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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-01-27 23:02:00 +0300
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2019-01-27 23:02:00 +0300
commit8a5f06056a25ac7dbca2b0505cc0fe8ffb6947c1 (patch)
treed864baa3498f141ab7433c878390b50d7febcb98 /arch
parent351e1aa6cb4b136e3f772605071d7a8db3c5b4e0 (diff)
parent625210cfa6c0c26ea422f655bf68288176f174e6 (diff)
downloadlinux-8a5f06056a25ac7dbca2b0505cc0fe8ffb6947c1.tar.xz
Merge branch 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Thomas Gleixner: "A set of fixes for x86: - Fix the swapped outb() parameters in the KASLR code - Fix the PKEY handling at fork which missed to preserve the pkey state for the child. Comes with a test case to validate that. - Fix the entry stack handling for XEN PV to respect that XEN PV systems enter the function already on the current thread stack and not on the trampoline. - Fix kexec load failure caused by using a stale value when the kexec_buf structure is reused for subsequent allocations. - Fix a bogus sizeof() in the memory encryption code - Enforce PCI dependency for the Intel Low Power Subsystem - Enforce PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG when PCI is enabled" * 'x86-urgent-for-linus' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip: x86/Kconfig: Select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI is enabled x86/entry/64/compat: Fix stack switching for XEN PV x86/kexec: Fix a kexec_file_load() failure x86/mm/mem_encrypt: Fix erroneous sizeof() x86/selftests/pkeys: Fork() to check for state being preserved x86/pkeys: Properly copy pkey state at fork() x86/kaslr: Fix incorrect i8254 outb() parameters x86/intel/lpss: Make PCI dependency explicit
Diffstat (limited to 'arch')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/Kconfig2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S6
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h18
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/crash.c1
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c2
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c4
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c4
7 files changed, 30 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 4b4a7f32b68e..26387c7bf305 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ config X86
select IRQ_FORCED_THREADING
select NEED_SG_DMA_LENGTH
select PCI_DOMAINS if PCI
- select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG
+ select PCI_LOCKLESS_CONFIG if PCI
select PERF_EVENTS
select RTC_LIB
select RTC_MC146818_LIB
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
index 8eaf8952c408..39913770a44d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64_compat.S
@@ -361,7 +361,8 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
/* Need to switch before accessing the thread stack. */
SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg=%rdi
- movq %rsp, %rdi
+ /* In the Xen PV case we already run on the thread stack. */
+ ALTERNATIVE "movq %rsp, %rdi", "jmp .Lint80_keep_stack", X86_FEATURE_XENPV
movq PER_CPU_VAR(cpu_current_top_of_stack), %rsp
pushq 6*8(%rdi) /* regs->ss */
@@ -370,8 +371,9 @@ ENTRY(entry_INT80_compat)
pushq 3*8(%rdi) /* regs->cs */
pushq 2*8(%rdi) /* regs->ip */
pushq 1*8(%rdi) /* regs->orig_ax */
-
pushq (%rdi) /* pt_regs->di */
+.Lint80_keep_stack:
+
pushq %rsi /* pt_regs->si */
xorl %esi, %esi /* nospec si */
pushq %rdx /* pt_regs->dx */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
index 0ca50611e8ce..19d18fae6ec6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/mmu_context.h
@@ -178,6 +178,10 @@ static inline void switch_ldt(struct mm_struct *prev, struct mm_struct *next)
void enter_lazy_tlb(struct mm_struct *mm, struct task_struct *tsk);
+/*
+ * Init a new mm. Used on mm copies, like at fork()
+ * and on mm's that are brand-new, like at execve().
+ */
static inline int init_new_context(struct task_struct *tsk,
struct mm_struct *mm)
{
@@ -228,8 +232,22 @@ do { \
} while (0)
#endif
+static inline void arch_dup_pkeys(struct mm_struct *oldmm,
+ struct mm_struct *mm)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS
+ if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSPKE))
+ return;
+
+ /* Duplicate the oldmm pkey state in mm: */
+ mm->context.pkey_allocation_map = oldmm->context.pkey_allocation_map;
+ mm->context.execute_only_pkey = oldmm->context.execute_only_pkey;
+#endif
+}
+
static inline int arch_dup_mmap(struct mm_struct *oldmm, struct mm_struct *mm)
{
+ arch_dup_pkeys(oldmm, mm);
paravirt_arch_dup_mmap(oldmm, mm);
return ldt_dup_context(oldmm, mm);
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
index c8b07d8ea5a2..17ffc869cab8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/crash.c
@@ -470,6 +470,7 @@ int crash_load_segments(struct kimage *image)
kbuf.memsz = kbuf.bufsz;
kbuf.buf_align = ELF_CORE_HEADER_ALIGN;
+ kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret) {
vfree((void *)image->arch.elf_headers);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
index 278cd07228dd..0d5efa34f359 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kexec-bzimage64.c
@@ -434,6 +434,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
kbuf.memsz = PAGE_ALIGN(header->init_size);
kbuf.buf_align = header->kernel_alignment;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_KERNEL_LOAD_ADDR;
+ kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
@@ -448,6 +449,7 @@ static void *bzImage64_load(struct kimage *image, char *kernel,
kbuf.bufsz = kbuf.memsz = initrd_len;
kbuf.buf_align = PAGE_SIZE;
kbuf.buf_min = MIN_INITRD_LOAD_ADDR;
+ kbuf.mem = KEXEC_BUF_MEM_UNKNOWN;
ret = kexec_add_buffer(&kbuf);
if (ret)
goto out_free_params;
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
index 79778ab200e4..a53665116458 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/kaslr.c
@@ -36,8 +36,8 @@ static inline u16 i8254(void)
u16 status, timer;
do {
- outb(I8254_PORT_CONTROL,
- I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0);
+ outb(I8254_CMD_READBACK | I8254_SELECT_COUNTER0,
+ I8254_PORT_CONTROL);
status = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
timer = inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0);
timer |= inb(I8254_PORT_COUNTER0) << 8;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
index a19ef1a416ff..4aa9b1480866 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt_identity.c
@@ -158,8 +158,8 @@ static void __init sme_populate_pgd(struct sme_populate_pgd_data *ppd)
pmd = pmd_offset(pud, ppd->vaddr);
if (pmd_none(*pmd)) {
pte = ppd->pgtable_area;
- memset(pte, 0, sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
- ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
+ memset(pte, 0, sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE);
+ ppd->pgtable_area += sizeof(*pte) * PTRS_PER_PTE;
set_pmd(pmd, __pmd(PMD_FLAGS | __pa(pte)));
}