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| author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-24 13:49:35 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-24 13:49:35 +0300 |
| commit | 638820d8da8ededd6dc609beaef02d5396599c03 (patch) | |
| tree | 7b0076c6e4ea30935f1d9a1af90f7c57d4b9a99f /kernel/seccomp.c | |
| parent | d5e4d81da4d443d54b0b5c28ba6d26be297c509b (diff) | |
| parent | 3f6caaf5ff33073ca1a3a0b82edacab3c57c38f9 (diff) | |
| download | linux-638820d8da8ededd6dc609beaef02d5396599c03.tar.xz | |
Merge branch 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security
Pull security subsystem updates from James Morris:
"In this patchset, there are a couple of minor updates, as well as some
reworking of the LSM initialization code from Kees Cook (these prepare
the way for ordered stackable LSMs, but are a valuable cleanup on
their own)"
* 'next-general' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jmorris/linux-security:
LSM: Don't ignore initialization failures
LSM: Provide init debugging infrastructure
LSM: Record LSM name in struct lsm_info
LSM: Convert security_initcall() into DEFINE_LSM()
vmlinux.lds.h: Move LSM_TABLE into INIT_DATA
LSM: Convert from initcall to struct lsm_info
LSM: Remove initcall tracing
LSM: Rename .security_initcall section to .lsm_info
vmlinux.lds.h: Avoid copy/paste of security_init section
LSM: Correctly announce start of LSM initialization
security: fix LSM description location
keys: Fix the use of the C++ keyword "private" in uapi/linux/keyctl.h
seccomp: remove unnecessary unlikely()
security: tomoyo: Fix obsolete function
security/capabilities: remove check for -EINVAL
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/seccomp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/seccomp.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/seccomp.c b/kernel/seccomp.c index 4d7809cdd27d..f2ae2324c232 100644 --- a/kernel/seccomp.c +++ b/kernel/seccomp.c @@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static u32 seccomp_run_filters(const struct seccomp_data *sd, READ_ONCE(current->seccomp.filter); /* Ensure unexpected behavior doesn't result in failing open. */ - if (unlikely(WARN_ON(f == NULL))) + if (WARN_ON(f == NULL)) return SECCOMP_RET_KILL_PROCESS; if (!sd) { @@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ static inline pid_t seccomp_can_sync_threads(void) /* Return the first thread that cannot be synchronized. */ failed = task_pid_vnr(thread); /* If the pid cannot be resolved, then return -ESRCH */ - if (unlikely(WARN_ON(failed == 0))) + if (WARN_ON(failed == 0)) failed = -ESRCH; return failed; } |