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author | Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> | 2018-10-09 19:48:58 +0300 |
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committer | James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 2018-10-26 11:30:47 +0300 |
commit | 0c36264aa1d5b77eb21f646f83223134e4528cfe (patch) | |
tree | a6415d4abbaffbd4aa103f51616db71560cf9d3f /crypto | |
parent | 22447981fc050b5f1bdd0e7cbee89b4152a2b2d8 (diff) | |
download | linux-0c36264aa1d5b77eb21f646f83223134e4528cfe.tar.xz |
KEYS: asym_tpm: Add loadkey2 and flushspecific [ver #2]
This commit adds TPM_LoadKey2 and TPM_FlushSpecific operations.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 94 |
1 files changed, 94 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 8edca3c4c193..6a2d33014ecc 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -7,11 +7,105 @@ #include <linux/seq_file.h> #include <linux/scatterlist.h> #include <linux/tpm.h> +#include <linux/tpm_command.h> #include <crypto/akcipher.h> +#include <crypto/hash.h> +#include <crypto/sha.h> #include <asm/unaligned.h> #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> +#include <keys/trusted.h> #include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> +#define TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC 186 +#define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65 +#define TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE 59 +#define TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE 18 + +#define TPM_RT_KEY 0x00000001 + +/* + * Load a TPM key from the blob provided by userspace + */ +static int tpm_loadkey2(struct tpm_buf *tb, + uint32_t keyhandle, unsigned char *keyauth, + const unsigned char *keyblob, int keybloblen, + uint32_t *newhandle) +{ + unsigned char nonceodd[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char enonce[TPM_NONCE_SIZE]; + unsigned char authdata[SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE]; + uint32_t authhandle = 0; + unsigned char cont = 0; + uint32_t ordinal; + int ret; + + ordinal = htonl(TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2); + + /* session for loading the key */ + ret = oiap(tb, &authhandle, enonce); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("oiap failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* generate odd nonce */ + ret = tpm_get_random(NULL, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("tpm_get_random failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + /* calculate authorization HMAC value */ + ret = TSS_authhmac(authdata, keyauth, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, enonce, + nonceodd, cont, sizeof(uint32_t), &ordinal, + keybloblen, keyblob, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + /* build the request buffer */ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_AUTH1_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_LOADKEY2_SIZE + keybloblen); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2); + store32(tb, keyhandle); + storebytes(tb, keyblob, keybloblen); + store32(tb, authhandle); + storebytes(tb, nonceodd, TPM_NONCE_SIZE); + store8(tb, cont); + storebytes(tb, authdata, SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE); + + ret = trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("authhmac failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + ret = TSS_checkhmac1(tb->data, ordinal, nonceodd, keyauth, + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE, 0, 0); + if (ret < 0) { + pr_info("TSS_checkhmac1 failed (%d)\n", ret); + return ret; + } + + *newhandle = LOAD32(tb->data, TPM_DATA_OFFSET); + return 0; +} + +/* + * Execute the FlushSpecific TPM command + */ +static int tpm_flushspecific(struct tpm_buf *tb, uint32_t handle) +{ + INIT_BUF(tb); + store16(tb, TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND); + store32(tb, TPM_FLUSHSPECIFIC_SIZE); + store32(tb, TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC); + store32(tb, handle); + store32(tb, TPM_RT_KEY); + + return trusted_tpm_send(tb->data, MAX_BUF_SIZE); +} + /* * Maximum buffer size for the BER/DER encoded public key. The public key * is of the form SEQUENCE { INTEGER n, INTEGER e } where n is a maximum 2048 |