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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-23 19:05:28 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2018-10-23 19:05:28 +0300 |
commit | 99792e0cea1ed733cdc8d0758677981e0cbebfed (patch) | |
tree | acf6868f48f687dd8667ee4f99c156415ea8ff7b /fs | |
parent | 382d72a9aa525b56ab8453ce61751fa712414d3d (diff) | |
parent | 977e4be5eb714c48a67afc26a6c477f24130a1f2 (diff) | |
download | linux-99792e0cea1ed733cdc8d0758677981e0cbebfed.tar.xz |
Merge branch 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 mm updates from Ingo Molnar:
"Lots of changes in this cycle:
- Lots of CPA (change page attribute) optimizations and related
cleanups (Thomas Gleixner, Peter Zijstra)
- Make lazy TLB mode even lazier (Rik van Riel)
- Fault handler cleanups and improvements (Dave Hansen)
- kdump, vmcore: Enable kdumping encrypted memory with AMD SME
enabled (Lianbo Jiang)
- Clean up VM layout documentation (Baoquan He, Ingo Molnar)
- ... plus misc other fixes and enhancements"
* 'x86-mm-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: (51 commits)
x86/stackprotector: Remove the call to boot_init_stack_canary() from cpu_startup_entry()
x86/mm: Kill stray kernel fault handling comment
x86/mm: Do not warn about PCI BIOS W+X mappings
resource: Clean it up a bit
resource: Fix find_next_iomem_res() iteration issue
resource: Include resource end in walk_*() interfaces
x86/kexec: Correct KEXEC_BACKUP_SRC_END off-by-one error
x86/mm: Remove spurious fault pkey check
x86/mm/vsyscall: Consider vsyscall page part of user address space
x86/mm: Add vsyscall address helper
x86/mm: Fix exception table comments
x86/mm: Add clarifying comments for user addr space
x86/mm: Break out user address space handling
x86/mm: Break out kernel address space handling
x86/mm: Clarify hardware vs. software "error_code"
x86/mm/tlb: Make lazy TLB mode lazier
x86/mm/tlb: Add freed_tables element to flush_tlb_info
x86/mm/tlb: Add freed_tables argument to flush_tlb_mm_range
smp,cpumask: introduce on_each_cpu_cond_mask
smp: use __cpumask_set_cpu in on_each_cpu_cond
...
Diffstat (limited to 'fs')
-rw-r--r-- | fs/proc/vmcore.c | 34 |
1 files changed, 28 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/fs/proc/vmcore.c b/fs/proc/vmcore.c index cbde728f8ac6..91ae16fbd7d5 100644 --- a/fs/proc/vmcore.c +++ b/fs/proc/vmcore.c @@ -24,6 +24,8 @@ #include <linux/vmalloc.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> +#include <linux/mem_encrypt.h> +#include <asm/pgtable.h> #include <asm/io.h> #include "internal.h" @@ -98,7 +100,8 @@ static int pfn_is_ram(unsigned long pfn) /* Reads a page from the oldmem device from given offset. */ static ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count, - u64 *ppos, int userbuf) + u64 *ppos, int userbuf, + bool encrypted) { unsigned long pfn, offset; size_t nr_bytes; @@ -120,8 +123,15 @@ static ssize_t read_from_oldmem(char *buf, size_t count, if (pfn_is_ram(pfn) == 0) memset(buf, 0, nr_bytes); else { - tmp = copy_oldmem_page(pfn, buf, nr_bytes, - offset, userbuf); + if (encrypted) + tmp = copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(pfn, buf, + nr_bytes, + offset, + userbuf); + else + tmp = copy_oldmem_page(pfn, buf, nr_bytes, + offset, userbuf); + if (tmp < 0) return tmp; } @@ -155,7 +165,7 @@ void __weak elfcorehdr_free(unsigned long long addr) */ ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) { - return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0); + return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, false); } /* @@ -163,7 +173,7 @@ ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) */ ssize_t __weak elfcorehdr_read_notes(char *buf, size_t count, u64 *ppos) { - return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0); + return read_from_oldmem(buf, count, ppos, 0, sme_active()); } /* @@ -173,10 +183,21 @@ int __weak remap_oldmem_pfn_range(struct vm_area_struct *vma, unsigned long from, unsigned long pfn, unsigned long size, pgprot_t prot) { + prot = pgprot_encrypted(prot); return remap_pfn_range(vma, from, pfn, size, prot); } /* + * Architectures which support memory encryption override this. + */ +ssize_t __weak +copy_oldmem_page_encrypted(unsigned long pfn, char *buf, size_t csize, + unsigned long offset, int userbuf) +{ + return copy_oldmem_page(pfn, buf, csize, offset, userbuf); +} + +/* * Copy to either kernel or user space */ static int copy_to(void *target, void *src, size_t size, int userbuf) @@ -351,7 +372,8 @@ static ssize_t __read_vmcore(char *buffer, size_t buflen, loff_t *fpos, m->offset + m->size - *fpos, buflen); start = m->paddr + *fpos - m->offset; - tmp = read_from_oldmem(buffer, tsz, &start, userbuf); + tmp = read_from_oldmem(buffer, tsz, &start, + userbuf, sme_active()); if (tmp < 0) return tmp; buflen -= tsz; |