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authorSteven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>2013-11-05 21:51:11 +0400
committerSteven Rostedt <rostedt@rostedt.homelinux.com>2013-11-06 23:44:49 +0400
commit12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7 (patch)
treeda4b38fcaa39449d289ddf42b798da0f7b6a551c /kernel
parent5e01dc7b26d9f24f39abace5da98ccbd6a5ceb52 (diff)
downloadlinux-12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7.tar.xz
perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has "perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function tracing by default. The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which "perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that check instead for enabling function tracing. Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com> Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu> Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org> Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com> Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+ CVE: CVE-2013-2930 Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf") Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r--kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c2
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
index 80c36bcf66e8..78e27e3b52ac 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event,
{
/* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */
if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event) &&
- perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
+ perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
return -EPERM;
/* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */