diff options
author | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org> | 2013-11-05 21:51:11 +0400 |
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committer | Steven Rostedt <rostedt@rostedt.homelinux.com> | 2013-11-06 23:44:49 +0400 |
commit | 12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7 (patch) | |
tree | da4b38fcaa39449d289ddf42b798da0f7b6a551c /kernel | |
parent | 5e01dc7b26d9f24f39abace5da98ccbd6a5ceb52 (diff) | |
download | linux-12ae030d54ef250706da5642fc7697cc60ad0df7.tar.xz |
perf/ftrace: Fix paranoid level for enabling function tracer
The current default perf paranoid level is "1" which has
"perf_paranoid_kernel()" return false, and giving any operations that
use it, access to normal users. Unfortunately, this includes function
tracing and normal users should not be allowed to enable function
tracing by default.
The proper level is defined at "-1" (full perf access), which
"perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw()" will only give access to. Use that
check instead for enabling function tracing.
Reported-by: Dave Jones <davej@redhat.com>
Reported-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Tested-by: Vince Weaver <vincent.weaver@maine.edu>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Frederic Weisbecker <fweisbec@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 3.4+
CVE: CVE-2013-2930
Fixes: ced39002f5ea ("ftrace, perf: Add support to use function tracepoint in perf")
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c | 2 |
1 files changed, 1 insertions, 1 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c index 80c36bcf66e8..78e27e3b52ac 100644 --- a/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c +++ b/kernel/trace/trace_event_perf.c @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ static int perf_trace_event_perm(struct ftrace_event_call *tp_event, { /* The ftrace function trace is allowed only for root. */ if (ftrace_event_is_function(tp_event) && - perf_paranoid_kernel() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) + perf_paranoid_tracepoint_raw() && !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) return -EPERM; /* No tracing, just counting, so no obvious leak */ |