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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-06-11 22:02:01 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2017-06-11 22:02:01 +0300 |
commit | 5ad9345d2321eb1442794098506d136d01cf8345 (patch) | |
tree | 500c5274cf0433c7266c901727b722315508c358 /drivers | |
parent | 5e38b72ac1b0000f1d7bd2b62fba7ee9053f5b94 (diff) | |
parent | b169c13de473a85b3c859bb36216a4cb5f00a54a (diff) | |
download | linux-5ad9345d2321eb1442794098506d136d01cf8345.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random
Pull randomness fixes from Ted Ts'o:
"Improve performance by using a lockless update mechanism suggested by
Linus, and make sure we refresh per-CPU entropy returned get_random_*
as soon as the CRNG is initialized"
* tag 'random_for_linus_stable' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tytso/random:
random: invalidate batched entropy after crng init
random: use lockless method of accessing and updating f->reg_idx
Diffstat (limited to 'drivers')
-rw-r--r-- | drivers/char/random.c | 49 |
1 files changed, 43 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/drivers/char/random.c b/drivers/char/random.c index a561f0c2f428..e870f329db88 100644 --- a/drivers/char/random.c +++ b/drivers/char/random.c @@ -1,6 +1,9 @@ /* * random.c -- A strong random number generator * + * Copyright (C) 2017 Jason A. Donenfeld <Jason@zx2c4.com>. All + * Rights Reserved. + * * Copyright Matt Mackall <mpm@selenic.com>, 2003, 2004, 2005 * * Copyright Theodore Ts'o, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999. All @@ -762,6 +765,8 @@ static DECLARE_WAIT_QUEUE_HEAD(crng_init_wait); static struct crng_state **crng_node_pool __read_mostly; #endif +static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void); + static void crng_initialize(struct crng_state *crng) { int i; @@ -799,6 +804,7 @@ static int crng_fast_load(const char *cp, size_t len) cp++; crng_init_cnt++; len--; } if (crng_init_cnt >= CRNG_INIT_CNT_THRESH) { + invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 1; wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); pr_notice("random: fast init done\n"); @@ -836,6 +842,7 @@ static void crng_reseed(struct crng_state *crng, struct entropy_store *r) memzero_explicit(&buf, sizeof(buf)); crng->init_time = jiffies; if (crng == &primary_crng && crng_init < 2) { + invalidate_batched_entropy(); crng_init = 2; process_random_ready_list(); wake_up_interruptible(&crng_init_wait); @@ -1097,15 +1104,15 @@ static void add_interrupt_bench(cycles_t start) static __u32 get_reg(struct fast_pool *f, struct pt_regs *regs) { __u32 *ptr = (__u32 *) regs; - unsigned long flags; + unsigned int idx; if (regs == NULL) return 0; - local_irq_save(flags); - if (f->reg_idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32)) - f->reg_idx = 0; - ptr += f->reg_idx++; - local_irq_restore(flags); + idx = READ_ONCE(f->reg_idx); + if (idx >= sizeof(struct pt_regs) / sizeof(__u32)) + idx = 0; + ptr += idx++; + WRITE_ONCE(f->reg_idx, idx); return *ptr; } @@ -2023,6 +2030,7 @@ struct batched_entropy { }; unsigned int position; }; +static rwlock_t batched_entropy_reset_lock = __RW_LOCK_UNLOCKED(batched_entropy_reset_lock); /* * Get a random word for internal kernel use only. The quality of the random @@ -2033,6 +2041,8 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u64); u64 get_random_u64(void) { u64 ret; + bool use_lock = crng_init < 2; + unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; #if BITS_PER_LONG == 64 @@ -2045,11 +2055,15 @@ u64 get_random_u64(void) #endif batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); + if (use_lock) + read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u64) == 0) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u64); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u64[batch->position++]; + if (use_lock) + read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u64); return ret; } @@ -2059,22 +2073,45 @@ static DEFINE_PER_CPU(struct batched_entropy, batched_entropy_u32); u32 get_random_u32(void) { u32 ret; + bool use_lock = crng_init < 2; + unsigned long flags; struct batched_entropy *batch; if (arch_get_random_int(&ret)) return ret; batch = &get_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); + if (use_lock) + read_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); if (batch->position % ARRAY_SIZE(batch->entropy_u32) == 0) { extract_crng((u8 *)batch->entropy_u32); batch->position = 0; } ret = batch->entropy_u32[batch->position++]; + if (use_lock) + read_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); put_cpu_var(batched_entropy_u32); return ret; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(get_random_u32); +/* It's important to invalidate all potential batched entropy that might + * be stored before the crng is initialized, which we can do lazily by + * simply resetting the counter to zero so that it's re-extracted on the + * next usage. */ +static void invalidate_batched_entropy(void) +{ + int cpu; + unsigned long flags; + + write_lock_irqsave(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); + for_each_possible_cpu (cpu) { + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u32, cpu)->position = 0; + per_cpu_ptr(&batched_entropy_u64, cpu)->position = 0; + } + write_unlock_irqrestore(&batched_entropy_reset_lock, flags); +} + /** * randomize_page - Generate a random, page aligned address * @start: The smallest acceptable address the caller will take. |