Merge branch 'power-supply-scope' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/jeremy/xen

1 files changed, 740 insertions, 0 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..9a1849a83e2a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/drivers/net/ppp/ppp_mppe.c
@@ -0,0 +1,740 @@
+/*
+ * ppp_mppe.c - interface MPPE to the PPP code.
+ * This version is for use with Linux kernel 2.6.14+
+ *
+ * By Frank Cusack <fcusack@fcusack.com>.
+ * Copyright (c) 2002,2003,2004 Google, Inc.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * License:
+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software and its
+ * documentation is hereby granted, provided that the above copyright
+ * notice appears in all copies.  This software is provided without any
+ * warranty, express or implied.
+ *
+ * ALTERNATIVELY, provided that this notice is retained in full, this product
+ * may be distributed under the terms of the GNU General Public License (GPL),
+ * in which case the provisions of the GPL apply INSTEAD OF those given above.
+ *
+ *   This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ *   it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ *   the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ *   (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ *   This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ *   but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ *   MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.  See the
+ *   GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ *   You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ *   along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ *   Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA  02111-1307  USA
+ *
+ *
+ * Changelog:
+ *      08/12/05 - Matt Domsch <Matt_Domsch@dell.com>
+ *                 Only need extra skb padding on transmit, not receive.
+ *      06/18/04 - Matt Domsch <Matt_Domsch@dell.com>, Oleg Makarenko <mole@quadra.ru>
+ *                 Use Linux kernel 2.6 arc4 and sha1 routines rather than
+ *                 providing our own.
+ *      2/15/04 - TS: added #include <version.h> and testing for Kernel
+ *                    version before using
+ *                    MOD_DEC_USAGE_COUNT/MOD_INC_USAGE_COUNT which are
+ *                    deprecated in 2.6
+ */
+
+#include <linux/err.h>
+#include <linux/module.h>
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/init.h>
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/string.h>
+#include <linux/crypto.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/ppp_defs.h>
+#include <linux/ppp-comp.h>
+#include <linux/scatterlist.h>
+#include <asm/unaligned.h>
+
+#include "ppp_mppe.h"
+
+MODULE_AUTHOR("Frank Cusack <fcusack@fcusack.com>");
+MODULE_DESCRIPTION("Point-to-Point Protocol Microsoft Point-to-Point Encryption support");
+MODULE_LICENSE("Dual BSD/GPL");
+MODULE_ALIAS("ppp-compress-" __stringify(CI_MPPE));
+MODULE_VERSION("1.0.2");
+
+static unsigned int
+setup_sg(struct scatterlist *sg, const void *address, unsigned int length)
+{
+	sg_set_buf(sg, address, length);
+	return length;
+}
+
+#define SHA1_PAD_SIZE 40
+
+/*
+ * kernel crypto API needs its arguments to be in kmalloc'd memory, not in the module
+ * static data area.  That means sha_pad needs to be kmalloc'd.
+ */
+
+struct sha_pad {
+	unsigned char sha_pad1[SHA1_PAD_SIZE];
+	unsigned char sha_pad2[SHA1_PAD_SIZE];
+};
+static struct sha_pad *sha_pad;
+
+static inline void sha_pad_init(struct sha_pad *shapad)
+{
+	memset(shapad->sha_pad1, 0x00, sizeof(shapad->sha_pad1));
+	memset(shapad->sha_pad2, 0xF2, sizeof(shapad->sha_pad2));
+}
+
+/*
+ * State for an MPPE (de)compressor.
