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| author | Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> | 2023-06-28 12:02:39 +0300 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> | 2023-07-27 12:07:14 +0300 |
| commit | fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855 (patch) | |
| tree | 7f5bfb82aa0ee0ce648eaf7ac79af55bdced1d9d /arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | |
| parent | 0e52740ffd10c6c316837c6c128f460f1aaba1ea (diff) | |
| download | linux-fb3bd914b3ec28f5fb697ac55c4846ac2d542855.tar.xz | |
x86/srso: Add a Speculative RAS Overflow mitigation
Add a mitigation for the speculative return address stack overflow
vulnerability found on AMD processors.
The mitigation works by ensuring all RET instructions speculate to
a controlled location, similar to how speculation is controlled in the
retpoline sequence. To accomplish this, the __x86_return_thunk forces
the CPU to mispredict every function return using a 'safe return'
sequence.
To ensure the safety of this mitigation, the kernel must ensure that the
safe return sequence is itself free from attacker interference. In Zen3
and Zen4, this is accomplished by creating a BTB alias between the
untraining function srso_untrain_ret_alias() and the safe return
function srso_safe_ret_alias() which results in evicting a potentially
poisoned BTB entry and using that safe one for all function returns.
In older Zen1 and Zen2, this is accomplished using a reinterpretation
technique similar to Retbleed one: srso_untrain_ret() and
srso_safe_ret().
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S')
| -rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 29 |
1 files changed, 27 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S index 03c885d3640f..e76813230192 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S @@ -134,13 +134,27 @@ SECTIONS SOFTIRQENTRY_TEXT #ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE __indirect_thunk_start = .; - *(.text.__x86.*) + *(.text.__x86.indirect_thunk) + *(.text.__x86.return_thunk) __indirect_thunk_end = .; #endif STATIC_CALL_TEXT ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_BEGIN +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + *(.text.__x86.rethunk_untrain) +#endif + ENTRY_TEXT + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO + /* + * See the comment above srso_untrain_ret_alias()'s + * definition. + */ + . = srso_untrain_ret_alias | (1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20); + *(.text.__x86.rethunk_safe) +#endif ALIGN_ENTRY_TEXT_END *(.gnu.warning) @@ -509,7 +523,18 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store); #endif #ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK -. = ASSERT((__x86_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "__x86_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned"); +. = ASSERT((__ret & 0x3f) == 0, "__ret not cacheline-aligned"); +. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned"); +#endif + +#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO +/* + * GNU ld cannot do XOR so do: (A | B) - (A & B) in order to compute the XOR + * of the two function addresses: + */ +. = ASSERT(((srso_untrain_ret_alias | srso_safe_ret_alias) - + (srso_untrain_ret_alias & srso_safe_ret_alias)) == ((1 << 2) | (1 << 8) | (1 << 14) | (1 << 20)), + "SRSO function pair won't alias"); #endif #endif /* CONFIG_X86_64 */ |