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author | Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2018-05-16 05:24:52 +0300 |
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committer | Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2018-05-16 16:01:41 +0300 |
commit | 85f4f12d51397f1648e1f4350f77e24039b82d61 (patch) | |
tree | 7913a89f385849f276a99c2fbfa2a1e345d3ddbd /lib | |
parent | 67b8d5c7081221efa252e111cd52532ec6d4266f (diff) | |
download | linux-85f4f12d51397f1648e1f4350f77e24039b82d61.tar.xz |
vsprintf: Replace memory barrier with static_key for random_ptr_key update
Reviewing Tobin's patches for getting pointers out early before
entropy has been established, I noticed that there's a lone smp_mb() in
the code. As with most lone memory barriers, this one appears to be
incorrectly used.
We currently basically have this:
get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key));
/*
* have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes().
* ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true
* after get_random_bytes() returns.
*/
smp_mb();
WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true);
And later we have:
if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key))
return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec);
/* Missing memory barrier here. */
hashval = (unsigned long)siphash_1u64((u64)ptr, &ptr_key);
As the CPU can perform speculative loads, we could have a situation
with the following:
CPU0 CPU1
---- ----
load ptr_key = 0
store ptr_key = random
smp_mb()
store have_filled_random_ptr_key
load have_filled_random_ptr_key = true
BAD BAD BAD! (you're so bad!)
Because nothing prevents CPU1 from loading ptr_key before loading
have_filled_random_ptr_key.
But this race is very unlikely, but we can't keep an incorrect smp_mb() in
place. Instead, replace the have_filled_random_ptr_key with a static_branch
not_filled_random_ptr_key, that is initialized to true and changed to false
when we get enough entropy. If the update happens in early boot, the
static_key is updated immediately, otherwise it will have to wait till
entropy is filled and this happens in an interrupt handler which can't
enable a static_key, as that requires a preemptible context. In that case, a
work_queue is used to enable it, as entropy already took too long to
establish in the first place waiting a little more shouldn't hurt anything.
The benefit of using the static key is that the unlikely branch in
vsprintf() now becomes a nop.
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180515100558.21df515e@gandalf.local.home
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ad67b74d2469d ("printk: hash addresses printed with %p")
Acked-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (VMware) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'lib')
-rw-r--r-- | lib/vsprintf.c | 26 |
1 files changed, 15 insertions, 11 deletions
diff --git a/lib/vsprintf.c b/lib/vsprintf.c index 30c0cb8cc9bc..23920c5ff728 100644 --- a/lib/vsprintf.c +++ b/lib/vsprintf.c @@ -1669,19 +1669,22 @@ char *pointer_string(char *buf, char *end, const void *ptr, return number(buf, end, (unsigned long int)ptr, spec); } -static bool have_filled_random_ptr_key __read_mostly; +static DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_TRUE(not_filled_random_ptr_key); static siphash_key_t ptr_key __read_mostly; -static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused) +static void enable_ptr_key_workfn(struct work_struct *work) { get_random_bytes(&ptr_key, sizeof(ptr_key)); - /* - * have_filled_random_ptr_key==true is dependent on get_random_bytes(). - * ptr_to_id() needs to see have_filled_random_ptr_key==true - * after get_random_bytes() returns. - */ - smp_mb(); - WRITE_ONCE(have_filled_random_ptr_key, true); + /* Needs to run from preemptible context */ + static_branch_disable(¬_filled_random_ptr_key); +} + +static DECLARE_WORK(enable_ptr_key_work, enable_ptr_key_workfn); + +static void fill_random_ptr_key(struct random_ready_callback *unused) +{ + /* This may be in an interrupt handler. */ + queue_work(system_unbound_wq, &enable_ptr_key_work); } static struct random_ready_callback random_ready = { @@ -1695,7 +1698,8 @@ static int __init initialize_ptr_random(void) if (!ret) { return 0; } else if (ret == -EALREADY) { - fill_random_ptr_key(&random_ready); + /* This is in preemptible context */ + enable_ptr_key_workfn(&enable_ptr_key_work); return 0; } @@ -1709,7 +1713,7 @@ static char *ptr_to_id(char *buf, char *end, void *ptr, struct printf_spec spec) unsigned long hashval; const int default_width = 2 * sizeof(ptr); - if (unlikely(!have_filled_random_ptr_key)) { + if (static_branch_unlikely(¬_filled_random_ptr_key)) { spec.field_width = default_width; /* string length must be less than default_width */ return string(buf, end, "(ptrval)", spec); |