+ */
+struct ppp_mppe_state {
+	struct crypto_blkcipher *arc4;
+	struct crypto_hash *sha1;
+	unsigned char *sha1_digest;
+	unsigned char master_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN];
+	unsigned char session_key[MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN];
+	unsigned keylen;	/* key length in bytes             */
+	/* NB: 128-bit == 16, 40-bit == 8! */
+	/* If we want to support 56-bit,   */
+	/* the unit has to change to bits  */
+	unsigned char bits;	/* MPPE control bits */
+	unsigned ccount;	/* 12-bit coherency count (seqno)  */
+	unsigned stateful;	/* stateful mode flag */
+	int discard;		/* stateful mode packet loss flag */
+	int sanity_errors;	/* take down LCP if too many */
+	int unit;
+	int debug;
+	struct compstat stats;
+};
+
+/* struct ppp_mppe_state.bits definitions */
+#define MPPE_BIT_A	0x80	/* Encryption table were (re)inititalized */
+#define MPPE_BIT_B	0x40	/* MPPC only (not implemented) */
+#define MPPE_BIT_C	0x20	/* MPPC only (not implemented) */
+#define MPPE_BIT_D	0x10	/* This is an encrypted frame */
+
+#define MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED	MPPE_BIT_A
+#define MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED	MPPE_BIT_D
+
+#define MPPE_BITS(p) ((p)[4] & 0xf0)
+#define MPPE_CCOUNT(p) ((((p)[4] & 0x0f) << 8) + (p)[5])
+#define MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE 0x1000	/* The size of the ccount space */
+
+#define MPPE_OVHD	2	/* MPPE overhead/packet */
+#define SANITY_MAX	1600	/* Max bogon factor we will tolerate */
+
+/*
+ * Key Derivation, from RFC 3078, RFC 3079.
+ * Equivalent to Get_Key() for MS-CHAP as described in RFC 3079.
+ */
+static void get_new_key_from_sha(struct ppp_mppe_state * state)
+{
+	struct hash_desc desc;
+	struct scatterlist sg[4];
+	unsigned int nbytes;
+
+	sg_init_table(sg, 4);
+
+	nbytes = setup_sg(&sg[0], state->master_key, state->keylen);
+	nbytes += setup_sg(&sg[1], sha_pad->sha_pad1,
+			   sizeof(sha_pad->sha_pad1));
+	nbytes += setup_sg(&sg[2], state->session_key, state->keylen);
+	nbytes += setup_sg(&sg[3], sha_pad->sha_pad2,
+			   sizeof(sha_pad->sha_pad2));
+
+	desc.tfm = state->sha1;
+	desc.flags = 0;
+
+	crypto_hash_digest(&desc, sg, nbytes, state->sha1_digest);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Perform the MPPE rekey algorithm, from RFC 3078, sec. 7.3.
+ * Well, not what's written there, but rather what they meant.
+ */
+static void mppe_rekey(struct ppp_mppe_state * state, int initial_key)
+{
+	struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[1];
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = state->arc4 };
+
+	get_new_key_from_sha(state);
+	if (!initial_key) {
+		crypto_blkcipher_setkey(state->arc4, state->sha1_digest,
+					state->keylen);
+		sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
+		sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
+		setup_sg(sg_in, state->sha1_digest, state->keylen);
+		setup_sg(sg_out, state->session_key, state->keylen);
+		if (crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in,
+					     state->keylen) != 0) {
+    		    printk(KERN_WARNING "mppe_rekey: cipher_encrypt failed\n");
+		}
+	} else {
+		memcpy(state->session_key, state->sha1_digest, state->keylen);
+	}
+	if (state->keylen == 8) {
+		/* See RFC 3078 */
+		state->session_key[0] = 0xd1;
+		state->session_key[1] = 0x26;
+		state->session_key[2] = 0x9e;
+	}
+	crypto_blkcipher_setkey(state->arc4, state->session_key, state->keylen);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Allocate space for a (de)compressor.
+ */
+static void *mppe_alloc(unsigned char *options, int optlen)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state;
+	unsigned int digestsize;
+
+	if (optlen != CILEN_MPPE + sizeof(state->master_key) ||
+	    options[0] != CI_MPPE || options[1] != CILEN_MPPE)
+		goto out;
+
+	state = kzalloc(sizeof(*state), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (state == NULL)
+		goto out;
+
+
+	state->arc4 = crypto_alloc_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(state->arc4)) {
+		state->arc4 = NULL;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	state->sha1 = crypto_alloc_hash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC);
+	if (IS_ERR(state->sha1)) {
+		state->sha1 = NULL;
+		goto out_free;
+	}
+
+	digestsize = crypto_hash_digestsize(state->sha1);
+	if (digestsize < MPPE_MAX_KEY_LEN)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	state->sha1_digest = kmalloc(digestsize, GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!state->sha1_digest)
+		goto out_free;
+
+	/* Save keys. */
+	memcpy(state->master_key, &options[CILEN_MPPE],
+	       sizeof(state->master_key));
+	memcpy(state->session_key, state->master_key,
+	       sizeof(state->master_key));
+
+	/*
+	 * We defer initial key generation until mppe_init(), as mppe_alloc()
+	 * is called frequently during negotiation.
