diff options
author | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-07-02 21:49:23 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> | 2020-07-09 01:59:57 +0300 |
commit | 160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a (patch) | |
tree | a1ce82f3b8d23a325c151bd998b815af9574617c /kernel | |
parent | 48778464bb7d346b47157d21ffde2af6b2d39110 (diff) | |
download | linux-160251842cd35a75edfb0a1d76afa3eb674ff40a.tar.xz |
kallsyms: Refactor kallsyms_show_value() to take cred
In order to perform future tests against the cred saved during open(),
switch kallsyms_show_value() to operate on a cred, and have all current
callers pass current_cred(). This makes it very obvious where callers
are checking the wrong credential in their "read" contexts. These will
be fixed in the coming patches.
Additionally switch return value to bool, since it is always used as a
direct permission check, not a 0-on-success, negative-on-error style
function return.
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel')
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kallsyms.c | 17 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/kprobes.c | 4 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | kernel/module.c | 2 |
3 files changed, 14 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/kallsyms.c b/kernel/kallsyms.c index 16c8c605f4b0..bb14e64f62a4 100644 --- a/kernel/kallsyms.c +++ b/kernel/kallsyms.c @@ -644,19 +644,20 @@ static inline int kallsyms_for_perf(void) * Otherwise, require CAP_SYSLOG (assuming kptr_restrict isn't set to * block even that). */ -int kallsyms_show_value(void) +bool kallsyms_show_value(const struct cred *cred) { switch (kptr_restrict) { case 0: if (kallsyms_for_perf()) - return 1; + return true; /* fallthrough */ case 1: - if (has_capability_noaudit(current, CAP_SYSLOG)) - return 1; + if (security_capable(cred, &init_user_ns, CAP_SYSLOG, + CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT) == 0) + return true; /* fallthrough */ default: - return 0; + return false; } } @@ -673,7 +674,11 @@ static int kallsyms_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) return -ENOMEM; reset_iter(iter, 0); - iter->show_value = kallsyms_show_value(); + /* + * Instead of checking this on every s_show() call, cache + * the result here at open time. + */ + iter->show_value = kallsyms_show_value(file->f_cred); return 0; } diff --git a/kernel/kprobes.c b/kernel/kprobes.c index 4a904cc56d68..d4de217e4a91 100644 --- a/kernel/kprobes.c +++ b/kernel/kprobes.c @@ -2448,7 +2448,7 @@ static void report_probe(struct seq_file *pi, struct kprobe *p, else kprobe_type = "k"; - if (!kallsyms_show_value()) + if (!kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) addr = NULL; if (sym) @@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ static int kprobe_blacklist_seq_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v) * If /proc/kallsyms is not showing kernel address, we won't * show them here either. */ - if (!kallsyms_show_value()) + if (!kallsyms_show_value(current_cred())) seq_printf(m, "0x%px-0x%px\t%ps\n", NULL, NULL, (void *)ent->start_addr); else diff --git a/kernel/module.c b/kernel/module.c index e8a198588f26..a5022ae84e50 100644 --- a/kernel/module.c +++ b/kernel/module.c @@ -4377,7 +4377,7 @@ static int modules_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file) if (!err) { struct seq_file *m = file->private_data; - m->private = kallsyms_show_value() ? NULL : (void *)8ul; + m->private = kallsyms_show_value(current_cred()) ? NULL : (void *)8ul; } return err; |