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| author | Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org> | 2024-04-11 08:40:48 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org> | 2024-04-11 11:30:33 +0300 |
| commit | 5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a (patch) | |
| tree | e81864ff7a59b1a389fd57280ddbcc0ddf2f3c84 /arch | |
| parent | 1cea8a280dfd1016148a3820676f2f03e3f5b898 (diff) | |
| download | linux-5f882f3b0a8bf0788d5a0ee44b1191de5319bb8a.tar.xz | |
x86/bugs: Clarify that syscall hardening isn't a BHI mitigation
While syscall hardening helps prevent some BHI attacks, there's still
other low-hanging fruit remaining. Don't classify it as a mitigation
and make it clear that the system may still be vulnerable if it doesn't
have a HW or SW mitigation enabled.
Fixes: ec9404e40e8f ("x86/bhi: Add BHI mitigation knob")
Signed-off-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/b5951dae3fdee7f1520d5136a27be3bdfe95f88b.1712813475.git.jpoimboe@kernel.org
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 |
1 files changed, 3 insertions, 3 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c index 08dfb94fcb3a..9eeb60f5fbb3 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c @@ -2818,10 +2818,10 @@ static const char *spectre_bhi_state(void) return "; BHI: SW loop, KVM: SW loop"; else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE) && rrsba_disabled) return "; BHI: Retpoline"; - else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) - return "; BHI: Syscall hardening, KVM: SW loop"; + else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP_ON_VMEXIT)) + return "; BHI: Vulnerable, KVM: SW loop"; - return "; BHI: Vulnerable (Syscall hardening enabled)"; + return "; BHI: Vulnerable"; } static ssize_t spectre_v2_show_state(char *buf) |