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authorEric Paris <eparis@redhat.com>2013-12-02 15:24:19 +0400
committerDavid Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>2013-12-02 15:24:19 +0400
commitc7277090927a5e71871e799a355ed2940f6c8fc6 (patch)
tree7d570fe7496a7d2b4dd671146074ab52bbc4c609 /include/linux/shmem_fs.h
parent9c5e45df215b4788f7a41c983ce862d08a083c2d (diff)
downloadlinux-c7277090927a5e71871e799a355ed2940f6c8fc6.tar.xz
security: shmem: implement kernel private shmem inodes
We have a problem where the big_key key storage implementation uses a shmem backed inode to hold the key contents. Because of this detail of implementation LSM checks are being done between processes trying to read the keys and the tmpfs backed inode. The LSM checks are already being handled on the key interface level and should not be enforced at the inode level (since the inode is an implementation detail, not a part of the security model) This patch implements a new function shmem_kernel_file_setup() which returns the equivalent to shmem_file_setup() only the underlying inode has S_PRIVATE set. This means that all LSM checks for the inode in question are skipped. It should only be used for kernel internal operations where the inode is not exposed to userspace without proper LSM checking. It is possible that some other users of shmem_file_setup() should use the new interface, but this has not been explored. Reproducing this bug is a little bit difficult. The steps I used on Fedora are: (1) Turn off selinux enforcing: setenforce 0 (2) Create a huge key k=`dd if=/dev/zero bs=8192 count=1 | keyctl padd big_key test-key @s` (3) Access the key in another context: runcon system_u:system_r:httpd_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 keyctl print $k >/dev/null (4) Examine the audit logs: ausearch -m AVC -i --subject httpd_t | audit2allow If the last command's output includes a line that looks like: allow httpd_t user_tmpfs_t:file { open read }; There was an inode check between httpd and the tmpfs filesystem. With this patch no such denial will be seen. (NOTE! you should clear your audit log if you have tested for this previously) (Please return you box to enforcing) Signed-off-by: Eric Paris <eparis@redhat.com> Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> cc: Hugh Dickins <hughd@google.com> cc: linux-mm@kvack.org
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/shmem_fs.h')
-rw-r--r--include/linux/shmem_fs.h2
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
index 30aa0dc60d75..9d55438bc4ad 100644
--- a/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
+++ b/include/linux/shmem_fs.h
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ extern int shmem_init(void);
extern int shmem_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent);
extern struct file *shmem_file_setup(const char *name,
loff_t size, unsigned long flags);
+extern struct file *shmem_kernel_file_setup(const char *name, loff_t size,
+ unsigned long flags);
extern int shmem_zero_setup(struct vm_area_struct *);
extern int shmem_lock(struct file *file, int lock, struct user_struct *user);
extern void shmem_unlock_mapping(struct address_space *mapping);