+	 */
+
+	return (void *)state;
+
+	out_free:
+	    if (state->sha1_digest)
+		kfree(state->sha1_digest);
+	    if (state->sha1)
+		crypto_free_hash(state->sha1);
+	    if (state->arc4)
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(state->arc4);
+	    kfree(state);
+	out:
+	return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Deallocate space for a (de)compressor.
+ */
+static void mppe_free(void *arg)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+	if (state) {
+	    if (state->sha1_digest)
+		kfree(state->sha1_digest);
+	    if (state->sha1)
+		crypto_free_hash(state->sha1);
+	    if (state->arc4)
+		crypto_free_blkcipher(state->arc4);
+	    kfree(state);
+	}
+}
+
+/*
+ * Initialize (de)compressor state.
+ */
+static int
+mppe_init(void *arg, unsigned char *options, int optlen, int unit, int debug,
+	  const char *debugstr)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+	unsigned char mppe_opts;
+
+	if (optlen != CILEN_MPPE ||
+	    options[0] != CI_MPPE || options[1] != CILEN_MPPE)
+		return 0;
+
+	MPPE_CI_TO_OPTS(&options[2], mppe_opts);
+	if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_128)
+		state->keylen = 16;
+	else if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_40)
+		state->keylen = 8;
+	else {
+		printk(KERN_WARNING "%s[%d]: unknown key length\n", debugstr,
+		       unit);
+		return 0;
+	}
+	if (mppe_opts & MPPE_OPT_STATEFUL)
+		state->stateful = 1;
+
+	/* Generate the initial session key. */
+	mppe_rekey(state, 1);
+
+	if (debug) {
+		int i;
+		char mkey[sizeof(state->master_key) * 2 + 1];
+		char skey[sizeof(state->session_key) * 2 + 1];
+
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "%s[%d]: initialized with %d-bit %s mode\n",
+		       debugstr, unit, (state->keylen == 16) ? 128 : 40,
+		       (state->stateful) ? "stateful" : "stateless");
+
+		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(state->master_key); i++)
+			sprintf(mkey + i * 2, "%02x", state->master_key[i]);
+		for (i = 0; i < sizeof(state->session_key); i++)
+			sprintf(skey + i * 2, "%02x", state->session_key[i]);
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG
+		       "%s[%d]: keys: master: %s initial session: %s\n",
+		       debugstr, unit, mkey, skey);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Initialize the coherency count.  The initial value is not specified
+	 * in RFC 3078, but we can make a reasonable assumption that it will
+	 * start at 0.  Setting it to the max here makes the comp/decomp code
+	 * do the right thing (determined through experiment).
+	 */
+	state->ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE - 1;
+
+	/*
+	 * Note that even though we have initialized the key table, we don't
+	 * set the FLUSHED bit.  This is contrary to RFC 3078, sec. 3.1.
+	 */
+	state->bits = MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED;
+
+	state->unit = unit;
+	state->debug = debug;
+
+	return 1;
+}
+
+static int
+mppe_comp_init(void *arg, unsigned char *options, int optlen, int unit,
+	       int hdrlen, int debug)
+{
+	/* ARGSUSED */
+	return mppe_init(arg, options, optlen, unit, debug, "mppe_comp_init");
+}
+
+/*
+ * We received a CCP Reset-Request (actually, we are sending a Reset-Ack),
+ * tell the compressor to rekey.  Note that we MUST NOT rekey for
+ * every CCP Reset-Request; we only rekey on the next xmit packet.
+ * We might get multiple CCP Reset-Requests if our CCP Reset-Ack is lost.
+ * So, rekeying for every CCP Reset-Request is broken as the peer will not
+ * know how many times we've rekeyed.  (If we rekey and THEN get another
+ * CCP Reset-Request, we must rekey again.)
+ */
+static void mppe_comp_reset(void *arg)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+
+	state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Compress (encrypt) a packet.
