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authorMartin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com>2018-12-13 21:41:48 +0300
committerAlexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>2018-12-15 01:17:34 +0300
commitd9762e84ede3eae9636f5dbbe0c8f0390d37e114 (patch)
tree2810d29d1a3ece2f739b42dbce1b238df53e576d /kernel
parent23127b33ec80e656921362d7dc82a0064bac20a2 (diff)
downloadlinux-d9762e84ede3eae9636f5dbbe0c8f0390d37e114.tar.xz
bpf: verbose log bpf_line_info in verifier
This patch adds bpf_line_info during the verifier's verbose. It can give error context for debug purpose. ~~~~~~~~~~ Here is the verbose log for backedge: while (a) { a += bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); bpf_trace_printk(fmt, sizeof(fmt), a); } ~> bpftool prog load ./test_loop.o /sys/fs/bpf/test_loop type tracepoint 13: while (a) { 3: a += bpf_get_smp_processor_id(); back-edge from insn 13 to 3 ~~~~~~~~~~ Here is the verbose log for invalid pkt access: Modification to test_xdp_noinline.c: data = (void *)(long)xdp->data; data_end = (void *)(long)xdp->data_end; /* if (data + 4 > data_end) return XDP_DROP; */ *(u32 *)data = dst->dst; ~> bpftool prog load ./test_xdp_noinline.o /sys/fs/bpf/test_xdp_noinline type xdp ; data = (void *)(long)xdp->data; 224: (79) r2 = *(u64 *)(r10 -112) 225: (61) r2 = *(u32 *)(r2 +0) ; *(u32 *)data = dst->dst; 226: (63) *(u32 *)(r2 +0) = r1 invalid access to packet, off=0 size=4, R2(id=0,off=0,r=0) R2 offset is outside of the packet Signed-off-by: Martin KaFai Lau <kafai@fb.com> Acked-by: Yonghong Song <yhs@fb.com> Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/bpf/verifier.c74
1 files changed, 69 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 89ce2613fdb0..ba8e3134bbc2 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -26,6 +26,7 @@
#include <linux/bsearch.h>
#include <linux/sort.h>
#include <linux/perf_event.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
#include "disasm.h"
@@ -216,6 +217,27 @@ struct bpf_call_arg_meta {
static DEFINE_MUTEX(bpf_verifier_lock);
+static const struct bpf_line_info *
+find_linfo(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_off)
+{
+ const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
+ const struct bpf_prog *prog;
+ u32 i, nr_linfo;
+
+ prog = env->prog;
+ nr_linfo = prog->aux->nr_linfo;
+
+ if (!nr_linfo || insn_off >= prog->len)
+ return NULL;
+
+ linfo = prog->aux->linfo;
+ for (i = 1; i < nr_linfo; i++)
+ if (insn_off < linfo[i].insn_off)
+ break;
+
+ return &linfo[i - 1];
+}
+
void bpf_verifier_vlog(struct bpf_verifier_log *log, const char *fmt,
va_list args)
{
@@ -266,6 +288,42 @@ __printf(2, 3) static void verbose(void *private_data, const char *fmt, ...)
va_end(args);
}
+static const char *ltrim(const char *s)
+{
+ while (isspace(*s))
+ s++;
+
+ return s;
+}
+
+__printf(3, 4) static void verbose_linfo(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
+ u32 insn_off,
+ const char *prefix_fmt, ...)
+{
+ const struct bpf_line_info *linfo;
+
+ if (!bpf_verifier_log_needed(&env->log))
+ return;
+
+ linfo = find_linfo(env, insn_off);
+ if (!linfo || linfo == env->prev_linfo)
+ return;
+
+ if (prefix_fmt) {
+ va_list args;
+
+ va_start(args, prefix_fmt);
+ bpf_verifier_vlog(&env->log, prefix_fmt, args);
+ va_end(args);
+ }
+
+ verbose(env, "%s\n",
+ ltrim(btf_name_by_offset(env->prog->aux->btf,
+ linfo->line_off)));
+
+ env->prev_linfo = linfo;
+}
+
static bool type_is_pkt_pointer(enum bpf_reg_type type)
{
return type == PTR_TO_PACKET ||
@@ -4561,6 +4619,7 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
return 0;
if (w < 0 || w >= env->prog->len) {
+ verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
verbose(env, "jump out of range from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -4578,6 +4637,8 @@ static int push_insn(int t, int w, int e, struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
insn_stack[cur_stack++] = w;
return 1;
} else if ((insn_state[w] & 0xF0) == DISCOVERED) {
+ verbose_linfo(env, t, "%d: ", t);
+ verbose_linfo(env, w, "%d: ", w);
verbose(env, "back-edge from insn %d to %d\n", t, w);
return -EINVAL;
} else if (insn_state[w] == EXPLORED) {
@@ -4600,10 +4661,6 @@ static int check_cfg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
int ret = 0;
int i, t;
- ret = check_subprogs(env);
- if (ret < 0)
- return ret;
-
insn_state = kcalloc(insn_cnt, sizeof(int), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!insn_state)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -5448,6 +5505,8 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
int insn_processed = 0;
bool do_print_state = false;
+ env->prev_linfo = NULL;
+
state = kzalloc(sizeof(struct bpf_verifier_state), GFP_KERNEL);
if (!state)
return -ENOMEM;
@@ -5521,6 +5580,7 @@ static int do_check(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
.private_data = env,
};
+ verbose_linfo(env, insn_idx, "; ");
verbose(env, "%d: ", insn_idx);
print_bpf_insn(&cbs, insn, env->allow_ptr_leaks);
}
@@ -6755,7 +6815,7 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
env->allow_ptr_leaks = capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN);
- ret = check_cfg(env);
+ ret = check_subprogs(env);
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
@@ -6763,6 +6823,10 @@ int bpf_check(struct bpf_prog **prog, union bpf_attr *attr,
if (ret < 0)
goto skip_full_check;
+ ret = check_cfg(env);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto skip_full_check;
+
ret = do_check(env);
if (env->cur_state) {
free_verifier_state(env->cur_state, true);