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author | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-12-13 04:28:58 +0300 |
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committer | Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org> | 2022-12-13 04:28:58 +0300 |
commit | 8702f2c611bf124c48b21b5c57bfc156cd11f4ca (patch) | |
tree | 00ea3dbf1acfd58d01fceebca41e11a6f9a6a943 /arch/powerpc | |
parent | a7cacfb0688e3988660e90fad7017cc9a18ab390 (diff) | |
parent | 12b677f2c697d61e5ddbcb6c1650050a39392f54 (diff) | |
download | linux-8702f2c611bf124c48b21b5c57bfc156cd11f4ca.tar.xz |
Merge tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2022-12-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm
Pull non-MM updates from Andrew Morton:
- A ptrace API cleanup series from Sergey Shtylyov
- Fixes and cleanups for kexec from ye xingchen
- nilfs2 updates from Ryusuke Konishi
- squashfs feature work from Xiaoming Ni: permit configuration of the
filesystem's compression concurrency from the mount command line
- A series from Akinobu Mita which addresses bound checking errors when
writing to debugfs files
- A series from Yang Yingliang to address rapidio memory leaks
- A series from Zheng Yejian to address possible overflow errors in
encode_comp_t()
- And a whole shower of singleton patches all over the place
* tag 'mm-nonmm-stable-2022-12-12' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/akpm/mm: (79 commits)
ipc: fix memory leak in init_mqueue_fs()
hfsplus: fix bug causing custom uid and gid being unable to be assigned with mount
rapidio: devices: fix missing put_device in mport_cdev_open
kcov: fix spelling typos in comments
hfs: Fix OOB Write in hfs_asc2mac
hfs: fix OOB Read in __hfs_brec_find
relay: fix type mismatch when allocating memory in relay_create_buf()
ocfs2: always read both high and low parts of dinode link count
io-mapping: move some code within the include guarded section
kernel: kcsan: kcsan_test: build without structleak plugin
mailmap: update email for Iskren Chernev
eventfd: change int to __u64 in eventfd_signal() ifndef CONFIG_EVENTFD
rapidio: fix possible UAF when kfifo_alloc() fails
relay: use strscpy() is more robust and safer
cpumask: limit visibility of FORCE_NR_CPUS
acct: fix potential integer overflow in encode_comp_t()
acct: fix accuracy loss for input value of encode_comp_t()
linux/init.h: include <linux/build_bug.h> and <linux/stringify.h>
rapidio: rio: fix possible name leak in rio_register_mport()
rapidio: fix possible name leaks when rio_add_device() fails
...
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/powerpc')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-tm.c | 10 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c | 15 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c | 8 |
4 files changed, 18 insertions, 17 deletions
diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-tm.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-tm.c index 44045363a903..210ea834e603 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-tm.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-tm.c @@ -170,9 +170,9 @@ int tm_cgpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg)); if (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1 < PT_TRAP && !ret) - ret = user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, - (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg), - PT_TRAP * sizeof(reg)); + user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, + (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg), + PT_TRAP * sizeof(reg)); if (!ret && count > 0) { ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, ®, @@ -183,8 +183,8 @@ int tm_cgpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, } if (!ret) - ret = user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, - (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1); + user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, + (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1); return ret; } diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c index 076d867412c7..2087a785f05f 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kernel/ptrace/ptrace-view.c @@ -267,9 +267,9 @@ static int gpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg)); if (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1 < PT_TRAP && !ret) - ret = user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, - (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg), - PT_TRAP * sizeof(reg)); + user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, + (PT_MAX_PUT_REG + 1) * sizeof(reg), + PT_TRAP * sizeof(reg)); if (!ret && count > 0) { ret = user_regset_copyin(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, ®, @@ -280,8 +280,8 @@ static int gpr_set(struct task_struct *target, const struct user_regset *regset, } if (!ret) - ret = user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, - (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1); + user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, + (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1); return ret; } @@ -706,8 +706,9 @@ int gpr32_set_common(struct task_struct *target, ubuf = u; pos *= sizeof(reg); count *= sizeof(reg); - return user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, - (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1); + user_regset_copyin_ignore(&pos, &count, &kbuf, &ubuf, + (PT_TRAP + 1) * sizeof(reg), -1); + return 0; Efault: user_read_access_end(); diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c index 349a781cea0b..60e12b716d3c 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/file_load_64.c @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ struct umem_info { /* usable memory ranges to look up */ unsigned int nr_ranges; - const struct crash_mem_range *ranges; + const struct range *ranges; }; const struct kexec_file_ops * const kexec_file_loaders[] = { diff --git a/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c b/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c index 563e9989a5bf..5fc53a5fcfdf 100644 --- a/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c +++ b/arch/powerpc/kexec/ranges.c @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static inline unsigned int get_max_nr_ranges(size_t size) { return ((size - sizeof(struct crash_mem)) / - sizeof(struct crash_mem_range)); + sizeof(struct range)); } /** @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ static inline size_t get_mem_rngs_size(struct crash_mem *mem_rngs) return 0; size = (sizeof(struct crash_mem) + - (mem_rngs->max_nr_ranges * sizeof(struct crash_mem_range))); + (mem_rngs->max_nr_ranges * sizeof(struct range))); /* * Memory is allocated in size multiple of MEM_RANGE_CHUNK_SZ. @@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ static int __add_mem_range(struct crash_mem **mem_ranges, u64 base, u64 size) */ static void __merge_memory_ranges(struct crash_mem *mem_rngs) { - struct crash_mem_range *ranges; + struct range *ranges; int i, idx; if (!mem_rngs) @@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ static void __merge_memory_ranges(struct crash_mem *mem_rngs) /* cmp_func_t callback to sort ranges with sort() */ static int rngcmp(const void *_x, const void *_y) { - const struct crash_mem_range *x = _x, *y = _y; + const struct range *x = _x, *y = _y; if (x->start > y->start) return 1; |