	kfree_skb(skb);
 	return err;
+
+drop:
+	BT_ERR("%s unexpected SMP command 0x%02x from %pMR", hcon->hdev->name,
+	       code, &hcon->dst);
+	kfree_skb(skb);
+	return 0;
 }
 
-static void smp_notify_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+static void smp_teardown_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, int err)
 {
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing *rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
-	bool persistent;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 
-	if (smp->remote_irk) {
-		mgmt_new_irk(hdev, smp->remote_irk);
-		/* Now that user space can be considered to know the
-		 * identity address track the connection based on it
-		 * from now on.
-		 */
-		bacpy(&hcon->dst, &smp->remote_irk->bdaddr);
-		hcon->dst_type = smp->remote_irk->addr_type;
-		l2cap_conn_update_id_addr(hcon);
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-		/* When receiving an indentity resolving key for
-		 * a remote device that does not use a resolvable
-		 * private address, just remove the key so that
-		 * it is possible to use the controller white
-		 * list for scanning.
-		 *
-		 * Userspace will have been told to not store
-		 * this key at this point. So it is safe to
-		 * just remove it.
-		 */
-		if (!bacmp(&smp->remote_irk->rpa, BDADDR_ANY)) {
-			list_del(&smp->remote_irk->list);
-			kfree(smp->remote_irk);
-			smp->remote_irk = NULL;
-		}
-	}
+	if (chan->data)
+		smp_chan_destroy(conn);
 
-	/* The LTKs and CSRKs should be persistent only if both sides
-	 * had the bonding bit set in their authentication requests.
-	 */
-	persistent = !!((req->auth_req & rsp->auth_req) & SMP_AUTH_BONDING);
+	conn->smp = NULL;
+	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}
 
-	if (smp->csrk) {
-		smp->csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
-		bacpy(&smp->csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
-		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->csrk, persistent);
-	}
+static void smp_resume_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
+{
+	struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
+	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
 
-	if (smp->slave_csrk) {
-		smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
-		bacpy(&smp->slave_csrk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
-		mgmt_new_csrk(hdev, smp->slave_csrk, persistent);
-	}
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-	if (smp->ltk) {
-		smp->ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
-		bacpy(&smp->ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
-		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->ltk, persistent);
-	}
+	if (!smp)
+		return;
 
-	if (smp->slave_ltk) {
-		smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr_type = hcon->dst_type;
-		bacpy(&smp->slave_ltk->bdaddr, &hcon->dst);
-		mgmt_new_ltk(hdev, smp->slave_ltk, persistent);
-	}
+	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_ENCRYPT, &hcon->flags))
+		return;
+
+	cancel_delayed_work(&smp->security_timer);
+
+	smp_distribute_keys(smp);
 }
 
-int smp_distribute_keys(struct l2cap_conn *conn)
+static void smp_ready_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan)
 {
-	struct smp_cmd_pairing *req, *rsp;
-	struct smp_chan *smp = conn->smp_chan;
-	struct hci_conn *hcon = conn->hcon;
-	struct hci_dev *hdev = hcon->hdev;
-	__u8 *keydist;
+	struct l2cap_conn *conn = chan->conn;
 
-	BT_DBG("conn %p", conn);
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-	if (!test_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags))
-		return 0;
+	conn->smp = chan;
+	l2cap_chan_hold(chan);
+}
 
-	rsp = (void *) &smp->prsp[1];
+static int smp_recv_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+	int err;
 
-	/* The responder sends its keys first */
-	if (hcon->out && (smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
-		return 0;
+	BT_DBG("chan %p", chan);
 
-	req = (void *) &smp->preq[1];
+	err = smp_sig_channel(chan, skb);
+	if (err) {
+		struct smp_chan *smp = chan->data;
 
-	if (hcon->out) {
-		keydist = &rsp->init_key_dist;
-		*keydist &= req->init_key_dist;
-	} else {
-		keydist = &rsp->resp_key_dist;
-		*keydist &= req->resp_key_dist;
+		if (smp)
+			cancel_delayed_work_sync(&smp->security_timer);
+
+		hci_disconnect(chan->conn->hcon, HCI_ERROR_AUTH_FAILURE);
 	}
 
-	BT_DBG("keydist 0x%x", *keydist);
+	return err;
+}
 
-	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY) {
-		struct smp_cmd_encrypt_info enc;
-		struct smp_cmd_master_ident ident;
-		struct smp_ltk *ltk;
-		u8 authenticated;
-		__le16 ediv;
-		__le64 rand;
+static struct sk_buff *smp_alloc_skb_cb(struct l2cap_chan *chan,
+					unsigned long hdr_len,
+					unsigned long len, int nb)
+{
+	struct sk_buff *skb;
 
-		get_random_bytes(enc.ltk, sizeof(enc.ltk));
-		get_random_bytes(&ediv, sizeof(ediv));
-		get_random_bytes(&rand, sizeof(rand));
+	skb = bt_skb_alloc(hdr_len + len, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!skb)
+		return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_ENCRYPT_INFO, sizeof(enc), &enc);
+	skb->priority = HCI_PRIO_MAX;
+	bt_cb(skb)->chan = chan;
 
-		authenticated = hcon->sec_level == BT_SECURITY_HIGH;
-		ltk = hci_add_ltk(hdev, &hcon->dst, hcon->dst_type,
-				  SMP_LTK_SLAVE, authenticated, enc.ltk,
-				  smp->enc_key_size, ediv, rand);
-		smp->slave_ltk = ltk;
+	return skb;
+}
 
