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author | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2017-03-21 04:56:06 +0300 |
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committer | Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk> | 2017-03-29 01:22:11 +0300 |
commit | d597580d373774b1bdab84b3d26ff0b55162b916 (patch) | |
tree | ebbd7de012fcb731c40c67791e4e5e370844f70c /include/linux/uaccess.h | |
parent | c1aad8dcc49382399f48541dc47b6e30b0ef1b62 (diff) | |
download | linux-d597580d373774b1bdab84b3d26ff0b55162b916.tar.xz |
generic ...copy_..._user primitives
provide raw_copy_..._user() and select ARCH_HAS_RAW_COPY_USER to use those.
Signed-off-by: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/uaccess.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/uaccess.h | 187 |
1 files changed, 187 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/uaccess.h b/include/linux/uaccess.h index 9c3ae8706e9d..5f76bc995d96 100644 --- a/include/linux/uaccess.h +++ b/include/linux/uaccess.h @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/thread_info.h> +#include <linux/kasan-checks.h> #define VERIFY_READ 0 #define VERIFY_WRITE 1 @@ -11,6 +12,192 @@ #include <asm/uaccess.h> +#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_RAW_COPY_USER +/* + * Architectures should provide two primitives (raw_copy_{to,from}_user()) + * select ARCH_HAS_RAW_COPY_FROM_USER and get rid of their private instances + * of copy_{to,from}_user() and __copy_{to,from}_user{,_inatomic}(). Once + * all of them switch, this part of linux/uaccess.h will become unconditional. + * + * raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) should copy up to size bytes and + * return the amount left to copy. They should assume that access_ok() has + * already been checked (and succeeded); they should *not* zero-pad anything. + * No KASAN or object size checks either - those belong here. + * + * Both of these functions should attempt to copy size bytes starting at from + * into the area starting at to. They must not fetch or store anything + * outside of those areas. Return value must be between 0 (everything + * copied successfully) and size (nothing copied). + * + * If raw_copy_{to,from}_user(to, from, size) returns N, size - N bytes starting + * at to must become equal to the bytes fetched from the corresponding area + * starting at from. All data past to + size - N must be left unmodified. + * + * If copying succeeds, the return value must be 0. If some data cannot be + * fetched, it is permitted to copy less than had been fetched; the only + * hard requirement is that not storing anything at all (i.e. returning size) + * should happen only when nothing could be copied. In other words, you don't + * have to squeeze as much as possible - it is allowed, but not necessary. + * + * For raw_copy_from_user() to always points to kernel memory and no faults + * on store should happen. Interpretation of from is affected by set_fs(). + * For raw_copy_to_user() it's the other way round. + * + * Both can be inlined - it's up to architectures whether it wants to bother + * with that. They should not be used directly; they are used to implement + * the 6 functions (copy_{to,from}_user(), __copy_{to,from}_user_inatomic()) + * that are used instead. Out of those, __... ones are inlined. Plain + * copy_{to,from}_user() might or might not be inlined. If you want them + * inlined, have asm/uaccess.h define INLINE_COPY_{TO,FROM}_USER. + * + * NOTE: only copy_from_user() zero-pads the destination in case of short copy. + * Neither __copy_from_user() nor __copy_from_user_inatomic() zero anything + * at all; their callers absolutely must check the return value. + * + * Biarch ones should also provide raw_copy_in_user() - similar to the above, + * but both source and destination are __user pointers (affected by set_fs() + * as usual) and both source and destination can trigger faults. + */ + +static __always_inline unsigned long +__copy_from_user_inatomic(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + kasan_check_write(to, n); + check_object_size(to, n, false); + return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n); +} + +static __always_inline unsigned long +__copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + might_fault(); + kasan_check_write(to, n); + check_object_size(to, n, false); + return raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n); +} + +/** + * __copy_to_user_inatomic: - Copy a block of data into user space, with less checking. + * @to: Destination address, in user space. + * @from: Source address, in kernel space. + * @n: Number of bytes to copy. + * + * Context: User context only. + * + * Copy data from kernel space to user space. Caller must check + * the specified block with access_ok() before calling this function. + * The caller should also make sure he pins the user space address + * so that we don't result in page fault and sleep. + */ +static __always_inline unsigned long +__copy_to_user_inatomic(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + kasan_check_read(from, n); + check_object_size(from, n, true); + return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n); +} + +static __always_inline unsigned long +__copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + might_fault(); + kasan_check_read(from, n); + check_object_size(from, n, true); + return raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n); +} + +#ifdef INLINE_COPY_FROM_USER +static inline unsigned long +_copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + unsigned long res = n; + if (likely(access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n))) + res = raw_copy_from_user(to, from, n); + if (unlikely(res)) + memset(to + (n - res), 0, res); + return res; +} +#else +extern unsigned long +_copy_from_user(void *, const void __user *, unsigned long); +#endif + +#ifdef INLINE_COPY_TO_USER +static inline unsigned long +_copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n)) + n = raw_copy_to_user(to, from, n); + return n; +} +#else +extern unsigned long +_copy_to_user(void __user *, const void *, unsigned long); +#endif + +extern void __compiletime_error("usercopy buffer size is too small") +__bad_copy_user(void); + +static inline void copy_user_overflow(int size, unsigned long count) +{ + WARN(1, "Buffer overflow detected (%d < %lu)!\n", size, count); +} + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +copy_from_user(void *to, const void __user *from, unsigned long n) +{ + int sz = __compiletime_object_size(to); + + might_fault(); + kasan_check_write(to, n); + + if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) { + check_object_size(to, n, false); + n = _copy_from_user(to, from, n); + } else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) + copy_user_overflow(sz, n); + else + __bad_copy_user(); + + return n; +} + +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +copy_to_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + int sz = __compiletime_object_size(from); + + kasan_check_read(from, n); + might_fault(); + + if (likely(sz < 0 || sz >= n)) { + check_object_size(from, n, true); + n = _copy_to_user(to, from, n); + } else if (!__builtin_constant_p(n)) + copy_user_overflow(sz, n); + else + __bad_copy_user(); + + return n; +} +#ifdef CONFIG_COMPAT +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +__copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + might_fault(); + return raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n); +} +static __always_inline unsigned long __must_check +copy_in_user(void __user *to, const void *from, unsigned long n) +{ + might_fault(); + if (access_ok(VERIFY_WRITE, to, n) && access_ok(VERIFY_READ, from, n)) + n = raw_copy_in_user(to, from, n); + return n; +} +#endif +#endif + static __always_inline void pagefault_disabled_inc(void) { current->pagefault_disabled++; |