diff options
author | Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com> | 2020-06-08 07:40:17 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2020-06-08 21:05:56 +0300 |
commit | db38d5c106dfdd7cb7207c83267d82fdf4950b61 (patch) | |
tree | 1b6d4b08878942fb32dcd6b2faccfd7cf32babb2 /include/linux/kernel.h | |
parent | ceabef7dd71720aef58bd182943352c9c307a3de (diff) | |
download | linux-db38d5c106dfdd7cb7207c83267d82fdf4950b61.tar.xz |
kernel: add panic_on_taint
Analogously to the introduction of panic_on_warn, this patch introduces
a kernel option named panic_on_taint in order to provide a simple and
generic way to stop execution and catch a coredump when the kernel gets
tainted by any given flag.
This is useful for debugging sessions as it avoids having to rebuild the
kernel to explicitly add calls to panic() into the code sites that
introduce the taint flags of interest.
For instance, if one is interested in proceeding with a post-mortem
analysis at the point a given code path is hitting a bad page (i.e.
unaccount_page_cache_page(), or slab_bug()), a coredump can be collected
by rebooting the kernel with 'panic_on_taint=0x20' amended to the
command line.
Another, perhaps less frequent, use for this option would be as a means
for assuring a security policy case where only a subset of taints, or no
single taint (in paranoid mode), is allowed for the running system. The
optional switch 'nousertaint' is handy in this particular scenario, as
it will avoid userspace induced crashes by writes to sysctl interface
/proc/sys/kernel/tainted causing false positive hits for such policies.
[akpm@linux-foundation.org: tweak kernel-parameters.txt wording]
Suggested-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Signed-off-by: Rafael Aquini <aquini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Reviewed-by: Luis Chamberlain <mcgrof@kernel.org>
Cc: Dave Young <dyoung@redhat.com>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Jonathan Corbet <corbet@lwn.net>
Cc: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Randy Dunlap <rdunlap@infradead.org>
Cc: "Theodore Ts'o" <tytso@mit.edu>
Cc: Adrian Bunk <bunk@kernel.org>
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
Cc: Laura Abbott <labbott@redhat.com>
Cc: Jeff Mahoney <jeffm@suse.com>
Cc: Jiri Kosina <jikos@kernel.org>
Cc: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200515175502.146720-1-aquini@redhat.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'include/linux/kernel.h')
-rw-r--r-- | include/linux/kernel.h | 3 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/include/linux/kernel.h b/include/linux/kernel.h index 9b7a8d74a9d6..f7835db7102e 100644 --- a/include/linux/kernel.h +++ b/include/linux/kernel.h @@ -528,6 +528,8 @@ extern int panic_on_oops; extern int panic_on_unrecovered_nmi; extern int panic_on_io_nmi; extern int panic_on_warn; +extern unsigned long panic_on_taint; +extern bool panic_on_taint_nousertaint; extern int sysctl_panic_on_rcu_stall; extern int sysctl_panic_on_stackoverflow; @@ -596,6 +598,7 @@ extern enum system_states { #define TAINT_AUX 16 #define TAINT_RANDSTRUCT 17 #define TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT 18 +#define TAINT_FLAGS_MAX ((1UL << TAINT_FLAGS_COUNT) - 1) struct taint_flag { char c_true; /* character printed when tainted */ |