x86/KASLR: Extend kernel image physical address randomization to addresses larger than 4G

We want the physical address to be randomized anywhere between
16MB and the top of physical memory (up to 64TB).

This patch exchanges the prior slots[] array for the new slot_areas[]
array, and lifts the limitation of KERNEL_IMAGE_SIZE on the physical
address offset for 64-bit. As before, process_e820_entry() walks
memory and populates slot_areas[], splitting on any detected mem_avoid
collisions.

Finally, since the slots[] array and its associated functions are not
needed any more, so they are removed.

Based on earlier patches by Baoquan He.

Originally-from: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Cc: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Andrey Ryabinin <aryabinin@virtuozzo.com>
Cc: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org>
Cc: Baoquan He <bhe@redhat.com>
Cc: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: Brian Gerst <brgerst@gmail.com>
Cc: Denys Vlasenko <dvlasenk@redhat.com>
Cc: Dmitry Vyukov <dvyukov@google.com>
Cc: H. Peter Anvin <hpa@zytor.com>
Cc: H.J. Lu <hjl.tools@gmail.com>
Cc: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@redhat.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Cc: Yinghai Lu <yinghai@kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/1464216334-17200-5-git-send-email-keescook@chromium.org
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>

0 files changed, 0 insertions, 0 deletions