-		ident.ediv = ediv;
-		ident.rand = rand;
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_chan_ops = {
+	.name			= "Security Manager",
+	.ready			= smp_ready_cb,
+	.recv			= smp_recv_cb,
+	.alloc_skb		= smp_alloc_skb_cb,
+	.teardown		= smp_teardown_cb,
+	.resume			= smp_resume_cb,
+
+	.new_connection		= l2cap_chan_no_new_connection,
+	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,
+	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
+};
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_MASTER_IDENT, sizeof(ident), &ident);
+static inline struct l2cap_chan *smp_new_conn_cb(struct l2cap_chan *pchan)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
 
-		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ENC_KEY;
-	}
+	BT_DBG("pchan %p", pchan);
 
-	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_ID_KEY) {
-		struct smp_cmd_ident_addr_info addrinfo;
-		struct smp_cmd_ident_info idinfo;
+	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+	if (!chan)
+		return NULL;
 
-		memcpy(idinfo.irk, hdev->irk, sizeof(idinfo.irk));
+	chan->chan_type	= pchan->chan_type;
+	chan->ops	= &smp_chan_ops;
+	chan->scid	= pchan->scid;
+	chan->dcid	= chan->scid;
+	chan->imtu	= pchan->imtu;
+	chan->omtu	= pchan->omtu;
+	chan->mode	= pchan->mode;
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_INFO, sizeof(idinfo), &idinfo);
+	BT_DBG("created chan %p", chan);
 
-		/* The hci_conn contains the local identity address
-		 * after the connection has been established.
-		 *
-		 * This is true even when the connection has been
-		 * established using a resolvable random address.
-		 */
-		bacpy(&addrinfo.bdaddr, &hcon->src);
-		addrinfo.addr_type = hcon->src_type;
+	return chan;
+}
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_IDENT_ADDR_INFO, sizeof(addrinfo),
-			     &addrinfo);
+static const struct l2cap_ops smp_root_chan_ops = {
+	.name			= "Security Manager Root",
+	.new_connection		= smp_new_conn_cb,
+
+	/* None of these are implemented for the root channel */
+	.close			= l2cap_chan_no_close,
+	.alloc_skb		= l2cap_chan_no_alloc_skb,
+	.recv			= l2cap_chan_no_recv,
+	.state_change		= l2cap_chan_no_state_change,
+	.teardown		= l2cap_chan_no_teardown,
+	.ready			= l2cap_chan_no_ready,
+	.defer			= l2cap_chan_no_defer,
+	.suspend		= l2cap_chan_no_suspend,
+	.resume			= l2cap_chan_no_resume,
+	.set_shutdown		= l2cap_chan_no_set_shutdown,
+	.get_sndtimeo		= l2cap_chan_no_get_sndtimeo,
+	.memcpy_fromiovec	= l2cap_chan_no_memcpy_fromiovec,
+};
 
-		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_ID_KEY;
-	}
+int smp_register(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher	*tfm_aes;
 
-	if (*keydist & SMP_DIST_SIGN) {
-		struct smp_cmd_sign_info sign;
-		struct smp_csrk *csrk;
+	BT_DBG("%s", hdev->name);
 
-		/* Generate a new random key */
-		get_random_bytes(sign.csrk, sizeof(sign.csrk));
+	tfm_aes = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(aes)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(tfm_aes)) {
+		int err = PTR_ERR(tfm_aes);
+		BT_ERR("Unable to create crypto context");
+		return err;
+	}
 
-		csrk = kzalloc(sizeof(*csrk), GFP_KERNEL);
-		if (csrk) {
-			csrk->master = 0x00;
-			memcpy(csrk->val, sign.csrk, sizeof(csrk->val));
-		}
-		smp->slave_csrk = csrk;
+	chan = l2cap_chan_create();
+	if (!chan) {
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	}
 
-		smp_send_cmd(conn, SMP_CMD_SIGN_INFO, sizeof(sign), &sign);
+	chan->data = tfm_aes;
 
-		*keydist &= ~SMP_DIST_SIGN;
-	}
+	l2cap_add_scid(chan, L2CAP_CID_SMP);
 
-	/* If there are still keys to be received wait for them */
-	if ((smp->remote_key_dist & 0x07))
-		return 0;
+	l2cap_chan_set_defaults(chan);
 
-	clear_bit(HCI_CONN_LE_SMP_PEND, &hcon->flags);
-	cancel_delayed_work_sync(&conn->security_timer);
-	set_bit(SMP_FLAG_COMPLETE, &smp->flags);
-	smp_notify_keys(conn);
+	bacpy(&chan->src, &hdev->bdaddr);
+	chan->src_type = BDADDR_LE_PUBLIC;
+	chan->state = BT_LISTEN;
+	chan->mode = L2CAP_MODE_BASIC;
+	chan->imtu = L2CAP_DEFAULT_MTU;
+	chan->ops = &smp_root_chan_ops;
 
-	smp_chan_destroy(conn);
+	hdev->smp_data = chan;
 
 	return 0;
 }
+
+void smp_unregister(struct hci_dev *hdev)
+{
+	struct l2cap_chan *chan = hdev->smp_data;
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *tfm_aes;
+
+	if (!chan)
+		return;
+
+	BT_DBG("%s chan %p", hdev->name, chan);
+
+	tfm_aes = chan->data;
+	if (tfm_aes) {
+		chan->data = NULL;
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(tfm_aes);
+	}
+
+	hdev->smp_data = NULL;
+	l2cap_chan_put(chan);
+}