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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-04-17 02:20:36 +0400
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@ppc970.osdl.org>2005-04-17 02:20:36 +0400
commit1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2 (patch)
tree0bba044c4ce775e45a88a51686b5d9f90697ea9d /kernel/capability.c
downloadlinux-1da177e4c3f41524e886b7f1b8a0c1fc7321cac2.tar.xz
Linux-2.6.12-rc2
Initial git repository build. I'm not bothering with the full history, even though we have it. We can create a separate "historical" git archive of that later if we want to, and in the meantime it's about 3.2GB when imported into git - space that would just make the early git days unnecessarily complicated, when we don't have a lot of good infrastructure for it. Let it rip!
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/capability.c')
-rw-r--r--kernel/capability.c220
1 files changed, 220 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/capability.c b/kernel/capability.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..64db1ee820c2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/kernel/capability.c
@@ -0,0 +1,220 @@
+/*
+ * linux/kernel/capability.c
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 1997 Andrew Main <zefram@fysh.org>
+ *
+ * Integrated into 2.1.97+, Andrew G. Morgan <morgan@transmeta.com>
+ * 30 May 2002: Cleanup, Robert M. Love <rml@tech9.net>
+ */
+
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/syscalls.h>
+#include <asm/uaccess.h>
+
+unsigned securebits = SECUREBITS_DEFAULT; /* systemwide security settings */
+kernel_cap_t cap_bset = CAP_INIT_EFF_SET;
+
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(securebits);
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(cap_bset);
+
+/*
+ * This lock protects task->cap_* for all tasks including current.
+ * Locking rule: acquire this prior to tasklist_lock.
+ */
+static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(task_capability_lock);
+
+/*
+ * For sys_getproccap() and sys_setproccap(), any of the three
+ * capability set pointers may be NULL -- indicating that that set is
+ * uninteresting and/or not to be changed.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * sys_capget - get the capabilities of a given process.
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_capget(cap_user_header_t header, cap_user_data_t dataptr)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ pid_t pid;
+ __u32 version;
+ task_t *target;
+ struct __user_cap_data_struct data;
+
+ if (get_user(version, &header->version))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) {
+ if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (pid < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ if (pid && pid != current->pid) {
+ target = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ if (!target) {
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else
+ target = current;
+
+ ret = security_capget(target, &data.effective, &data.inheritable, &data.permitted);
+
+out:
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
+
+ if (!ret && copy_to_user(dataptr, &data, sizeof data))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cap_set_pg - set capabilities for all processes in a given process
+ * group. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
+ */
+static inline int cap_set_pg(int pgrp, kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ task_t *g, *target;
+ int ret = -EPERM;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ do_each_task_pid(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g) {
+ target = g;
+ while_each_thread(g, target) {
+ if (!security_capset_check(target, effective,
+ inheritable,
+ permitted)) {
+ security_capset_set(target, effective,
+ inheritable,
+ permitted);
+ ret = 0;
+ }
+ found = 1;
+ }
+ } while_each_task_pid(pgrp, PIDTYPE_PGID, g);
+
+ if (!found)
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * cap_set_all - set capabilities for all processes other than init
+ * and self. We call this holding task_capability_lock and tasklist_lock.
+ */
+static inline int cap_set_all(kernel_cap_t *effective,
+ kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
+ kernel_cap_t *permitted)
+{
+ task_t *g, *target;
+ int ret = -EPERM;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ do_each_thread(g, target) {
+ if (target == current || target->pid == 1)
+ continue;
+ found = 1;
+ if (security_capset_check(target, effective, inheritable,
+ permitted))
+ continue;
+ ret = 0;
+ security_capset_set(target, effective, inheritable, permitted);
+ } while_each_thread(g, target);
+
+ if (!found)
+ ret = 0;
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * sys_capset - set capabilities for a given process, all processes, or all
+ * processes in a given process group.
+ *
+ * The restrictions on setting capabilities are specified as:
+ *
+ * [pid is for the 'target' task. 'current' is the calling task.]
+ *
+ * I: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
+ * P: any raised capabilities must be a subset of the (old current) permitted
+ * E: must be set to a subset of (new target) permitted
+ */
+asmlinkage long sys_capset(cap_user_header_t header, const cap_user_data_t data)
+{
+ kernel_cap_t inheritable, permitted, effective;
+ __u32 version;
+ task_t *target;
+ int ret;
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ if (get_user(version, &header->version))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (version != _LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION) {
+ if (put_user(_LINUX_CAPABILITY_VERSION, &header->version))
+ return -EFAULT;
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ if (get_user(pid, &header->pid))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ if (pid && pid != current->pid && !capable(CAP_SETPCAP))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(&effective, &data->effective, sizeof(effective)) ||
+ copy_from_user(&inheritable, &data->inheritable, sizeof(inheritable)) ||
+ copy_from_user(&permitted, &data->permitted, sizeof(permitted)))
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ spin_lock(&task_capability_lock);
+ read_lock(&tasklist_lock);
+
+ if (pid > 0 && pid != current->pid) {
+ target = find_task_by_pid(pid);
+ if (!target) {
+ ret = -ESRCH;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ } else
+ target = current;
+
+ ret = 0;
+
+ /* having verified that the proposed changes are legal,
+ we now put them into effect. */
+ if (pid < 0) {
+ if (pid == -1) /* all procs other than current and init */
+ ret = cap_set_all(&effective, &inheritable, &permitted);
+
+ else /* all procs in process group */
+ ret = cap_set_pg(-pid, &effective, &inheritable,
+ &permitted);
+ } else {
+ ret = security_capset_check(target, &effective, &inheritable,
+ &permitted);
+ if (!ret)
+ security_capset_set(target, &effective, &inheritable,
+ &permitted);
+ }
+
+out:
+ read_unlock(&tasklist_lock);
+ spin_unlock(&task_capability_lock);
+
+ return ret;
+}