fanotify, inotify, dnotify, security: add security hook for fs notifications

As of now, setting watches on filesystem objects has, at most, applied a
check for read access to the inode, and in the case of fanotify, requires
CAP_SYS_ADMIN. No specific security hook or permission check has been
provided to control the setting of watches. Using any of inotify, dnotify,
or fanotify, it is possible to observe, not only write-like operations, but
even read access to a file. Modeling the watch as being merely a read from
the file is insufficient for the needs of SELinux. This is due to the fact
that read access should not necessarily imply access to information about
when another process reads from a file. Furthermore, fanotify watches grant
more power to an application in the form of permission events. While
notification events are solely, unidirectional (i.e. they only pass
information to the receiving application), permission events are blocking.
Permission events make a request to the receiving application which will
then reply with a decision as to whether or not that action may be
completed. This causes the issue of the watching application having the
ability to exercise control over the triggering process. Without drawing a
distinction within the permission check, the ability to read would imply
the greater ability to control an application. Additionally, mount and
superblock watches apply to all files within the same mount or superblock.
Read access to one file should not necessarily imply the ability to watch
all files accessed within a given mount or superblock.

In order to solve these issues, a new LSM hook is implemented and has been
placed within the system calls for marking filesystem objects with inotify,
fanotify, and dnotify watches. These calls to the hook are placed at the
point at which the target path has been resolved and are provided with the
path struct, the mask of requested notification events, and the type of
object on which the mark is being set (inode, superblock, or mount). The
mask and obj_type have already been translated into common FS_* values
shared by the entirety of the fs notification infrastructure. The path
struct is passed rather than just the inode so that the mount is available,
particularly for mount watches. This also allows for use of the hook by
pathname-based security modules. However, since the hook is intended for
use even by inode based security modules, it is not placed under the
CONFIG_SECURITY_PATH conditional. Otherwise, the inode-based security
modules would need to enable all of the path hooks, even though they do not
use any of them.

This only provides a hook at the point of setting a watch, and presumes
that permission to set a particular watch implies the ability to receive
all notification about that object which match the mask. This is all that
is required for SELinux. If other security modules require additional hooks
or infrastructure to control delivery of notification, these can be added
by them. It does not make sense for us to propose hooks for which we have
no implementation. The understanding that all notifications received by the
requesting application are all strictly of a type for which the application
has been granted permission shows that this implementation is sufficient in
its coverage.

Security modules wishing to provide complete control over fanotify must
also implement a security_file_open hook that validates that the access
requested by the watching application is authorized. Fanotify has the issue
that it returns a file descriptor with the file mode specified during
fanotify_init() to the watching process on event. This is already covered
by the LSM security_file_open hook if the security module implements
checking of the requested file mode there. Otherwise, a watching process
can obtain escalated access to a file for which it has not been authorized.

The selinux_path_notify hook implementation works by adding five new file
permissions: watch, watch_mount, watch_sb, watch_reads, and watch_with_perm
(descriptions about which will follow), and one new filesystem permission:
watch (which is applied to superblock checks). The hook then decides which
subset of these permissions must be held by the requesting application
based on the contents of the provided mask and the obj_type. The
selinux_file_open hook already checks the requested file mode and therefore
ensures that a watching process cannot escalate its access through
fanotify.

The watch, watch_mount, and watch_sb permissions are the baseline
permissions for setting a watch on an object and each are a requirement for
any watch to be set on a file, mount, or superblock respectively. It should
be noted that having either of the other two permissions (watch_reads and
watch_with_perm) does not imply the watch, watch_mount, or watch_sb
permission. Superblock watches further require the filesystem watch
permission to the superblock. As there is no labeled object in view for
mounts, there is no specific check for mount watches beyond watch_mount to
the inode. Such a check could be added in the future, if a suitable labeled
object existed representing the mount.

The watch_reads permission is required to receive notifications from
read-exclusive events on filesystem objects. These events include accessing
a file for the purpose of reading and closing a file which has been opened
read-only. This distinction has been drawn in order to provide a direct
indication in the policy for this otherwise not obvious capability. Read
access to a file should not necessarily imply the ability to observe read
events on a file.

Finally, watch_with_perm only applies to fanotify masks since it is the
only way to set a mask which allows for the blocking, permission event.
This permission is needed for any watch which is of this type. Though
fanotify requires CAP_SYS_ADMIN, this is insufficient as it gives implicit
trust to root, which we do not do, and does not support least privilege.

Signed-off-by: Aaron Goidel <acgoide@tycho.nsa.gov>
Acked-by: Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
Acked-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>

1 files changed, 17 insertions, 2 deletions

diff --git a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
index a90bb19dcfa2..8b4e2ad6d208 100644
--- a/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
+++ b/fs/notify/fanotify/fanotify_user.c
@@ -528,7 +528,8 @@ static const struct file_operations fanotify_fops = {
 };
 
 static int fanotify_find_path(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
-			      struct path *path, unsigned int flags)
+			      struct path *path, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
+			      unsigned int obj_type)
 {
 	int ret;
 
@@ -567,8 +568,15 @@ static int fanotify_find_path(int dfd, const char __user *filename,
 
 	/* you can only watch an inode if you have read permissions on it */
 	ret = inode_permission(path->dentry->d_inode, MAY_READ);
+	if (ret) {
+		path_put(path);
+		goto out;
+	}
+
+	ret = security_path_notify(path, mask, obj_type);
 	if (ret)
 		path_put(path);
+
 out:
 	return ret;
 }
@@ -931,6 +939,7 @@ static int do_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
 	__kernel_fsid_t __fsid, *fsid = NULL;
 	u32 valid_mask = FANOTIFY_EVENTS | FANOTIFY_EVENT_FLAGS;
 	unsigned int mark_type = flags & FANOTIFY_MARK_TYPE_BITS;
+	unsigned int obj_type;
 	int ret;
 
 	pr_debug("%s: fanotify_fd=%d flags=%x dfd=%d pathname=%p mask=%llx\n",
@@ -945,8 +954,13 @@ static int do_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
 
 	switch (mark_type) {
 	case FAN_MARK_INODE:
+		obj_type = FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_INODE;
+		break;
 	case FAN_MARK_MOUNT:
+		obj_type = FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_VFSMOUNT;
+		break;
 	case FAN_MARK_FILESYSTEM:
+		obj_type = FSNOTIFY_OBJ_TYPE_SB;
 		break;
 	default:
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -1014,7 +1028,8 @@ static int do_fanotify_mark(int fanotify_fd, unsigned int flags, __u64 mask,
 		goto fput_and_out;
 	}
 
-	ret = fanotify_find_path(dfd, pathname, &path, flags);
+	ret = fanotify_find_path(dfd, pathname, &path, flags,
+			(mask & ALL_FSNOTIFY_EVENTS), obj_type);
 	if (ret)
 		goto fput_and_out;