+ * It's strange to call this a compressor, since the output is always
+ * MPPE_OVHD + 2 bytes larger than the input.
+ */
+static int
+mppe_compress(void *arg, unsigned char *ibuf, unsigned char *obuf,
+	      int isize, int osize)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = state->arc4 };
+	int proto;
+	struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[1];
+
+	/*
+	 * Check that the protocol is in the range we handle.
+	 */
+	proto = PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf);
+	if (proto < 0x0021 || proto > 0x00fa)
+		return 0;
+
+	/* Make sure we have enough room to generate an encrypted packet. */
+	if (osize < isize + MPPE_OVHD + 2) {
+		/* Drop the packet if we should encrypt it, but can't. */
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_compress[%d]: osize too small! "
+		       "(have: %d need: %d)\n", state->unit,
+		       osize, osize + MPPE_OVHD + 2);
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	osize = isize + MPPE_OVHD + 2;
+
+	/*
+	 * Copy over the PPP header and set control bits.
+	 */
+	obuf[0] = PPP_ADDRESS(ibuf);
+	obuf[1] = PPP_CONTROL(ibuf);
+	put_unaligned_be16(PPP_COMP, obuf + 2);
+	obuf += PPP_HDRLEN;
+
+	state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
+	if (state->debug >= 7)
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_compress[%d]: ccount %d\n", state->unit,
+		       state->ccount);
+	put_unaligned_be16(state->ccount, obuf);
+
+	if (!state->stateful ||	/* stateless mode     */
+	    ((state->ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) ||	/* "flag" packet      */
+	    (state->bits & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED)) {	/* CCP Reset-Request  */
+		/* We must rekey */
+		if (state->debug && state->stateful)
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_compress[%d]: rekeying\n",
+			       state->unit);
+		mppe_rekey(state, 0);
+		state->bits |= MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;
+	}
+	obuf[0] |= state->bits;
+	state->bits &= ~MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;	/* reset for next xmit */
+
+	obuf += MPPE_OVHD;
+	ibuf += 2;		/* skip to proto field */
+	isize -= 2;
+
+	/* Encrypt packet */
+	sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
+	sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
+	setup_sg(sg_in, ibuf, isize);
+	setup_sg(sg_out, obuf, osize);
+	if (crypto_blkcipher_encrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, isize) != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto_cypher_encrypt failed\n");
+		return -1;
+	}
+
+	state->stats.unc_bytes += isize;
+	state->stats.unc_packets++;
+	state->stats.comp_bytes += osize;
+	state->stats.comp_packets++;
+
+	return osize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Since every frame grows by MPPE_OVHD + 2 bytes, this is always going
+ * to look bad ... and the longer the link is up the worse it will get.
+ */
+static void mppe_comp_stats(void *arg, struct compstat *stats)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+
+	*stats = state->stats;
+}
+
+static int
+mppe_decomp_init(void *arg, unsigned char *options, int optlen, int unit,
+		 int hdrlen, int mru, int debug)
+{
+	/* ARGSUSED */
+	return mppe_init(arg, options, optlen, unit, debug, "mppe_decomp_init");
+}
+
+/*
+ * We received a CCP Reset-Ack.  Just ignore it.
+ */
+static void mppe_decomp_reset(void *arg)
+{
+	/* ARGSUSED */
+	return;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Decompress (decrypt) an MPPE packet.
+ */
+static int
+mppe_decompress(void *arg, unsigned char *ibuf, int isize, unsigned char *obuf,
+		int osize)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+	struct blkcipher_desc desc = { .tfm = state->arc4 };
+	unsigned ccount;
+	int flushed = MPPE_BITS(ibuf) & MPPE_BIT_FLUSHED;
+	int sanity = 0;
+	struct scatterlist sg_in[1], sg_out[1];
+
+	if (isize <= PPP_HDRLEN + MPPE_OVHD) {
+		if (state->debug)
+			printk(KERN_DEBUG
+			       "mppe_decompress[%d]: short pkt (%d)\n",
+			       state->unit, isize);
+		return DECOMP_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Make sure we have enough room to decrypt the packet.
+	 * Note that for our test we only subtract 1 byte whereas in
+	 * mppe_compress() we added 2 bytes (+MPPE_OVHD);
+	 * this is to account for possible PFC.
