diff options
author | <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org> | 2005-04-29 18:54:44 +0400 |
---|---|---|
committer | <dwmw2@shinybook.infradead.org> | 2005-04-29 18:54:44 +0400 |
commit | 83c7d09173fdb6b06b109e65895392db3e49ac9c (patch) | |
tree | 3f48367a4d1413e221a5367bcd0cf8df7322c368 /kernel | |
parent | c60c390620e0abb60d4ae8c43583714bda27763f (diff) | |
download | linux-83c7d09173fdb6b06b109e65895392db3e49ac9c.tar.xz |
AUDIT: Avoid log pollution by untrusted strings.
We log strings from userspace, such as arguments to open(). These could
be formatted to contain \n followed by fake audit log entries. Provide
a function for logging such strings, which gives a hex dump when the
string contains anything but basic printable ASCII characters. Use it
for logging filenames.
Signed-off-by: David Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/audit.c | 23 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/auditsc.c | 7 |
2 files changed, 27 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/audit.c b/kernel/audit.c index 0f84dd7af2c8..dca7b99615d2 100644 --- a/kernel/audit.c +++ b/kernel/audit.c @@ -720,6 +720,29 @@ void audit_log_format(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *fmt, ...) va_end(args); } +void audit_log_hex(struct audit_buffer *ab, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len) +{ + int i; + + for (i=0; i<len; i++) + audit_log_format(ab, "%02x", buf[i]); +} + +void audit_log_untrustedstring(struct audit_buffer *ab, const char *string) +{ + const char *p = string; + + while (*p) { + if (*p == '"' || *p == ' ' || *p < 0x20 || *p > 0x7f) { + audit_log_hex(ab, string, strlen(string)); + return; + } + p++; + } + audit_log_format(ab, "\"%s\"", string); +} + + /* This is a helper-function to print the d_path without using a static * buffer or allocating another buffer in addition to the one in * audit_buffer. */ diff --git a/kernel/auditsc.c b/kernel/auditsc.c index 6f1931381bc9..00e87ffff13b 100644 --- a/kernel/auditsc.c +++ b/kernel/auditsc.c @@ -696,9 +696,10 @@ static void audit_log_exit(struct audit_context *context) if (!ab) continue; /* audit_panic has been called */ audit_log_format(ab, "item=%d", i); - if (context->names[i].name) - audit_log_format(ab, " name=%s", - context->names[i].name); + if (context->names[i].name) { + audit_log_format(ab, " name="); + audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, context->names[i].name); + } if (context->names[i].ino != (unsigned long)-1) audit_log_format(ab, " inode=%lu dev=%02x:%02x mode=%#o" " uid=%d gid=%d rdev=%02x:%02x", |