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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-03-14 22:48:10 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2021-03-14 22:48:10 +0300 |
commit | 0a7c10df49eb69dd888ea8b8ddd29bde2aa2fd48 (patch) | |
tree | 433e5a9f1252cea52ff4a5dac2ec4b9d8be09a34 /arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | |
parent | c3c7579f5e3b4826d32af0521e53d5d565ed5a73 (diff) | |
parent | bffe30dd9f1f3b2608a87ac909a224d6be472485 (diff) | |
download | linux-0a7c10df49eb69dd888ea8b8ddd29bde2aa2fd48.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.12_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip
Pull x86 fixes from Borislav Petkov:
- A couple of SEV-ES fixes and robustifications: verify usermode stack
pointer in NMI is not coming from the syscall gap, correctly track
IRQ states in the #VC handler and access user insn bytes atomically
in same handler as latter cannot sleep.
- Balance 32-bit fast syscall exit path to do the proper work on exit
and thus not confuse audit and ptrace frameworks.
- Two fixes for the ORC unwinder going "off the rails" into KASAN
redzones and when ORC data is missing.
* tag 'x86_urgent_for_v5.12_rc3' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/tip/tip:
x86/sev-es: Use __copy_from_user_inatomic()
x86/sev-es: Correctly track IRQ states in runtime #VC handler
x86/sev-es: Check regs->sp is trusted before adjusting #VC IST stack
x86/sev-es: Introduce ip_within_syscall_gap() helper
x86/entry: Fix entry/exit mismatch on failed fast 32-bit syscalls
x86/unwind/orc: Silence warnings caused by missing ORC data
x86/unwind/orc: Disable KASAN checking in the ORC unwinder, part 2
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c | 14 |
1 files changed, 7 insertions, 7 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c index 2a1d47f47eee..a1202536fc57 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/unwind_orc.c @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ #define orc_warn_current(args...) \ ({ \ - if (state->task == current) \ + if (state->task == current && !state->error) \ orc_warn(args); \ }) @@ -367,8 +367,8 @@ static bool deref_stack_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr, if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, sizeof(struct pt_regs))) return false; - *ip = regs->ip; - *sp = regs->sp; + *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip); + *sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->sp); return true; } @@ -380,8 +380,8 @@ static bool deref_stack_iret_regs(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned long addr if (!stack_access_ok(state, addr, IRET_FRAME_SIZE)) return false; - *ip = regs->ip; - *sp = regs->sp; + *ip = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->ip); + *sp = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(regs->sp); return true; } @@ -402,12 +402,12 @@ static bool get_reg(struct unwind_state *state, unsigned int reg_off, return false; if (state->full_regs) { - *val = ((unsigned long *)state->regs)[reg]; + *val = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)state->regs)[reg]); return true; } if (state->prev_regs) { - *val = ((unsigned long *)state->prev_regs)[reg]; + *val = READ_ONCE_NOCHECK(((unsigned long *)state->prev_regs)[reg]); return true; } |