+	 */
+	if (osize < isize - MPPE_OVHD - 1) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: osize too small! "
+		       "(have: %d need: %d)\n", state->unit,
+		       osize, isize - MPPE_OVHD - 1);
+		return DECOMP_ERROR;
+	}
+	osize = isize - MPPE_OVHD - 2;	/* assume no PFC */
+
+	ccount = MPPE_CCOUNT(ibuf);
+	if (state->debug >= 7)
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: ccount %d\n",
+		       state->unit, ccount);
+
+	/* sanity checks -- terminate with extreme prejudice */
+	if (!(MPPE_BITS(ibuf) & MPPE_BIT_ENCRYPTED)) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG
+		       "mppe_decompress[%d]: ENCRYPTED bit not set!\n",
+		       state->unit);
+		state->sanity_errors += 100;
+		sanity = 1;
+	}
+	if (!state->stateful && !flushed) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set in "
+		       "stateless mode!\n", state->unit);
+		state->sanity_errors += 100;
+		sanity = 1;
+	}
+	if (state->stateful && ((ccount & 0xff) == 0xff) && !flushed) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "mppe_decompress[%d]: FLUSHED bit not set on "
+		       "flag packet!\n", state->unit);
+		state->sanity_errors += 100;
+		sanity = 1;
+	}
+
+	if (sanity) {
+		if (state->sanity_errors < SANITY_MAX)
+			return DECOMP_ERROR;
+		else
+			/*
+			 * Take LCP down if the peer is sending too many bogons.
+			 * We don't want to do this for a single or just a few
+			 * instances since it could just be due to packet corruption.
+			 */
+			return DECOMP_FATALERROR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Check the coherency count.
+	 */
+
+	if (!state->stateful) {
+		/* RFC 3078, sec 8.1.  Rekey for every packet. */
+		while (state->ccount != ccount) {
+			mppe_rekey(state, 0);
+			state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
+		}
+	} else {
+		/* RFC 3078, sec 8.2. */
+		if (!state->discard) {
+			/* normal state */
+			state->ccount = (state->ccount + 1) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
+			if (ccount != state->ccount) {
+				/*
+				 * (ccount > state->ccount)
+				 * Packet loss detected, enter the discard state.
+				 * Signal the peer to rekey (by sending a CCP Reset-Request).
+				 */
+				state->discard = 1;
+				return DECOMP_ERROR;
+			}
+		} else {
+			/* discard state */
+			if (!flushed) {
+				/* ccp.c will be silent (no additional CCP Reset-Requests). */
+				return DECOMP_ERROR;
+			} else {
+				/* Rekey for every missed "flag" packet. */
+				while ((ccount & ~0xff) !=
+				       (state->ccount & ~0xff)) {
+					mppe_rekey(state, 0);
+					state->ccount =
+					    (state->ccount +
+					     256) % MPPE_CCOUNT_SPACE;
+				}
+
+				/* reset */
+				state->discard = 0;
+				state->ccount = ccount;
+				/*
+				 * Another problem with RFC 3078 here.  It implies that the
+				 * peer need not send a Reset-Ack packet.  But RFC 1962
+				 * requires it.  Hopefully, M$ does send a Reset-Ack; even
+				 * though it isn't required for MPPE synchronization, it is
+				 * required to reset CCP state.
+				 */
+			}
+		}
+		if (flushed)
+			mppe_rekey(state, 0);
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Fill in the first part of the PPP header.  The protocol field
+	 * comes from the decrypted data.
+	 */
+	obuf[0] = PPP_ADDRESS(ibuf);	/* +1 */
+	obuf[1] = PPP_CONTROL(ibuf);	/* +1 */
+	obuf += 2;
+	ibuf += PPP_HDRLEN + MPPE_OVHD;
+	isize -= PPP_HDRLEN + MPPE_OVHD;	/* -6 */
+	/* net osize: isize-4 */
+
+	/*
+	 * Decrypt the first byte in order to check if it is
+	 * a compressed or uncompressed protocol field.
