diff options
| author | Alexei Starovoitov <ast@fb.com> | 2016-04-28 04:56:20 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net> | 2016-04-29 00:29:45 +0300 |
| commit | 92117d8443bc5afacc8d5ba82e541946310f106e (patch) | |
| tree | d0db595b54f82b59049d4b879561c2f97d25e18b /kernel/bpf/inode.c | |
| parent | bd34cf66cc48a5fb17deb7a1494845c45d71ba8e (diff) | |
| download | linux-92117d8443bc5afacc8d5ba82e541946310f106e.tar.xz | |
bpf: fix refcnt overflow
On a system with >32Gbyte of phyiscal memory and infinite RLIMIT_MEMLOCK,
the malicious application may overflow 32-bit bpf program refcnt.
It's also possible to overflow map refcnt on 1Tb system.
Impose 32k hard limit which means that the same bpf program or
map cannot be shared by more than 32k processes.
Fixes: 1be7f75d1668 ("bpf: enable non-root eBPF programs")
Reported-by: Jann Horn <jannh@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Diffstat (limited to 'kernel/bpf/inode.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | kernel/bpf/inode.c | 7 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/inode.c b/kernel/bpf/inode.c index f2ece3c174a5..8f94ca1860cf 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/inode.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/inode.c @@ -31,10 +31,10 @@ static void *bpf_any_get(void *raw, enum bpf_type type) { switch (type) { case BPF_TYPE_PROG: - atomic_inc(&((struct bpf_prog *)raw)->aux->refcnt); + raw = bpf_prog_inc(raw); break; case BPF_TYPE_MAP: - bpf_map_inc(raw, true); + raw = bpf_map_inc(raw, true); break; default: WARN_ON_ONCE(1); @@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ static void *bpf_obj_do_get(const struct filename *pathname, goto out; raw = bpf_any_get(inode->i_private, *type); - touch_atime(&path); + if (!IS_ERR(raw)) + touch_atime(&path); path_put(&path); return raw; |