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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-01-10 22:52:16 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-01-10 22:52:16 +0300 |
commit | d93aebbd76a07a8101d2f7393dc18be3e235f11b (patch) | |
tree | 5c3b5931bfe1d18879bc5a8b9ddcda2e428c79f9 /include | |
parent | 9d3a1e0a88e76bcb914e269cba0bfed6f4584a5e (diff) | |
parent | 6c8e11e08a5b74bb8a5cdd5cbc1e5143df0fba72 (diff) | |
download | linux-d93aebbd76a07a8101d2f7393dc18be3e235f11b.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'random-5.17-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random
Pull random number generator updates from Jason Donenfeld:
"These a bit more numerous than usual for the RNG, due to folks
resubmitting patches that had been pending prior and generally renewed
interest.
There are a few categories of patches in here:
1) Dominik Brodowski and I traded a series back and forth for a some
weeks that fixed numerous issues related to seeds being provided
at extremely early boot by the firmware, before other parts of the
kernel or of the RNG have been initialized, both fixing some
crashes and addressing correctness around early boot randomness.
One of these is marked for stable.
2) I replaced the RNG's usage of SHA-1 with BLAKE2s in the entropy
extractor, and made the construction a bit safer and more
standard. This was sort of a long overdue low hanging fruit, as we
were supposed to have phased out SHA-1 usage quite some time ago
(even if all we needed here was non-invertibility). Along the way
it also made extraction 131% faster. This required a bit of
Kconfig and symbol plumbing to make things work well with the
crypto libraries, which is one of the reasons why I'm sending you
this pull early in the cycle.
3) I got rid of a truly superfluous call to RDRAND in the hot path,
which resulted in a whopping 370% increase in performance.
4) Sebastian Andrzej Siewior sent some patches regarding PREEMPT_RT,
the full series of which wasn't ready yet, but the first two
preparatory cleanups were good on their own. One of them touches
files in kernel/irq/, which is the other reason why I'm sending
you this pull early in the cycle.
5) Other assorted correctness fixes from Eric Biggers, Jann Horn,
Mark Brown, Dominik Brodowski, and myself"
* 'random-5.17-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/crng/random:
random: don't reset crng_init_cnt on urandom_read()
random: avoid superfluous call to RDRAND in CRNG extraction
random: early initialization of ChaCha constants
random: use IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_NUMA) instead of ifdefs
random: harmonize "crng init done" messages
random: mix bootloader randomness into pool
random: do not throw away excess input to crng_fast_load
random: do not re-init if crng_reseed completes before primary init
random: fix crash on multiple early calls to add_bootloader_randomness()
random: do not sign extend bytes for rotation when mixing
random: use BLAKE2s instead of SHA1 in extraction
lib/crypto: blake2s: include as built-in
random: fix data race on crng init time
random: fix data race on crng_node_pool
irq: remove unused flags argument from __handle_irq_event_percpu()
random: remove unused irq_flags argument from add_interrupt_randomness()
random: document add_hwgenerator_randomness() with other input functions
MAINTAINERS: add git tree for random.c
Diffstat (limited to 'include')
-rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/chacha.h | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h | 6 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/random.h | 2 |
3 files changed, 15 insertions, 8 deletions
diff --git a/include/crypto/chacha.h b/include/crypto/chacha.h index dabaee698718..b3ea73b81944 100644 --- a/include/crypto/chacha.h +++ b/include/crypto/chacha.h @@ -47,12 +47,19 @@ static inline void hchacha_block(const u32 *state, u32 *out, int nrounds) hchacha_block_generic(state, out, nrounds); } +enum chacha_constants { /* expand 32-byte k */ + CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA = 0x61707865U, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3 = 0x3320646eU, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY = 0x79622d32U, + CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K = 0x6b206574U +}; + static inline void chacha_init_consts(u32 *state) { - state[0] = 0x61707865; /* "expa" */ - state[1] = 0x3320646e; /* "nd 3" */ - state[2] = 0x79622d32; /* "2-by" */ - state[3] = 0x6b206574; /* "te k" */ + state[0] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_EXPA; + state[1] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_ND_3; + state[2] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_2_BY; + state[3] = CHACHA_CONSTANT_TE_K; } void chacha_init_arch(u32 *state, const u32 *key, const u8 *iv); diff --git a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h index 8e50d487500f..d39cfa0d333e 100644 --- a/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h +++ b/include/crypto/internal/blake2s.h @@ -11,11 +11,11 @@ #include <crypto/internal/hash.h> #include <linux/string.h> -void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block, +void blake2s_compress_generic(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block, size_t nblocks, const u32 inc); -void blake2s_compress_arch(struct blake2s_state *state,const u8 *block, - size_t nblocks, const u32 inc); +void blake2s_compress(struct blake2s_state *state, const u8 *block, + size_t nblocks, const u32 inc); bool blake2s_selftest(void); diff --git a/include/linux/random.h b/include/linux/random.h index f45b8be3e3c4..c45b2693e51f 100644 --- a/include/linux/random.h +++ b/include/linux/random.h @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ static inline void add_latent_entropy(void) {} extern void add_input_randomness(unsigned int type, unsigned int code, unsigned int value) __latent_entropy; -extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq, int irq_flags) __latent_entropy; +extern void add_interrupt_randomness(int irq) __latent_entropy; extern void get_random_bytes(void *buf, int nbytes); extern int wait_for_random_bytes(void); |