+	 */
+	sg_init_table(sg_in, 1);
+	sg_init_table(sg_out, 1);
+	setup_sg(sg_in, ibuf, 1);
+	setup_sg(sg_out, obuf, 1);
+	if (crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, 1) != 0) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto_cypher_decrypt failed\n");
+		return DECOMP_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	/*
+	 * Do PFC decompression.
+	 * This would be nicer if we were given the actual sk_buff
+	 * instead of a char *.
+	 */
+	if ((obuf[0] & 0x01) != 0) {
+		obuf[1] = obuf[0];
+		obuf[0] = 0;
+		obuf++;
+		osize++;
+	}
+
+	/* And finally, decrypt the rest of the packet. */
+	setup_sg(sg_in, ibuf + 1, isize - 1);
+	setup_sg(sg_out, obuf + 1, osize - 1);
+	if (crypto_blkcipher_decrypt(&desc, sg_out, sg_in, isize - 1)) {
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG "crypto_cypher_decrypt failed\n");
+		return DECOMP_ERROR;
+	}
+
+	state->stats.unc_bytes += osize;
+	state->stats.unc_packets++;
+	state->stats.comp_bytes += isize;
+	state->stats.comp_packets++;
+
+	/* good packet credit */
+	state->sanity_errors >>= 1;
+
+	return osize;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Incompressible data has arrived (this should never happen!).
+ * We should probably drop the link if the protocol is in the range
+ * of what should be encrypted.  At the least, we should drop this
+ * packet.  (How to do this?)
+ */
+static void mppe_incomp(void *arg, unsigned char *ibuf, int icnt)
+{
+	struct ppp_mppe_state *state = (struct ppp_mppe_state *) arg;
+
+	if (state->debug &&
+	    (PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf) >= 0x0021 && PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf) <= 0x00fa))
+		printk(KERN_DEBUG
+		       "mppe_incomp[%d]: incompressible (unencrypted) data! "
+		       "(proto %04x)\n", state->unit, PPP_PROTOCOL(ibuf));
+
+	state->stats.inc_bytes += icnt;
+	state->stats.inc_packets++;
+	state->stats.unc_bytes += icnt;
+	state->stats.unc_packets++;
+}
+
+/*************************************************************
+ * Module interface table
+ *************************************************************/
+
+/*
+ * Procedures exported to if_ppp.c.
+ */
+static struct compressor ppp_mppe = {
+	.compress_proto = CI_MPPE,
+	.comp_alloc     = mppe_alloc,
+	.comp_free      = mppe_free,
+	.comp_init      = mppe_comp_init,
+	.comp_reset     = mppe_comp_reset,
+	.compress       = mppe_compress,
+	.comp_stat      = mppe_comp_stats,
+	.decomp_alloc   = mppe_alloc,
+	.decomp_free    = mppe_free,
+	.decomp_init    = mppe_decomp_init,
+	.decomp_reset   = mppe_decomp_reset,
+	.decompress     = mppe_decompress,
+	.incomp         = mppe_incomp,
+	.decomp_stat    = mppe_comp_stats,
+	.owner          = THIS_MODULE,
+	.comp_extra     = MPPE_PAD,
+};
+
+/*
+ * ppp_mppe_init()
+ *
+ * Prior to allowing load, try to load the arc4 and sha1 crypto
+ * libraries.  The actual use will be allocated later, but
+ * this way the module will fail to insmod if they aren't available.
+ */
+
+static int __init ppp_mppe_init(void)
+{
+	int answer;
+	if (!(crypto_has_blkcipher("ecb(arc4)", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC) &&
+	      crypto_has_hash("sha1", 0, CRYPTO_ALG_ASYNC)))
+		return -ENODEV;
+
+	sha_pad = kmalloc(sizeof(struct sha_pad), GFP_KERNEL);
+	if (!sha_pad)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+	sha_pad_init(sha_pad);
+
+	answer = ppp_register_compressor(&ppp_mppe);
+
+	if (answer == 0)
+		printk(KERN_INFO "PPP MPPE Compression module registered\n");
+	else
+		kfree(sha_pad);
+
+	return answer;
+}
+
+static void __exit ppp_mppe_cleanup(void)
+{
+	ppp_unregister_compressor(&ppp_mppe);
+	kfree(sha_pad);
+}
+
+module_init(ppp_mppe_init);
+module_exit(ppp_mppe_cleanup);