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authorPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2021-04-22 05:11:15 +0300
committerPaolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>2021-04-26 12:27:15 +0300
commitd9db0fd6c5c9fa7c9a462a2c54d5e91455a74fca (patch)
tree44ca9d2af91b6486a802b4f32d188f191f6b74e3 /arch/x86/kvm/svm
parente8126bdaf19400050a57a2c1662a22786b9426f1 (diff)
downloadlinux-d9db0fd6c5c9fa7c9a462a2c54d5e91455a74fca.tar.xz
KVM: SEV: Mask CPUID[0x8000001F].eax according to supported features
Add a reverse-CPUID entry for the memory encryption word, 0x8000001F.EAX, and use it to override the supported CPUID flags reported to userspace. Masking the reported CPUID flags avoids over-reporting KVM support, e.g. without the mask a SEV-SNP capable CPU may incorrectly advertise SNP support to userspace. Clear SEV/SEV-ES if their corresponding module parameters are disabled, and clear the memory encryption leaf completely if SEV is not fully supported in KVM. Advertise SME_COHERENT in addition to SEV and SEV-ES, as the guest can use SME_COHERENT to avoid CLFLUSH operations. Explicitly omit SME and VM_PAGE_FLUSH from the reporting. These features are used by KVM, but are not exposed to the guest, e.g. guest access to related MSRs will fault. Cc: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com> Cc: Brijesh Singh <brijesh.singh@amd.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com> Co-developed-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com> Message-Id: <20210422021125.3417167-6-seanjc@google.com> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kvm/svm')
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c8
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c3
-rw-r--r--arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h1
3 files changed, 12 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
index d7088a1d4de6..055aedec2f64 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c
@@ -1807,6 +1807,14 @@ void sev_vm_destroy(struct kvm *kvm)
sev_asid_free(sev);
}
+void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void)
+{
+ if (!sev)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV);
+ if (!sev_es)
+ kvm_cpu_cap_clear(X86_FEATURE_SEV_ES);
+}
+
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)
{
unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx, sev_asid_count, sev_es_asid_count;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index cbddcdb18d97..eed6f9455e1b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -923,6 +923,9 @@ static __init void svm_set_cpu_caps(void)
if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_LS_CFG_SSBD) ||
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_AMD_SSBD))
kvm_cpu_cap_set(X86_FEATURE_VIRT_SSBD);
+
+ /* CPUID 0x8000001F (SME/SEV features) */
+ sev_set_cpu_caps();
}
static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
index afc3166c9027..81894fd649bd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.h
@@ -575,6 +575,7 @@ int svm_unregister_enc_region(struct kvm *kvm,
struct kvm_enc_region *range);
int svm_vm_copy_asid_from(struct kvm *kvm, unsigned int source_fd);
void pre_sev_run(struct vcpu_svm *svm, int cpu);
+void __init sev_set_cpu_caps(void);
void __init sev_hardware_setup(void);
void sev_hardware_teardown(void);
void sev_free_vcpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu);