diff options
author | Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com> | 2018-10-09 19:49:20 +0300 |
---|---|---|
committer | James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com> | 2018-10-26 11:30:47 +0300 |
commit | e08e6891231f5fae82a6ffb4affdfa2ced8c1a77 (patch) | |
tree | 35766b02094256b30237bfd93656ced38faf11a4 /crypto/asymmetric_keys | |
parent | a335974ae0883e045151a2160093a22aa02c3626 (diff) | |
download | linux-e08e6891231f5fae82a6ffb4affdfa2ced8c1a77.tar.xz |
KEYS: asym_tpm: Implement signature verification [ver #2]
This patch implements the verify_signature operation. The public key
portion extracted from the TPM key blob is used. The operation is
performed entirely in software using the crypto API.
Signed-off-by: Denis Kenzior <denkenz@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Tested-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Reviewed-by: Marcel Holtmann <marcel@holtmann.org>
Signed-off-by: James Morris <james.morris@microsoft.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/asymmetric_keys')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c | 106 |
1 files changed, 100 insertions, 6 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c index 6f5d5cf98910..a38ba375675e 100644 --- a/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c +++ b/crypto/asymmetric_keys/asym_tpm.c @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ #include <keys/asymmetric-subtype.h> #include <keys/trusted.h> #include <crypto/asym_tpm_subtype.h> +#include <crypto/public_key.h> #define TPM_ORD_FLUSHSPECIFIC 186 #define TPM_ORD_LOADKEY2 65 @@ -286,12 +287,16 @@ static uint32_t derive_pub_key(const void *pub_key, uint32_t len, uint8_t *buf) static int determine_akcipher(const char *encoding, const char *hash_algo, char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]) { - /* TODO: We don't support hashing yet */ - if (hash_algo) - return -ENOPKG; - if (strcmp(encoding, "pkcs1") == 0) { - strcpy(alg_name, "pkcs1pad(rsa)"); + if (!hash_algo) { + strcpy(alg_name, "pkcs1pad(rsa)"); + return 0; + } + + if (snprintf(alg_name, CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME, "pkcs1pad(rsa,%s)", + hash_algo) >= CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME) + return -EINVAL; + return 0; } @@ -342,7 +347,8 @@ static int tpm_key_query(const struct kernel_pkey_params *params, info->max_dec_size = tk->key_len / 8; info->supported_ops = KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_ENCRYPT | - KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT; + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_DECRYPT | + KEYCTL_SUPPORTS_VERIFY; ret = 0; error_free_tfm: @@ -488,6 +494,93 @@ static int tpm_key_eds_op(struct kernel_pkey_params *params, } /* + * Verify a signature using a public key. + */ +static int tpm_key_verify_signature(const struct key *key, + const struct public_key_signature *sig) +{ + const struct tpm_key *tk = key->payload.data[asym_crypto]; + struct crypto_wait cwait; + struct crypto_akcipher *tfm; + struct akcipher_request *req; + struct scatterlist sig_sg, digest_sg; + char alg_name[CRYPTO_MAX_ALG_NAME]; + uint8_t der_pub_key[PUB_KEY_BUF_SIZE]; + uint32_t der_pub_key_len; + void *output; + unsigned int outlen; + int ret; + + pr_devel("==>%s()\n", __func__); + + BUG_ON(!tk); + BUG_ON(!sig); + BUG_ON(!sig->s); + + if (!sig->digest) + return -ENOPKG; + + ret = determine_akcipher(sig->encoding, sig->hash_algo, alg_name); + if (ret < 0) + return ret; + + tfm = crypto_alloc_akcipher(alg_name, 0, 0); + if (IS_ERR(tfm)) + return PTR_ERR(tfm); + + der_pub_key_len = derive_pub_key(tk->pub_key, tk->pub_key_len, + der_pub_key); + + ret = crypto_akcipher_set_pub_key(tfm, der_pub_key, der_pub_key_len); + if (ret < 0) + goto error_free_tfm; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + req = akcipher_request_alloc(tfm, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!req) + goto error_free_tfm; + + ret = -ENOMEM; + outlen = crypto_akcipher_maxsize(tfm); + output = kmalloc(outlen, GFP_KERNEL); + if (!output) + goto error_free_req; + + sg_init_one(&sig_sg, sig->s, sig->s_size); + sg_init_one(&digest_sg, output, outlen); + akcipher_request_set_crypt(req, &sig_sg, &digest_sg, sig->s_size, + outlen); + crypto_init_wait(&cwait); + akcipher_request_set_callback(req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG | + CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_SLEEP, + crypto_req_done, &cwait); + + /* Perform the verification calculation. This doesn't actually do the + * verification, but rather calculates the hash expected by the + * signature and returns that to us. + */ + ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_akcipher_verify(req), &cwait); + if (ret) + goto out_free_output; + + /* Do the actual verification step. */ + if (req->dst_len != sig->digest_size || + memcmp(sig->digest, output, sig->digest_size) != 0) + ret = -EKEYREJECTED; + +out_free_output: + kfree(output); +error_free_req: + akcipher_request_free(req); +error_free_tfm: + crypto_free_akcipher(tfm); + pr_devel("<==%s() = %d\n", __func__, ret); + if (WARN_ON_ONCE(ret > 0)) + ret = -EINVAL; + return ret; +} + +/* * Parse enough information out of TPM_KEY structure: * TPM_STRUCT_VER -> 4 bytes * TPM_KEY_USAGE -> 2 bytes @@ -645,6 +738,7 @@ struct asymmetric_key_subtype asym_tpm_subtype = { .destroy = asym_tpm_destroy, .query = tpm_key_query, .eds_op = tpm_key_eds_op, + .verify_signature = tpm_key_verify_signature, }; EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(asym_tpm_subtype); |