cxl/region: Manage CPU caches relative to DPA invalidation events

A "DPA invalidation event" is any scenario where the contents of a DPA
(Device Physical Address) is modified in a way that is incoherent with
CPU caches, or if the HPA (Host Physical Address) to DPA association
changes due to a remapping event.

PMEM security events like Unlock and Passphrase Secure Erase already
manage caches through LIBNVDIMM, so that leaves HPA to DPA remap events
that need cache management by the CXL core. Those only happen when the
boot time CXL configuration has changed. That event occurs when
userspace attaches an endpoint decoder to a region configuration, and
that region is subsequently activated.

The implications of not invalidating caches between remap events is that
reads from the region at different points in time may return different
results due to stale cached data from the previous HPA to DPA mapping.
Without a guarantee that the region contents after cxl_region_probe()
are written before being read (a layering-violation assumption that
cxl_region_probe() can not make) the CXL subsystem needs to ensure that
reads that precede writes see consistent results.

A CONFIG_CXL_REGION_INVALIDATION_TEST option is added to support debug
and unit testing of the CXL implementation in QEMU or other environments
where cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion() returns false. This may prove
too restrictive for QEMU where the HDM decoders are emulated, but in
that case the CXL subsystem needs some new mechanism / indication that
the HDM decoder is emulated and not a passthrough of real hardware.

Reviewed-by: Dave Jiang <dave.jiang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/166993222098.1995348.16604163596374520890.stgit@dwillia2-xfh.jf.intel.com
Signed-off-by: Dan Williams <dan.j.williams@intel.com>

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 14 deletions

diff --git a/drivers/cxl/security.c b/drivers/cxl/security.c
index cbd005ceb091..5484d4eecfd1 100644
--- a/drivers/cxl/security.c
+++ b/drivers/cxl/security.c
@@ -120,17 +120,12 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_unlock(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
 	u8 pass[NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN];
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	memcpy(pass, key_data->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
 	rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_UNLOCK,
 			       pass, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN, NULL, 0);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	/* DIMM unlocked, invalidate all CPU caches before we read it */
-	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -144,21 +139,14 @@ static int cxl_pmem_security_passphrase_erase(struct nvdimm *nvdimm,
 	struct cxl_pass_erase erase;
 	int rc;
 
-	if (!cpu_cache_has_invalidate_memregion())
-		return -EINVAL;
-
 	erase.type = ptype == NVDIMM_MASTER ?
 		CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_MASTER : CXL_PMEM_SEC_PASS_USER;
 	memcpy(erase.pass, key->data, NVDIMM_PASSPHRASE_LEN);
-	/* Flush all cache before we erase mem device */
-	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
 	rc = cxl_mbox_send_cmd(cxlds, CXL_MBOX_OP_PASSPHRASE_SECURE_ERASE,
 			       &erase, sizeof(erase), NULL, 0);
 	if (rc < 0)
 		return rc;
 
-	/* mem device erased, invalidate all CPU caches before data is read */
-	cpu_cache_invalidate_memregion(IORES_DESC_PERSISTENT_MEMORY);
 	return 0;
 }
 
@@ -173,5 +161,3 @@ static const struct nvdimm_security_ops __cxl_security_ops = {
 };
 
 const struct nvdimm_security_ops *cxl_security_ops = &__cxl_security_ops;
-
-MODULE_IMPORT_NS(DEVMEM);